Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

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Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 4:38 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 2:36 am
Atla wrote: Sat Dec 07, 2024 5:27 pm This isn't rocket science. I keep saying the same thing over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over and over again. A 'Kant expert' such as you should understand it at a glance, not still fail to get it after years.
Yours is a strawman.
As a Kantian "expert" [reasonable] the above response from ChatGpt is addressed at the gnat level.
If you ask ChatGpt at the 'gnat' level, it will give your gnat-level answers.
You keep asking ChatGpt [over, over .. and over again] from only your expectations but did not let ChatGpt present alternative views.
Worst, you keep asking for "summary only" thus confining ChatGpt to quickie answers.

Can't you see your deception and dishonesty in this case.
To be honest, you must post "ChatGpt's response to Me [VA]" in your question to ChatGpt and ask it to comment on it.

You should present ChatGpt-to-Me response to Chat-Gpt-Atla asking;
"My interlocutor presented this view from ChatGpt [ChatGpt-to-VA] which is different from your response to me [Atla]. Why is there a different response from the same ChatGpt on the same issue? Are there deeper nuanced and alternative views to your [ChatGpt] response?"

Do it the honest way.
As always, I did it the honest way. You are asking tha AI kindi gnat questions where you tell the AI in advance what you would like the answer to be, while I just ask it impartial questions. You don't actually keep getting different answers from me, you just tell the AI to view everything from Kant's perspective, while I ask it to compare the 2 perspectives.
I discuss with AI from the various perspectives, but the point is ChatGpt gave me a different answers from a wider perspective in contrast to ChatGpt giving you an answer from a narrower perspective.
Surely it is rational you should present the two responses from the same GptChat to different users and ask why there is a difference.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 4:38 am As always, I did it the honest way. You are asking tha AI kindi gnat questions where you tell the AI in advance what you would like the answer to be, while I just ask it impartial questions. You don't actually keep getting different answers from me, you just tell the AI to view everything from Kant's perspective, while I ask it to compare the 2 perspectives.
Nope. Here is the honest way. I presented ChatGpt's response to you and ask AI to comment on it. Note how I dig into the nuanced views to get to the truth of the matter.

Notes:

Here is a discussion with AI starting with a crude answer and digging deeper into the essential truth of the matter in both CPR and general knowledge of philosophical realism and direct realism. It took 3 levels of nuances consideration before we get to the essential truths of the matter:
1.. VA to AI
Below is a chat between Mr.A and AI:
[Atla]Does indirect realism's definition of the noumenon (as in the mind-independent external world) typically differ from Kant's original definition of the noumenon in transcendental idealism? Summary only.

[Mr.A] "Kant's Transcendental Idealism: The noumenon refers to things-in-themselves, which exist independently of human perception or cognition but are fundamentally unknowable. Kant distinguishes the noumenon from phenomena, the latter being the world as we experience it through our sensory and cognitive faculties.
Indirect Realism: The term "noumenon" (or mind-independent external world) in this context typically refers to an external reality that causes our sensory perceptions and representations. Unlike Kant, indirect realism does not necessarily claim the external world is unknowable but instead focuses on the mediated nature of our knowledge.
The main difference lies in Kant's strict unknowability of the noumenon versus indirect realism's allowance for partial or mediated knowledge of the external world." [End]

Is the above correct, sufficient or are there nuanced views to it?
AI Responded
Your summary of Kant's Transcendental Idealism and the contrast with Indirect Realism captures some foundational concepts, but it could benefit from a bit more nuance and clarity. Let's break this down and analyze each part.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism
Noumenon and Phenomenon:
You accurately describe the noumenon as things-in-themselves, which exist independently of human perception. Kant argued that while we can conceive of these noumena, we cannot have direct knowledge of them. This is because our understanding is always filtered through the lens of our sensory and cognitive faculties.
The phenomena, on the other hand, are the appearances or experiences that we have of the world around us. These are the realities as we perceive them, shaped by our senses and mental frameworks.

Unknowability:
It's important to emphasize that for Kant, the essence of the noumenon is fundamentally unknowable to us; we can only categorize our experiences in terms of phenomena. This isn't just a limitation of our knowledge but a radical claim about the nature of reality itself—Kant believed that our cognitive faculties shape the very structure of our experience.

