Can the Religious Be Trusted?

[henry quirk]

Your skepticism seems to come from wanting something more

No Mike. My *skepticism comes from you wanting sumthin' more.

Allow me to illustrate...

You say...

Mercy is the deliberate withholding of punishment

Please, define deliberate.




*I'm not skeptical about determinism...as a notion, its sound....we, may, as fact, be meat machines, all of us...I've said so, at least once, in most or all of your threads

[Alexis Jacobi]

…

I know that that is your opinion, and I see clearly how, and why, the predicates that you hold in your foreground leave you no other option but contemptuous dismissal. And it is not merely directed at me but rather at an entire (sort or type of) epistemology. Do you have that right? You really believe that you do! I acknowledge this.

And I also believe that I understand that “philosophy today”, and also a general popular outlook, arrives at both dismissal and contempt of much of what I have offered. They’ve become ‘operative sentiments’.

Yet on the other side is (to put it in negative terms) a belief that has been made to seem irrational, because it blindly or uninformedly defends itself with inadequate tools.

I get it, BigMike. I got it right at the start.

And yet I hold to different perspectives, and ones I base on my experience. I have not deviated from my (subjective) outlook.

You have not moved me very much except that I am now more curious about how other professional physicists and physiologists deal in the same area. It is not an area I am familiar with.

[henry quirk]

I am now more curious about how other professional physicists and physiologists deal in the same area. It is not an area I am familiar with.

https://mindmatters.ai/

It's a clearinghouse. There's a lot there, leading to a lot more.

Use the search function.

[BigMike]

…

I know that that is your opinion, and I see clearly how, and why, the predicates that you hold in your foreground leave you no other option but contemptuous dismissal. And it is not merely directed at me but rather at an entire (sort or type of) epistemology. Do you have that right? You really believe that you do! I acknowledge this.

And I also believe that I understand that “philosophy today”, and also a general popular outlook, arrives at both dismissal and contempt of much of what I have offered. They’ve become ‘operative sentiments’.

Yet on the other side is (to put it in negative terms) a belief that has been made to seem irrational, because it blindly or uninformedly defends itself with inadequate tools.

I get it, BigMike. I got it right at the start.

And yet I hold to different perspectives, and ones I base on my experience. I have not deviated from my (subjective) outlook.

You have not moved me very much except that I am now more curious about how other professional physicists and physiologists deal in the same area. It is not an area I am familiar with.

Alexis, the principles we’re discussing—how neurons function, how the brain processes stimuli—are elementary scientific knowledge that most people are exposed to by the age of 12. You don’t need professional physicists or physiologists to weigh in; it’s basic biology and neuroscience. Your curiosity would be better directed toward understanding these fundamentals before attempting to critique or dismiss them.

[Gary Childress]

...

On the face of it, I sort of gather that you would be in the camp of eliminative materialism with respect to your understanding of the "mind". In other words, there is no "ghost" in Descartes' "machine", only the machine. Would that be an accurate way of summarizing your position?

And if it is an accurate summary of your position, does that satisfactorily explain the world we live in in its entirety? For example, do you believe that computers can be made to feel pain or can experience a color as being "pleasant" or "attractive"? Is there nothing in this world that cannot be adequately explained in terms of mechanisms in motion?

And if you do count yourself as an eliminative materialist, do you see it as a kind of provisional point of agreement among the sciences not to delve into the untestable and unprovable, in a sense a bit like a scientific positivism--that brains can only be explained in terms of the testable and observable as a matter of convention? In another sense, it might be along the lines of Wittgenstein's "there of which one cannot speak, one must remain silent". We can only talk about what we know of the world and what we know of the world maybe isn't a whole lot in terms of explaining everything we think seems to be out there.

