Examples of Inconsistencies of AI Responses

[Atla]

In response to ChatGpt-to-Me response, ChatGpt-to-Atla still insist:

"In summary, the critique aligns with Kant’s transcendental idealism but not with monist indirect realism, which rejects the strict unknowability of the ultimate object and operates outside the Kantian epistemological constraints."

ChatGpt-to-Atla Wrote
The critique outlined is valid from a Kantian perspective because it operates within Kant's transcendental idealism, emphasizing the fundamental unknowability of the noumenon. From Kant's framework:

Noumenon is fundamentally unknowable: Any claim to know, even partially, the noumenon (thing-in-itself) contradicts Kant's core argument that human cognition is confined to phenomena, which are shaped by the a priori conditions of sensibility and understanding.

Indirect realism's vulnerability: Indirect realism posits an "ultimate object" as mind-independent reality triggering perception. Kant would critique this as an illegitimate claim to noumenal knowledge, whether full or partial, because all knowledge must pertain to appearances, not things-in-themselves.

This critique does not apply from a monist indirect realist perspective. Monist indirect realism might argue that:

The "ultimate object" is knowable indirectly through its effects (sense data), even if our understanding of it is incomplete or mediated.
Such indirect knowledge, though limited, does not violate the framework of realism, which does not depend on the Kantian dichotomy of phenomena and noumenon.

From this perspective, the claim to partial knowledge of an independent reality would be defended as consistent with the framework of indirect realism, even if Kant’s transcendental idealism denies such a possibility.

In summary, the critique aligns with Kant’s transcendental idealism but not with monist indirect realism, which rejects the strict unknowability of the ultimate object and operates outside the Kantian epistemological constraints.

I presented the above to ChatGpt-ot-VA and here is its counter to the above:

• " monist indirect realism, as presented, seems to conflate "knowing effects" with "knowing the ultimate object." "
  This distinction is crucial:
  Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.

AI Wrote:
The counter argument provided by ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor introduces a "monist indirect realist" perspective to challenge the critique based on Kant's framework. Here's an evaluation of its claims:

Main Points of ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor's Counter

Kantian Framework (Agreement with Your Critique):
Acknowledges that within Kant's transcendental idealism, noumenon (or the ultimate object of indirect realism) is fundamentally unknowable.
Indirect realism's claim to partial knowledge of the ultimate object is criticized as illegitimate in Kantian terms because:
Human cognition is limited to phenomena shaped by the mind's a priori conditions.
Knowledge of things-in-themselves (noumena) is impossible without sensible intuition, which humans lack.

Monist Indirect Realism (Disagreement):
Suggests that monist indirect realism does not adopt Kant's strict dichotomy between phenomena and noumenon.
Proposes that:
The "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable through its effects (e.g., sense data).
This indirect, mediated knowledge is consistent with realism, even if it does not provide a complete or direct understanding.

Evaluation of the Counter
1. Definition of Monist vs. Dualist Perspectives:
Monism typically refers to a unified ontological view where reality is fundamentally of one kind. In this case, monist indirect realism seems to posit a single reality that is both mind-independent and accessible (at least partially) through sensory data.
Dualism (as implied in Kant's framework) creates a strict division between phenomena (what is experienced) and noumenon (what exists independently of experience), with the latter being unknowable.

However, monist indirect realism, as presented, seems to conflate "knowing effects" with "knowing the ultimate object."

This distinction is crucial:

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

2. Indirect Knowledge and Realism:
The claim that "partial knowledge of the ultimate object is consistent with realism" relies on a broader interpretation of knowledge. While indirect realism suggests that knowledge of the external world is mediated, it does not eliminate the epistemological gap:

The ultimate object remains unknown in itself, as the mind accesses only its representations, not its true, independent nature.
This view aligns with Kant's critique: any supposed knowledge of the noumenon or the ultimate object is still constrained by the limits of human cognition.

3. Unacknowledged Core Issues:
Hypostatization: Monist indirect realism implicitly treats the "ultimate object" as if it has an accessible reality, even though it is only known via mediated sense data. Kant would call this a hypostatization (treating an abstract concept as a concrete reality), which leads to a form of illusion.
Circular Justification: Claiming that the ultimate object is knowable indirectly through effects does not resolve the fundamental problem of how such effects correspond to the independent reality. Without a direct link, this knowledge remains speculative.