Indirect Realism
Definition:
Indirect Realism, or Representational Realism, posits that the world external to us exists and that our perceptions are representations of that world. This means that our sensory experiences are not direct reflections of reality, but rather mediated through our cognitive processes.

Differences from Kant:
You highlight an important distinction: Indirect Realism does not claim that the external world is unknowable. Rather, it asserts that while our perceptions are mediated, there is a mind-independent world that we can gain knowledge about, even if that knowledge is not perfect.
This perspective allows for the possibility that we can know something about the noumenon—unlike Kant, who maintains that we cannot access the noumenon at all.

Nuanced Views
Kant's Agnosticism: Kant's emphasis on the unknowability of the noumenon is tied to his broader epistemological project, which seeks to delineate the limits of human knowledge. While he acknowledges the existence of things-in-themselves, he ultimately argues that they are beyond the reach of our understanding.

Indirect Realism's Variations: Within Indirect Realism, there are different schools of thought. Some philosophers argue for more robust forms of realism, suggesting that our perceptions, while not direct, can still be reliable guides to the external reality. Others may adopt a more skeptical stance about our ability to know anything accurately about the external world.

Metaphysical Implications: Both positions offer significant implications for metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, particularly concerning our understanding of reality, perception, and knowledge. Exploring these implications can deepen our understanding of both theories.

Conclusion
Your initial explanation captures some vital aspects of these philosophical theories, but it is essential to clarify the nuances in terms of knowledge claims and the implications of those claims. By delving deeper into the definitions and conceptual differences, you can better appreciate the rich landscape of philosophical thought surrounding appearance, perception, and reality.

……………………
2.. VA to AI
Taken into account the below definitions, the deeper nuance is:
- Kant's noumenon aka thing-in-itself conform to philosophical realism which is also his Transcendental Realism.
-indirect realism either dualist or monists are subsets of philosophical realism, positing an external world as it really is, i.e. absolutely mind independent from observations, it exists regardless of whether there are humans not not.
Therefore the noumenon on Kant is the same as the mind-independent ultimate object of indirect realism.

"Philosophical realism—usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters— is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

[v]"Indirect realism [/b]is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism
AI Responded
Your re-framing touches on an important aspect of both Kant's philosophy and the broader category of Indirect Realism, specifically in relation to philosophical realism. Let's clarify and expand on these nuances while addressing the relationships and distinctions between these concepts.

Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Realism
Noumenon and Transcendental Realism:
You correctly identify Kant's concept of the noumenon (things-in-themselves) as aligning with a form of philosophical realism in that it posits the existence of a mind-independent reality. Kant can be seen as a kind of transcendental realist in that he does assert that there is a reality independent of our perceptions, but he ultimately claims we cannot know it in itself.
However, Kant distinguishes his transcendental idealism from traditional realism by emphasizing that our understanding of this noumenal reality is limited by our cognitive faculties. Thus, while Kant agrees with a form of realism that posits the existence of things-in-themselves, he also radically limits our access to that reality, making it fundamentally different from straightforward philosophical realism.

Indirect Realism
Mind-Independent External Reality:
Indirect Realism indeed asserts that there exists an external world that is mind-independent, akin to the notion of the noumenon in Kant's philosophy. Indirect Realists, whether they lean toward dualism or monism, posit that there is a reality that exists completely independently of human consciousness or perception.
This perspective can think of the external world as "real" in a more accessible way, focusing on how human cognition and perception mediate our experience of that world rather than imposing limits on knowing it altogether.

Comparison
Similarities and Differences:
Similarity: Both Kant's noumenon and the mind-independent objects of Indirect Realism refer to a reality that exists outside human perception. They stress that there is a world beyond appearances.
Difference: The crucial difference lies in the epistemological claims. Kant holds that while noumena exist, we cannot have knowledge of them (they are unknowable), which sets him apart from standard forms of philosophical realism, including Indirect Realism. Indirect Realists maintain that, while our perceptions may be mediated, we can have varying degrees of knowledge about the mind-independent world.