There's a very interesting lecture that Naom Chomsky gives (I think it was given in the Netherlands, IIRC) that is almost mystical in nature where he claims that contemporary science has done more to throw out the "machine" than to throw out the "ghost" of consciousness. Not sure how correct that is but he does point to things like "spooky action at a distance" in Quantum physics which seems to defy conventional material explanations. In other words, it would involve the instantaneous transmission of information over vast distances that defies the speed of light or the existence of a "particle" to carry it. From there he seems to suspect that there are phenomena in this world that we just can't capture with the physical sciences as practiced by human beings. I'll try to dig up the lecture if you are interested in seeing it.

[BigMike]

Your skepticism seems to come from wanting something more

No Mike. My *skepticism comes from you wanting sumthin' more.

Allow me to illustrate...

You say...

Mercy is the deliberate withholding of punishment

Please, define deliberate.




*I'm not skeptical about determinism...as a notion, its sound....we, may, as fact, be meat machines, all of us...I've said so, at least once, in most or all of your threads

Henry, it’s amusing that you think this rhetorical ploy of redirecting the need for clarification back to me somehow elevates your argument. Since you’re insisting on it, “deliberate” refers to an action or decision carried out consciously and with intention. And before you predictably leap to claim that "intention" requires free will, let me save you the trouble: intention is just the manifestation of underlying deterministic processes—prior causes filtered through experience, memory, and environment. There’s nothing mysterious or metaphysical about it.

If you're not skeptical of determinism, as you claim, then this semantic tap-dance is a transparent dodge. You're grasping at words while sidestepping the substance of the argument. So, by all means, define your understanding of “deliberate” if it somehow exists outside the deterministic framework you supposedly accept.

[henry quirk]

You don’t need professional physicists or physiologists to weigh in

Oh my.

That's damning.

[Gary Childress]

...

On the face of it, I sort of gather that you would be in the camp of eliminative materialism with respect to your understanding of the "mind". In other words, there is no "ghost" in Descartes' "machine", only the machine. Would that be an accurate way of summarizing your position?

And if it is an accurate summary of your position, does that satisfactorily explain the world we live in in its entirety? For example, do you believe that computers can be made to feel pain or can experience a color as being "pleasant" or "attractive"? Is there nothing in this world that cannot be adequately explained in terms of mechanisms in motion?

And if you do count yourself as an eliminative materialist, do you see it as a kind of provisional point of agreement among the sciences not to delve into the untestable and unprovable, in a sense a bit like a scientific positivism--that brains can only be explained in terms of the testable and observable as a matter of convention? In another sense, it might be along the lines of Wittgenstein's "there of which one cannot speak, one must remain silent". We can only talk about what we know of the world and what we know of the world maybe isn't a whole lot in terms of explaining everything we think seems to be out there.

There's a very interesting lecture that Naom Chomsky gives (I think it was given in the Netherlands, IIRC) that is almost mystical in nature where he claims that contemporary science has done more to throw out the "machine" than to throw out the "ghost" of consciousness. Not sure how correct that is but he does point to things like "spooky action at a distance" in Quantum physics which seems to defy conventional material explanations. In other words, it would involve the instantaneous transmission of information over vast distances that defies the speed of light or the existence of a "particle" to carry it. From there he seems to suspect that there are phenomena in this world that we just can't capture with the physical sciences as practiced by human beings. I'll try to dig up the lecture if you are interested in seeing it.

Here's the lecture. Worth a listen I would think. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5in5EdjhD0&t=24s

[BigMike]

...

On the face of it, I sort of gather that you would be in the camp of eliminative materialism with respect to your understanding the mind. In other words, there is no "ghost" in Descartes' "machine", only the machine. Would that be an accurate way of summarizing your position?

And if it is an accurate summary of your position, does that satisfactorily explain the world we live in in its entirety? For example, do you believe that computers can be made to feel pain or can experience a color as being "pleasant" or "attractive"? Is there nothing in this world that cannot be adequately explained in terms of mechanisms in motion?