Refinement of Your Critique
To address the counter effectively, you might respond as follows:

Challenge the Partial Knowability Claim:

Monist indirect realism conflates knowing effects (sense data) with knowing the ultimate object. The two are distinct:
Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.
Therefore, "knowing effects" does not equate to "knowing the ultimate object" in any meaningful sense.

Kant’s Critique of Hypostatization:

The ultimate object in monist indirect realism parallels Kant’s noumenon: it is postulated as real, yet unknowable in itself.
Kant would argue that this postulation hypostatizes (treats as real) what is ultimately an illusion, as there is no empirical or rational basis to assert even partial knowledge of the thing-in-itself.

Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:

Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.

Conclusion
The counter argument relies on a redefinition of "knowledge" and avoids addressing the core issue of epistemological access to the ultimate object. Your original critique, grounded in Kantian epistemology, remains valid because it highlights the fundamental unknowability of the ultimate object, even within indirect realism. By focusing on the distinction between representations and reality itself, you can robustly counter the claims of "partial knowability" made by monist indirect realism.

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.

Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.

That's what IR says, it doesn't conflate the two. (If anything, Kant conflates them. You're trying to refute IR by arguing that IR is the rational one?)

IR also says that there is a causal link between the two. What direct link?

You jumped from monism on reality's nature to "monism" as in conflating perceiving and perceived. Word salad.

All the above is just an ignorant kindi strawman, that's why you shouldn't rely on manipulating AIs.

Does monist indirect realism hold the following?

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.

Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.

Yes, monist indirect realism generally aligns with the propositions you have outlined:

Knowing effects does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object: Monist indirect realism posits that we have access only to the effects or representations caused by mind-independent reality. These representations are mediated by our sensory and cognitive faculties. As such, while we may infer the existence of external objects, we do not directly know their intrinsic nature.

Sense data as representations shaped by human faculties: This is central to indirect realism, which holds that what we perceive are not the objects themselves but representations (often called sense data or percepts). These representations are shaped by the structure and function of our sensory organs and cognitive systems, suggesting that our perceptions are not faithful duplicates of external reality but are influenced by the characteristics of our human faculties.

Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety. This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.

duh, the guy is so bad at philosophy that he manipulated the AI into trying to refute IR by pointing out that IR is right

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juhkN58ngs4

[Atla]

Is the following argument valid from the Kantian perspective but invalid from the monist indirect realist perspective? Summary only. Here is the argument:

The counter argument provided by ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor introduces a "monist indirect realist" perspective to challenge the critique based on Kant's framework. Here's an evaluation of its claims:

Main Points of ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor's Counter

Kantian Framework (Agreement with Your Critique):
Acknowledges that within Kant's transcendental idealism, noumenon (or the ultimate object of indirect realism) is fundamentally unknowable.
Indirect realism's claim to partial knowledge of the ultimate object is criticized as illegitimate in Kantian terms because:
Human cognition is limited to phenomena shaped by the mind's a priori conditions.
Knowledge of things-in-themselves (noumena) is impossible without sensible intuition, which humans lack.

Monist Indirect Realism (Disagreement):
Suggests that monist indirect realism does not adopt Kant's strict dichotomy between phenomena and noumenon.
Proposes that:
The "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable through its effects (e.g., sense data).
This indirect, mediated knowledge is consistent with realism, even if it does not provide a complete or direct understanding.

Evaluation of the Counter
1. Definition of Monist vs. Dualist Perspectives:
Monism typically refers to a unified ontological view where reality is fundamentally of one kind. In this case, monist indirect realism seems to posit a single reality that is both mind-independent and accessible (at least partially) through sensory data.
Dualism (as implied in Kant's framework) creates a strict division between phenomena (what is experienced) and noumenon (what exists independently of experience), with the latter being unknowable.

However, monist indirect realism, as presented, seems to conflate "knowing effects" with "knowing the ultimate object."

This distinction is crucial:

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

2. Indirect Knowledge and Realism:
The claim that "partial knowledge of the ultimate object is consistent with realism" relies on a broader interpretation of knowledge. While indirect realism suggests that knowledge of the external world is mediated, it does not eliminate the epistemological gap:

The ultimate object remains unknown in itself, as the mind accesses only its representations, not its true, independent nature.
This view aligns with Kant's critique: any supposed knowledge of the noumenon or the ultimate object is still constrained by the limits of human cognition.