Philosophical Realism
Philosophical Realism:
Your definition of philosophical realism captures its core: the belief in a mind-independent existence of various entities or truths. This framing applies broadly, accounting for various philosophical perspectives on reality.
It effectively places both Kant's noumenon and the claims of Indirect Realism within the broader context of realism. However, one must remember that Kant's unique position also attempts to navigate between idealism and realism, suggesting that characteristics of knowledge and experience are shaped by our faculties.

Conclusion
In summation, your nuanced definitions align with an understanding that Kant's noumenon and the concept of mind-independent reality in Indirect Realism share a common commitment to the existence of an external world. However, they diverge significantly on the issue of our ability to know this reality. Kant's transcendental idealism introduces an epistemic barrier, asserting the noumenon's unknowability, while Indirect Realism allows for different degrees and types of knowledge about the external world. Recognizing these positions within the broader framework of philosophical realism enriches the conversation about perception, reality, and knowledge in philosophy.
3.. VA to AI
I believe there is another nuance level for consideration:
Both the posited ultimate object of indirect realism and as noumenon are absolutely mind-independent, i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are human or not.
Knowability is a concept that requires a mind and humans.
There the question of knowability and unknowability of the noumenon or ultimate object of indirect realism is moot, a non-starter or an oxymoron.
Kant did mention the noumenon is unknowable only in the early part of his Transcendental Aesthetic in relation to the sensibility but ultimately there is no question of knowability with the same transcendental object as a thing-in-itself which is illusory if hypostatized.

AI Responded:
Your further nuance introduces critical elements regarding the relationship between knowability and the concepts of noumena and the ultimate object of Indirect Realism. Let’s explore this in a detailed yet accessible manner.

Mind-Independence of Noumena and Indirect Realism's Ultimate Object
Mind-Independence:
As you have stated, both the noumenon in Kant’s framework and the ultimate object of Indirect Realism are mind-independent. They exist regardless of whether there is a human cognitive apparatus or even human existence. This is an essential aspect of both philosophical positions, as both assert the existence of a reality that is not contingent upon the perceptions or thoughts of any observer.

Knowability and Its Relation to Cognition
Concept of Knowability:
Knowability inherently involves a cognitive agent—the mind perceiving or conceptualizing a phenomenon. Thus, asserting that something is unknowable usually assumes the existence of a subject or observer who may recognize the boundary between what can and cannot be known.
When you point out that questions of knowability are moot or oxymoronic when considering absolute mind-independent entities, you are emphasizing a critical philosophical distinction. Asking whether an ultimate object (as posited by Indirect Realism) or the noumenon can be known or not presupposes a perspective grounded in human cognition. When detached from human experience, these questions become somewhat irrelevant.

Kant’s Stance on the Noumenon and Knowledge
Kant’s Argument:
Early in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does indeed discuss the unknowability of the noumenon in relation to our sensibility and faculties of perception. He argues that while noumena exist, we can only know phenomena—the world as we experience it through our senses.
However, as you suggest, if we regard the noumenon as an ultimate reality that must be conceptualized, then asserting its unknowability becomes a more complex issue. If we understand the noumenon merely as a representation of the ultimate reality (without hypostatizing it), we might more accurately view it as a necessary part of an epistemic framework where human cognition plays a role.

Illusory Nature of Hypostatizing
Hypostatization:
The notion that something, like a noumenon, can be hypostatized (treated as a concrete, independently existing reality) leads to complications. It gives rise to metaphysical implications that Kant might argue are not warranted. For Kant, to take the noumenon as a concrete entity could obscure the essential project of understanding phenomena and the limits of human cognition.
Therefore, while Kant acknowledges the presence of things-in-themselves (noumena), treating them as real entities independent of our perception can lead to misconceptions about their role in his epistemology.

Conclusion
Your insights draw attention to a valuable distinction: the concepts of noumena and the ultimate objects of Indirect Realism share a key feature of mind-independence, but discussions of knowability are inherently tied to subjects capable of knowledge. Thus, in contemplating these ideas, one might conclude that philosophical debates about unknowability become less meaningful when we focus on the nature of the objects themselves, which are asserted to exist independently of human observers.

