Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

[Atla]

I have defined 'absolute' in 'absolutely mind-independent' as
it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not in contrast
to relatively mind-independent where humans are somehow involved.
What is wrong with the above?

That's not what the word "absolute" means by default, which again I already told you many times. You are too stupid to understand this much. I can also define "up" as "mostly up and a little down" but then I need to tell the AI every time.

The main contention is:
You asked AI to confirm;
-the ultimate object of IR is not the noumenon
-the ultimate object of IR is partially knowable
and AI agree with you on the above.

However when I present your AI's response to ChatGpt, it give me a different response with consideration of the nuances involved.

Surely you should ask your ChatGpt why my ChatGpt counter to it is different on the same issue, who are right?

Again, for philosophy sake;
I still insist you asked your chatGpt why the counter [ChatGpt-to-me] is different from its response to you.
It will expose to you the fact that because you asked kindi questions to ChatGpt in ignorance of Kantianism that you get kindi answers from ChatGpt.

It gave a different response because you again asked it from a Kantian or Kantian-like perspective. You don't understand this therefore you are retarded.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have defined 'absolute' in 'absolutely mind-independent' as
it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not in contrast
to relatively mind-independent where humans are somehow involved.
What is wrong with the above?

That's not what the word "absolute" means by default, which again I already told you many times. You are too stupid to understand this much. I can also define "up" as "mostly up and a little down" but then I need to tell the AI every time.

You are blabbering without justification.
Demonstrate and justify your argument.

Meanings of words are not carved in stone.
How I used 'absolute' in absolutely mind-independent in contrast to relatively mind-independent, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not, is not an issue.

absolute:
viewed independently; not comparative or relative; intrinsic:
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/absolute

The main contention is:
You asked AI to confirm;
-the ultimate object of IR is not the noumenon
-the ultimate object of IR is partially knowable
and AI agree with you on the above.

However when I present your AI's response to ChatGpt, it give me a different response with consideration of the nuances involved.

Surely you should ask your ChatGpt why my ChatGpt counter to it is different on the same issue, who are right?

Again, for philosophy sake;
I still insist you asked your chatGpt why the counter [ChatGpt-to-me] is different from its response to you.
It will expose to you the fact that because you asked kindi questions to ChatGpt in ignorance of Kantianism that you get kindi answers from ChatGpt.

It gave a different response because you again asked it from a Kantian or Kantian-like perspective. You don't understand this therefore you are retarded.

Off topic.
Don't put words into ChatGpt's "mouth".

I am interested in how 'your' ChatGpt will explain the difference when it is presented with the counter from my ChatGpt.
Ultimate your own ChatGpt will expose your ignorance.

Again, for philosophy sake;
I still insist you asked your chatGpt why the counter [ChatGpt-to-me] is different from its response to you.
Why are you a coward to do it?

Just present to your ChatGpt, i.e.
"In response to your above response, my interlocutor presented the following from ChatGpt. Please explain the difference?"

[Atla]

.

[Atla]

Is the following critique valid from a Kantian or Kantian-like perspective, but not from the monist indirect realist perspective? Summary only. Here is the critique:

"ChatGPT Wrote
Your comments are well-aligned with Kant's transcendental idealist framework and offer a clear critique of monist indirect realism from that perspective. Here's a concise analysis to support your point:

Kant's Core Claim: The Unknowability of the Noumenon
For Kant, the noumenon or thing-in-itself is not merely unknown but fundamentally unknowable due to the limits of human cognition. Our knowledge is confined to appearances (phenomena), structured by the forms of sensibility (space and time) and the categories of the understanding.
Any claim to partial knowledge of the noumenon would involve overstepping the bounds of possible experience and thus be unjustifiable within Kant’s system.

Indirect Realism and Its Ultimate Object

Both monist and dualist versions of indirect realism posit a reality that exists independently of perception and triggers sense data. This reality, often understood as the "ultimate object," is effectively equivalent to Kant's noumenon.
Since indirect realism acknowledges a separation between the perceived world and the ultimate reality, it must concede that the latter (the noumenal realm) lies beyond the direct grasp of perception or empirical knowledge.

No Partial Knowability of the Ultimate Object

From a Kantian perspective, any claim that the "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable is incoherent because even mediated access (via sense data or physical processes) pertains strictly to phenomena, not to the noumenon.
The noumenon, being entirely beyond the scope of human conditions of cognition, cannot be known, even indirectly or partially.