And if you do count yourself as an eliminative materialist, do you see it as a kind of provisional point of agreement among the sciences not to delve into the untestable and unprovable, in a sense a bit like a scientific positivism--that brains can only be explained in terms of the testable and observable as a matter of convention? In another sense, it might be along the lines of Wittgenstein's "there of which one cannot speak, one must remain silent". We can only talk about what we know of the world and what we know of the world maybe isn't a whole lot in terms of explaining everything we think seems to be out there.

There's a very interesting lecture that Naom Chomsky gives (I think it was given in the Netherlands, IIRC) that is almost mystical in nature where he claims that contemporary science has done more to throw out the "machine" than to throw out the "ghost" of consciousness. Not sure how correct that is but he does point to things like "spooky action at a distance" in Quantum physics which seems to defy conventional material explanations. In other words, it would involve the instantaneous transmission of information over vast distances that defies the speed of light or the existence of a "particle" to carry it. From there he seems to suspect that there are phenomena in this world that we just can't capture with the physical sciences as practiced by human beings. I'll try to dig up the lecture if you are interested in seeing it.

Gary, you're correct that I reject the notion of a "ghost in the machine," whether it's tied to the pineal gland or any other organ. My view aligns with eliminative materialism in that I don't see evidence for anything outside the physical, causal processes of the brain and body to explain consciousness. But let's unpack your questions further.

Do I believe computers can "feel pain" or experience the "pleasantness" of color? Not in the same way humans do. Pain and qualia—our subjective experiences—are emergent properties of highly complex neural networks shaped by evolution to ensure survival and reproduction. A computer processes information, but it doesn't have the biological apparatus or evolutionary history that gives rise to the subjective experience we call "pain" or the aesthetic response to color. That doesn’t mean these processes are outside the realm of physical explanation; it just means the mechanisms are far more intricate than anything we've replicated artificially.

As for whether eliminative materialism adequately explains "everything," the answer depends on what you mean by "explain." If you’re looking for mechanistic, testable accounts of mental phenomena, it’s a robust framework, though incomplete in detail. If you’re asking whether it satisfies metaphysical yearnings for mystery or transcendence, it won’t. But science isn’t obligated to provide existential consolation; its job is to describe how the world works based on evidence.

Regarding quantum entanglement, it’s a fascinating phenomenon, but it’s not unphysical—it simply defies our everyday intuition. Entanglement doesn’t transmit information faster than light; it reflects correlations established when particles interact, no matter how far apart they are. It's counterintuitive, yes, but it's consistent with the mathematical framework of quantum mechanics, which remains firmly within the bounds of physical explanation.

Chomsky’s point about science challenging the "machine" more than the "ghost" is interesting, but it conflates "material" with "mechanistic" in a classical sense. Modern physics, with its probabilistic nature and non-local effects, expands our understanding of the "machine" rather than invalidating it. These phenomena don’t imply anything mystical or supernatural—just that our intuitions, shaped by macroscopic experiences, aren’t suited for the quantum scale.

If you have that Chomsky lecture handy, I'd be curious to hear more, but I’d wager that even his speculations don’t escape the broader deterministic framework of causality, whether they are intuitive to us or not.

[henry quirk]

Yes, Mike, the definition for deliberate is...

an action or decision carried out consciously and with intention

...or...

done with or marked by full consciousness of the nature and effects; intentional.

...or...

arising from or marked by careful consideration: synonym: voluntary.

So how does...

your brain (as) a deterministic machine, operating under the same unyielding physical laws as a rock rolling downhill

...do anything deliberately?

You say it's all about a...

manifestation of underlying deterministic processes

...but you see the problem, yes? You see how you want far more from determinism than it can give?

You insist on...

usin' words that mean much more than input (or a manifestation of underlying deterministic processes). If you truly believe in (determinism) then my input ought lead to the output: you amend your posts.

But you won't. Not becuz it's causally inevitable you shouldn't but becuz you choose not to, just like any other free will.