3. Unacknowledged Core Issues:
Hypostatization: Monist indirect realism implicitly treats the "ultimate object" as if it has an accessible reality, even though it is only known via mediated sense data. Kant would call this a hypostatization (treating an abstract concept as a concrete reality), which leads to a form of illusion.
Circular Justification: Claiming that the ultimate object is knowable indirectly through effects does not resolve the fundamental problem of how such effects correspond to the independent reality. Without a direct link, this knowledge remains speculative.

Refinement of Your Critique
To address the counter effectively, you might respond as follows:

Challenge the Partial Knowability Claim:

Monist indirect realism conflates knowing effects (sense data) with knowing the ultimate object. The two are distinct:
Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.
Therefore, "knowing effects" does not equate to "knowing the ultimate object" in any meaningful sense.

Kant’s Critique of Hypostatization:

The ultimate object in monist indirect realism parallels Kant’s noumenon: it is postulated as real, yet unknowable in itself.
Kant would argue that this postulation hypostatizes (treats as real) what is ultimately an illusion, as there is no empirical or rational basis to assert even partial knowledge of the thing-in-itself.

Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:

Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.

Conclusion
The counter argument relies on a redefinition of "knowledge" and avoids addressing the core issue of epistemological access to the ultimate object. Your original critique, grounded in Kantian epistemology, remains valid because it highlights the fundamental unknowability of the ultimate object, even within indirect realism. By focusing on the distinction between representations and reality itself, you can robustly counter the claims of "partial knowability" made by monist indirect realism.

Summary
From a Kantian perspective, the argument is valid because it highlights the unknowability of the noumenon (thing-in-itself). Kant's transcendental idealism maintains that human knowledge is restricted to phenomena shaped by the mind’s a priori structures, rendering claims of even partial knowledge of the noumenon illegitimate.

From the perspective of monist indirect realism, the argument is invalid because this perspective rejects Kant’s strict dichotomy between phenomena and noumenon. Monist indirect realism posits that the ultimate object is partially knowable through its effects (e.g., sensory data). However, this conflation of knowing effects with knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object is a critical flaw when analyzed within Kantian epistemology.

Ultimately, Kantian critique would deem monist indirect realism speculative and unjustified due to its failure to bridge the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object.

Obviously, same result over and over again. What are you trying to achieve?

You like to play with FSKs yes? Well Kant's "impossible" epistemological gap was neatly mapped by the "science-biology-neuroscience-human perception-FSK-proper". You know, the science of perception.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Is the following argument valid from the Kantian perspective but invalid from the monist indirect realist perspective? Summary only. Here is the argument:

The counter argument provided by ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor introduces a "monist indirect realist" perspective to challenge the critique based on Kant's framework. Here's an evaluation of its claims:

Main Points of ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor's Counter

Kantian Framework (Agreement with Your Critique):
Acknowledges that within Kant's transcendental idealism, noumenon (or the ultimate object of indirect realism) is fundamentally unknowable.
Indirect realism's claim to partial knowledge of the ultimate object is criticized as illegitimate in Kantian terms because:
Human cognition is limited to phenomena shaped by the mind's a priori conditions.
Knowledge of things-in-themselves (noumena) is impossible without sensible intuition, which humans lack.

Monist Indirect Realism (Disagreement):
Suggests that monist indirect realism does not adopt Kant's strict dichotomy between phenomena and noumenon.
Proposes that:
The "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable through its effects (e.g., sense data).
This indirect, mediated knowledge is consistent with realism, even if it does not provide a complete or direct understanding.

Evaluation of the Counter
1. Definition of Monist vs. Dualist Perspectives:
Monism typically refers to a unified ontological view where reality is fundamentally of one kind. In this case, monist indirect realism seems to posit a single reality that is both mind-independent and accessible (at least partially) through sensory data.
Dualism (as implied in Kant's framework) creates a strict division between phenomena (what is experienced) and noumenon (what exists independently of experience), with the latter being unknowable.

However, monist indirect realism, as presented, seems to conflate "knowing effects" with "knowing the ultimate object."

This distinction is crucial:

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

2. Indirect Knowledge and Realism:
The claim that "partial knowledge of the ultimate object is consistent with realism" relies on a broader interpretation of knowledge. While indirect realism suggests that knowledge of the external world is mediated, it does not eliminate the epistemological gap:

The ultimate object remains unknown in itself, as the mind accesses only its representations, not its true, independent nature.
This view aligns with Kant's critique: any supposed knowledge of the noumenon or the ultimate object is still constrained by the limits of human cognition.