This line of reasoning challenges us to re-evaluate classic epistemological discussions by considering the very nature of reality and knowledge itself, encouraging deeper reflection on what it means to know or engage with the world around us. It’s an important contribution to the dialogue surrounding Kantian philosophy and Indirect Realism, prompting further exploration of how we conceptualize existence in relation to perception and knowledge.
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 6:38 am
Atla wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 4:38 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 2:36 am
Yours is a strawman.
As a Kantian "expert" [reasonable] the above response from ChatGpt is addressed at the gnat level.
If you ask ChatGpt at the 'gnat' level, it will give your gnat-level answers.
You keep asking ChatGpt [over, over .. and over again] from only your expectations but did not let ChatGpt present alternative views.
Worst, you keep asking for "summary only" thus confining ChatGpt to quickie answers.

Can't you see your deception and dishonesty in this case.
To be honest, you must post "ChatGpt's response to Me [VA]" in your question to ChatGpt and ask it to comment on it.

You should present ChatGpt-to-Me response to Chat-Gpt-Atla asking;
"My interlocutor presented this view from ChatGpt [ChatGpt-to-VA] which is different from your response to me [Atla]. Why is there a different response from the same ChatGpt on the same issue? Are there deeper nuanced and alternative views to your [ChatGpt] response?"

Do it the honest way.
As always, I did it the honest way. You are asking tha AI kindi gnat questions where you tell the AI in advance what you would like the answer to be, while I just ask it impartial questions. You don't actually keep getting different answers from me, you just tell the AI to view everything from Kant's perspective, while I ask it to compare the 2 perspectives.
I discuss with AI from the various perspectives, but the point is ChatGpt gave me a different answers from a wider perspective in contrast to ChatGpt giving you an answer from a narrower perspective.
Surely it is rational you should present the two responses from the same GptChat to different users and ask why there is a difference.
That's a lie, you're an incompetent kindi who always ends up torturing the AI from the Kantian perspective.
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 6:49 am
Atla wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 4:38 am As always, I did it the honest way. You are asking tha AI kindi gnat questions where you tell the AI in advance what you would like the answer to be, while I just ask it impartial questions. You don't actually keep getting different answers from me, you just tell the AI to view everything from Kant's perspective, while I ask it to compare the 2 perspectives.
Nope. Here is the honest way. I presented ChatGpt's response to you and ask AI to comment on it. Note how I dig into the nuanced views to get to the truth of the matter.

Notes:

Here is a discussion with AI starting with a crude answer and digging deeper into the essential truth of the matter in both CPR and general knowledge of philosophical realism and direct realism. It took 3 levels of nuances consideration before we get to the essential truths of the matter:
1.. VA to AI
Below is a chat between Mr.A and AI:
[Atla]Does indirect realism's definition of the noumenon (as in the mind-independent external world) typically differ from Kant's original definition of the noumenon in transcendental idealism? Summary only.

[Mr.A] "Kant's Transcendental Idealism: The noumenon refers to things-in-themselves, which exist independently of human perception or cognition but are fundamentally unknowable. Kant distinguishes the noumenon from phenomena, the latter being the world as we experience it through our sensory and cognitive faculties.
Indirect Realism: The term "noumenon" (or mind-independent external world) in this context typically refers to an external reality that causes our sensory perceptions and representations. Unlike Kant, indirect realism does not necessarily claim the external world is unknowable but instead focuses on the mediated nature of our knowledge.
The main difference lies in Kant's strict unknowability of the noumenon versus indirect realism's allowance for partial or mediated knowledge of the external world." [End]

Is the above correct, sufficient or are there nuanced views to it?
AI Responded
Your summary of Kant's Transcendental Idealism and the contrast with Indirect Realism captures some foundational concepts, but it could benefit from a bit more nuance and clarity. Let's break this down and analyze each part.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism
Noumenon and Phenomenon:
You accurately describe the noumenon as things-in-themselves, which exist independently of human perception. Kant argued that while we can conceive of these noumena, we cannot have direct knowledge of them. This is because our understanding is always filtered through the lens of our sensory and cognitive faculties.
The phenomena, on the other hand, are the appearances or experiences that we have of the world around us. These are the realities as we perceive them, shaped by our senses and mental frameworks.

