No Humans = No Absolutely Mind-Independent Moon

[Belinda]

And what are those innate/inborn 'rules', for language acquisition, exactly?

Chomsky's theory of language acquisition is called Generative Grammar. Generative grammar is about subconscious knowledge of grammatical rules such that a native speaker of a language knows sort of instinctively if a sentence sounds odd.

But which obviously could only 'arise' AFTER one has 'grown up in' or has 'been already introduced' to 'that language', right?

Obviously the words 'native speaker of a language' could only refer to one that has, ALREADY, HAD prior experience with a particular language

The man is happy.
Happy man is the.

Well considering that the knowing of where the placement of words is correct, like in your example here, only 'arises' AFTER being introduced or being 'educated' in and with a particular language, NO one is born ALREADY knowing what is correct NOR incorrect, here.

Sounds odd , and we know that instinctively and did not have to be taught it.

Are you JOKING, here?

Language is LEARNED, and the DIFFERENT ways languages are SPOKEN, WRITTEN, and TAUGHT all around the world could NEVER be instinctively NOR innately known.

Your question is legitimate although tangential to the main question. It's a long time since I studied Chomsky and I have forgotten the explicit rules , I seem to remember there actually are explicit rules. I'm sorry but I can't find a brief resume of the rules of generative transformational grammar.

That is fine, there is no need to apologize.

Another linguistic theory called linguistic determinism concerns whether or not the Moon is mind-independent. Linguistic determinism is the concept that language and its structures limit and determine human knowledge or thought, as well as thought processes such as categorization, memory, and perception.

Okay. But ALL theories are NOT necessarily true, nor right, completely NOR partly.

Now, OBVIOUSLY, the 'thing', which some of you 'things', called 'human beings', call, and have labelled and/or named, 'moon', existed BEFORE the 'thing', human being, came-to-be, and would still exist even if the 'thing' that some 'things' call and label 'human beings' stopped existing.

And, this applies to ALL 'things'. The 'thing', itself, or 'things', themselves, NEVER depend upon what 'the things', human beings, have 'conceptualized up', or not.

Now, 'communicating' or 'communication', itself, may have some sort of innate, inborn, or instinctive 'knowing' component to it. However, language, itself, and 'the way' that it is spoken and written in the COUNTLESS DIFFERENT ways around the world is ALL LEARNED, and TAUGHT, along the way.

For example, if you grew up LEARNING what you 'now know' as, 'The man is happy', as, 'Happy is the man', (as it is spoken and written in SOME languages, then 'that' would NOT sound, AT ALL, odd. And, this is NOT because of some CLAIMED 'instinctive knowing'. It is BECAUSE OF being TAUGHT, consciously AND unconsciously of what so-call 'sounds odd' or 'sounds not odd'.

Another example is if you grew up hearing and/or reading, 'Happy man is the', when the words, 'Happy is man the', were TAUGHT, to you, to mean or referred to what you 'now' know as, 'tree is not green'. Words, and thus language, itself, do NOT mean absolutely ANY thing, in and of themselves. you human beings just TEACH and LEARN a 'conceptualized version' of what words, themselves, mean, refer to, and/or are 'pointing at', as some would say, here.

NO one is born KNOWING what 'sounds' 'odd' NOR 'correct'. you ALL just LEARN 'these things', along the way.

I.m inclined to agree with you, and yet I also have to agree with Chomsky, because there is no way a three year old child could acquire such amazing fluency in her native language without some basic knowledge of what order of words makes sense and what order of words does not make sense.

[Age]

Chomsky's theory of language acquisition is called Generative Grammar. Generative grammar is about subconscious knowledge of grammatical rules such that a native speaker of a language knows sort of instinctively if a sentence sounds odd.

But which obviously could only 'arise' AFTER one has 'grown up in' or has 'been already introduced' to 'that language', right?

Obviously the words 'native speaker of a language' could only refer to one that has, ALREADY, HAD prior experience with a particular language

The man is happy.
Happy man is the.

Well considering that the knowing of where the placement of words is correct, like in your example here, only 'arises' AFTER being introduced or being 'educated' in and with a particular language, NO one is born ALREADY knowing what is correct NOR incorrect, here.

Sounds odd , and we know that instinctively and did not have to be taught it.

Are you JOKING, here?

Language is LEARNED, and the DIFFERENT ways languages are SPOKEN, WRITTEN, and TAUGHT all around the world could NEVER be instinctively NOR innately known.

Your question is legitimate although tangential to the main question. It's a long time since I studied Chomsky and I have forgotten the explicit rules , I seem to remember there actually are explicit rules. I'm sorry but I can't find a brief resume of the rules of generative transformational grammar.

That is fine, there is no need to apologize.

Another linguistic theory called linguistic determinism concerns whether or not the Moon is mind-independent. Linguistic determinism is the concept that language and its structures limit and determine human knowledge or thought, as well as thought processes such as categorization, memory, and perception.

Okay. But ALL theories are NOT necessarily true, nor right, completely NOR partly.

Now, OBVIOUSLY, the 'thing', which some of you 'things', called 'human beings', call, and have labelled and/or named, 'moon', existed BEFORE the 'thing', human being, came-to-be, and would still exist even if the 'thing' that some 'things' call and label 'human beings' stopped existing.

And, this applies to ALL 'things'. The 'thing', itself, or 'things', themselves, NEVER depend upon what 'the things', human beings, have 'conceptualized up', or not.

Now, 'communicating' or 'communication', itself, may have some sort of innate, inborn, or instinctive 'knowing' component to it. However, language, itself, and 'the way' that it is spoken and written in the COUNTLESS DIFFERENT ways around the world is ALL LEARNED, and TAUGHT, along the way.