Conclusion: The Limitations of Indirect Realism
Whether monist or dualist, indirect realism (IR) must ultimately face the same critique Kant levels at any claim to noumenal knowledge: it is speculative and lacks justification. Additionally, IR, as a subset of philosophical realism, asserts the absolute mind-independence of the external world, claiming that it exists regardless of human perception or cognition.

Even without explicit reference to the noumenon, IR’s claim to partial knowability of its absolutely mind-independent object is incoherent. Knowability, whether partial or complete, inherently involves the human mind. If the ultimate object of IR is indeed absolutely mind-independent, then any assertion of its partial knowability entails a contradiction. To claim knowability of something posited as unknowable is an oxymoron.

Thus, IR cannot coherently maintain both the absolute mind-independence of its ultimate object and the possibility of its partial knowability, reinforcing its vulnerability to Kant's critique and underscoring its conceptual limitations."

The critique outlined is valid from a Kantian perspective because it operates within Kant's transcendental idealism, emphasizing the fundamental unknowability of the noumenon. From Kant's framework:

Noumenon is fundamentally unknowable: Any claim to know, even partially, the noumenon (thing-in-itself) contradicts Kant's core argument that human cognition is confined to phenomena, which are shaped by the a priori conditions of sensibility and understanding.

Indirect realism's vulnerability: Indirect realism posits an "ultimate object" as mind-independent reality triggering perception. Kant would critique this as an illegitimate claim to noumenal knowledge, whether full or partial, because all knowledge must pertain to appearances, not things-in-themselves.

This critique does not apply from a monist indirect realist perspective. Monist indirect realism might argue that:

The "ultimate object" is knowable indirectly through its effects (sense data), even if our understanding of it is incomplete or mediated.
Such indirect knowledge, though limited, does not violate the framework of realism, which does not depend on the Kantian dichotomy of phenomena and noumenon.

From this perspective, the claim to partial knowledge of an independent reality would be defended as consistent with the framework of indirect realism, even if Kant’s transcendental idealism denies such a possibility.

In summary, the critique aligns with Kant’s transcendental idealism but not with monist indirect realism, which rejects the strict unknowability of the ultimate object and operates outside the Kantian epistemological constraints.

My conclusion is that you can't even comprehend what perspectives are. Or just play dumb. We'll add that to your list of shortcomings.

Perspectives can be so different that even their axioms are irreconcilable. TI is irreconcilable with IR. This is philosophy 101, Mr. GOAT.

Did you really think that just because Kant spent 11 years and 1000 pages on his argument in the CPR, his argument can't be wrong? From the monist IR perspective Kant's argument can have more holes than swiss cheese.

[Veritas Aequitas]

My conclusion is that you can't even comprehend what perspectives are. Or just play dumb. We'll add that to your list of shortcomings.

Perspectives can be so different that even their axioms are irreconcilable. TI is irreconcilable with IR. This is philosophy 101, Mr. GOAT.

Did you really think that just because Kant spent 11 years and 1000 pages on his argument in the CPR, his argument can't be wrong? From the monist IR perspective Kant's argument can have more holes than swiss cheese.

Why take so long, but it is not too late. We all can benefit when we rely on AI in this case.
You need to be more humble when you are a kindi crepidatarian gnat.
You must present this whole counter to your 'ChatGpt' and get its response:

AI Wrote:
The counter argument provided by ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor introduces a "monist indirect realist" perspective to challenge the critique based on Kant's framework. Here's an evaluation of its claims:

Main Points of ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor's Counter

Kantian Framework (Agreement with Your Critique):
Acknowledges that within Kant's transcendental idealism, noumenon (or the ultimate object of indirect realism) is fundamentally unknowable.
Indirect realism's claim to partial knowledge of the ultimate object is criticized as illegitimate in Kantian terms because:
Human cognition is limited to phenomena shaped by the mind's a priori conditions.
Knowledge of things-in-themselves (noumena) is impossible without sensible intuition, which humans lack.

Monist Indirect Realism (Disagreement):
Suggests that monist indirect realism does not adopt Kant's strict dichotomy between phenomena and noumenon.
Proposes that:
The "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable through its effects (e.g., sense data).
This indirect, mediated knowledge is consistent with realism, even if it does not provide a complete or direct understanding.

