Newcomb's Paradox - the modern version of the determinism vs non-determinism

[Skepdick]

The scenario: A superintelligent being (Omega) presents you with two boxes.

* Box A is transparent and contains $1,000. Box
* Box B is opaque and contains either $1,000,000 or nothing.

The twist:

If Omega had already predicted you'll take only Box B, they will put $1,000,000 in it.
If Omega had already predicted you'll take both boxes, they will leave Box B empty.
e.g the contents of box B are already determined.

Should you take opaque box; or both boxes?

The non-determinist/one-box argument:

Omega has a reputation as near-perfect predictor.
If I choose only Box B, Omega likely predicted this and put $1,000,000 in it
Therefore, choosing only Box B will likely get you $1,000,000.

The determinist/two-box argument:

The money is already in the boxes.
Whatever is in Box B won't change based on your choice because the future can't affect the past.
Taking both boxes will always give me $1,000 more than taking just Box B
Therefore I should take both boxes.

But the crux... A consistent determinist must two-box, because doing otherwise would mean abandoning determinism itself, and yet the determinist simply can't explain why choosing the opaque box reliably correlates with better outcomes.

[mickthinks]

At first glance this looks like a problem to be solved by game theory. But game theory is incompatible with secure predictions of the future. I’m not sure, but I’ve an idea that the condition that the opaque box contents are dependent on whether the player understands and applies game theory, effectively invalidates the thought experiment.

[Flannel Jesus]

The distinction between the two arguments has nothing to do with determinism vs indeterminism. An indeterminist may also reason that the future can't affect the past, that taking both boxes will always give me $1,000 more than taking just Box B. And on the other side of the coin, I can point you to thousands of determinists who would one-box.

Do indeterminists think the future can affect the past? That's not my view of them. And in fact retrocausality can itself be deterministic.

I don't think the two arguments should be labeled 'non-determinist' and 'determinist' for those reasons.

[FlashDangerpants]

At first glance this looks like a problem to be solved by game theory.

I think that's because the variable is nothing to do with whether determinism is true or false, and simply a matter of whether the participant believes it to be true or false. However the only outcome that we get from such belief is a post-hoc explanation of how we made some choice we already made, so the boxes are simply irrelevant.

[Skepdick]

The distinction between the two arguments has nothing to do with determinism vs indeterminism.

An indeterminist may also reason that the future can't affect the past, that taking both boxes will always give me $1,000 more than taking just Box B. And on the other side of the coin, I can point you to thousands of determinists who would one-box.

Do indeterminists think the future can affect the past? That's not my view of them. And in fact retrocausality can itself be deterministic.

I don't think the two arguments should be labeled 'non-determinist' and 'determinist' for those reasons.

Your thinking is muddled up in the Greek way of thinking that one's beliefs and narrative as to what they believe determine who or what they are.
That's all just tautological lip service.

The exact same person could call themselves a "determinist" or a "non-determinist" whatever their beliefs.
This gives us precisely zero information because it doesn't in any way connect to the choices or actions one makes.

Given the scenario: you can't call yourself a determinist without choosing both boxes. Their contents are already determined. You believe in cause and effect. There's no mechanism possible (in your head) where your choice can change the contents of the determined contents of the boxes.

There's not much left of determinism if the choice one makes in the future alters the past.

[Skepdick]

At first glance this looks like a problem to be solved by game theory. But game theory is incompatible with secure predictions of the future. I’m not sure, but I’ve an idea that the condition that the opaque box contents are dependent on whether the player understands and applies game theory, effectively invalidates the thought experiment.

It's only game theoretic insofar as there are two possible strategies available to players.

Game theory doesn't tell you which strategy to choose. The choice-procedure is still left in your hands.

Hence the paradox.

[Skepdick]

However the only outcome that we get from such belief is a post-hoc explanation of how we made some choice we already made, so the boxes are simply irrelevant.

Except for the part where the pragmatic outcomes/payouts correlate with the justification; and boxes you choose.
If they were mere posthoc rationalizatons you'd expect a random distribution of outcomes e.g zero predictive power.

Either way, you can resolve the descriptive paradox with a many-worlds interpretation. Omega's not a perfect predictor, just statistically very good one. The choice of boxes collapses into any given timeline.

This still leaves the normative question open: Since what we mean by "rationality" is always normative - which choice is "rational"?

[Atla]

A smart determinist will choose box B, because a smart determinist knows that the lack of retrocausality is irrelevant here. Omega knew that the smart determinist knows this and will choose box B and so box B will have 1 million in it.

[Impenitent]

opened a box and found a dead cat

-Imp

[Flannel Jesus]

The distinction between the two arguments has nothing to do with determinism vs indeterminism.

An indeterminist may also reason that the future can't affect the past, that taking both boxes will always give me $1,000 more than taking just Box B. And on the other side of the coin, I can point you to thousands of determinists who would one-box.