3. Unacknowledged Core Issues:
Hypostatization: Monist indirect realism implicitly treats the "ultimate object" as if it has an accessible reality, even though it is only known via mediated sense data. Kant would call this a hypostatization (treating an abstract concept as a concrete reality), which leads to a form of illusion.
Circular Justification: Claiming that the ultimate object is knowable indirectly through effects does not resolve the fundamental problem of how such effects correspond to the independent reality. Without a direct link, this knowledge remains speculative.

Refinement of Your Critique
To address the counter effectively, you might respond as follows:

Challenge the Partial Knowability Claim:

Monist indirect realism conflates knowing effects (sense data) with knowing the ultimate object. The two are distinct:
Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.
Therefore, "knowing effects" does not equate to "knowing the ultimate object" in any meaningful sense.

Kant’s Critique of Hypostatization:

The ultimate object in monist indirect realism parallels Kant’s noumenon: it is postulated as real, yet unknowable in itself.
Kant would argue that this postulation hypostatizes (treats as real) what is ultimately an illusion, as there is no empirical or rational basis to assert even partial knowledge of the thing-in-itself.

Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:

Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.

Conclusion
The counter argument relies on a redefinition of "knowledge" and avoids addressing the core issue of epistemological access to the ultimate object. Your original critique, grounded in Kantian epistemology, remains valid because it highlights the fundamental unknowability of the ultimate object, even within indirect realism. By focusing on the distinction between representations and reality itself, you can robustly counter the claims of "partial knowability" made by monist indirect realism.

Summary
From a Kantian perspective, the argument is valid because it highlights the unknowability of the noumenon (thing-in-itself). Kant's transcendental idealism maintains that human knowledge is restricted to phenomena shaped by the mind’s a priori structures, rendering claims of even partial knowledge of the noumenon illegitimate.

From the perspective of monist indirect realism, the argument is invalid because this perspective rejects Kant’s strict dichotomy between phenomena and noumenon. Monist indirect realism posits that the ultimate object is partially knowable through its effects (e.g., sensory data). However, this conflation of knowing effects with knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object is a critical flaw when analyzed within Kantian epistemology.

Ultimately, Kantian critique would deem monist indirect realism speculative and unjustified due to its failure to bridge the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object.

Obviously, same result over and over again. What are you trying to achieve?

You like to play with FSKs yes? Well Kant's "impossible" epistemological gap was neatly mapped by the "science-biology-neuroscience-human perception-FSK-proper". You know, the science of perception.

You are leading AI to merely Kantian's view which it agree with and it overlooked this:

ChatGpt-to-Me
Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:
Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.

You should ask ChatGpt, what about the point above [even outside Kant's Framework] which it has missed because you misdirect ChatGpt to Kantian view only.
IR's ultimate object itself is not epistemological tenable as real.

In the other post, I highlighted even your ChatGpt agreed the ultimate object of RI is mind-independent in the absolute sense, which is the same as Kant IR and PR noumenon.

[Atla]

You are leading AI to merely Kantian's view which it agree with and it overlooked this:
ChatGpt-to-Me
Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:
Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.
You should ask ChatGpt, what about the point above [even outside Kant's Framework] which it has missed because you misdirect ChatGpt to Kantian view only.
IR's ultimate object itself is not epistemological tenable as real.

Is the following criticism valid under the general axiom that only phenomena are certain to exist, but invalid under the axiom that phenomena are part of a wider world? Summary only. "indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified."

The criticism is valid under the axiom that only phenomena are certain to exist because, within this framework, mediated representations cannot bridge the epistemological gap to any supposed ultimate object, making claims to partial knowledge speculative. However, under the axiom that phenomena are part of a wider world, the criticism is less persuasive, as indirect realism presupposes that mediated representations can reliably connect to aspects of the wider reality, even if not fully comprehended.

You so badly want everyone to accept Kant's irrational "certainty".

In the other post, I highlighted even your ChatGpt agreed the ultimate object of RI is mind-independent in the absolute sense, which is the same as Kant IR and PR noumenon.

No, what you highlighted meant that it's noumenal in the IR sense which is different from the Kantian sense.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You are leading AI to merely Kantian's view which it agree with and it overlooked this:
ChatGpt-to-Me
Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:
Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.
You should ask ChatGpt, what about the point above [even outside Kant's Framework] which it has missed because you misdirect ChatGpt to Kantian view only.
IR's ultimate object itself is not epistemological tenable as real.

