So what's it called when two people are looking at someone's four legged pet, and one sees a dog and the other sees a cat?Atla wrote: ↑Mon Dec 23, 2024 6:07 pmNo that's not what direct realism means. Look up the definition anywhere. Equating experience with reality doesn't tell us whether we perceive external objects directly or indirectly.amihart wrote: ↑Mon Dec 23, 2024 7:05 amYou don't understand the topic at hand. Equating experience to reality (not as mere correlations or as an analogy, but that they are literally being used as synonyms) is direct realism, and to deny this would require an enormous amount of mental gymnastics. Hence why you do not actually explain yourself but just hurl an accusation against me without any elaboration, because you know for a fact such a point cannot be elaborated on.
Anyways, I came here for a discussion, not accusation-flinging without any elaboration. That is clearly something you are not interested in, so I will end this conversation here from my end.
Direct Realism: we can directly perceive ordinary objects.
Direct realism is the view that: The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism). And we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct).
Direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence.
Maybe you equate "experience" with "my personal subjective experience".
Theories of Consciousness
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Re: Theories of Consciousness
Re: Theories of Consciousness
Hallucinationattofishpi wrote: ↑Tue Dec 31, 2024 11:08 pmSo what's it called when two people are looking at someone's four legged pet, and one sees a dog and the other sees a cat?Atla wrote: ↑Mon Dec 23, 2024 6:07 pmNo that's not what direct realism means. Look up the definition anywhere. Equating experience with reality doesn't tell us whether we perceive external objects directly or indirectly.amihart wrote: ↑Mon Dec 23, 2024 7:05 am
You don't understand the topic at hand. Equating experience to reality (not as mere correlations or as an analogy, but that they are literally being used as synonyms) is direct realism, and to deny this would require an enormous amount of mental gymnastics. Hence why you do not actually explain yourself but just hurl an accusation against me without any elaboration, because you know for a fact such a point cannot be elaborated on.
Anyways, I came here for a discussion, not accusation-flinging without any elaboration. That is clearly something you are not interested in, so I will end this conversation here from my end.
Direct Realism: we can directly perceive ordinary objects.
Direct realism is the view that: The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism). And we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct).
Direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence.
Maybe you equate "experience" with "my personal subjective experience".
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Re: Theories of Consciousness
Which one was "hallucinating"?Atla wrote: ↑Wed Jan 01, 2025 7:28 amHallucinationattofishpi wrote: ↑Tue Dec 31, 2024 11:08 pmSo what's it called when two people are looking at someone's four legged pet, and one sees a dog and the other sees a cat?Atla wrote: ↑Mon Dec 23, 2024 6:07 pm
No that's not what direct realism means. Look up the definition anywhere. Equating experience with reality doesn't tell us whether we perceive external objects directly or indirectly.
Direct Realism: we can directly perceive ordinary objects.
Direct realism is the view that: The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism). And we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct).
Direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence.
Maybe you equate "experience" with "my personal subjective experience".
Re: Theories of Consciousness
youattofishpi wrote: ↑Wed Jan 01, 2025 8:44 amWhich one was "hallucinating"?Atla wrote: ↑Wed Jan 01, 2025 7:28 amHallucinationattofishpi wrote: ↑Tue Dec 31, 2024 11:08 pm
So what's it called when two people are looking at someone's four legged pet, and one sees a dog and the other sees a cat?
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Re: Theories of Consciousness
By having a fucking clue about how this world works.attofishpi wrote: ↑Wed Jan 01, 2025 9:04 amHow do you logically compute to reason to that?
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Re: Theories of Consciousness
How the sphere we apparently inhabit, most of us are aware of what it does at the least. It spins as it traverses around a very hot heat source (apparently).
Yet, you are flawed in your comprehension of reality. If I may lift you from that floor..
If both people are viewing an OBJECT of something, what is within each mind is what?
Is it not plausible in the mind and more importantly the comprehension of reality, that two minds could view differing OBJECTS within the same vector POV?
Re: Theories of Consciousness
Am I supposed to make sense of that? Two people are viewing the same external cat: in the first person's head a cat is being represented and in the second person's head a dog is being represented. We can verify ojectively that the first person's representation is the accurate one unless 100% of the world is a deception.attofishpi wrote: ↑Wed Jan 01, 2025 10:29 amHow the sphere we apparently inhabit, most of us are aware of what it does at the least. It spins as it traverses around a very hot heat source (apparently).
Yet, you are flawed in your comprehension of reality. If I may lift you from that floor..
If both people are viewing an OBJECT of something, what is within each mind is what?
