Can the Religious Be Trusted?

[BigMike]

This is the Chomsky lecture I was alluding to. I think you might find it very fascinating. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5in5EdjhD0&t=24s

I'll be interested in hearing your response to it.

Chomsky's lecture, fascinating and nuanced as it is, does not contradict determinism in any way. He delves into the limits of human cognition and the historical development of scientific understanding, but these topics align seamlessly with a deterministic framework. Here's why:

Chomsky acknowledges that humans, like all biological organisms, have cognitive constraints shaped by evolution. This directly supports the deterministic view that our mental faculties are the result of physical processes—biological evolution and neurological architecture.

His reference to Newton and the "limits of intelligibility" reflects the acknowledgment that human comprehension has boundaries. These boundaries are not a rejection of determinism but a recognition that our deterministic brains have evolved within specific parameters. Determinism doesn't promise omniscience; it describes how processes unfold within a causal framework.

Even the idea of "mysteries" that are beyond human understanding fits into determinism. Mysteries are simply phenomena that exceed the explanatory power of our current neural and intellectual capabilities, all of which are causally determined by our evolutionary history, culture, and education.

Chomsky’s mention of quantum mechanics and "spooky action at a distance" doesn’t challenge determinism either. Quantum phenomena operate under deterministic or probabilistic laws of physics, depending on interpretation, but they remain governed by well-defined principles. Quantum indeterminacy is not a loophole for free will or metaphysical entities—it’s simply a different kind of determinism, one that incorporates probability.

Chomsky's overall argument points to the humility required in scientific exploration, acknowledging that there are limits to what our deterministic cognitive apparatus can achieve. None of this undermines the deterministic view; rather, it complements it by situating human understanding within the scope of our evolved capacities.

If anything in the lecture seems to contradict determinism, it would have to rely on specific mechanisms or principles that show causation being violated. Chomsky does not provide such mechanisms; instead, he reinforces the idea that our knowledge and understanding, while vast, are inherently bounded by deterministic processes.

[BigMike]

Chomsky's overarching argument highlights the importance of humility in scientific exploration, recognizing the limits of human cognition and the mysteries that may forever elude our understanding. This humility is a vital part of intellectual honesty—it keeps us grounded and prevents overconfidence in our ability to explain everything. However, this perspective carries a potential danger, especially when applied in a religious or metaphysical context. Taken too far, such humility can lead to a paralyzing skepticism about even our most basic understandings of the world.

Consider an extreme scenario: imagine encountering a horrifying crime—an elderly man assaulting a young girl. To step back and refrain from acting because one assumes that a divine purpose may justify such an atrocity is not humility; it’s moral abdication. This hypothetical underscores the peril of surrendering our reasoning and ethical instincts to an unknowable “higher plan.” If we start doubting our ability to discern right from wrong in even the most egregious situations, we risk losing the moral foundation that guides our actions.

The problem arises when humility becomes a form of intellectual and ethical nihilism, where all judgment is suspended because we claim our reasoning is too limited to grasp the full picture. But this undermines the very tools—logic, reason, and moral intuition—that enable us to navigate the world and make meaningful decisions. Without trusting these faculties, we’re left adrift, with no reliable foundation upon which to act or form coherent judgments.

True humility acknowledges the limits of human understanding but also recognizes that within those limits, we possess valuable tools for engaging with the world. To doubt everything, even what is demonstrably clear to us, is not humility; it’s a surrender to confusion and inaction. If we cannot rely on our own reasoning and logic to address the challenges we encounter, what is left to guide us? At some point, humility must give way to action, especially in situations where the stakes—ethical, practical, or otherwise—demand it.

[BigMike]

Do I believe computers can "feel pain" or experience the "pleasantness" of color? Not in the same way humans do. Pain and qualia—our subjective experiences—are emergent properties of highly complex neural networks shaped by evolution to ensure survival and reproduction. A computer processes information, but it doesn't have the biological apparatus or evolutionary history that gives rise to the subjective experience we call "pain" or the aesthetic response to color. That doesn’t mean these processes are outside the realm of physical explanation; it just means the mechanisms are far more intricate than anything we've replicated artificially.