Evaluation of the Counter
1. Definition of Monist vs. Dualist Perspectives:
Monism typically refers to a unified ontological view where reality is fundamentally of one kind. In this case, monist indirect realism seems to posit a single reality that is both mind-independent and accessible (at least partially) through sensory data.
Dualism (as implied in Kant's framework) creates a strict division between phenomena (what is experienced) and noumenon (what exists independently of experience), with the latter being unknowable.

However, monist indirect realism, as presented, seems to conflate "knowing effects" with "knowing the ultimate object."

This distinction is crucial:

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

2. Indirect Knowledge and Realism:
The claim that "partial knowledge of the ultimate object is consistent with realism" relies on a broader interpretation of knowledge. While indirect realism suggests that knowledge of the external world is mediated, it does not eliminate the epistemological gap:

The ultimate object remains unknown in itself, as the mind accesses only its representations, not its true, independent nature.
This view aligns with Kant's critique: any supposed knowledge of the noumenon or the ultimate object is still constrained by the limits of human cognition.

3. Unacknowledged Core Issues:
Hypostatization: Monist indirect realism implicitly treats the "ultimate object" as if it has an accessible reality, even though it is only known via mediated sense data. Kant would call this a hypostatization (treating an abstract concept as a concrete reality), which leads to a form of illusion.
Circular Justification: Claiming that the ultimate object is knowable indirectly through effects does not resolve the fundamental problem of how such effects correspond to the independent reality. Without a direct link, this knowledge remains speculative.

Refinement of Your Critique
To address the counter effectively, you might respond as follows:

Challenge the Partial Knowability Claim:

Monist indirect realism conflates knowing effects (sense data) with knowing the ultimate object. The two are distinct:
Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.
Therefore, "knowing effects" does not equate to "knowing the ultimate object" in any meaningful sense.

Kant’s Critique of Hypostatization:

The ultimate object in monist indirect realism parallels Kant’s noumenon: it is postulated as real, yet unknowable in itself.
Kant would argue that this postulation hypostatizes (treats as real) what is ultimately an illusion, as there is no empirical or rational basis to assert even partial knowledge of the thing-in-itself.

Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:

Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.

Conclusion
The counter argument relies on a redefinition of "knowledge" and avoids addressing the core issue of epistemological access to the ultimate object. Your original critique, grounded in Kantian epistemology, remains valid because it highlights the fundamental unknowability of the ultimate object, even within indirect realism. By focusing on the distinction between representations and reality itself, you can robustly counter the claims of "partial knowability" made by monist indirect realism.

[Atla]

My conclusion is that you can't even comprehend what perspectives are. Or just play dumb. We'll add that to your list of shortcomings.

Perspectives can be so different that even their axioms are irreconcilable. TI is irreconcilable with IR. This is philosophy 101, Mr. GOAT.

Did you really think that just because Kant spent 11 years and 1000 pages on his argument in the CPR, his argument can't be wrong? From the monist IR perspective Kant's argument can have more holes than swiss cheese.

Why take so long, but it is not too late. We all can benefit when we rely on AI in this case.
You need to be more humble when you are a kindi crepidatarian gnat.
You must present this whole counter to your 'ChatGpt' and get its response:

AI Wrote:
The counter argument provided by ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor introduces a "monist indirect realist" perspective to challenge the critique based on Kant's framework. Here's an evaluation of its claims:

Main Points of ChatGPT-to-Interlocutor's Counter

Kantian Framework (Agreement with Your Critique):
Acknowledges that within Kant's transcendental idealism, noumenon (or the ultimate object of indirect realism) is fundamentally unknowable.
Indirect realism's claim to partial knowledge of the ultimate object is criticized as illegitimate in Kantian terms because:
Human cognition is limited to phenomena shaped by the mind's a priori conditions.
Knowledge of things-in-themselves (noumena) is impossible without sensible intuition, which humans lack.

Monist Indirect Realism (Disagreement):
Suggests that monist indirect realism does not adopt Kant's strict dichotomy between phenomena and noumenon.
Proposes that:
The "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable through its effects (e.g., sense data).
This indirect, mediated knowledge is consistent with realism, even if it does not provide a complete or direct understanding.