Is the following criticism valid under the general axiom that only phenomena are certain to exist, but invalid under the axiom that phenomena are part of a wider world? Summary only. "indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified."

The criticism is valid under the axiom that only phenomena are certain to exist because, within this framework, mediated representations cannot bridge the epistemological gap to any supposed ultimate object, making claims to partial knowledge speculative. However, under the axiom that phenomena are part of a wider world, the criticism is less persuasive, as indirect realism presupposes that mediated representations can reliably connect to aspects of the wider reality, even if not fully comprehended.

You so badly want everyone to accept Kant's irrational "certainty".

Note the term 'presupposes' which is the same as theists presuppose their mind-independent God exists as real.

How can you justify [prove philosophically] it exists as real and not a fake thing, i.e. illusory?

In the other post, I highlighted even your ChatGpt agreed the ultimate object of RI is mind-independent in the absolute sense, which is the same as Kant IR and PR noumenon.

No, what you highlighted meant that it's noumenal in the IR sense which is different from the Kantian sense.

I have already show you what is
noumenal in the IR sense
is exactly the same as
noumenal in the Kantian sense, i.e.

both are absolutely mind-independent i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Present to ChatGpt, e.g.:

"My interlocutor claimed:
noumenal in the IR sense
is exactly the same as
noumenal in the Kantian sense, i.e.
both are absolutely mind-independent i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not."

[Atla]

Note the term 'presupposes' which is the same as theists presupposes their mind-independent God exists as real.

How can you justify [prove philosophically] it exists as real and not a fake thing, i.e. illusory?

Well tell us, how does Kant presuppose and justify that existence operates based on his mind-dependence? He doesn't.

In fact his solipsistic axiom is so retarded that he had to create a whole pragmatic philosophy to try to fix it, but you can't fix what is inherently solipsistic.

I have already show you what is
noumenal in the IR sense
is exactly the same as
noumenal in the Kantian sense, i.e.

both are absolutely mind-independent i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Present to ChatGpt, e.g.:

"My interlocutor claimed:
noumenal in the IR sense
is exactly the same as
noumenal in the Kantian sense, i.e.
both are absolutely mind-independent i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not."

Whatever you say lol

Is the following accurate or contains strawmen? Summary only.

"noumenal in the IR sense is exactly the same as noumenal in the Kantian sense, i.e. both are absolutely mind-independent i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not."

The statement contains a potential strawman. It conflates two different uses of the term "noumenal" without clarifying their distinctions.

In Kantian philosophy, the noumenal refers to the things-in-themselves, which are beyond human perception and understanding. Kant argued that we cannot know these things directly, as our knowledge is mediated by our senses and cognitive faculties.

In the context of indirect realism (IR), the "noumenal" typically refers to the external world as it exists independently of our perception, but we only access it through sensory experience and mental representations. While it is assumed to be mind-independent, it is still seen as indirectly known through the mind's interpretation.

Thus, equating the two concepts as "exactly the same" simplifies the difference between Kant's epistemological claims and the empirical assumptions in indirect realism. Kant's view is more focused on the limits of human knowledge, while indirect realism concerns how we represent the mind-independent world.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Note the term 'presupposes' which is the same as theists presupposes their mind-independent God exists as real.

How can you justify [prove philosophically] it exists as real and not a fake thing, i.e. illusory?

Well tell us, how does Kant presuppose and justify that existence operates based on his mind-dependence? He doesn't.

In fact his solipsistic axiom is so retarded that he had to create a whole pragmatic philosophy to try to fix it, but you can't fix what is inherently solipsistic.

Kant does not speculate there is the noumenal object beyond whatever is possible beyond the empirical world.

The term 'mind-dependence' can be very misleading.
Instead for Kant, whatever exists as real is somewhat and somehow related to the human conditions, i.e. it cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions and its mind.
So, whatever is real is contingent upon a human-based FSERC of which the science FSERC is the most credible and objective.

I have already show you what is
noumenal in the IR sense
is exactly the same as
noumenal in the Kantian sense, i.e.

both are absolutely mind-independent i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Present to ChatGpt, e.g.:

"My interlocutor claimed:
noumenal in the IR sense
is exactly the same as
noumenal in the Kantian sense, i.e.
both are absolutely mind-independent i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not."

Whatever you say lol

Is the following accurate or contains strawmen? Summary only.

"noumenal in the IR sense is exactly the same as noumenal in the Kantian sense, i.e. both are absolutely mind-independent i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are humans or not."