However, and extending the facts that you establish (that are being established) about the material basis of intelligence, it is logically inevitable that artificial intelligence can achieve that awareness that the human brain exhibits. It would, I gather, “emerge” at one moment or another.

(Chomsky’s interesting views on AI).

My personal, admittedly 'unscientific' view is that consciousness evolved as an extension of survival mechanisms, beginning with the first self-replicating molecules and later self-replicating cells. These early forms of life developed instincts and mechanisms aimed at survival and reproduction, which, over billions of years, became increasingly complex. Consciousness, in this framework, is an emergent property of this evolution—a way for organisms to navigate their environments and fulfill needs, much like those outlined in something akin to Maslow's hierarchy. At its core, consciousness could be seen as the ultimate tool for survival, enabling beings to perceive, reflect, and respond to the challenges of existence.

Furthermore, consciousness may have been essential for the development of communication among individuals within a tribe or kin group. The ability to share information about threats, resources, or social hierarchies could have significantly increased the chances of survival for a community. Emotional awareness and empathy, key aspects of consciousness, would have played a critical role in fostering cooperation and cohesion within the group. These traits enabled early humans to form alliances, warn one another of dangers, and collectively strategize for survival, giving tribes with higher levels of communication and social awareness a distinct advantage.

This, however, is where the comparison to artificial intelligence breaks down. Current AI, no matter how sophisticated, lacks the evolutionary context that gave rise to consciousness in living organisms. It doesn’t "struggle" to survive, it doesn’t "need" anything in the biological sense, and it certainly doesn’t face the existential pressures that shaped the human mind. While AI can mimic intelligent behavior and even adapt to tasks, the lack of these underlying survival-driven processes means it operates fundamentally differently from biological consciousness.

That said, who knows what the future holds? The nature of consciousness remains one of the great mysteries, and our understanding of it is far from complete. Perhaps as we push the boundaries of AI development, we may stumble upon mechanisms or structures that lead to emergent properties akin to consciousness. But until we better understand our own minds, any prediction about AI consciousness remains, at best, speculative.

[promethean75]

Indeed, it seems to me that the final returns you get for being conscious is an awareness of the world of shit you and everyone else is in. The consciousness in a fully developed frontal cortex that produces a decent IQ. This consciousness will be intelligent enough to recognize and know that the situation is pretty bad. The question is, when were the first official nihilists? Was there a homonihilictus species? Did man 'grasp' the meaning of his mortality, of a godless universe, of relative morals, of conflicting Biggsean goods and political economies? Were there Schopenhauereans 80,000 years ago? When exactly did the curse of the epiphenomal emergence of consciousness begin? Better yet, when will we have the courage to become animals again... to stop having faith in grammar and dispense with this greatest burden? I think from the Lacanic mirror stage forward we're all fucked, Mike B. When you say 'holy shit that's me', it's only downhill from there, boss.

A relevant Fritz bomb:

"The problem of consciousness (more precisely, of becoming conscious of something) confronts us only when we begin to comprehend how we could dispense with it; and now physiology and the history of animals place us at the beginning of such comprehension (it took them two centuries to catch up with Leibniz’s suspicion which soared ahead). For we could think, feel, will, and remember, and we could also “act” in every sense of that word, and yet none of this would have to “enter our consciousness” (as one says metaphorically). The whole of life would be possible without, as it were, seeing itself in a mirror. Even now, for that matter, by far the greatest portion of our life actually takes place without this mirror effect; and this is true even of our thinking, feeling, and willing life, however offensive this may sound to older philosophers."

[Gary Childress]

This is the Chomsky lecture I was alluding to. I think you might find it very fascinating. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5in5EdjhD0&t=24s

I'll be interested in hearing your response to it.