Evaluation of the Counter
1. Definition of Monist vs. Dualist Perspectives:
Monism typically refers to a unified ontological view where reality is fundamentally of one kind. In this case, monist indirect realism seems to posit a single reality that is both mind-independent and accessible (at least partially) through sensory data.
Dualism (as implied in Kant's framework) creates a strict division between phenomena (what is experienced) and noumenon (what exists independently of experience), with the latter being unknowable.

However, monist indirect realism, as presented, seems to conflate "knowing effects" with "knowing the ultimate object."

This distinction is crucial:

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

2. Indirect Knowledge and Realism:
The claim that "partial knowledge of the ultimate object is consistent with realism" relies on a broader interpretation of knowledge. While indirect realism suggests that knowledge of the external world is mediated, it does not eliminate the epistemological gap:

The ultimate object remains unknown in itself, as the mind accesses only its representations, not its true, independent nature.
This view aligns with Kant's critique: any supposed knowledge of the noumenon or the ultimate object is still constrained by the limits of human cognition.

3. Unacknowledged Core Issues:
Hypostatization: Monist indirect realism implicitly treats the "ultimate object" as if it has an accessible reality, even though it is only known via mediated sense data. Kant would call this a hypostatization (treating an abstract concept as a concrete reality), which leads to a form of illusion.
Circular Justification: Claiming that the ultimate object is knowable indirectly through effects does not resolve the fundamental problem of how such effects correspond to the independent reality. Without a direct link, this knowledge remains speculative.

Refinement of Your Critique
To address the counter effectively, you might respond as follows:

Challenge the Partial Knowability Claim:

Monist indirect realism conflates knowing effects (sense data) with knowing the ultimate object. The two are distinct:
Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.
Therefore, "knowing effects" does not equate to "knowing the ultimate object" in any meaningful sense.

Kant’s Critique of Hypostatization:

The ultimate object in monist indirect realism parallels Kant’s noumenon: it is postulated as real, yet unknowable in itself.
Kant would argue that this postulation hypostatizes (treats as real) what is ultimately an illusion, as there is no empirical or rational basis to assert even partial knowledge of the thing-in-itself.

Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:

Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.

Conclusion
The counter argument relies on a redefinition of "knowledge" and avoids addressing the core issue of epistemological access to the ultimate object. Your original critique, grounded in Kantian epistemology, remains valid because it highlights the fundamental unknowability of the ultimate object, even within indirect realism. By focusing on the distinction between representations and reality itself, you can robustly counter the claims of "partial knowability" made by monist indirect realism.

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.

Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.

That's what IR says, it doesn't conflate the two. (If anything, Kant conflates them. You're trying to refute IR by arguing that IR is the rational one?)

IR also says that there is a causal link between the two. What direct link?

You jumped from monism on reality's nature to "monism" as in conflating perceiving and perceived. Word salad.

All the above is just an ignorant kindi strawman, that's why you shouldn't rely on manipulating AIs.

Does monist indirect realism hold the following?

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.

Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.

Yes, monist indirect realism generally aligns with the propositions you have outlined:

Knowing effects does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object: Monist indirect realism posits that we have access only to the effects or representations caused by mind-independent reality. These representations are mediated by our sensory and cognitive faculties. As such, while we may infer the existence of external objects, we do not directly know their intrinsic nature.

Sense data as representations shaped by human faculties: This is central to indirect realism, which holds that what we perceive are not the objects themselves but representations (often called sense data or percepts). These representations are shaped by the structure and function of our sensory organs and cognitive systems, suggesting that our perceptions are not faithful duplicates of external reality but are influenced by the characteristics of our human faculties.

Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety. This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.

duh, the guy is so bad at philosophy that he manipulated the AI into trying to refute IR by pointing out that IR is right

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=juhkN58ngs4

[Veritas Aequitas]

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.

That's what IR says, it doesn't conflate the two. (If anything, Kant conflates them. You're trying to refute IR by arguing that IR is the rational one?)
IR also says that there is a causal link between the two. What direct link?
You jumped from monism on reality's nature to "monism" as in conflating perceiving and perceived. Word salad.
All the above is just an ignorant kindi strawman, that's why you shouldn't rely on manipulating AIs.

Does monist indirect realism hold the following?

Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.

Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.

Yes, monist indirect realism generally aligns with the propositions you have outlined:

Knowing effects does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object: Monist indirect realism posits that we have access only to the effects or representations caused by mind-independent reality. These representations are mediated by our sensory and cognitive faculties. As such, while we may infer the existence of external objects, we do not directly know their intrinsic nature.