The statement contains a potential strawman. It conflates two different uses of the term "noumenal" without clarifying their distinctions.

In Kantian philosophy, the noumenal refers to the things-in-themselves, which are beyond human perception and understanding. Kant argued that we cannot know these things directly, as our knowledge is mediated by our senses and cognitive faculties.

In the context of indirect realism (IR), the "noumenal" typically refers to the external world as it exists independently of our perception, but we only access it through sensory experience and mental representations. While it is assumed to be mind-independent, it is still seen as indirectly known through the mind's interpretation.

Thus, equating the two concepts as "exactly the same" simplifies the difference between Kant's epistemological claims and the empirical assumptions in indirect realism. Kant's view is more focused on the limits of human knowledge, while indirect realism concerns how we represent the mind-independent world.

ChatGpt focus in on "exactly the same" in a general context.
What I meant with "exactly the same" in the same fundamental sense, i.e. with reference to the mind-independent noumenon claimed by IR and Kant, i.e. both exist regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Example, the moon exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Ask ChatGpt again with reference in the fundamental sense.

ChatGpt to Atla:
While it is assumed to be mind-independent, it is still seen as indirectly known through the mind's interpretation.

As explained this is not tenable.
There is a conflation of knowing its effect with the mind independent ontology thing.

Besides, knowing need a mind, if it is assumed to be mind-independent, how can we ever know it if it is 'independent' of the mind. This is contradictory.

[Atla]

Kant does not speculate there is the noumenal object beyond whatever is possible beyond the empirical world.

The term 'mind-dependence' can be very misleading.
Instead for Kant, whatever exists as real is somewhat and somehow related to the human conditions, i.e. it cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions and its mind.
So, whatever is real is contingent upon a human-based FSERC of which the science FSERC is the most credible and objective.

Yes that's Kant's speculative axiom. IR simply says that IR's speculative axiom is better.

ChatGpt focus in on "exactly the same" in a general context.
What I meant with "exactly the same" in the same fundamental sense, i.e. with reference to the mind-independent noumenon claimed by IR and Kant, i.e. both exist regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Example, the moon exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Backwards word salad, you're the one not looking at the more fundamental kind of mind-independence, while the AI was. "regardless of whether there are humans or not" is a lesser issue.

Ask ChatGpt again with reference in the fundamental sense.
ChatGpt to Atla:
While it is assumed to be mind-independent, it is still seen as indirectly known through the mind's interpretation.
As explained this is not tenable.
There is a conflation of knowing its effect with the mind independent ontology thing.

Besides, knowing need a mind, if it is assumed to be mind-independent, how can we ever know it if it is 'independent' of the mind. This is contradictory.

You are conflating it, I'm not. And it's only contradictory when the only perspective you can comprehend is Kant's TI. Even Kant could have grasped IR (not necessarily agree with it), why can't you?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kant does not speculate there is the noumenal object beyond whatever is possible beyond the empirical world.

The term 'mind-dependence' can be very misleading.
Instead for Kant, whatever exists as real is somewhat and somehow related to the human conditions, i.e. it cannot be absolutely independent of the human conditions and its mind.
So, whatever is real is contingent upon a human-based FSERC of which the science FSERC is the most credible and objective.

Yes that's Kant's speculative axiom. IR simply says that IR's speculative axiom is better.

Note sure of your point.
Kant did not speculate there is the noumenal object beyond whatever is possible beyond the empirical world.
Kant condemned those who did as chasing an illusion, e.g. indirect realists, philosophical realists, scientific realists and the like.

"IR simply says that IR's speculative axiom is better."
To Kant, one should not even speculate on such a claim and assume it exists as real.

ChatGpt focus in on "exactly the same" in a general context.
What I meant with "exactly the same" in the same fundamental sense, i.e. with reference to the mind-independent noumenon claimed by IR and Kant, i.e. both exist regardless of whether there are humans or not.
Example, the moon exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Backwards word salad, you're the one not looking at the more fundamental kind of mind-independence, while the AI was. "regardless of whether there are humans or not" is a lesser issue.

This is a critical issue "regardless of whether there are humans or not" especially when you charge antirealists with solipsism.
IR claim its ultimate object is mind-independent and to affirm it with more confidence, it is so mind-independent that it exists regardless of where there are humans [thus minds] or not.