[BigMike]

Yes, Mike, the definition for deliberate is...

an action or decision carried out consciously and with intention

...or...

done with or marked by full consciousness of the nature and effects; intentional.

...or...

arising from or marked by careful consideration: synonym: voluntary.

So how does...

your brain (as) a deterministic machine, operating under the same unyielding physical laws as a rock rolling downhill

...do anything deliberately?

You say it's all about a...

manifestation of underlying deterministic processes

...but you see the problem, yes? You see how you want far more from determinism than it can give?

You insist on...

usin' words that mean much more than input (or a manifestation of underlying deterministic processes). If you truly believe in (determinism) then my input ought lead to the output: you amend your posts.

But you won't. Not becuz it's causally inevitable you shouldn't but becuz you choose not to, just like any other free will.

Henry, you're circling back to a fundamental issue of language rather than determinism itself. The words we use—like "deliberate"—are steeped in colloquial and philosophical baggage that doesn’t easily translate into a deterministic framework without lengthy explanations.

In everyday language, "deliberate" implies intention and conscious thought, which are shorthand for complex processes happening in the brain: inputs, evaluations, and outputs shaped by prior experiences, biology, and external stimuli. When I use "deliberate" in this context, it’s not about invoking mystical free will but describing a process that feels intentional because it emerges from our brain's deterministic architecture—a cascade of neural activity and feedback loops.

The problem isn’t determinism failing to explain these processes; it’s that our language was crafted for a pre-scientific understanding of human behavior. Concepts like "intention" and "choice" are useful approximations for describing deterministic processes but require unpacking to fit within the deterministic framework. You see, my use of "deliberate" doesn’t contradict determinism—it reflects the constraints of our vocabulary.

As for your assertion that I "choose" not to amend my posts, that’s just you reintroducing free will into the conversation as though repeating it will make it real. My "choice" not to amend isn’t a rejection of your input—it’s the output of my prior thoughts, experiences, and the deterministic processes driving this interaction. So, no, I don’t want more from determinism than it can give—I’m merely working within the limits of language. You might want to start grappling with that instead of projecting your insistence on free will onto me.

[Alexis Jacobi]

You don’t need professional physicists or physiologists to weigh in; it’s basic biology and neuroscience. Your curiosity would be better directed toward understanding these fundamentals before attempting to critique or dismiss them.

I could say I admire your puffed-up certainty that you know what’s up with life and being “in this mysterious cosmos”. Arrogant flippancy, the wielding of it and especially on these forums, can be seen as strategically useful. What I take away from you is just what I noticed, and some other people noticed (•we• noticed to use the royal plural!) at the start: it is that swaggering certainty that underpins your convictions.

You are entitled to it and if it serves you stay with it!

That attitude does not serve me, so I eschew it.

You seem to believe that I dispute biological and physiological understanding. No, that is not right. But I have already expressed this in various ways.

What I dispute, in you, is just that swaggering certainty that pervades your presentation. And that too I have explained.

I am interested in highlighting the question What does really serve us? It is I think perhaps the fundamental one at the base of my concerns.

I opt to stay with sets of questions and issues that, I gather for you, have been voided of relevancy.

[Gary Childress]

...

On the face of it, I sort of gather that you would be in the camp of eliminative materialism with respect to your understanding the mind. In other words, there is no "ghost" in Descartes' "machine", only the machine. Would that be an accurate way of summarizing your position?

And if it is an accurate summary of your position, does that satisfactorily explain the world we live in in its entirety? For example, do you believe that computers can be made to feel pain or can experience a color as being "pleasant" or "attractive"? Is there nothing in this world that cannot be adequately explained in terms of mechanisms in motion?

And if you do count yourself as an eliminative materialist, do you see it as a kind of provisional point of agreement among the sciences not to delve into the untestable and unprovable, in a sense a bit like a scientific positivism--that brains can only be explained in terms of the testable and observable as a matter of convention? In another sense, it might be along the lines of Wittgenstein's "there of which one cannot speak, one must remain silent". We can only talk about what we know of the world and what we know of the world maybe isn't a whole lot in terms of explaining everything we think seems to be out there.