Sense data as representations shaped by human faculties: This is central to indirect realism, which holds that what we perceive are not the objects themselves but representations (often called sense data or percepts). These representations are shaped by the structure and function of our sensory organs and cognitive systems, suggesting that our perceptions are not faithful duplicates of external reality but are influenced by the characteristics of our human faculties.

Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety. This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.

duh, the guy is so bad at philosophy that he manipulated the AI into trying to refute IR by pointing out that IR is right

You are deceptive and a cheater.
I asked you to present the full ChatGpt-to-VA response to your ChatGpt but you merely presented;


[ChatGpt to VA] Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.

without the crucial:
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

The above is a counter to your claim that the ultimate object of IR can be partially known, i.e. it is "Not 100% Unknowable."


Even the latest ChatGpt-to-Atla confirmed my point:

ChatGpt-to-Atla Wrote:
Yes, monist indirect realism generally aligns with the propositions you have outlined:

Knowing effects does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object: Monist indirect realism posits that we have access only to the effects or representations caused by mind-independent reality. These representations are mediated by our sensory and cognitive faculties.
As such, while we may infer the existence of external objects, we do not directly know their intrinsic nature.

Sense data as representations shaped by human faculties: This is central to indirect realism, which holds that what we perceive are not the objects themselves but representations (often called sense data or percepts). These representations are shaped by the structure and function of our sensory organs and cognitive systems, suggesting that our perceptions are not faithful duplicates of external reality but are influenced by the characteristics of our human faculties.

Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety.
This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.

You insist the ultimate object of IR is not the same as the noumenon but
what is highlighted above in relation to the ultimate object of IR [mind-independent] is the same as Kant's absolute mind-independent noumenon of TR and PR.

ChatGpt-to-Atlla stated above "we do not directly know their intrinsic nature" so how can you claim you can partially know the ultimate object of IR?

Don't Cheat, I suggest you present the whole of ChatGpt-to-VA as a counter to your earlier ChatGpt response, i.e.

However, monist indirect realism, as presented, seems to conflate "knowing effects" with "knowing the ultimate object."

This distinction is crucial:
Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

2. Indirect Knowledge and Realism:
The claim that "partial knowledge of the ultimate object is consistent with realism" relies on a broader interpretation of knowledge. While indirect realism suggests that knowledge of the external world is mediated, it does not eliminate the epistemological gap:

The ultimate object remains unknown in itself, as the mind accesses only its representations, not its true, independent nature.
This view aligns with Kant's critique: any supposed knowledge of the noumenon or the ultimate object is still constrained by the limits of human cognition.

3. Unacknowledged Core Issues:
Hypostatization: Monist indirect realism implicitly treats the "ultimate object" as if it has an accessible reality, even though it is only known via mediated sense data. Kant would call this a hypostatization (treating an abstract concept as a concrete reality), which leads to a form of illusion.
Circular Justification: Claiming that the ultimate object is knowable indirectly through effects does not resolve the fundamental problem of how such effects correspond to the independent reality. Without a direct link, this knowledge remains speculative.

Refinement of Your Critique
To address the counter effectively, you might respond as follows:

Challenge the Partial Knowability Claim:
Monist indirect realism conflates knowing effects (sense data) with knowing the ultimate object. The two are distinct:
Sense data are representations shaped by human sensory and cognitive faculties, not direct access to the mind-independent reality.
Therefore, "knowing effects" does not equate to "knowing the ultimate object" in any meaningful sense.

Kant’s Critique of Hypostatization:
The ultimate object in monist indirect realism parallels Kant’s noumenon: it is postulated as real, yet unknowable in itself.
Kant would argue that this postulation hypostatizes (treats as real) what is ultimately an illusion, as there is no empirical or rational basis to assert even partial knowledge of the thing-in-itself.

Limits of Monist Indirect Realism:
Even outside Kant’s framework, indirect realism does not solve the epistemological gap between mediated representations and the ultimate object. Without direct access, the claim to partial knowledge remains speculative and unjustified.

Conclusion
The counter argument relies on a redefinition of "knowledge" and avoids addressing the core issue of epistemological access to the ultimate object.
Your original critique, grounded in Kantian epistemology, remains valid because it highlights the fundamental unknowability of the ultimate object, even within indirect realism.
By focusing on the distinction between representations and reality itself, you can robustly counter the claims of "partial knowability" made by monist indirect realism.