Ask ChatGpt again with reference in the fundamental sense.
ChatGpt to Atla:
While it is assumed to be mind-independent, it is still seen as indirectly known through the mind's interpretation.
As explained this is not tenable.
There is a conflation of knowing its effect with the mind independent ontology thing.

Besides, knowing need a mind, if it is assumed to be mind-independent, how can we ever know it if it is 'independent' of the mind. This is contradictory.

You are conflating it, I'm not. And it's only contradictory when the only perspective you can comprehend is Kant's TI. Even Kant could have grasped IR (not necessarily agree with it), why can't you?

I have already my understanding of what IR is from various references.
Sure Kant did understand it as well.

When you claimed the unknowable noumenon of IR can be partially known [i.e. not 100% unknowable], you are conflating the possible to be known empirical effect with the mind-independent noumenon of IR.

[Atla]

Note sure of your point.
Kant did not speculate there is the noumenal object beyond whatever is possible beyond the empirical world.
Kant condemned those who did as chasing an illusion, e.g. indirect realists, philosophical realists, scientific realists and the like.

"IR simply says that IR's speculative axiom is better."
To Kant, one should not even speculate on such a claim and assume it exists as real.

Kant speculated that the issue of mind-dependence and mind-independence is central to reality, according to IR we shouldn't base everything on such an irrational speculation.

This is a critical issue "regardless of whether there are humans or not" especially when you charge antirealists with solipsism.
IR claim its ultimate object is mind-independent and to affirm it with more confidence, it is so mind-independent that it exists regardless of where there are humans [thus minds] or not.

I didn't say it wasn't a critical issue.

I have already my understanding of what IR is from various references.
Sure Kant did understand it as well.

When you claimed the unknowable noumenon of IR can be partially known [i.e. not 100% unknowable], you are conflating the possible to be known empirical effect with the mind-independent noumenon of IR.

Strawman from Kantian perspective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Note sure of your point.
Kant did not speculate there is the noumenal object beyond whatever is possible beyond the empirical world.
Kant condemned those who did as chasing an illusion, e.g. indirect realists, philosophical realists, scientific realists and the like.

"IR simply says that IR's speculative axiom is better."
To Kant, one should not even speculate on such a claim and assume it exists as real.

Kant speculated that the issue of mind-dependence and mind-independence is central to reality, according to IR we shouldn't base everything on such an irrational speculation.

Kant did not speculate on the issue.
It is philosophical realism [indirect/direct realism, scientific realism] that claim there is an absolute mind-independence reality out there driven from an evolutionary default of externalness.
This ideological claim of absolute mind-independence of reality has caused a lot of philosophical dilemma from the beginning.
The Failures of Philosophical Realism
viewtopic.php?t=43061
To resolve the above dilemmas Kant has to highlight the issue of mind-independence to counter IR accusations that Idealists are solipsists.

This is a critical issue "regardless of whether there are humans or not" especially when you charge antirealists with solipsism.
IR claim its ultimate object is mind-independent and to affirm it with more confidence, it is so mind-independent that it exists regardless of where there are humans [thus minds] or not.

I didn't say it wasn't a critical issue.

It has to be critical when you use it as a basis to charge antirealists are solipsists.

I have already my understanding of what IR is from various references.
Sure Kant did understand it as well.

When you claimed the unknowable noumenon of IR can be partially known [i.e. not 100% unknowable], you are conflating the possible to be known empirical effect with the mind-independent noumenon of IR.

Strawman from Kantian perspective.

You forgot you claim this?

Atla Wrote:
viewtopic.php?p=743417#p743417
IR typically holds that the "ultimate object" isn't 100% unknowable.

which means "the unknowable noumenon of IR can be partially known"

[Atla]

Kant did not speculate on the issue.
It is philosophical realism [indirect/direct realism, scientific realism] that claim there is an absolute mind-independence reality out there driven from an evolutionary default of externalness.
This ideological claim of absolute mind-independence of reality has caused a lot of philosophical dilemma from the beginning.
The Failures of Philosophical Realism
viewtopic.php?t=43061
To resolve the above dilemmas Kant has to highlight the issue of mind-independence to counter IR accusations that Idealists are solipsists.

Kant was lying to you of course, basing reality's evaluation on mind-dependence vs mind-independence, is a massive speculation. Did you really not even realize this?

It has to be critical when you use it as a basis to charge antirealists are solipsists.

I didn't say it wasn't a critical issue. And strawman, you are conflating the two bases again.