For example, if you grew up LEARNING what you 'now know' as, 'The man is happy', as, 'Happy is the man', (as it is spoken and written in SOME languages, then 'that' would NOT sound, AT ALL, odd. And, this is NOT because of some CLAIMED 'instinctive knowing'. It is BECAUSE OF being TAUGHT, consciously AND unconsciously of what so-call 'sounds odd' or 'sounds not odd'.

Another example is if you grew up hearing and/or reading, 'Happy man is the', when the words, 'Happy is man the', were TAUGHT, to you, to mean or referred to what you 'now' know as, 'tree is not green'. Words, and thus language, itself, do NOT mean absolutely ANY thing, in and of themselves. you human beings just TEACH and LEARN a 'conceptualized version' of what words, themselves, mean, refer to, and/or are 'pointing at', as some would say, here.

NO one is born KNOWING what 'sounds' 'odd' NOR 'correct'. you ALL just LEARN 'these things', along the way.

I.m inclined to agree with you, and yet I also have to agree with Chomsky, because there is no way a three year old child could acquire such amazing fluency in her native language without some basic knowledge of what order of words makes sense and what order of words does not make sense.

I agree, WHOLEHEARTEDLY, that the rate of very young children's ABILITY to GRASP, COMPREHEND, UNDERSTAND, and then REPEAT, words, and/or language, is Truly AMAZING. However, the words 'native language, could be VERY DECEIVING. For an example, ANY child could be born in ANY part of the world, and at ANY given time throughout human history, and be 'transport' just after birth to ANY other part of the world', at ANY other given time throughout human history, and 'that baby' will grow up speaking the 'native language', of that place and time.

So, where does the so-called 'some basic knowledge of what order of words making sense' come FROM, EXACTLY?

I would suggest that it came FROM the 'past experiences' of 'that child', in Life. Again, I would say there is some sort of truth in saying and claiming that there is an 'instinctual knowing' about 'communicating' with other human beings, somehow. But in regards to ever-evolving 'languages', 'worlds' and 'their meanings', themselves, I would have to be SHOWN HOW, exactly.

So, what did that human being "noam chomsky" say, and/or write, EXACTLY, about 'this'?

By the way, I would say and claim that the Truly AMAZING ABILITY of a very young child to GRASP, UNDERSTAND, and COPY 'words', and 'their UNEXPLAINED definitions', or to just become fluent in ANY language that it finds "itself" with in, comes FROM the Truly AMAZING ABILITY of the (ALWAYS OPEN) Mind, within EVERY human being, to be ABLE TO learn, understand, and reason ANY and EVERY thing, AND, the Truly AMAZING ABILITY of the 'brain' to just GRASP ONTO, HOLD, and to RECALL, the 'knowledge', or the words and languages that are spoken and shared around that individual human body, and being.

NO child is born WITH a 'native language', because, literally, there is NO 'native language' on earth. ALL languages evolve and change, and always have been. ANY language only become 'native' AFTER one has been introduced to it and lived with it for a while. Also, what order of words makes sense and what order of words does not make sense is DIFFERENT in DIFFERENT countries, and thus in DIFFERENT languages.

ANY and EVERY child born into one area, with its language, and where the order of words WOULD so-call 'make sense' could be taken to a completely different area, with a completely different language, where the order of words is, also, completely different, but 'that child' would, STILL, be FLUENT in THAT 'native language' where is is completely DIFFERENT from THE 'native language' of the area in which is was born, and even if the parentage was of a consistent lineage of 'that area'.

However, I am, STILL, COMPLETELY OPEN to seeing and hearing what you can find out about so-called 'instinctive or innate knowing' of 'the order of words', which supposedly are 'inborn' in you human beings.

[Belinda]

But which obviously could only 'arise' AFTER one has 'grown up in' or has 'been already introduced' to 'that language', right?

Obviously the words 'native speaker of a language' could only refer to one that has, ALREADY, HAD prior experience with a particular language


Well considering that the knowing of where the placement of words is correct, like in your example here, only 'arises' AFTER being introduced or being 'educated' in and with a particular language, NO one is born ALREADY knowing what is correct NOR incorrect, here.



Are you JOKING, here?

Language is LEARNED, and the DIFFERENT ways languages are SPOKEN, WRITTEN, and TAUGHT all around the world could NEVER be instinctively NOR innately known.


That is fine, there is no need to apologize.


Okay. But ALL theories are NOT necessarily true, nor right, completely NOR partly.

Now, OBVIOUSLY, the 'thing', which some of you 'things', called 'human beings', call, and have labelled and/or named, 'moon', existed BEFORE the 'thing', human being, came-to-be, and would still exist even if the 'thing' that some 'things' call and label 'human beings' stopped existing.

And, this applies to ALL 'things'. The 'thing', itself, or 'things', themselves, NEVER depend upon what 'the things', human beings, have 'conceptualized up', or not.

Now, 'communicating' or 'communication', itself, may have some sort of innate, inborn, or instinctive 'knowing' component to it. However, language, itself, and 'the way' that it is spoken and written in the COUNTLESS DIFFERENT ways around the world is ALL LEARNED, and TAUGHT, along the way.

For example, if you grew up LEARNING what you 'now know' as, 'The man is happy', as, 'Happy is the man', (as it is spoken and written in SOME languages, then 'that' would NOT sound, AT ALL, odd. And, this is NOT because of some CLAIMED 'instinctive knowing'. It is BECAUSE OF being TAUGHT, consciously AND unconsciously of what so-call 'sounds odd' or 'sounds not odd'.

