Alexiev wrote: ↑Fri Dec 20, 2024 6:15 pm
BigMike wrote: ↑Thu Dec 19, 2024 12:33 am
Alexiev, your response veers into emotional rhetoric and misrepresentation rather than engaging with the core argument. You conflate the deterministic understanding of choice with a denial of agency, which is not what I’m proposing. Let’s address this step by step:
First,
you are misunderstanding determinism in the context of choice. The definition of choice you provided—“an act of selecting or making a decision when faced with two or more possibilities”—does not contradict determinism. Under determinism, the act of selection is shaped entirely by prior causes: neural processes, environmental factors, and biological predispositions. The “possibilities” you perceive are products of your mind integrating inputs, but the decision you ultimately make is not free of those causes.
Second,
your gambler analogy doesn’t rescue the notion of free will. Yes, the gambler perceives possibilities, but the card they draw is predetermined, as is the decision-making process that leads them to bet, fold, or bluff. Their decision feels autonomous, but it’s driven by a web of prior influences—experience, emotion, and probability assessments. Determinism doesn’t negate the subjective experience of deliberation; it explains it.
Now, to address your dramatic leap into morality:
determinism does not absolve moral responsibility; it redefines its basis. Responsibility isn’t about some mystical “freedom” to transcend causality—it’s about understanding the causes of behavior and acting to shape better outcomes. Determinism doesn’t excuse cruelty or oppression; it provides the framework to understand why it occurs and how to prevent it. You invoke the image of the slave master wielding a whip, yet fail to see that determinism is precisely what allows us to identify the systemic causes of such oppression—economic conditions, cultural ideologies, and power structures—and work to dismantle them.
Finally,
your use of “freedom” is loaded with emotional connotations but lacks precision. Freedom in the deterministic sense isn’t about being uncaused; it’s about operating within the parameters of what causes allow. Slavery is a denial of freedoms granted by societal norms and ethical considerations, not some metaphysical violation of free will. A determinist framework doesn’t deny the harm of slavery—it deepens our understanding of the causes behind it and strengthens the case for its abolition.
If you truly believe my argument promotes evil, then you’re either misreading it or willfully ignoring the nuance. Determinism doesn’t eliminate moral responsibility; it shifts our focus to addressing the causes of suffering and oppression, which is far more constructive than clinging to an antiquated notion of “freedom” detached from causality.
You appear unable or unwilling to understand my points. Of course using my definition of "choice", choice does not contradict determinism (nor does it verify it). I've so stated many times.
Your logic appears to be:
P1: All our actions and behaviors are predetermined by the laws of physics (and environmental factors)
P2 If actions are unalterable (i.e. predetermined) those who do them should not be blamed
Therefore, we should not ascribe moral blame to murderers, rapists, and embezzlers.
Of course the problematic postulate is #2 (even if we accept #1). Why should we refuse to ascribe moral blame? All actions that have already happened are unalterable. Does that imply that we can ascribe moral blame only to potential events that might happen in the future?
In addition, your deterministic theory is that humans' behavior is determined by biology and culture. WE wouldn't learn to speak English if the language did not exist. So why would you think that changing the culture by refusing to ascribe moral blame (or praise) would improve society? Isn't it far more likely that moral rules and the sanctions (positive or negative) that accompany them help conduce human happiness and prevent mayhem?
Continue to argue (if you want) for determinism. But the notion that acceptance of determinism will (or should) change human society is, I think, incorrect -- especially so as you present it.
Alexiev, let’s tackle this head-on because your critique zeroes in on one of the most challenging aspects of determinism: how it intersects with moral responsibility and societal norms. The heart of your argument seems to hinge on the idea that determinism undermines the utility of moral blame and sanctions. Let me clarify why that’s not the case.
First, let’s revisit your interpretation of my logic:
1. Yes, our actions are predetermined by the laws of physics and environmental factors. This is a deterministic framework.
2. No, this does not mean we abandon all notions of responsibility; it means we rethink what responsibility is and how it functions in a deterministic context.
When we talk about "moral blame," we’re addressing a system that has evolved to regulate behavior. In a deterministic framework, the point isn’t to eliminate consequences or accountability—it’s to align them with the actual causes of behavior. When someone commits a harmful act, determinism doesn’t excuse them; it explains why they acted the way they did. This understanding enables society to target the underlying causes—be they psychological, environmental, or systemic—rather than focusing on punitive measures that often fail to address the root of the issue.
Your concern about societal improvement is valid. Would refusing to ascribe moral blame improve society? Not if it’s simply replaced with permissiveness or chaos. However, determinism advocates for a shift from
blame as a moral condemnation to
responsibility as a tool for shaping future outcomes. Instead of saying, "You’re evil, so we punish you," we’d say, "This behavior arose from specific causes, so we address those causes to prevent recurrence."
For instance, consider the criminal justice system. The deterministic approach wouldn’t mean letting murderers and embezzlers go free. Instead, it would mean creating evidence-based interventions—rehabilitation programs, social reforms, and educational initiatives—that reduce the likelihood of such crimes occurring in the first place. This is not utopian idealism; it’s grounded in empirical evidence from societies that have successfully implemented restorative justice models and preventative measures.
You also suggest that moral rules and sanctions contribute to human happiness and prevent mayhem. That’s true to an extent, but those rules must evolve as we learn more about human behavior. Determinism doesn’t discard moral rules; it refines them, ensuring they’re based on causality and evidence rather than retribution or superstition.
Finally, the idea that acceptance of determinism won’t or shouldn’t change society misses the transformative potential of understanding causality. Determinism compels us to stop asking "Who deserves blame?" and start asking, "What caused this, and how can we fix it?" It’s not about removing accountability; it’s about making accountability more effective and just.
The shift may seem radical, but it’s no different than the transition from medieval punitive justice to modern systems that incorporate psychological and sociological insights. Determinism is simply the next step in that evolution, rooted in the same desire to create a safer, more compassionate society.