You forgot you claim this?
Atla Wrote:
viewtopic.php?p=743417#p743417
IR typically holds that the "ultimate object" isn't 100% unknowable.
which means "the unknowable noumenon of IR can be partially known"

No it doesn't mean that. You are worthless scum who puts words into my mouth I never said and would never say.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kant did not speculate on the issue.
It is philosophical realism [indirect/direct realism, scientific realism] that claim there is an absolute mind-independence reality out there driven from an evolutionary default of externalness.
This ideological claim of absolute mind-independence of reality has caused a lot of philosophical dilemma from the beginning.
The Failures of Philosophical Realism
viewtopic.php?t=43061
To resolve the above dilemmas Kant has to highlight the issue of mind-independence to counter IR accusations that Idealists are solipsists.

Kant was lying to you of course, basing reality's evaluation on mind-dependence vs mind-independence, is a massive speculation. Did you really not even realize this?

Your thinking is going haywire.
Kant did not speculate at all.
He was condemning those who are speculating, i.e. people like you and other philosophical realists who are bring a scandal to philosophy who cannot provide 'proof' to their claim of an ultimate object.

... it still remains a scandal to Philosophy and to Human Reason-in-General that the Existence of Things outside us (from which we derive the whole Material of Knowledge, even for our Inner Sense) must be accepted merely on Faith,
and that if anyone thinks good to doubt their Existence, we are unable to counter his doubts by any satisfactory proof. B54

It has to be critical when you use it as a basis to charge antirealists are solipsists.

I didn't say it wasn't a critical issue. And strawman, you are conflating the two bases again.

You did note use the term 'critical' but it has to be critical when you charge antirealists with solipsism.

You forgot you claim this?
Atla Wrote:
viewtopic.php?p=743417#p743417
IR typically holds that the "ultimate object" isn't 100% unknowable.
which means "the unknowable noumenon of IR can be partially known"

No it doesn't mean that. You are worthless scum who puts words into my mouth I never said and would never say.

What??
I provided the link and that is your posting.

[Atla]

Your thinking is going haywire.
Kant did not speculate at all.
He was condemning those who are speculating, i.e. people like you and other philosophical realists who are bring a scandal to philosophy who cannot provide 'proof' to their claim of an ultimate object.

Stop defending Kant the liar, he can't provide any proof for his axiom either where he bases everything on mind-dependence.

You did note use the term 'critical' but it has to be critical when you charge antirealists with solipsism.

Double strawman actually, the second strawman is that Kant isn't equal to all antirealism. You didn't even know that?

What??
I provided the link and that is your posting.

No, you lied that I claim knowledge of the unknowable but you can't show it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Your thinking is going haywire.
Kant did not speculate at all.
He was condemning those who are speculating, i.e. people like you and other philosophical realists who are bring a scandal to philosophy who cannot provide 'proof' to their claim of an ultimate object.

Stop defending Kant the liar, he can't provide any proof for his axiom either where he bases everything on mind-dependence.

I stated "mind-dependence" is misleading rather it is more like "mind-related" or human related which is leveraged on in Copernican Revolution: in [] = mine

A similar experiment [like Copernicus'] can be tried in Metaphysics, as regards the Intuition of Objects.
If Intuition [human conditions] must conform to the constitution of the Objects [as Things-in-themselves], I do not see how we could Know anything of the latter [the Objects as Things-in-Themselves] a priori
but if the Object (as Object of the Senses) must conform to the constitution of our Faculty of Intuition {human conditions, mind}, I have no difficulty in conceiving such a possibility. [as Object related to the human mind]
Bxvi

The whole of the CPR is one whole argument to 'prove' everything is human mind-related.

Basically;

• 1. Reality is all-there-is [everything]
  2. all-there-is [everything] includes human beings, thus interrelated
  3. Reality is interrelated with humans.
  4. Everything cannot be absolutely human and mind-independent

Unfortunately you are ignorant and do not understand [not necessary agree with] the CPR thoroughly to counter it effectively.

You did not use the term 'critical' but it has to be critical when you charge antirealists with solipsism.

Double strawman actually, the second strawman is that Kant isn't equal to all antirealism. You didn't even know that?

Kant is an antirealism in relation to philosophical realism which includes indirect realism, scientific realism and the like.

What??
I provided the link and that is your posting.

No, you lied that I claim knowledge of the unknowable but you can't show it.
[/quote]
How can you deny what you wrote, i.e.

viewtopic.php?p=743417#p743417
IR typically holds that the "ultimate object" isn't 100% unknowable.