Unknowability:
It's important to emphasize that for Kant, the essence of the noumenon is fundamentally unknowable to us; we can only categorize our experiences in terms of phenomena. This isn't just a limitation of our knowledge but a radical claim about the nature of reality itself—Kant believed that our cognitive faculties shape the very structure of our experience.

Indirect Realism
Definition:
Indirect Realism, or Representational Realism, posits that the world external to us exists and that our perceptions are representations of that world. This means that our sensory experiences are not direct reflections of reality, but rather mediated through our cognitive processes.

Differences from Kant:
You highlight an important distinction: Indirect Realism does not claim that the external world is unknowable. Rather, it asserts that while our perceptions are mediated, there is a mind-independent world that we can gain knowledge about, even if that knowledge is not perfect.
This perspective allows for the possibility that we can know something about the noumenon—unlike Kant, who maintains that we cannot access the noumenon at all.

Nuanced Views
Kant's Agnosticism: Kant's emphasis on the unknowability of the noumenon is tied to his broader epistemological project, which seeks to delineate the limits of human knowledge. While he acknowledges the existence of things-in-themselves, he ultimately argues that they are beyond the reach of our understanding.

Indirect Realism's Variations: Within Indirect Realism, there are different schools of thought. Some philosophers argue for more robust forms of realism, suggesting that our perceptions, while not direct, can still be reliable guides to the external reality. Others may adopt a more skeptical stance about our ability to know anything accurately about the external world.

Metaphysical Implications: Both positions offer significant implications for metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, particularly concerning our understanding of reality, perception, and knowledge. Exploring these implications can deepen our understanding of both theories.

Conclusion
Your initial explanation captures some vital aspects of these philosophical theories, but it is essential to clarify the nuances in terms of knowledge claims and the implications of those claims. By delving deeper into the definitions and conceptual differences, you can better appreciate the rich landscape of philosophical thought surrounding appearance, perception, and reality.

……………………
2.. VA to AI
Taken into account the below definitions, the deeper nuance is:
- Kant's noumenon aka thing-in-itself conform to philosophical realism which is also his Transcendental Realism.
-indirect realism either dualist or monists are subsets of philosophical realism, positing an external world as it really is, i.e. absolutely mind independent from observations, it exists regardless of whether there are humans not not.
Therefore the noumenon on Kant is the same as the mind-independent ultimate object of indirect realism.

"Philosophical realism—usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters— is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

[v]"Indirect realism [/b]is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism
AI Responded
Your re-framing touches on an important aspect of both Kant's philosophy and the broader category of Indirect Realism, specifically in relation to philosophical realism. Let's clarify and expand on these nuances while addressing the relationships and distinctions between these concepts.

Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Realism
Noumenon and Transcendental Realism:
You correctly identify Kant's concept of the noumenon (things-in-themselves) as aligning with a form of philosophical realism in that it posits the existence of a mind-independent reality. Kant can be seen as a kind of transcendental realist in that he does assert that there is a reality independent of our perceptions, but he ultimately claims we cannot know it in itself.
However, Kant distinguishes his transcendental idealism from traditional realism by emphasizing that our understanding of this noumenal reality is limited by our cognitive faculties. Thus, while Kant agrees with a form of realism that posits the existence of things-in-themselves, he also radically limits our access to that reality, making it fundamentally different from straightforward philosophical realism.

Indirect Realism
Mind-Independent External Reality:
Indirect Realism indeed asserts that there exists an external world that is mind-independent, akin to the notion of the noumenon in Kant's philosophy. Indirect Realists, whether they lean toward dualism or monism, posit that there is a reality that exists completely independently of human consciousness or perception.
This perspective can think of the external world as "real" in a more accessible way, focusing on how human cognition and perception mediate our experience of that world rather than imposing limits on knowing it altogether.

