Monistic, and according to the imo really incompetent Western philosophers who pretend that idealism and materialism aren't subtle dualisms. But they are based on the original mental/material split hence dualistic.
Philosophical anti-realism says that there is no mind-independent, objective external world. That already means that there can be no two objectively existing physical systems that can interact.How do the two differ? I mean, often the philosophical one stands opposed to the special case of mind-dependent reality, while QM gets far more general and specific and nails it down to two systems interacting in any way that entangles their states. But fundamentally, they're both the same thing IMO.
Then I find the view that QM can be explained by interacting systems to be a non-serious attempt. The universe isn't made up of interacting systems. The universe is one "system", and the concept of "interaction" is just handwaving that can't ultimately explain anything.
Main point still stands: One cannot have philosophical realism without accepting retro-causal physics. Most philosophers don't know their physics and ignore that, which is why I took it upon myself to learn enough physics to put all these old views to the test.
And I disagree with that, I think we just need to extend determinism to all things quantum. Take Wheeler's cosmic delayed-choice thought experiment for example. One way to look at it is that we cause the past to be a certain way, from the present. Another way to look at it is that the universe is deterministic (and nonlocal), including quantum behaviour, so Wheeler couldn't have made any other choice.It might be normal to take those two stances, but I find that the statement boils down to it being normal to hold self-inconsistent views. I do it myself, so I agree on the normality of it.
QM does say though imo that time doesn't really exist. It's more like an emergent property but not fundamental.
Unless what I'm saying is inconsistent, then explain how.