[Atla]

You are deceptive and a cheater.
I asked you to present the full ChatGpt-to-VA response to your ChatGpt but you merely presented;


[ChatGpt to VA] Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.

without the crucial:
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

The above is a counter to your claim that the ultimate object of IR can be partially known, i.e. it is "Not 100% Unknowable."

You insist the ultimate object of IR is not the same as the noumenon but
what is highlighted above in relation to the ultimate object of IR [mind-independent] is the same as Kant's absolute mind-independent noumenon of TR and PR.

ChatGpt-to-Atlla stated above "we do not directly know their intrinsic nature" so how can you claim you can partially know the ultimate object of IR?

Don't Cheat, I suggest you present the whole of ChatGpt-to-VA as a counter to your earlier ChatGpt response, i.e.

I did that too, you're just a retard who keeps posting the same thing in different topics, and then loses the reply. viewtopic.php?p=744755#p744755

And do you even know what a "counter" is in philosophy, when two irreconcilable systems are compared? I don't think so.

Even the latest ChatGpt-to-Atla confirmed my point:
ChatGpt-to-Atla Wrote:
Yes, monist indirect realism generally aligns with the propositions you have outlined:

Knowing effects does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object: Monist indirect realism posits that we have access only to the effects or representations caused by mind-independent reality. These representations are mediated by our sensory and cognitive faculties.
As such, while we may infer the existence of external objects, we do not directly know their intrinsic nature.

Sense data as representations shaped by human faculties: This is central to indirect realism, which holds that what we perceive are not the objects themselves but representations (often called sense data or percepts). These representations are shaped by the structure and function of our sensory organs and cognitive systems, suggesting that our perceptions are not faithful duplicates of external reality but are influenced by the characteristics of our human faculties.

Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety.
This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.

No, it confirmed my point. It's what IR says.

[Veritas Aequitas]

You are deceptive and a cheater.
I asked you to present the full ChatGpt-to-VA response to your ChatGpt but you merely presented;


[ChatGpt to VA] Knowing effects (e.g., sensory data) does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object.
Sense data are mediated representations, not the object itself.

without the crucial:
Therefore, the "partial knowability" claimed by monist indirect realism does not extend to the ultimate object but only to its appearances or effects.

The above is a counter to your claim that the ultimate object of IR can be partially known, i.e. it is "Not 100% Unknowable."

You insist the ultimate object of IR is not the same as the noumenon but
what is highlighted above in relation to the ultimate object of IR [mind-independent] is the same as Kant's absolute mind-independent noumenon of TR and PR.

ChatGpt-to-Atlla stated above "we do not directly know their intrinsic nature" so how can you claim you can partially know the ultimate object of IR?

Don't Cheat, I suggest you present the whole of ChatGpt-to-VA as a counter to your earlier ChatGpt response, i.e.

I did that too, you're just a retard who keeps posting the same thing in different topics, and then loses the reply. viewtopic.php?p=744755#p744755

And do you even know what a "counter" is in philosophy, when two irreconcilable systems are compared? I don't think so.

It is for my easy reference in future retrieval.
I countered that too over there.

Even the latest ChatGpt-to-Atla confirmed my point:
ChatGpt-to-Atla Wrote:
Yes, monist indirect realism generally aligns with the propositions you have outlined:

Knowing effects does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object: Monist indirect realism posits that we have access only to the effects or representations caused by mind-independent reality. These representations are mediated by our sensory and cognitive faculties.
As such, while we may infer the existence of external objects, we do not directly know their intrinsic nature.

Sense data as representations shaped by human faculties: This is central to indirect realism, which holds that what we perceive are not the objects themselves but representations (often called sense data or percepts). These representations are shaped by the structure and function of our sensory organs and cognitive systems, suggesting that our perceptions are not faithful duplicates of external reality but are influenced by the characteristics of our human faculties.

Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety.
This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.

No, it confirmed my point. It's what IR says.

Yes, that is what IR says.

Your IR stated the ultimate object of IR [as highlighted above] is;
-a mind-independent reality
-external reality
-the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations
-the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality

of which
-we do not directly know their intrinsic nature
-remains inaccessible in its entirety

the above description of the ultimate object of IR is exactly what is Kant's noumenon with TR and PR.