Comparison
Similarities and Differences:
Similarity: Both Kant's noumenon and the mind-independent objects of Indirect Realism refer to a reality that exists outside human perception. They stress that there is a world beyond appearances.
Difference: The crucial difference lies in the epistemological claims. Kant holds that while noumena exist, we cannot have knowledge of them (they are unknowable), which sets him apart from standard forms of philosophical realism, including Indirect Realism. Indirect Realists maintain that, while our perceptions may be mediated, we can have varying degrees of knowledge about the mind-independent world.

Philosophical Realism
Philosophical Realism:
Your definition of philosophical realism captures its core: the belief in a mind-independent existence of various entities or truths. This framing applies broadly, accounting for various philosophical perspectives on reality.
It effectively places both Kant's noumenon and the claims of Indirect Realism within the broader context of realism. However, one must remember that Kant's unique position also attempts to navigate between idealism and realism, suggesting that characteristics of knowledge and experience are shaped by our faculties.

Conclusion
In summation, your nuanced definitions align with an understanding that Kant's noumenon and the concept of mind-independent reality in Indirect Realism share a common commitment to the existence of an external world. However, they diverge significantly on the issue of our ability to know this reality. Kant's transcendental idealism introduces an epistemic barrier, asserting the noumenon's unknowability, while Indirect Realism allows for different degrees and types of knowledge about the external world. Recognizing these positions within the broader framework of philosophical realism enriches the conversation about perception, reality, and knowledge in philosophy.
3.. VA to AI
I believe there is another nuance level for consideration:
Both the posited ultimate object of indirect realism and as noumenon are absolutely mind-independent, i.e. they exists regardless of whether there are human or not.
Knowability is a concept that requires a mind and humans.
There the question of knowability and unknowability of the noumenon or ultimate object of indirect realism is moot, a non-starter or an oxymoron.
Kant did mention the noumenon is unknowable only in the early part of his Transcendental Aesthetic in relation to the sensibility but ultimately there is no question of knowability with the same transcendental object as a thing-in-itself which is illusory if hypostatized.

AI Responded:
Your further nuance introduces critical elements regarding the relationship between knowability and the concepts of noumena and the ultimate object of Indirect Realism. Let’s explore this in a detailed yet accessible manner.

Mind-Independence of Noumena and Indirect Realism's Ultimate Object
Mind-Independence:
As you have stated, both the noumenon in Kant’s framework and the ultimate object of Indirect Realism are mind-independent. They exist regardless of whether there is a human cognitive apparatus or even human existence. This is an essential aspect of both philosophical positions, as both assert the existence of a reality that is not contingent upon the perceptions or thoughts of any observer.

Knowability and Its Relation to Cognition
Concept of Knowability:
Knowability inherently involves a cognitive agent—the mind perceiving or conceptualizing a phenomenon. Thus, asserting that something is unknowable usually assumes the existence of a subject or observer who may recognize the boundary between what can and cannot be known.
When you point out that questions of knowability are moot or oxymoronic when considering absolute mind-independent entities, you are emphasizing a critical philosophical distinction. Asking whether an ultimate object (as posited by Indirect Realism) or the noumenon can be known or not presupposes a perspective grounded in human cognition. When detached from human experience, these questions become somewhat irrelevant.

Kant’s Stance on the Noumenon and Knowledge
Kant’s Argument:
Early in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant does indeed discuss the unknowability of the noumenon in relation to our sensibility and faculties of perception. He argues that while noumena exist, we can only know phenomena—the world as we experience it through our senses.
However, as you suggest, if we regard the noumenon as an ultimate reality that must be conceptualized, then asserting its unknowability becomes a more complex issue. If we understand the noumenon merely as a representation of the ultimate reality (without hypostatizing it), we might more accurately view it as a necessary part of an epistemic framework where human cognition plays a role.

Illusory Nature of Hypostatizing
Hypostatization:
The notion that something, like a noumenon, can be hypostatized (treated as a concrete, independently existing reality) leads to complications. It gives rise to metaphysical implications that Kant might argue are not warranted. For Kant, to take the noumenon as a concrete entity could obscure the essential project of understanding phenomena and the limits of human cognition.
Therefore, while Kant acknowledges the presence of things-in-themselves (noumena), treating them as real entities independent of our perception can lead to misconceptions about their role in his epistemology.