Chomsky's lecture, fascinating and nuanced as it is, does not contradict determinism in any way. He delves into the limits of human cognition and the historical development of scientific understanding, but these topics align seamlessly with a deterministic framework. Here's why:

Chomsky acknowledges that humans, like all biological organisms, have cognitive constraints shaped by evolution. This directly supports the deterministic view that our mental faculties are the result of physical processes—biological evolution and neurological architecture.

His reference to Newton and the "limits of intelligibility" reflects the acknowledgment that human comprehension has boundaries. These boundaries are not a rejection of determinism but a recognition that our deterministic brains have evolved within specific parameters. Determinism doesn't promise omniscience; it describes how processes unfold within a causal framework.

Even the idea of "mysteries" that are beyond human understanding fits into determinism. Mysteries are simply phenomena that exceed the explanatory power of our current neural and intellectual capabilities, all of which are causally determined by our evolutionary history, culture, and education.

Chomsky’s mention of quantum mechanics and "spooky action at a distance" doesn’t challenge determinism either. Quantum phenomena operate under deterministic or probabilistic laws of physics, depending on interpretation, but they remain governed by well-defined principles. Quantum indeterminacy is not a loophole for free will or metaphysical entities—it’s simply a different kind of determinism, one that incorporates probability.

Chomsky's overall argument points to the humility required in scientific exploration, acknowledging that there are limits to what our deterministic cognitive apparatus can achieve. None of this undermines the deterministic view; rather, it complements it by situating human understanding within the scope of our evolved capacities.

If anything in the lecture seems to contradict determinism, it would have to rely on specific mechanisms or principles that show causation being violated. Chomsky does not provide such mechanisms; instead, he reinforces the idea that our knowledge and understanding, while vast, are inherently bounded by deterministic processes.

I think if we humans can have limitations in our understanding of how the world works, then that opens up the possibility that we are wrong in our understanding of how the world works.

[promethean75]

Memory. That's what did it, Mike. Emotional dissonance of the complex nervous system sort can only be experienced if the organism can a) have shitty experiences and b) be forced to anticipate more shitty experience because he has memory.

Otherwise, every shitty experience would be an arbitrarily new shitty experience the organism would be aware of only directly and immediately as painful, unpleasant, etc. But to be intelligent enough to recognize and therefore need to be cautious of shitty experience... well, that makes things even more shitty than they already were.

We would be able to class organisms into three categories, which i order according to their capacity for experiencing shittiness.

Organisms without a complex nervous system. They suffer only immediate pain and need and can not become philosophers.

Organisms with complex nervous systems but without self-awareness. They have memories and can anticipate danger (placing them into an unpleasant state of panic and nervousness... a form of existential anxiety) but they can't assess the matter philosophically... can't know exactly how and why the world is so shitty. They exist in a greater state of dread than the former organism, but that dread doesn't yet have the breadth and depth it will have in the organism that develops consciousness and self awareness and reads Schopenhauer.

In any case, it was memory that sent everything south in the universe. A piece of the universe became aware of itself just long enough to experience how shitty it is. Whether a paramecium or a Neils Bohr, you get a spectrum of experience of shittiness that is determined by your physiological capacities. The more advanced, the deeper the shit gets for you.

[BigMike]

Chomsky's lecture, fascinating and nuanced as it is, does not contradict determinism in any way. He delves into the limits of human cognition and the historical development of scientific understanding, but these topics align seamlessly with a deterministic framework. Here's why:

Chomsky acknowledges that humans, like all biological organisms, have cognitive constraints shaped by evolution. This directly supports the deterministic view that our mental faculties are the result of physical processes—biological evolution and neurological architecture.

His reference to Newton and the "limits of intelligibility" reflects the acknowledgment that human comprehension has boundaries. These boundaries are not a rejection of determinism but a recognition that our deterministic brains have evolved within specific parameters. Determinism doesn't promise omniscience; it describes how processes unfold within a causal framework.

Even the idea of "mysteries" that are beyond human understanding fits into determinism. Mysteries are simply phenomena that exceed the explanatory power of our current neural and intellectual capabilities, all of which are causally determined by our evolutionary history, culture, and education.