Another example is if you grew up hearing and/or reading, 'Happy man is the', when the words, 'Happy is man the', were TAUGHT, to you, to mean or referred to what you 'now' know as, 'tree is not green'. Words, and thus language, itself, do NOT mean absolutely ANY thing, in and of themselves. you human beings just TEACH and LEARN a 'conceptualized version' of what words, themselves, mean, refer to, and/or are 'pointing at', as some would say, here.

NO one is born KNOWING what 'sounds' 'odd' NOR 'correct'. you ALL just LEARN 'these things', along the way.

I.m inclined to agree with you, and yet I also have to agree with Chomsky, because there is no way a three year old child could acquire such amazing fluency in her native language without some basic knowledge of what order of words makes sense and what order of words does not make sense.

I agree, WHOLEHEARTEDLY, that the rate of very young children's ABILITY to GRASP, COMPREHEND, UNDERSTAND, and then REPEAT, words, and/or language, is Truly AMAZING. However, the words 'native language, could be VERY DECEIVING. For an example, ANY child could be born in ANY part of the world, and at ANY given time throughout human history, and be 'transport' just after birth to ANY other part of the world', at ANY other given time throughout human history, and 'that baby' will grow up speaking the 'native language', of that place and time.

So, where does the so-called 'some basic knowledge of what order of words making sense' come FROM, EXACTLY?

I would suggest that it came FROM the 'past experiences' of 'that child', in Life. Again, I would say there is some sort of truth in saying and claiming that there is an 'instinctual knowing' about 'communicating' with other human beings, somehow. But in regards to ever-evolving 'languages', 'worlds' and 'their meanings', themselves, I would have to be SHOWN HOW, exactly.

So, what did that human being "noam chomsky" say, and/or write, EXACTLY, about 'this'?

By the way, I would say and claim that the Truly AMAZING ABILITY of a very young child to GRASP, UNDERSTAND, and COPY 'words', and 'their UNEXPLAINED definitions', or to just become fluent in ANY language that it finds "itself" with in, comes FROM the Truly AMAZING ABILITY of the (ALWAYS OPEN) Mind, within EVERY human being, to be ABLE TO learn, understand, and reason ANY and EVERY thing, AND, the Truly AMAZING ABILITY of the 'brain' to just GRASP ONTO, HOLD, and to RECALL, the 'knowledge', or the words and languages that are spoken and shared around that individual human body, and being.

NO child is born WITH a 'native language', because, literally, there is NO 'native language' on earth. ALL languages evolve and change, and always have been. ANY language only become 'native' AFTER one has been introduced to it and lived with it for a while. Also, what order of words makes sense and what order of words does not make sense is DIFFERENT in DIFFERENT countries, and thus in DIFFERENT languages.

ANY and EVERY child born into one area, with its language, and where the order of words WOULD so-call 'make sense' could be taken to a completely different area, with a completely different language, where the order of words is, also, completely different, but 'that child' would, STILL, be FLUENT in THAT 'native language' where is is completely DIFFERENT from THE 'native language' of the area in which is was born, and even if the parentage was of a consistent lineage of 'that area'.

However, I am, STILL, COMPLETELY OPEN to seeing and hearing what you can find out about so-called 'instinctive or innate knowing' of 'the order of words', which supposedly are 'inborn' in you human beings.

You are of course right that "native language" needed explanation in the context of Chomsky's universal grammar. Your question in your second last paragraph does indicate an important part of Chomsky's theory. Universal does in fact mean that the grammar is the SAME BASIC structure in any and all human languages .And also that this basic structure generates all human languages.
It's called generative universal grammar.

It's always good to be asked questions that make us think and think again.

[amihart]

This is odd, how can it be contextualized which require a mind if no mind or consciousness are involved.There are no absolutely mind-independent object that 'send' signal as appearances; but there is mind-related appearance appearing to the mind-related empirical self.

Why do you think contextualization requires mind? How can there be mind-related appearances if there is nothing independent of them to "appear"?

I don't think contextual-direct-realism makes sense within the current philosophical community? You have an argument for it?

Philosophy is not a popularity contest. Metaphysical realism is indeed far more popular than any sort of direct realism, like contextual realism, but that does not make it correct. Indeed, I find the hard problem of consciousness to be a proof by contradiction that metaphysical realism just is not a tenable position, at it leads to irreconcilable contradictions which metaphysical philosophers have written hundreds of thousands of pages on yet never proposed a single convincing solution.

Let me give you an analogy. Let's say in the early days of mathematics, the axioms weren't formulated very well so you could prove within the mathematical framework that 2+2=5. If that's the case, then you can prove that 0=1, and you end up with a contradiction, and you can prove just about anything. Now, let's imagine that those early mathematicians, rather than recognizing their axioms were just poorly formulated and needed adjustment, instead believed that 2+2=5 reflected some profound property of nature that needed some additional new scientific discovery to "solve," or maybe there is some additional nonphysical substance that you need to add to 2+2+(this substance) to get to 5.

This would be very bizarre and maybe even a bit silly, no? That's how I see most philosophers who write on the hard problem of consciousness. They treat it as reflecting something deeply profound about reality, that it either needs some new major scientific breakthrough to explain, or some even go as far as saying it requires introducing an entirely nonphysical substance. From my point of view, all of this is missing the mark. The problem is just a contradiction because the axioms are poorly formulated. Metaphysical realism is just a self-contradictory position.