Conclusion
Your insights draw attention to a valuable distinction: the concepts of noumena and the ultimate objects of Indirect Realism share a key feature of mind-independence, but discussions of knowability are inherently tied to subjects capable of knowledge. Thus, in contemplating these ideas, one might conclude that philosophical debates about unknowability become less meaningful when we focus on the nature of the objects themselves, which are asserted to exist independently of human observers.

This line of reasoning challenges us to re-evaluate classic epistemological discussions by considering the very nature of reality and knowledge itself, encouraging deeper reflection on what it means to know or engage with the world around us. It’s an important contribution to the dialogue surrounding Kantian philosophy and Indirect Realism, prompting further exploration of how we conceptualize existence in relation to perception and knowledge.
1. and 2. just repeat what I've been saying, and in 3. you are torturing the AI to assess IR from the Kantian perspective, like I said you would (dishonest kindi gnat).

And your point was?
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Atla »

Anyone can do that, kindi gnat (and we don't need 3 pages for it)
Atla the KG wrote:From the monist indirect realist perspective, is Kant's idea that anything beyond phenomena is 100% unknowable, seen as irrational? Summary only.
God wrote:From a monist indirect realist perspective, Kant's assertion that anything beyond phenomena (the "noumena" or things-in-themselves) is entirely unknowable may be seen as overly rigid or unwarranted. This perspective often assumes that while our perception of reality is mediated by sensory and cognitive processes, it is still grounded in a single, unified reality. Thus, monist indirect realists might argue that although our knowledge of the noumenal world is limited or mediated, it is not entirely inaccessible or unknowable. Kant's strict separation between phenomena and noumena could be viewed as an unnecessary epistemological barrier.
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Atla »

Here it is in reverse, it's what you keep strawmanning me with. Except again I don't need 3 pages for it:
Atla KG wrote:From the Kantian transcendental idealist perspective, is monist indirect realism's view that not everything beyond phenomena is 100% unknowable, seen as irrational? Summary only.
God wrote:From a Kantian transcendental idealist perspective, monist indirect realism's view that not everything beyond phenomena is entirely unknowable could be seen as irrational because it contradicts Kant's core claim that the noumenal realm (things-in-themselves) is fundamentally beyond human cognition. While indirect realism admits a mediated knowledge of external reality, Kant maintains that any such mediation still confines knowledge to the phenomenal domain. Therefore, any assertion about partial knowability of the noumenal would lack justification within Kant’s framework.
ta-daa
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 7:08 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 6:38 am
Atla wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 4:38 am As always, I did it the honest way. You are asking tha AI kindi gnat questions where you tell the AI in advance what you would like the answer to be, while I just ask it impartial questions. You don't actually keep getting different answers from me, you just tell the AI to view everything from Kant's perspective, while I ask it to compare the 2 perspectives.
I discuss with AI from the various perspectives, but the point is ChatGpt gave me a different answers from a wider perspective in contrast to ChatGpt giving you an answer from a narrower perspective.
Surely it is rational you should present the two responses from the same GptChat to different users and ask why there is a difference.
That's a lie, you're an incompetent kindi who always ends up torturing the AI from the Kantian perspective.
What are you talking about?
To compare two different [contradictory] views from the same source is a very rational intellectual quest.

The issue is your
Atla: "Indirect Realism [IR] typically holds that the "ultimate object" isn't 100% unknowable."

This issue of "unknowability" arose from the discussion of Kant's noumenon.
So obviously we have to bring in Kant's perspective with reference to "unknowability" and indirect realism.

AI has shown that the ultimate object of IR [which is the same as noumenon] is 100% unknowable [in one sense].

Your claim, "Indirect Realism [IR] typically holds that the "ultimate object" isn't 100% unknowable" makes no sense, i.e. nonsense.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 7:17 am
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 6:49 am Here is a discussion with AI starting with a crude answer and digging deeper into the essential truth of the matter in both CPR and general knowledge of philosophical realism and direct realism. It took 3 levels of nuances consideration before we get to the essential truths of the matter:
..........
.............
1. and 2. just repeat what I've been saying, and in 3. you are torturing the AI to assess IR from the Kantian perspective, like I said you would (dishonest kindi gnat).