Chomsky’s mention of quantum mechanics and "spooky action at a distance" doesn’t challenge determinism either. Quantum phenomena operate under deterministic or probabilistic laws of physics, depending on interpretation, but they remain governed by well-defined principles. Quantum indeterminacy is not a loophole for free will or metaphysical entities—it’s simply a different kind of determinism, one that incorporates probability.

Chomsky's overall argument points to the humility required in scientific exploration, acknowledging that there are limits to what our deterministic cognitive apparatus can achieve. None of this undermines the deterministic view; rather, it complements it by situating human understanding within the scope of our evolved capacities.

If anything in the lecture seems to contradict determinism, it would have to rely on specific mechanisms or principles that show causation being violated. Chomsky does not provide such mechanisms; instead, he reinforces the idea that our knowledge and understanding, while vast, are inherently bounded by deterministic processes.

I think if we humans can have limitations in our understanding of how the world works, then that opens up the possibility that we are wrong in our understanding of how the world works.

Of course, Gary, humans can be wrong—and often are—in their understanding of the world. That’s precisely why science is a process, not a proclamation. We refine our understanding over time through evidence, experimentation, and critical analysis. However, being wrong doesn’t invalidate the deterministic framework; it only highlights the limitations of our cognitive tools, which themselves operate deterministically.

Think of it this way: the deterministic nature of our brains and the universe doesn’t guarantee perfect knowledge. It only means that everything—including our mistakes, our misunderstandings, and even our eventual corrections—is part of a causal chain. The existence of cognitive limitations doesn’t imply that the underlying processes of the universe are somehow exempt from causation. It simply means that our ability to grasp the full picture is constrained by the biology and evolution of our minds.

Mistakes and misinterpretations are inevitable when finite beings attempt to understand an infinite and complex universe. That’s why the scientific method matters—it’s a tool that helps us correct our errors and move closer to an accurate understanding, step by step, while acknowledging that our explanations are always provisional and open to revision.

So, yes, we might be wrong about how the world works, but the process of figuring out where we’re wrong and refining our understanding is itself an example of determinism in action. Far from undermining the deterministic view, it reinforces it.

[Belinda]

This is the Chomsky lecture I was alluding to. I think you might find it very fascinating. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5in5EdjhD0&t=24s

I'll be interested in hearing your response to it.

Chomsky's lecture, fascinating and nuanced as it is, does not contradict determinism in any way. He delves into the limits of human cognition and the historical development of scientific understanding, but these topics align seamlessly with a deterministic framework. Here's why:

Chomsky acknowledges that humans, like all biological organisms, have cognitive constraints shaped by evolution. This directly supports the deterministic view that our mental faculties are the result of physical processes—biological evolution and neurological architecture.

His reference to Newton and the "limits of intelligibility" reflects the acknowledgment that human comprehension has boundaries. These boundaries are not a rejection of determinism but a recognition that our deterministic brains have evolved within specific parameters. Determinism doesn't promise omniscience; it describes how processes unfold within a causal framework.

Even the idea of "mysteries" that are beyond human understanding fits into determinism. Mysteries are simply phenomena that exceed the explanatory power of our current neural and intellectual capabilities, all of which are causally determined by our evolutionary history, culture, and education.

Chomsky’s mention of quantum mechanics and "spooky action at a distance" doesn’t challenge determinism either. Quantum phenomena operate under deterministic or probabilistic laws of physics, depending on interpretation, but they remain governed by well-defined principles. Quantum indeterminacy is not a loophole for free will or metaphysical entities—it’s simply a different kind of determinism, one that incorporates probability.

Chomsky's overall argument points to the humility required in scientific exploration, acknowledging that there are limits to what our deterministic cognitive apparatus can achieve. None of this undermines the deterministic view; rather, it complements it by situating human understanding within the scope of our evolved capacities.