Not only is metaphysical realism a self-contradictory position, but the arguments against direct realism are incredibly weak. For example, one popular argument is of optical illusions that supposedly prove we do not see reality as it really is. Yet, all optical illusions prove is that we may fail to interpret reality correctly if we are provided limited information. The failure here is not on reality, as if reality presents itself in a way that is false, but it is on us for jumping to incorrect conclusions. As Jocelyn Benoist would say, reality cannot be true nor false: reality just is what it is.

There is ultimately three reasons why I find direct realism to be the most tenable positions. (1) Metaphysical realism is self-contradictory, see the hard problem of consciousness. (2) Arguments against direct realism are incredibly weak. (3) Direct realism is more parsimonious, as metaphysical realism posits two fundamental concepts: experience + reality, whereas direct realism only posits a single fundamental concept: experience = reality, not as a claim, but as a definition, i.e. the are used interchangeably as synonyms. The experience of a tree is the reality of the tree.

The reason for contextual realism specifically is because it is just an unavoidable consequence of being a direct realist. In Thomas Nagel's essay "What is it like to be a bat?" he argues that if reality is independent of point of view, well, clearly our experience of the world depends upon perspective, and so Nagel concludes experience must be something separate from reality and created by the "mammalian brain." This is metaphysical realism. If we take a direct realist stance, then the fact experience depends upon perspective means we have to conclude that reality itself is perspectival. There simply is no perspective-independent, point-of-view independent reality. Such a thing is a metaphysical fantasy.

If you take direct realism seriously, you inevitably fall into contextualism, or something similar, like relationalism or perspectivalism. You routinely see philosophers like Ernest Mach, Alexander Bogdanov, Jocelyn Benoist, Carlo Rovelli, etc, all coming to similar conclusions like this from taking a more direct realist approach. It's unavoidable, and Nagel's essay unintentionally points out the exact reason why. If you presume there exists a reality independent of context, this does not comport with our experiences, and thus contradicts "experience = reality," and so I do not find it compatible with direct realism.

As I read it, contextual realism could believe,
no humans = no absolutely mind-independent moon, but maybe or maybe not?

There is no context-independent moon, i.e. you have to specify the context under which the moon's properties are realized, a context is kind of like a perspective. That context may be the observation of a human observer, but it could be something else. I could send a robot to observe the moon and write down what they see and report back to me. Structurally, this is not fundamentally different than sending a person to do the same. In both cases, I presume that from the robot's perspective, and from the human's perspective, they really are seeing something, i.e. the properties of the moon are realized in their own contexts, from their own perspectives. If I did not presume this, then how could I conclude they would indeed succeed in observing anything at all?

The point is that the moon only exists in respect to some context. Some "perspective" if you will. That "perspective" does not have to be that of a conscious human agent with a mind. It could even be defined in terms of a single fundamental particle. To quote Francois-Igor Pris, "An application of any theory, as well as any norm, rule or concept, including quantum mechanics, depends on a context. This is so in a broad sense – a theory is applicable only in the domain of its applicability (again, this is a tautology) – as well as in a narrow sense: any application of a theory within the domain of its applicability requires attention to the concrete conditions of its application (context)."

If we talk about objects in the abstract, independently of the concrete conditions in which that word for that object is applied, then we are not meaningfully talking about anything real. Cats in the abstract are not real, circles in the abstract are not real, the color blue in the abstract is not real. However, if we observe in a real context, and identify within those concrete conditions, a cat or a circle or blueness, they are indeed real and other observers can also verify its reality for themselves. Similarly, the moon in the abstract is not meaningfully real, but the concrete conditions under which the norm "moon" is applied to judge a set of real experiences to be something, i.e. to be the moon, that is the real moon.

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is odd, how can it be contextualized which require a mind if no mind or consciousness are involved.There are no absolutely mind-independent object that 'send' signal as appearances; but there is mind-related appearance appearing to the mind-related empirical self.

Why do you think contextualization requires mind? How can there be mind-related appearances if there is nothing independent of them to "appear"?

It is self-explanatory 'contextualization' is a mental [mind] activity, therefore requires mind [as defined https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind].
Note mind-related appearances within hallucinations, i.e. that are "real-appearance" to the hallucinator; such appearances does not require 'something-that-appear', they are merely mind-related.

In a way, what we realized as real is some sort of hallucinations which is more realistic than the typical "unreal" hallucinations.
Anil Seth: Is Reality a Controlled Hallucination?
viewtopic.php?f=5&t=34077

I don't think contextual-direct-realism makes sense within the current philosophical community? You have an argument for it?

Philosophy is not a popularity contest. Metaphysical realism is indeed far more popular than any sort of direct realism, like contextual realism, but that does not make it correct. Indeed, I find the hard problem of consciousness to be a proof by contradiction that metaphysical realism just is not a tenable position, at it leads to irreconcilable contradictions which metaphysical philosophers have written hundreds of thousands of pages on yet never proposed a single convincing solution.

Let me give you an analogy. Let's say in the early days of mathematics, the axioms weren't formulated very well so you could prove within the mathematical framework that 2+2=5. If that's the case, then you can prove that 0=1, and you end up with a contradiction, and you can prove just about anything. Now, let's imagine that those early mathematicians, rather than recognizing their axioms were just poorly formulated and needed adjustment, instead believed that 2+2=5 reflected some profound property of nature that needed some additional new scientific discovery to "solve," or maybe there is some additional nonphysical substance that you need to add to 2+2+(this substance) to get to 5.