Is it not plausible in the mind and more importantly the comprehension of reality, that two minds could view differing OBJECTS within the same vector POV?
What is more likely: that God deceives everyone but you because you are Special and Better Than Everyone Else, or that you are hallucinating?
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Re: Theories of Consciousness
Atla wrote: ↑Wed Jan 01, 2025 10:53 amAm I supposed to make sense of that? Two people are viewing the same external cat: in the first person's head a cat is being represented and in the second person's head a dog is being represented. We can verify ojectively that the first person's representation is the accurate one unless 100% of the world is a deception.attofishpi wrote: ↑Wed Jan 01, 2025 10:29 amHow the sphere we apparently inhabit, most of us are aware of what it does at the least. It spins as it traverses around a very hot heat source (apparently).
Yet, you are flawed in your comprehension of reality. If I may lift you from that floor..
If both people are viewing an OBJECT of something, what is within each mind is what?
Is it not plausible in the mind and more importantly the comprehension of reality, that two minds could view differing OBJECTS within the same vector POV?
Y would U jump straight to that 100% of the world is a deception?
I'd accept that 100% of what we perceive is not 100% accurate, all of the time.
Re: Theories of Consciousness
OK, you seem to be an idealist, a position of realism of only mind. This is a completely different stance than realism (a mind/perception-independent reality), be it direct or indirect.Atla wrote: ↑Tue Dec 17, 2024 3:18 pm The Occam's razor view is that the brain per se has nothing to do with experience. All of reality is experience. Experience is one and the same thing as stuff. Western civilization posits that there are two different things, stuff and experience, which view is probably completely insane.
A naturalist would suggest that the brain (and other organs) have plenty to do with experience, but as an idealist, one does not have experience of one's own brain, so I guess it works.
This is ambiguous. Is your postiion that direct realists equate experience to reality, or are you declaring that you're a direct realist? The description you give does not seem to match that I find online, and seems once again to be closer to idealism that makes no distinction between phenomena and noumena.amihart wrote: ↑Tue Dec 17, 2024 5:52 pm saying what we experience is directly equivalent to reality itself (not that reality and experience just correlate, or that somehow experience "creates" reality, but that reality and experience are just literally synonyms) is the definition of direct realism, which is my position.
The two positions (direct vs indirect realism) don't seem to depend on a particular philosophy of mind (except to exclude idealism which denies the realism part)
I find direct realism (both direct and the realism part) to have serious problems. Modern science has put some significant nails into both coffins, but the latter is possible if one is willing to concede retro-causality, something I find difficult to swallow.
Experience is process, be it physical or not. Stuff is objects and whatnot. Experience can be implemented with stuff, but idealism implements stuff with experience.
I agree with you here, but your definitions here are circular, which isn't helping.
That's circular. What do you mean to perceive the world directly vs indirectly? The definitions I see say that it means you experience them as they are, not as a model manufactured from an information stream. It does not posit a 1:1 correspondence between phenomena and noumena as you seem to posit. This, once again, describes idealism. Kant apparently partially defended direct realism, and he is an idealist, no? So there is precedent for what you say.Direct realism is the view that: The external world exists independently of the mind (hence, realism). And we perceive the external world directly (hence, direct).
This is probably the strongest argument against direct realism, which cannot handle illusions. Some see a duck, some a rabbit. That's a self contradiction under direct realism, and they've no easy retort.attofishpi wrote: ↑Tue Dec 31, 2024 11:08 pm So what's it called when two people are looking at someone's four legged pet, and one sees a dog and the other sees a cat?
Re: Theories of Consciousness
Noax wrote: ↑Wed Jan 01, 2025 8:16 pm OK, you seem to be an idealist, a position of realism of only mind. This is a completely different stance than realism (a mind/perception-independent reality), be it direct or indirect.
A naturalist would suggest that the brain (and other organs) have plenty to do with experience, but as an idealist, one does not have experience of one's own brain, so I guess it works.
No I'm not an idealist, I'm a nondualist which is a position outside Western philosophy. Idealism says that mind (mental experience) is fundamental while stuff isn't, while I'm saying that they are one and the same.Experience is process, be it physical or not. Stuff is objects and whatnot. Experience can be implemented with stuff, but idealism implements stuff with experience.
What is circular?That's circular. What do you mean to perceive the world directly vs indirectly? The definitions I see say that it means you experience them as they are, not as a model manufactured from an information stream. It does not posit a 1:1 correspondence between phenomena and noumena as you seem to posit. This, once again, describes idealism. Kant apparently partially defended direct realism, and he is an idealist, no? So there is precedent for what you say.
By direct vs indirect perception I mean direct realism vs indirect realism. We don't directly perceive external objects as they really are, but experience a representation of them in our head.