There's a very interesting lecture that Naom Chomsky gives (I think it was given in the Netherlands, IIRC) that is almost mystical in nature where he claims that contemporary science has done more to throw out the "machine" than to throw out the "ghost" of consciousness. Not sure how correct that is but he does point to things like "spooky action at a distance" in Quantum physics which seems to defy conventional material explanations. In other words, it would involve the instantaneous transmission of information over vast distances that defies the speed of light or the existence of a "particle" to carry it. From there he seems to suspect that there are phenomena in this world that we just can't capture with the physical sciences as practiced by human beings. I'll try to dig up the lecture if you are interested in seeing it.

Gary, you're correct that I reject the notion of a "ghost in the machine," whether it's tied to the pineal gland or any other organ. My view aligns with eliminative materialism in that I don't see evidence for anything outside the physical, causal processes of the brain and body to explain consciousness. But let's unpack your questions further.

Do I believe computers can "feel pain" or experience the "pleasantness" of color? Not in the same way humans do. Pain and qualia—our subjective experiences—are emergent properties of highly complex neural networks shaped by evolution to ensure survival and reproduction. A computer processes information, but it doesn't have the biological apparatus or evolutionary history that gives rise to the subjective experience we call "pain" or the aesthetic response to color. That doesn’t mean these processes are outside the realm of physical explanation; it just means the mechanisms are far more intricate than anything we've replicated artificially.

As for whether eliminative materialism adequately explains "everything," the answer depends on what you mean by "explain." If you’re looking for mechanistic, testable accounts of mental phenomena, it’s a robust framework, though incomplete in detail. If you’re asking whether it satisfies metaphysical yearnings for mystery or transcendence, it won’t. But science isn’t obligated to provide existential consolation; its job is to describe how the world works based on evidence.

Regarding quantum entanglement, it’s a fascinating phenomenon, but it’s not unphysical—it simply defies our everyday intuition. Entanglement doesn’t transmit information faster than light; it reflects correlations established when particles interact, no matter how far apart they are. It's counterintuitive, yes, but it's consistent with the mathematical framework of quantum mechanics, which remains firmly within the bounds of physical explanation.

Chomsky’s point about science challenging the "machine" more than the "ghost" is interesting, but it conflates "material" with "mechanistic" in a classical sense. Modern physics, with its probabilistic nature and non-local effects, expands our understanding of the "machine" rather than invalidating it. These phenomena don’t imply anything mystical or supernatural—just that our intuitions, shaped by macroscopic experiences, aren’t suited for the quantum scale.

If you have that Chomsky lecture handy, I'd be curious to hear more, but I’d wager that even his speculations don’t escape the broader deterministic framework of causality, whether they are intuitive to us or not.

This is the Chomsky lecture I was alluding to. I think you might find it very fascinating. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5in5EdjhD0&t=24s

I'll be interested in hearing your response to it.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Do I believe computers can "feel pain" or experience the "pleasantness" of color? Not in the same way humans do. Pain and qualia—our subjective experiences—are emergent properties of highly complex neural networks shaped by evolution to ensure survival and reproduction. A computer processes information, but it doesn't have the biological apparatus or evolutionary history that gives rise to the subjective experience we call "pain" or the aesthetic response to color. That doesn’t mean these processes are outside the realm of physical explanation; it just means the mechanisms are far more intricate than anything we've replicated artificially.

However, and extending the facts that you establish (that are being established) about the material basis of intelligence, it is logically inevitable that artificial intelligence can achieve that awareness that the human brain exhibits. It would, I gather, “emerge” at one moment or another.

(Chomsky’s interesting views on AI).

[accelafine]

What on earth would he know about it? Why are people always quoting that arsehole?