This would be very bizarre and maybe even a bit silly, no? That's how I see most philosophers who write on the hard problem of consciousness. They treat it as reflecting something deeply profound about reality, that it either needs some new major scientific breakthrough to explain, or some even go as far as saying it requires introducing an entirely nonphysical substance. From my point of view, all of this is missing the mark. The problem is just a contradiction because the axioms are poorly formulated. Metaphysical realism is just a self-contradictory position.

Not only is metaphysical realism a self-contradictory position, but the arguments against direct realism are incredibly weak. For example, one popular argument is of optical illusions that supposedly prove we do not see reality as it really is. Yet, all optical illusions prove is that we may fail to interpret reality correctly if we are provided limited information. The failure here is not on reality, as if reality presents itself in a way that is false, but it is on us for jumping to incorrect conclusions. As Jocelyn Benoist would say, reality cannot be true nor false: reality just is what it is.

There is ultimately three reasons why I find direct realism to be the most tenable positions. (1) Metaphysical realism is self-contradictory, see the hard problem of consciousness. (2) Arguments against direct realism are incredibly weak. (3) Direct realism is more parsimonious, as metaphysical realism posits two fundamental concepts: experience + reality, whereas direct realism only posits a single fundamental concept: experience = reality, not as a claim, but as a definition, i.e. the are used interchangeably as synonyms. The experience of a tree is the reality of the tree.

The reason for contextual realism specifically is because it is just an unavoidable consequence of being a direct realist. In Thomas Nagel's essay "What is it like to be a bat?" he argues that if reality is independent of point of view, well, clearly our experience of the world depends upon perspective, and so Nagel concludes experience must be something separate from reality and created by the "mammalian brain." This is metaphysical realism. If we take a direct realist stance, then the fact experience depends upon perspective means we have to conclude that reality itself is perspectival. There simply is no perspective-independent, point-of-view independent reality. Such a thing is a metaphysical fantasy.

If you take direct realism seriously, you inevitably fall into contextualism, or something similar, like relationalism or perspectivalism. You routinely see philosophers like Ernest Mach, Alexander Bogdanov, Jocelyn Benoist, Carlo Rovelli, etc, all coming to similar conclusions like this from taking a more direct realist approach. It's unavoidable, and Nagel's essay unintentionally points out the exact reason why. If you presume there exists a reality independent of context, this does not comport with our experiences, and thus contradicts "experience = reality," and so I do not find it compatible with direct realism.

Noted your point.
However, I was referring to the typical version of 'Direct Realism', i.e.

In philosophy of perception and epistemology, naïve realism (also known as direct realism or perceptual realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.[1]
According to the naïve realist, the objects of perception are not representations of external objects, but are in fact those external objects themselves.
The naïve realist is typically also a metaphysical realist, holding that these objects continue to obey the laws of physics and retain all of their properties regardless of whether or not there is anyone to observe them.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Na%C3%AFve_realism

In this sense, direct [naïve] realism do not seem to be able to reconcile with contextual realism.

As I read it, contextual realism could believe,
no humans = no absolutely mind-independent moon, but maybe or maybe not?

There is no context-independent moon, i.e. you have to specify the context under which the moon's properties are realized, a context is kind of like a perspective. That context may be the observation of a human observer, but it could be something else. I could send a robot to observe the moon and write down what they see and report back to me. Structurally, this is not fundamentally different than sending a person to do the same. In both cases, I presume that from the robot's perspective, and from the human's perspective, they really are seeing something, i.e. the properties of the moon are realized in their own contexts, from their own perspectives. If I did not presume this, then how could I conclude they would indeed succeed in observing anything at all?

The point is that the moon only exists in respect to some context. Some "perspective" if you will. That "perspective" does not have to be that of a conscious human agent with a mind. It could even be defined in terms of a single fundamental particle. To quote Francois-Igor Pris, "An application of any theory, as well as any norm, rule or concept, including quantum mechanics, depends on a context. This is so in a broad sense – a theory is applicable only in the domain of its applicability (again, this is a tautology) – as well as in a narrow sense: any application of a theory within the domain of its applicability requires attention to the concrete conditions of its application (context)."

If we talk about objects in the abstract, independently of the concrete conditions in which that word for that object is applied, then we are not meaningfully talking about anything real. Cats in the abstract are not real, circles in the abstract are not real, the color blue in the abstract is not real.
However, if we observe in a real context, and identify within those concrete conditions, a cat or a circle or blueness, they are indeed real and other observers can also verify its reality for themselves.
Similarly, the moon in the abstract is not meaningfully real, but the concrete conditions under which the norm "moon" is applied to judge a set of real experiences to be something, i.e. to be the moon, that is the real moon.

Re the bolded above,
what is a real cat is a contextual cat
so what is a real moon is a contextual moon.
What is contextual is mind-related, i.e. mind require human beings.
So, no humans = no metaphysical realist moon.

A Metaphysical realist [also philosophical realist] will insist the moon exists regardless of whether there are humans or not, i.e. it exists absolutely mind-independently.

If you are not a Metaphysical realist [also philosophical realist] then you're an ANTI_Philosophical_Realism, i.e. you oppose and reject the ideology Metaphysical realism [also philosophical realism].

Btw, I have downloaded 'your uploaded?' Contextual Realism and Quantum Mechanics by Igor Pris and is reading it [intend to cover first 4 Chapters and the conclusion].
I am trying to find Benoist's Book but none available.

Note my:
What is a Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK]?
viewtopic.php?t=43232
it is ANTI-Metaphysical_Realism and ANTI-Philosophical_Realism

[amihart]

It is self-explanatory 'contextualization' is a mental [mind] activity, therefore requires mind [as defined https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind].