Where did I posit 1:1 correspondence? In indirect realism? I didn't.
Kant was against idealism (or at least that's what he claims I think).
Kant rejected any correspondence between phenomena and noumena.
Re: Theories of Consciousness
Do you really need retro-causality for realism, or is it "enough" to extend determinism to the quantum world? I think it's the latter.
Re: Theories of Consciousness
I got idealism from your description.
No, they say stuff is mind, the same thing, as you put it. Stuff is ideals and no more.Idealism says that mind (mental experience) is fundamental while stuff isn't
Direct means 'direct'. That totally fails to describe the distinction between that and indirect realism. I was forced to look it up and the description I found did not match how people here seem to be using the term.What is circular?
Case in point. Totally true, but tautologically useless.By direct vs indirect perception I mean direct realism vs indirect realism.
That's better. I guess I buy into the indirect bit, if not the realist bit.We don't directly perceive external objects as they really are, but experience a representation of them in our head.
When you assert that mind and stuff are one and the same.Where did I posit 1:1 correspondence?
Well, I don't ever claim to be a Kant expert, but a quick google identifies him as a transcendental idealist. How that differs from just plain idealist, well, is more than I bother to find out.Kant was against idealism (or at least that's what he claims I think).
I have little interest in philosophers that don't have knowledge of 20th century physics and the implications.
Nothing to do with determinism. You can't have both locality and counterfactuals. No valid interpretation has both. Realism (that the world is in a state in the absence of measurement *) is the latter. The only mainstream realist interpretation is Bohmian mechanics. There's also transactional interpretation, about which I know next to nothing.
* 'Measurement' has nothing to do with mind, knowledge, consciousness, or ideals (except under the Wigner interpretation, which almost nobody, not even Wigner, supports).
Bell's theorem (not theory) proves that both cannot be the case. The universe is not classical, and since one experiences a classical reality, it seems doubtful that what is experienced is actually what is. That's quite the problem for the direct realists. Bohmian mechanics is probably one of the most complex interpretations, the opposite of Occam's choice, so to speak. It was invented to attempt to salvage some semblance of classical reality.
Re: Theories of Consciousness
No, stuff isn't ideals. I'm not an idealist.
I still don't know what you mean.Direct means 'direct'. That totally fails to describe the distinction between that and indirect realism. I was forced to look it up and the description I found did not match how people here seem to be using the term.
Ok look, my whole point was that idealism vs nondualism and direct vs indirect perception are two different issues. Combined they lead to more than 2 different philosophies.When you assert that mind and stuff are one and the same.
Imo just skip Kant. Yes transcendental idealism isn't idealism, he was really bad at naming things.Well, I don't ever claim to be a Kant expert, but a quick google identifies him as a transcendental idealist. How that differs from just plain idealist, well, is more than I bother to find out.
I have little interest in philosophers that don't have knowledge of 20th century physics and the implications.
Imo you seem to be conflating philosophical realism with realism in QM. It's normal to be a philosophical realist and also subscribe to measurement-dependence in QM.Nothing to do with determinism. You can't have both locality and counterfactuals. No valid interpretation has both. Realism (that the world is in a state in the absence of measurement *) is the latter. The only mainstream realist interpretation is Bohmian mechanics. There's also transactional interpretation, about which I know next to nothing.
* 'Measurement' has nothing to do with mind, knowledge, consciousness, or ideals (except under the Wigner interpretation, which almost nobody, not even Wigner, supports).
Bell's theorem (not theory) proves that both cannot be the case. The universe is not classical, and since one experiences a classical reality, it seems doubtful that what is experienced is actually what is. That's quite the problem for the direct realists. Bohmian mechanics is probably one of the most complex interpretations, the opposite of Occam's choice, so to speak. It was invented to attempt to salvage some semblance of classical reality.
Re: Theories of Consciousness
False dichotomy. Idealism is a non-dualistic stance.
How do the two differ? I mean, often the philosophical one stands opposed to the special case of mind-dependent reality, while QM gets far more general and specific and nails it down to two systems interacting in any way that entangles their states. But fundamentally, they're both the same thing IMO. Main point still stands: One cannot have philosophical realism without accepting retro-causal physics. Most philosophers don't know their physics and ignore that, which is why I took it upon myself to learn enough physics to put all these old views to the test.Imo you seem to be conflating philosophical realism with realism in QM.
It might be normal to take those two stances, but I find that the statement boils down to it being normal to hold self-inconsistent views. I do it myself, so I agree on the normality of it.It's normal to be a philosophical realist and also subscribe to measurement-dependence in QM.