Therefore the ultimate object of IR cannot be partially known at all.
Since the ultimate object of IR is the same as the noumenon which is an illusion, the ultimate object of IR is also an illusion.
So IR whether monist or dualist is chasing an illusion [a fake ultimate object of IR].

If you insist the ultimate object of IR is real, then justify with arguments it is real.
If you relies on scientific realism, that is only knowing its effect and no way of knowing and confirming what is posited ontological beyond the effects.

[Atla]

-the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations

By default, IR has nothing to do with noumena "underlying" phenomena. How did you come up with such a bad Kantian strawman?

-remains inaccessible in its entirety

"in its entirety" means that it's not 100% directly accessible, instead it's indirectly accessible and indirectly, partially knowable. Not that it's 100% inaccessible and 100% unknowable.

the above description of the ultimate object of IR is exactly what is Kant's noumenon with TR and PR.

No it's totally not

[Veritas Aequitas]

-the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations

By default, IR has nothing to do with noumena "underlying" phenomena. How did you come up with such a bad Kantian strawman?

That is from your ChatGpt response to you:

ChatGpt to Atla:
Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety.
This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.

So?

-remains inaccessible in its entirety

"in its entirety" means that it's not 100% directly accessible, instead it's indirectly accessible and indirectly, partially knowable. Not that it's 100% inaccessible and 100% unknowable.

ChatGpt already explained, in this case your are conflating knowing the effects with knowing it ontologically.
"indirectly, partially knowable" is only with reference to observations not to the ontological ultimate object of IR.
There is no such thing as partially knowing the ontological ultimate object of IR which is fake and illusory.

the above description of the ultimate object of IR is exactly what is Kant's noumenon with TR and PR.

No it's totally not

Your ChatGpt's response above implied the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR and PR.

[Atla]

Atla wrote: ↑Fri Dec 13, 2024 6:09 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Dec 13, 2024 6:02 am
-the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations
By default, IR has nothing to do with noumena "underlying" phenomena. How did you come up with such a bad Kantian strawman?

That is from your ChatGpt response to you:
ChatGpt to Atla:
Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety.
This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.
So?

That could be because it was a reply to your already manipulated AI text and not the default.

By default, does monist indirect realism claim that the world beyond phenomena "underlies" phenomena, or simply that it's beyond phenomena? Summary only.

By default, monist indirect realism typically claims that the world beyond phenomena simply exists beyond phenomena, without necessarily asserting that it "underlies" phenomena in a metaphysical sense. It emphasizes the distinction between the phenomenal realm (what is perceived) and the noumenal or external world (which is inferred but not directly accessed).

ChatGpt already explained, in this case your are conflating knowing the effects with knowing it ontologically.
"indirectly, partially knowable" is only with reference to observations not to the ontological ultimate object of IR.
There is no such thing as partially knowing the ontological ultimate object of IR which is fake and illusory.

Total strawman, I never claimed to directly know the "ultimate object".

Your ChatGpt's response above implied the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR and PR.

No it didn't, not even the AI can be manipulated into say something so very incorrect.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Atla wrote: ↑Fri Dec 13, 2024 6:09 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Dec 13, 2024 6:02 am
-the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations
By default, IR has nothing to do with noumena "underlying" phenomena. How did you come up with such a bad Kantian strawman?

That is from your ChatGpt response to you:
ChatGpt to Atla:
Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety.
This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.
So?

That could be because it was a reply to your already manipulated AI text and not the default.

You are giving silly excuses when cornered.

Whether monist or dualist this the general definition of Indirect Realism:
"Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism

"the external world as it really is" is the same as the mind-independent external world. the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations
which is the same as Kant noumenon within TR and PR.

Show me references if otherwise.

By default, does monist indirect realism claim that the world beyond phenomena "underlies" phenomena, or simply that it's beyond phenomena? Summary only.

By default, monist indirect realism typically claims that the world beyond phenomena simply exists beyond phenomena, without necessarily asserting that it "underlies" phenomena in a metaphysical sense. It emphasizes the distinction between the phenomenal realm (what is perceived) and the noumenal or external world (which is inferred but not directly accessed).

ChatGpt already explained, in this case your are conflating knowing the effects with knowing it ontologically.
"indirectly, partially knowable" is only with reference to observations not to the ontological ultimate object of IR.
There is no such thing as partially knowing the ontological ultimate object of IR which is fake and illusory.