If anything in the lecture seems to contradict determinism, it would have to rely on specific mechanisms or principles that show causation being violated. Chomsky does not provide such mechanisms; instead, he reinforces the idea that our knowledge and understanding, while vast, are inherently bounded by deterministic processes.

I think if we humans can have limitations in our understanding of how the world works, then that opens up the possibility that we are wrong in our understanding of how the world works.

Yes, but that's no justification and no reason to abdicate moral responsibility. We must do the best we can with what we have.

[BigMike]

Memory. That's what did it, Mike. Emotional dissonance of the complex nervous system sort can only be experienced if the organism can a) have shitty experiences and b) be forced to anticipate more shitty experience because he has memory.

Otherwise, every shitty experience would be an arbitrarily new shitty experience the organism would be aware of only directly and immediately as painful, unpleasant, etc. But to be intelligent enough to recognize and therefore need to be cautious of shitty experience... well, that makes things even more shitty than they already were.

We would be able to class organisms into three categories, which i order according to their capacity for experiencing shittiness.

Organisms without a complex nervous system. They suffer only immediate pain and need and can not become philosophers.

Organisms with complex nervous systems but without self-awareness. They have memories and can anticipate danger (placing them into an unpleasant state of panic and nervousness... a form of existential anxiety) but they can't assess the matter philosophically... can't know exactly how and why the world is so shitty. They exist in a greater state of dread than the former organism, but that dread doesn't yet have the breadth and depth it will have in the organism that develops consciousness and self awareness and reads Schopenhauer.

In any case, it was memory that sent everything south in the universe. A piece of the universe became aware of itself just long enough to experience how shitty it is. Whether a paramecium or a Neils Bohr, you get a spectrum of experience of shittiness that is determined by your physiological capacities. The more advanced, the deeper the shit gets for you.

I agree entirely, Promethean75, that memory is fundamental to the complexities of human experience, including the ability to anticipate and dread future "shitty experiences." Memory, combined with learning, forms the backbone of what we call intelligence, and I've emphasized its importance in past discussions. However, I didn’t explicitly touch on it in my recent response about AI consciousness because AI already replicates aspects of human memory and learning.

AI systems are designed to "learn" by adjusting the strength of connections between nodes—essentially mimicking synaptic plasticity in the human brain. This modeling is directly inspired by our understanding of human learning and memory, albeit in a simplified, algorithmic way. But here’s where things diverge: AI, despite learning and remembering, does not feel. It doesn’t experience dread, existential anxiety, or "shittiness," precisely because it lacks the biological basis—evolved nervous systems and survival instincts—that shape those human experiences.

Memory might have sent things south for humanity, as you poetically describe, but for AI, memory and learning are tools devoid of self-awareness or subjective experience. They enable machines to perform tasks, recognize patterns, and simulate responses, but not to suffer or philosophize about Schopenhauer. For AI, there's no “spectrum of shittiness.” It's all just data, processed without the burden—or the richness—of human consciousness.

[Gary Childress]

Chomsky's lecture, fascinating and nuanced as it is, does not contradict determinism in any way. He delves into the limits of human cognition and the historical development of scientific understanding, but these topics align seamlessly with a deterministic framework. Here's why:

Chomsky acknowledges that humans, like all biological organisms, have cognitive constraints shaped by evolution. This directly supports the deterministic view that our mental faculties are the result of physical processes—biological evolution and neurological architecture.

His reference to Newton and the "limits of intelligibility" reflects the acknowledgment that human comprehension has boundaries. These boundaries are not a rejection of determinism but a recognition that our deterministic brains have evolved within specific parameters. Determinism doesn't promise omniscience; it describes how processes unfold within a causal framework.

Even the idea of "mysteries" that are beyond human understanding fits into determinism. Mysteries are simply phenomena that exceed the explanatory power of our current neural and intellectual capabilities, all of which are causally determined by our evolutionary history, culture, and education.

