The Transcendental Ground of Science

[Atla]

How could he notice that he reserved a dependence, when he never had a concept of the original dependence in the first place?

Yes, his meaning shifts. He's a bricoleur of the thoughts of others. So, when he grabs from one argument out there, his 'dependence' wanders into a new meaning.

A dependence is a logical relation, but VA can't process logic so he doesn't know what a dependence is. Everything just blends together in his mind.

[Will Bouwman]

The what, now?

From the philosophical perspective, the general view of science is that of scientific realism [a sub of philosophical realism].

Says who?

From the philosophical perspective, Philosophical realism is the default view i.e. the majority, thus extended to scientific realism.

Well, your claim equates to most scientists being realists.

Convinced?

Not by a list of definitions of scientific realism. I did some work for you and found a 2020 survey that supports your claim: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4910
The headline stat from which is:
Accept or lean towards:
scientific realism:
72.35%
While it's a bit dodgy drawing conclusions from a single survey, I'm happy to accept that most scientists are realists. That raises the question: realists about what? On the general question of whether there is an external cause of phenomena that science observes and measures, it wouldn't surprise me if the figure was even higher. But then you look at other results and you get things like:
Accept or lean towards:
Platonism
38.38%
Accept or lean towards:
nominalism
41.85%
So it's a bit of a mixed bag. Personally, I haven't seen many scientists insist either that there is an external world, or that the objects of any particular theory are definitely real. Most scientists, if pressed, would admit to agnosticism, but just carry on doing the science they do anyway.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The what, now?

Says who?

From the philosophical perspective, Philosophical realism is the default view i.e. the majority, thus extended to scientific realism.

Well, your claim equates to most scientists being realists.

Convinced?

Not by a list of definitions of scientific realism. I did some work for you and found a 2020 survey that supports your claim: https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4910
The headline stat from which is:
Accept or lean towards:
scientific realism:
72.35%
While it's a bit dodgy drawing conclusions from a single survey, I'm happy to accept that most scientists are realists. That raises the question: realists about what? On the general question of whether there is an external cause of phenomena that science observes and measures, it wouldn't surprise me if the figure was even higher. But then you look at other results and you get things like:
Accept or lean towards:
Platonism
38.38%
Accept or lean towards:
nominalism
41.85%
So it's a bit of a mixed bag. Personally, I haven't seen many scientists insist either that there is an external world, or that the objects of any particular theory are definitely real. Most scientists, if pressed, would admit to agnosticism, but just carry on doing the science they do anyway.

Here is one point to note;

VA To ChatGpt
Scientific Realism is an ideology which some scientists adopt as their philosophical stance.
Besides the above, in general, is a mind-independent external world [regularity and consistency] adopted as an assumption within the scientific framework and system.

ChatGPT said:

ChatGPT wrote
Yes, within the scientific framework and system, the assumption of a mind-independent external world with regularity and consistency is generally adopted.
This assumption underpins the practice of science, regardless of whether individual scientists align with philosophical realism, anti-realism, or other perspectives.
Here's why this assumption is central to scientific practice:

1. Empirical Investigation and Replicability
Science operates on the premise that phenomena studied are not wholly contingent on subjective perception but exist and behave in regular patterns that can be observed, measured, and tested.
Replicability depends on the belief that experiments performed under similar conditions will yield consistent results, which presupposes a stable, mind-independent reality.

2. Objective Consistency
Scientific laws and theories are expected to apply universally (e.g., the law of gravity) and to predict phenomena irrespective of individual observers. This universality assumes a consistent framework of external reality.

3. Pragmatic Basis
Science focuses on practical outcomes: models and theories that predict and explain phenomena effectively. While the question of ultimate mind-independence is philosophical, the pragmatic assumption is that phenomena behave as though they exist independently of human thought.

Distinction from Scientific Realism
It’s important to note that this assumption is methodological rather than ontological.
Scientific Realism, as an ideology, claims that the entities and structures posited by successful scientific theories genuinely exist in a mind-independent way. However:

A scientific anti-realist might argue that the regularities science identifies are constructs or frameworks imposed by human cognition, yet still adopt the methodological assumption of consistency for practical purposes.

This means that the methodological adoption of regularity and consistency does not require a commitment to the metaphysical position that the world is fundamentally mind-independent.

Thus, the assumption of a regular, consistent external world is a practical and operational cornerstone of the scientific framework, without necessitating a commitment to Scientific Realism as a philosophy.

[Iwannaplato]

Well, your claim equates to most scientists being realists.

This should have ended the discussion. Most scientists are still realists. Which means ACCORDING TO YOU THAT it is the more objective position. They have a realist FSERC. Objectivity, according to you, is intersubjective. Most scientists are realists. Why not ask your AI if most scientists think the Moon persists when not perceived?