Do indeterminists think the future can affect the past? That's not my view of them. And in fact retrocausality can itself be deterministic.

I don't think the two arguments should be labeled 'non-determinist' and 'determinist' for those reasons.

Your thinking is muddled up in the Greek way of thinking that one's beliefs and narrative as to what they believe determine who or what they are.
That's all just tautological lip service.

The exact same person could call themselves a "determinist" or a "non-determinist" whatever their beliefs.
This gives us precisely zero information because it doesn't in any way connect to the choices or actions one makes.

Given the scenario: you can't call yourself a determinist without choosing both boxes. Their contents are already determined. You believe in cause and effect. There's no mechanism possible (in your head) where your choice can change the contents of the determined contents of the boxes.

And in the heads of most indeterminists there's also no mechanism possible where a choice now can change the contents of the boxes, whose contents were decided in the past. Indeterminism doesn't imply retrocausality, and retrocausality also doesn't imply indeterminism. There's no reason to split up the choices as being 'determinist vs indeterminist'.

[Skepdick]

And in the heads of most indeterminists there's also no mechanism possible where a choice now can change the contents of the boxes, whose contents were decided in the past. Indeterminism doesn't imply retrocausality, and retrocausality also doesn't imply indeterminism. There's no reason to split up the choices as being 'determinist vs indeterminist'.

I can only explain it to you. I can't understand it for you.

Because determinism is the view that all events and states of affairs are the necessary and inevitable consequences of previous events and conditions, combined with the laws of nature retrocausality is impossible on determinism.

And because retrocausality is impossible on determinism one's choice cannot retroactively change any past physical states, including the current contents of the boxes. No present event can remove $1M that's already there by choosing both boxes; or $1M that's not there by choosing one box.

In fact, no common philosophical views or scientific theories allow for genuine retrocausality then they are all functionally equivalent to determinism and there's no argument to be made for one-boxing.

If you insist on one-boxing you can't commit to ANY of those determinism-equivalent view ergo the class of beliefs which are not functionally equivalent to determinism and let you commit to one-boxing is non-determinism.

One-boxing reven requires one rejecting the metaphysical view that reality has determinate physical states.

[Skepdick]

A smart determinist...

Now there's an oxymoron.

[Noax]

The distinction between the two arguments has nothing to do with determinism vs indeterminism. An indeterminist may also reason that the future can't affect the past, that taking both boxes will always give me $1,000 more than taking just Box B. And on the other side of the coin, I can point you to thousands of determinists who would one-box.

Do indeterminists think the future can affect the past? That's not my view of them. And in fact retrocausality can itself be deterministic.

I don't think the two arguments should be labeled 'non-determinist' and 'determinist' for those reasons.

Agree with all of this. I don't see a paradox at all, and I don't see where it matters if one is a determinist or not.

Take the one box since all that do so have more money than those that choose both. That's the obvious choice regardless of what sort of xxx-ist one considers himself to be.


Side note: Determinism is not incompatible with retro-causality, but I don't see retro-causality playing any role in this supposed 'paradox'.

[Skepdick]

Agree with all of this. I don't see a paradox at all, and I don't see where it matters if one is a determinist or not.

None are so blind as those who cannot see...

Take the one box since all that do so have more money than those that choose both. That's the obvious choice regardless of what sort of xxx-ist one considers himself to be.

It's not so obvious to people who believe in causality; or realism.

The boxes have a definite state that your choice cannot alter.

Either the opaque box is empty; or it's not empty. By taking both you'll get $1000 over whatever's already in the opaque box.

Side note: Determinism is not incompatible with retro-causality.

Yes, it is. By definition.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

Causal determinism is, roughly speaking, the idea that every event is necessitated by antecedent events and conditions together with the laws of nature.

For retrocausality you need events necessitated by consequent events.

If you want to one-box - fine. But then you can't hold onto realism/causality in your metaphysic.
You can't simultaneously believe:

* The boxes have definite contents prior to you choosing
* Your choice cannot affect the definite contents of the boxes.
* You should one-box

[Flannel Jesus]

The distinction between the two arguments has nothing to do with determinism vs indeterminism. An indeterminist may also reason that the future can't affect the past, that taking both boxes will always give me $1,000 more than taking just Box B. And on the other side of the coin, I can point you to thousands of determinists who would one-box.

Do indeterminists think the future can affect the past? That's not my view of them. And in fact retrocausality can itself be deterministic.

I don't think the two arguments should be labeled 'non-determinist' and 'determinist' for those reasons.

Agree with all of this. I don't see a paradox at all, and I don't see where it matters if one is a determinist or not.

Take the one box since all that do so have more money than those that choose both. That's the obvious choice regardless of what sort of xxx-ist one considers himself to be.


Side note: Determinism is not incompatible with retro-causality, but I don't see retro-causality playing any role in this supposed 'paradox'.

Yeah, you're right. But those who are blind cannot see.