Chomsky’s mention of quantum mechanics and "spooky action at a distance" doesn’t challenge determinism either. Quantum phenomena operate under deterministic or probabilistic laws of physics, depending on interpretation, but they remain governed by well-defined principles. Quantum indeterminacy is not a loophole for free will or metaphysical entities—it’s simply a different kind of determinism, one that incorporates probability.

Chomsky's overall argument points to the humility required in scientific exploration, acknowledging that there are limits to what our deterministic cognitive apparatus can achieve. None of this undermines the deterministic view; rather, it complements it by situating human understanding within the scope of our evolved capacities.

If anything in the lecture seems to contradict determinism, it would have to rely on specific mechanisms or principles that show causation being violated. Chomsky does not provide such mechanisms; instead, he reinforces the idea that our knowledge and understanding, while vast, are inherently bounded by deterministic processes.

I think if we humans can have limitations in our understanding of how the world works, then that opens up the possibility that we are wrong in our understanding of how the world works.

Yes, but that's no justification and no reason to abdicate moral responsibility. We must do the best we can with what we have.

Of course, skepticism doesn't give us reason to abdicate moral responsibility. However, if the universe and we humans in it are ruled by deterministic mechanisms, then there really is no moral responsibility. A pocket watch isn't "responsible" if it stops telling the correct time. It didn't do anything wrong, something wrong happened to it.

[BigMike]

I think if we humans can have limitations in our understanding of how the world works, then that opens up the possibility that we are wrong in our understanding of how the world works.

Yes, but that's no justification and no reason to abdicate moral responsibility. We must do the best we can with what we have.

Of course, skepticism doesn't give us reason to abdicate moral responsibility. However, if the universe and we humans in it are ruled by deterministic mechanisms, then there really is no moral responsibility. A pocket watch isn't "responsible" if it stops telling the correct time. It didn't do anything wrong, something wrong happened to it.

Understanding the causes of our actions is exactly what gives us the ability to act morally "next time," Gary. If we comprehend the factors that led to a poor decision—be they environmental, emotional, or situational—we can adjust those factors or prepare ourselves better in the future. This doesn’t negate moral responsibility; it reframes it as a process of learning and improving rather than assigning blame.

By identifying the determinants of behavior, we can establish moral rules of thumb—guidelines that help steer our actions in the right direction when similar situations arise. These rules act as a kind of practical shortcut, shaped by understanding what led to harm or benefit in the past, and they guide us toward actions that align with the moral values we strive to uphold.

In this way, determinism doesn’t strip us of moral responsibility; it empowers us with the tools to act more ethically and consistently in the future. The clock may not be "responsible" for stopping, but understanding why it stopped allows us to fix it—and prevent it from failing again. Similarly, we gain moral agency by understanding the causes of our behavior and using that knowledge to guide better choices.

[Gary Childress]

Yes, but that's no justification and no reason to abdicate moral responsibility. We must do the best we can with what we have.

Of course, skepticism doesn't give us reason to abdicate moral responsibility. However, if the universe and we humans in it are ruled by deterministic mechanisms, then there really is no moral responsibility. A pocket watch isn't "responsible" if it stops telling the correct time. It didn't do anything wrong, something wrong happened to it.

Understanding the causes of our actions is exactly what gives us the ability to act morally "next time," Gary. If we comprehend the factors that led to a poor decision—be they environmental, emotional, or situational—we can adjust those factors or prepare ourselves better in the future. This doesn’t negate moral responsibility; it reframes it as a process of learning and improving rather than assigning blame.

By identifying the determinants of behavior, we can establish moral rules of thumb—guidelines that help steer our actions in the right direction when similar situations arise. These rules act as a kind of practical shortcut, shaped by understanding what led to harm or benefit in the past, and they guide us toward actions that align with the moral values we strive to uphold.

In this way, determinism doesn’t strip us of moral responsibility; it empowers us with the tools to act more ethically and consistently in the future. The clock may not be "responsible" for stopping, but understanding why it stopped allows us to fix it—and prevent it from failing again. Similarly, we gain moral agency by understanding the causes of our behavior and using that knowledge to guide better choices.