I was talking about context, not contextualization which is obviously very different. It's like the difference between the words society and socialization. One is just a noun referring to something, the other is an active process carried out by people. When you contextualize something you put it into context. The context I'm talking about is what is already there prior to you doing anything, more akin to "the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood."

Note mind-related appearances within hallucinations, i.e. that are "real-appearance" to the hallucinator; such appearances does not require 'something-that-appear', they are merely mind-related.

They are neither appearances nor does anything "appear." Objects they identify in their hallucinations are still real objects as the person is really hallucinating, they are undergoing a real experience in the real world. They would be mistaken if they confused the objects of their hallucination as the same kind of object as those when they are not hallucinating, such as, to confuse a hallucinated tree for a non-hallucinated tree, but they are not wrong to state they observe a hallucinated tree. That is a real object that they have perceived and identified.

Re the bolded above,
what is a real cat is a contextual cat
so what is a real moon is a contextual moon.
What is contextual is mind-related, i.e. mind require human beings.

No, contextual does not mean mind-related. Unless you just want to define it as such. But then "mind" just becomes synonymous with reality itself, and so you achieve idealism by fiat. Which, as I said, you are perfectly free to define things in any way you wish, so no argument could be made against it if that is what you wish to do, but I personally see no reason to substitute the word reality for mind, as "mind" usually carries a lot more connotations and thus it can be misleading.

It is too self-referential, as a noun talking about "the mind" is like talking bout "the self" or "the brain." You can't begin from a position of self-reference. The self only exists as an object identified in reflections, so it is exists alongside all other objects, including those that are not the self, and holds no special place. The more abstract "mind," if you say it has nothing to do with the self and is just what we experience, then you would, again, just be defining the mind to be reality, so you establish idealism by definition. Allowed, but strange.

Btw, I have downloaded 'your uploaded?' Contextual Realism and Quantum Mechanics by Igor Pris and is reading it [intend to cover first 4 Chapters and the conclusion].

That book is hard to read because there is no proper English translations of his works. Some scammy company was selling AI translations which are horrible. I bought one and scanned it just so nobody else would have to give that company money. The book is definitely readable if you already have a background on the topic. If you don't, it will be very hard to follow, because the poor translation has a lot of errors which if you don't have some background (on both quantum theory and contextual realism) it will be difficult to know what it's talking about.

I am trying to find Benoist's Book but none available.

Toward a Contextual Realism

[Veritas Aequitas]

I believe my FSK encompasses Contextual Realism [CR].
What is a Framework and System of Knowledge [FSK]?
viewtopic.php?t=43232
it is ANTI-Metaphysical_Realism and ANTI-Philosophical_Realism
Do you have any comment on it in relation to your CR?

It is self-explanatory 'contextualization' is a mental [mind] activity, therefore requires mind [as defined https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind].

I was talking about context, not contextualization which is obviously very different. It's like the difference between the words society and socialization. One is just a noun referring to something, the other is an active process carried out by people. When you contextualize something you put it into context. The context I'm talking about is what is already there prior to you doing anything, more akin to "the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood."

Since I regard CR as a subset of my FSK, the context within CR is ultimately mind-related.
Your 'reality is what it is' require nuance considerations; I define reality as 'all there is' which is be contextualized [re CR].

Here's from AI:

You can clarify the interdependence of "context" and "contextualization" in Contextual Realism and how the concept of context inherently involves human minds, even in its seemingly static form. Here's how you can approach the counterargument:

1. Context is Not Independent of Minds
The claim that context "is already there" before any human action assumes a static and objective notion of context. However, in Contextual Realism, contexts are not pre-given or absolute; they are shaped by human conceptual frameworks, practices, and perspectives. Even when context seems to be a "circumstance that forms the setting," it presupposes:
A human perspective to define and interpret those circumstances.
A framework of meaning to delineate what counts as the relevant "setting."
Counterpoint:
"Even the concept of 'circumstances that form the setting' assumes a framework for determining relevance, which is inherently mind-dependent. What is 'already there' is not a context until it is identified, structured, and understood through human cognition and interaction."

2. The Act of Identifying Context is Contextualization
Even if you focus on context as a static "setting," this setting is only meaningful when related to an event, idea, or statement. This act of relating—or assigning significance—is an act of contextualization that cannot occur without minds:

The process of understanding or situating an event requires cognitive engagement.
Without minds, circumstances remain unstructured and undifferentiated, lacking the relational quality that defines "context."

Counterpoint:
"Context is inseparable from the act of contextualization because its meaningfulness depends on human perspectives. What is 'already there' only becomes a context through its relational interpretation by a mind."

3. Context in Contextual Realism is Dynamic
In Contextual Realism, context is not merely the passive background but is dynamic, shaped by ongoing human interactions and cultural-historical factors. This dynamism blurs the boundary between "context" and "contextualization":

Contexts evolve and are redefined based on human practices, language, and intentionality.
Even static-seeming contexts (e.g., physical settings) gain significance only through human engagement.

Counterpoint:
"Context is not a static, pre-existing entity. In Contextual Realism, it evolves through human interaction and meaning-making. What appears 'already there' is actually part of a dynamic process shaped by human perspectives and interpretations."

4. Use a Wittgensteinian Perspective
Wittgenstein’s philosophy supports the idea that context (like meaning) is inherently tied to human use and practices. His notion of "language games" demonstrates that what we call "context" derives its significance from the rules, norms, and practices of human interaction.

Counterpoint:
"From a Wittgensteinian perspective, context gains its meaning through human practices, much like language. Even if it feels 'pre-existing,' its relevance and structure depend on the shared frameworks we bring to it."