Perhaps one day antirealism will become the main position, but it's not now. According to your own position, it is NOT the most objective one.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Well, your claim equates to most scientists being realists.

This should have ended the discussion. Most scientists are still realists. Which means ACCORDING TO YOU THAT it is the more objective position. They have a realist FSERC. Objectivity, according to you, is intersubjective. Most scientists are realists. Why not ask your AI if most scientists think the Moon persists when not perceived?

Perhaps one day antirealism will become the main position, but it's not now. According to your own position, it is NOT the most objective one.

I stated before, most scientists are not into philosophy; thus they do not claim to be realists nor anti-realists.

'Realism' and 'realist are very general terms.
A philosophical antirealist can be an empirical realist.

Where scientists wear the philosophy hat as well, yes most scientists are specifically philosophical realists as driven by the inherent evolutionary default.
In this case they are into scientific philosophical realism; they believe the Moon persists when not perceived in the absolutesense.

Those scientists who oppose scientific philosophical realism are scientific philosophical antirealists aka scientific empirical realists.
They believe the Moon persists when not perceived in the relativesense.

Both scientific philosophical realists and scientific empirical realists rely on the human-based [collective-of-subjects] FSERC thus intersubjective and objective but because scientific philosophical realism is grounded on an illusion, its credibility objectivity is negligible as rated.

[Iwannaplato]

I stated before, most scientists are not into philosophy; thus they do not claim to be realists nor anti-realists.

Sorry, that's BS, most people are realists, even if they don't label themselves that way. It's not just people interested in philosophy who have philosophical positions.

'Realism' and 'realist are very general terms.
A philosophical antirealist can be an empirical realist.

Right, but they are not that, most of them.

Where scientists wear the philosophy hat as well, yes most scientists are specifically philosophical realists as driven by the inherent evolutionary default.
In this case they are into scientific philosophical realism; they believe the Moon persists when not perceived in the absolute[/v

Yup, that's the dominant position and hence the most objective, according to logic you have used time and again.

Those scientists who oppose scientific philosophical realism are scientific philosophical antirealists aka scientific empirical realists.
They believe the Moon persists when not perceived in the relativesense.

And they are a minority position.

Both scientific philosophical realists and scientific empirical realists rely on the human-based [collective-of-subjects] FSERC thus intersubjective and objective but because scientific philosophical realism is grounded on an illusion, its credibility objectivity is negligible as rated.

UH, uh. You don't get to determine that. You can argue that, but your idea of objectivity is that it is intersubjectivity. And the dominant scientific position with the most adherents is philosophical realism. You can certainly argue with them and one day you may be in the majority, but right now according to your own logic, yours is not as objective.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I stated before, most scientists are not into philosophy; thus they do not claim to be realists nor anti-realists.

Sorry, that's BS, most people are realists, even if they don't label themselves that way. It's not just people interested in philosophy who have philosophical positions.

Where did you get that idea?

The question of the nature and plausibility of realism arises with respect to a large number of subject matters, including ethics, aesthetics, causation, modality, science, mathematics, semantics, and the everyday world of macroscopic material objects and their properties. Although it would be possible to accept (or reject) realism across the board, it is more common for philosophers to be selectively realist or non-realist about various topics:
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/

The above implied it is only 'philosophers' or at least within philosophy where the question of 'realist' or non-realist is relevant.
There is the inherent evolutionary default of externalness which is instinctual and common sense, but not philosophy.

Where scientists wear the philosophy hat as well, yes most scientists are specifically philosophical realists as driven by the inherent evolutionary default.
In this case they are into scientific philosophical realism; they believe the Moon persists when not perceived in the absolute

Yup, that's the dominant position and hence the most objective, according to logic you have used time and again.

Where precisely?
You complained about my comprehension, you are at serious fault here.
Theism is the most dominant position, did I ever state it is the most objective intersubjectively?
Creationism is more dominant than science-cosmology, I have never claimed creationism is the most objective, rather it is less popular science view that is the most objective based on some ranking system.

Those scientists who oppose scientific philosophical realism are scientific philosophical antirealists aka scientific empirical realists.
They believe the Moon persists when not perceived in the relativesense.

And they are a minority position.

So?
Scientific philosophical realism is grounded on an illusion while scientific philosophical antirealists aka scientific empirical realists rely solely on empirical evidences only.

Both scientific philosophical realists and scientific empirical realists rely on the human-based [collective-of-subjects] FSERC thus intersubjective and objective but because scientific philosophical realism is grounded on an illusion, its credibility objectivity is negligible as rated.

UH, uh. You don't get to determine that. You can argue that, but your idea of objectivity is that it is intersubjectivity. And the dominant scientific position with the most adherents is philosophical realism. You can certainly argue with them and one day you may be in the majority, but right now according to your own logic, yours is not as objective.

As stated above, dominance do not correlate with degrees of objectivity, else that would be an ad populum fallacy.