Total strawman, I never claimed to directly know the "ultimate object".

I did not state you "claimed to directly know the "ultimate object"".
Re the OP you claimed the unknowable noumenon [ultimate object of IR] is partially knowable, i.e. it is not 100% unknowable.

Your ChatGpt's response above implied the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR and PR.

No it didn't, not even the AI can be manipulated into say something so very incorrect.

I have already show you all the evidences from AI that, in the fundamental sense, the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR and PR.

If not, show me your argument with references where I or AI is wrong?

[Atla]

Atla wrote: ↑Fri Dec 13, 2024 6:09 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Fri Dec 13, 2024 6:02 am
-the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations
By default, IR has nothing to do with noumena "underlying" phenomena. How did you come up with such a bad Kantian strawman?

That is from your ChatGpt response to you:
ChatGpt to Atla:
Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety.
This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.
So?

That could be because it was a reply to your already manipulated AI text and not the default.

You are giving silly excuses when cornered.

Whether monist or dualist this the general definition of Indirect Realism:
"Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism

"the external world as it really is" is the same as the mind-independent external world. the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations
which is the same as Kant noumenon within TR and PR.

Show me references if otherwise.

By default, does monist indirect realism claim that the world beyond phenomena "underlies" phenomena, or simply that it's beyond phenomena? Summary only.

By default, monist indirect realism typically claims that the world beyond phenomena simply exists beyond phenomena, without necessarily asserting that it "underlies" phenomena in a metaphysical sense. It emphasizes the distinction between the phenomenal realm (what is perceived) and the noumenal or external world (which is inferred but not directly accessed).

ChatGpt already explained, in this case your are conflating knowing the effects with knowing it ontologically.
"indirectly, partially knowable" is only with reference to observations not to the ontological ultimate object of IR.
There is no such thing as partially knowing the ontological ultimate object of IR which is fake and illusory.

Total strawman, I never claimed to directly know the "ultimate object".

I did not state you "claimed to directly know the "ultimate object"".
Re the OP you claimed the unknowable noumenon [ultimate object of IR] is partially knowable, i.e. it is not 100% unknowable.

Your ChatGpt's response above implied the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR and PR.

No it didn't, not even the AI can be manipulated into say something so very incorrect.

I have already show you all the evidences from AI that, in the fundamental sense, the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR and PR.

If not, show me your argument with references where I or AI is wrong?

Oh please copy where an AI says that the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR, or that TR is the same as PR. It said the opposite dozens of times.

Fact is, after the posters on this forum have exposed you for a complete intellectual fraud for years, now AI did the same.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I have already show you all the evidences from AI that, in the fundamental sense, the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR and PR.

If not, show me your argument with references where I or AI is wrong?

Oh please copy where an AI says that the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR, or that TR is the same as PR. It said the opposite dozens of times.

Fact is, after the posters on this forum have exposed you for a complete intellectual fraud for years, now AI did the same.

ChatGpt response to me stated the
"the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR, or that TR is the same as PR."

ChatGpt-to-You did not state directly but it is implied in your following post:
viewtopic.php?p=744743#p744743
The highlighted sentences implied
"the noumenon of IR is exactly the same as Kant's noumenon within TR, or that TR is the same as PR."

ChatGpt-to-Atla Wrote:
Yes, monist indirect realism generally aligns with the propositions you have outlined:

Knowing effects does not equate to knowing the intrinsic nature of the ultimate object: Monist indirect realism posits that we have access only to the effects or representations caused by mind-independent reality. These representations are mediated by our sensory and cognitive faculties.
As such, while we may infer the existence of external objects, we do not directly know their intrinsic nature.

Sense data as representations shaped by human faculties: This is central to indirect realism, which holds that what we perceive are not the objects themselves but representations (often called sense data or percepts). These representations are shaped by the structure and function of our sensory organs and cognitive systems, suggesting that our perceptions are not faithful duplicates of external reality but are influenced by the characteristics of our human faculties.

Thus, monist indirect realism acknowledges a distinction between the mediated, representational knowledge we have (sense data) and the unmediated, intrinsic reality that underlies those representations, which remains inaccessible in its entirety.
This view underscores the epistemological limits of human cognition while maintaining the ontological existence of a mind-independent reality.