5. Address the Analogy Directly
The analogy between "society" and "socialization" highlights a distinction between a noun and a process. However, contexts and contextualization are not as easily separable because:

A society can exist without direct ongoing acts of socialization, but contexts require interpretation to be meaningful.
Contexts are not just "there" in the same way as a society because their relevance always involves human frameworks.

Counterpoint:
"While society can exist independently of acts of socialization, context cannot exist independently of contextualization. Context requires human frameworks to define what is relevant, meaningful, or part of the 'setting' in question."

Concluding Counterargument
You can summarize your position as follows:

• "Context in the sense of 'circumstances forming a setting' still depends on human minds to identify, interpret, and relate those circumstances to a specific event or idea. In Contextual Realism, context is not an independent, pre-existing entity but a relational and interpretive framework shaped by human cognition, culture, and history. Without human minds, there are no contexts, only undifferentiated circumstances lacking relevance or meaning."

This argument reinforces the centrality of minds to the notion of context within Contextual Realism, countering the attempt to separate "context" from human involvement.

Note mind-related appearances within hallucinations, i.e. that are "real-appearance" to the hallucinator; such appearances does not require 'something-that-appear', they are merely mind-related.

They are neither appearances nor does anything "appear." Objects they identify in their hallucinations are still real objects as the person is really hallucinating, they are undergoing a real experience in the real world. They would be mistaken if they confused the objects of their hallucination as the same kind of object as those when they are not hallucinating, such as, to confuse a hallucinated tree for a non-hallucinated tree, but they are not wrong to state they observe a hallucinated tree. That is a real object that they have perceived and identified.

Philosophically, what is "appearance" is that which is brought to consciousness and enabling one to recognize it as 'something' regardless of whether it is typically real [cognized properly] or not [hallucinated].
I call that 'appearance' while you at the least recognize it as 'something that is brought forth to conscious awareness' or you have another view to it?

A Metaphysical realist will claim that "something that is brought forth to conscious awareness" pre-existed or existing in the external world, i.e. absolutely mind-independent.

A Contextual Realist will claim that "something that is brought forth to conscious awareness" as a context of reality as what-it-is. In this case, it has to be mind-related.

Me, a FS Realist claims that "something that is brought forth to conscious awareness" is somehow human/mind-related, i.e. the argument;
Reality is Human_Mind-Related
viewtopic.php?t=43260
1. Reality is all-there-is
2. All-there-is comprised humans [minds].
3. Therefore, humans [minds] are intricately part and parcel of reality [all there is].
4. Therefore, reality cannot be absolutely independent of humans [minds].

Appearances are part and parcel of reality,
therefore appearances are mind-related.

Re the bolded above,
what is a real cat is a contextual cat
so what is a real moon is a contextual moon.
What is contextual is mind-related, i.e. mind require human beings.

No, contextual does not mean mind-related. Unless you just want to define it as such. But then "mind" just becomes synonymous with reality itself, and so you achieve idealism by fiat. Which, as I said, you are perfectly free to define things in any way you wish, so no argument could be made against it if that is what you wish to do, but I personally see no reason to substitute the word reality for mind, as "mind" usually carries a lot more connotations and thus it can be misleading.

It is too self-referential, as a noun talking about "the mind" is like talking bout "the self" or "the brain." You can't begin from a position of self-reference. The self only exists as an object identified in reflections, so it is exists alongside all other objects, including those that are not the self, and holds no special place. The more abstract "mind," if you say it has nothing to do with the self and is just what we experience, then you would, again, just be defining the mind to be reality, so you establish idealism by definition. Allowed, but strange.

Within contexts, an idealist can be a realist and vice-versa
For example a Metaphysical Realist [MR] is a Transcendental Idealist. For the MR whatever is really real is beyond the mind but that is be a postulation [speculation] by the mind. Because the central focus of the MR is confined to sense datum in the mind, the MR is also a transcendental realist, i.e. his reality is beyond [transcendent] the mind.

Meanwhile your attribution to my view as mind-related is idealism, it would be Transcendental Idealism [Kant] who is also an empirical realism where the focus in on the direct empirical world and empirical evidences, i.e. based on scientific antirealism.
As such a mind-related transcendental_idealist-empirical_realist is relying on scientific antirealism is more credible and objective than transcendental_realist-empirical_idealist.

To make sense of the above we need the FSK, i.e. FS Realism.

Self-referencing is inevitable when dealing with humans' since there is a default of iterativeness within itself as an evolving system.

Btw, I have downloaded 'your uploaded?' Contextual Realism and Quantum Mechanics by Igor Pris and is reading it [intend to cover first 4 Chapters and the conclusion].

That book is hard to read because there is no proper English translations of his works. Some scammy company was selling AI translations which are horrible. I bought one and scanned it just so nobody else would have to give that company money. The book is definitely readable if you already have a background on the topic. If you don't, it will be very hard to follow, because the poor translation has a lot of errors which if you don't have some background (on both quantum theory and contextual realism) it will be difficult to know what it's talking about.

I am trying to find Benoist's Book but none available.

Toward a Contextual Realism

When I put my attention on subject like CR, I will attempt to exhaust everything that is to know of the subject.
I have scan the internet for resources in CR.
The relevant topics [excluding QM] in Contextual Realism and Quantum Mechanics by Igor Pris do give an idea of what CR is driving at.
I cannot afford to buy books, I can't find a free download of Benoist's Book Toward a Contextual Realism. I can read parts of it in GoodReads.