Determinism implies that consciousness cannot affect physical matter. If you believe in determinism, then how can you believe in moral responsibility? How can you assign moral responsibility to something which is entirely mechanical in nature? Responsibility implies choice and the ability to not do something that was done. Determinism implies that there is no such choice.

[Belinda]

I think if we humans can have limitations in our understanding of how the world works, then that opens up the possibility that we are wrong in our understanding of how the world works.

Yes, but that's no justification and no reason to abdicate moral responsibility. We must do the best we can with what we have.

Of course, skepticism doesn't give us reason to abdicate moral responsibility. However, if the universe and we humans in it are ruled by deterministic mechanisms, then there really is no moral responsibility. A pocket watch isn't "responsible" if it stops telling the correct time. It didn't do anything wrong, something wrong happened to it.

But you are not a pocket watch!

[Gary Childress]

Yes, but that's no justification and no reason to abdicate moral responsibility. We must do the best we can with what we have.

Of course, skepticism doesn't give us reason to abdicate moral responsibility. However, if the universe and we humans in it are ruled by deterministic mechanisms, then there really is no moral responsibility. A pocket watch isn't "responsible" if it stops telling the correct time. It didn't do anything wrong, something wrong happened to it.

But you are not a pocket watch!

I know. A pocket watch isn't a windmill either, however, they are both deterministic machines.

[BigMike]

Of course, skepticism doesn't give us reason to abdicate moral responsibility. However, if the universe and we humans in it are ruled by deterministic mechanisms, then there really is no moral responsibility. A pocket watch isn't "responsible" if it stops telling the correct time. It didn't do anything wrong, something wrong happened to it.

Understanding the causes of our actions is exactly what gives us the ability to act morally "next time," Gary. If we comprehend the factors that led to a poor decision—be they environmental, emotional, or situational—we can adjust those factors or prepare ourselves better in the future. This doesn’t negate moral responsibility; it reframes it as a process of learning and improving rather than assigning blame.

By identifying the determinants of behavior, we can establish moral rules of thumb—guidelines that help steer our actions in the right direction when similar situations arise. These rules act as a kind of practical shortcut, shaped by understanding what led to harm or benefit in the past, and they guide us toward actions that align with the moral values we strive to uphold.

In this way, determinism doesn’t strip us of moral responsibility; it empowers us with the tools to act more ethically and consistently in the future. The clock may not be "responsible" for stopping, but understanding why it stopped allows us to fix it—and prevent it from failing again. Similarly, we gain moral agency by understanding the causes of our behavior and using that knowledge to guide better choices.

Determinism implies that consciousness cannot affect physical matter. If you believe in determinism, then how can you believe in moral responsibility? How can you assign moral responsibility to something which is entirely mechanical in nature? Responsibility implies choice and the ability to not do something that was done. Determinism implies that there is no such choice.

Gary, your concern hinges on a misunderstanding of determinism and its relationship to moral responsibility. Determinism doesn’t imply that consciousness is powerless or irrelevant—it acknowledges that consciousness itself arises from physical processes in the brain, which are influenced by prior causes. These causes include our experiences, upbringing, and the knowledge we acquire, all of which shape our decisions.

Moral responsibility, in this context, is not about some magical ability to transcend causality and act "outside" of it. It’s about recognizing the causal chain and using that understanding to guide behavior. Responsibility doesn’t require free will in the libertarian sense; it requires the capacity to learn, adapt, and act within the deterministic framework.

When we say someone is morally responsible, we’re essentially saying that their actions can be understood, influenced, and corrected through reasoning, education, or consequences. This allows us to establish systems of accountability—not because people could have acted differently in an ultimate sense, but because understanding the factors influencing behavior gives us the power to encourage better outcomes in the future.

The notion that determinism negates responsibility is akin to saying that because gravity governs motion, we can’t build bridges. Just as we work within the laws of physics to achieve structural integrity, we work within the deterministic framework of human behavior to achieve moral integrity. Far from undermining moral responsibility, determinism provides a rational basis for it.