The grey area I noted with CR is its 'reality is what it is' which is problematic.
Note Kant demonstrated a thing-in-itself or a thing-by-itself is not feasible to be really real.
What is really really is contingent upon a human-based [collective-of-subjects] Framework and System [FS] with conditions from 13.7 billion years of physical history and 3.5 billion years of organic history up to the present. In a way this is a necessary context that must be considered with reference to reality. Somehow [can be explained] all this is mind-related and self-referencing.

[Lee horgan]

Philosophical Realism [absolute] versus Philosophical AntiRealism [relative]

• [[b[/b]

Philosophical Realism [cover indirect/direct realism, scientific realism ] claims there is a real absolutely mind-independent object [noumenon] beyond empirical observations.
see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

On the other hand, Philosophical antirealism oppose and reject such a claim, i.e. it is impossible for a real absolutely mind-independent object [noumenon] to exists beyond empirical observations.

Rather, Philosophical antirealists [Kantian] claim there is only a relatively mind-independent object within the empirical world. As such, while humans do observe an apple on a tree out there which is independent from humans physically, somehow [require detailed explanations] they are still related to the human conditions.

Here at 54:37
https://youtu.be/ISdBAf-ysI0?t=3268
Professor Jim Al-Khalili stated,
"In some strange sense, it really does suggest the moon doesn't exists when we are not looking. It truly defies common sense."

So, there is no absolutely mind-independent moon if there are no humans.

While Al-Khalili [as a Quantum Physicist] admit the above, as a dogmatic philosophical realist he is unable to accept the above fact from QM. This reflect a psychological issue dealing with the pains of cognitive dissonances which he had to avoid.

I had argued, philosophical realism is a dogmatic ideology that is adopted from an evolutionary default to deal with an existential crisis that generate cognitive dissonance that generate terrible and terrific existential pains and terror at a subliminal level.

While philosophical realists are at the mercy of the above terror, philosophical antirealists has evolved and matured further to be able to manage the terror of the evolutionary default to some degrees.

As such the contentions between Philosophical Realists [absolute] versus Philosophical AntiRealists [relative] has to be revealed by Critical Philosophy and resolved at the psychological level and not the epistemological level.

Discuss??
Views??

Note this is merely philosophical discussion not a "whack-a-mole" game.

[Lee horgan]

Hello to all
I'm a new member to this forum.
I stumbled upon a post that suggested that time would not exist without a human observer to see the passage of time itself and equally said if there were no human observer to see the passage of time to entire universe wouldn't exist either.
Please don't judge my post and ignore it for thinking I'm not of the correct IQ to understand logical complex explanations I'm just curious to know what the post was actually implying was the author saying that if humans had never evolved when they did but evolved this year that time would only start when we were conscious of aging and by seasonal conditions in the weather,
So for animals that are not conscious of their own life span time didn't exist for animals that had no concept of thier mortality.
Time exists everywhere,
Even a black hole depends on time if you could watch a black whole from earth and see it move or suck in star's planet's ect you could monitor the amount of time it takes for materials to be attracted and finally swallowed by the black hole the time scale maybe different but it is still time passing for everything involved.
I'm not posting this to show my ignorance to be blatantly ridiculed I'm very interested to learn more and would appreciate some respect and courteous replies.
Many thanks in advance for your help and patience
Kind regards Lee

[Age]

Hello to all
I'm a new member to this forum.
I stumbled upon a post that suggested that time would not exist without a human observer to see the passage of time itself and equally said if there were no human observer to see the passage of time to entire universe wouldn't exist either.
Please don't judge my post and ignore it for thinking I'm not of the correct IQ to understand logical complex explanations I'm just curious to know what the post was actually implying was the author saying that if humans had never evolved when they did but evolved this year that time would only start when we were conscious of aging and by seasonal conditions in the weather,
So for animals that are not conscious of their own life span time didn't exist for animals that had no concept of thier mortality.
Time exists everywhere,
Even a black hole depends on time if you could watch a black whole from earth and see it move or suck in star's planet's ect you could monitor the amount of time it takes for materials to be attracted and finally swallowed by the black hole the time scale maybe different but it is still time passing for everything involved.
I'm not posting this to show my ignorance to be blatantly ridiculed I'm very interested to learn more and would appreciate some respect and courteous replies.
Many thanks in advance for your help and patience
Kind regards Lee

Just out of curiosity why do you not ask the one who wrote the post what they were implying, instead of 'us', here?

[Martin Peter Clarke]

There are no humans, no observers in 99.99..99% of the universe. Of my back yard. Right now!!! So it's not there! Yeah, that's what Jim Al-Khalili means!!!! Yeahh, right. OK. Yeah, the photons indeterminately bouncing off the moon ARE the moon! Right? I mean, hey man. Who need weed?

[Belinda]

There are no humans, no observers in 99.99..99% of the universe. Of my back yard. Right now!!! So it's not there! Yeah, that's what Jim Al-Khalili means!!!! Yeahh, right. OK. Yeah, the photons indeterminately bouncing off the moon ARE the moon! Right? I mean, hey man. Who need weed?

For brief moment the universe was able to look at itself in a mirror.

[FlashDangerpants]

For brief moment the universe was able to look at itself in a mirror.

Waste of a perfectly good universe that is.

[Belinda]

For brief moment the universe was able to look at itself in a mirror.

Waste of a perfectly good universe that is.

The process and development of the universe may displease you , Attofishpi, however it was not made for your pleasure.

[FlashDangerpants]

For brief moment the universe was able to look at itself in a mirror.

Waste of a perfectly good universe that is.

The process and development of the universe may displease you , Attofishpi, however it was not made for your pleasure.

I have been called some dreadful things in my time, but my honour cannot permit me to forgive this slight. There shall be a duel!