And your point was?
My point is; the above exposed your ignorance.
If you ask ChatGpt merely based on your ignorance and without suggesting the nuances involved, you will get a general, crude and rough answers only.

As shown above, one need to ask ChatGpt to consider alternative views and the nuances involved especially on a complex topic like 'IR & Noumenon'.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Sun Dec 08, 2024 11:32 am Here it is in reverse, it's what you keep strawmanning me with. Except again I don't need 3 pages for it:
Atla KG wrote:From the Kantian transcendental idealist perspective, is monist indirect realism's view that not everything beyond phenomena is 100% unknowable, seen as irrational? Summary only.
God wrote:From a Kantian transcendental idealist perspective, monist indirect realism's view that not everything beyond phenomena is entirely unknowable could be seen as irrational because it contradicts Kant's core claim that the noumenal realm (things-in-themselves) is fundamentally beyond human cognition. While indirect realism admits a mediated knowledge of external reality, Kant maintains that any such mediation still confines knowledge to the phenomenal domain. Therefore, any assertion about partial knowability of the noumenal would lack justification within Kant’s framework.
ta-daa
With intellectual integrity and responsibility I presented the above ChatGpt-to-You [Atla] with my comments and for its critique.
The following exposed your ignorance both of IR itself and Kant's noumenon;
VA to AI
[Interlocutor [Atla] to ChatGpt]
From the Kantian transcendental idealist perspective, is monist indirect realism's view that not everything beyond phenomena is 100% unknowable, seen as irrational? Summary only.
[ChatGpt to Interlocutor [Atla]]
From a Kantian transcendental idealist perspective, monist indirect realism's view that NOT everything beyond phenomena is entirely unknowable could be seen as irrational because it contradicts Kant's core claim that the noumenal realm (things-in-themselves) is fundamentally beyond human cognition.
While indirect realism admits a mediated knowledge of external reality, Kant maintains that any such mediation still confines knowledge to the phenomenal domain. Therefore, any assertion about partial knowability of the noumenal would lack justification within Kant’s framework."
My comments:
The ultimate object of Indirect Realism [IR] whether monist and dualist is the same as Kant's noumenon or ultimately the thing-in-itself.
Since the noumenon is 100% unknowable, the ultimate object of IR is 100% unknowable.
There is no question of the absolute mind-independent ultimate-object of IR can be partially knowable via the human conditions.
ChatGPT's Response:

ChatGPT Wrote
Your comments are well-aligned with Kant's transcendental idealist framework and offer a clear critique of monist indirect realism from that perspective. Here's a concise analysis to support your point:

Kant's Core Claim: The Unknowability of the Noumenon
For Kant, the noumenon or thing-in-itself is not merely unknown but fundamentally unknowable due to the limits of human cognition. Our knowledge is confined to appearances (phenomena), structured by the forms of sensibility (space and time) and the categories of the understanding.
Any claim to partial knowledge of the noumenon would involve overstepping the bounds of possible experience and thus be unjustifiable within Kant’s system.
Indirect Realism and Its Ultimate Object

Both monist and dualist versions of indirect realism posit a reality that exists independently of perception and triggers sense data. This reality, often understood as the "ultimate object," is effectively equivalent to Kant's noumenon.
Since indirect realism acknowledges a separation between the perceived world and the ultimate reality, it must concede that the latter (the noumenal realm) lies beyond the direct grasp of perception or empirical knowledge.

No Partial Knowability of the Ultimate Object

From a Kantian perspective, any claim that the "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable is incoherent because even mediated access (via sense data or physical processes) pertains strictly to phenomena, not to the noumenon.
The noumenon, being entirely beyond the scope of human conditions of cognition, cannot be known, even indirectly or partially.

Conclusion: The Limitations of Indirect Realism
Whether monist or dualist, indirect realism (IR) must ultimately face the same critique Kant levels at any claim to noumenal knowledge: it is speculative and lacks justification. Additionally, IR, as a subset of philosophical realism, asserts the absolute mind-independence of the external world, claiming that it exists regardless of human perception or cognition.

Even without explicit reference to the noumenon, IR’s claim to partial knowability of its absolutely mind-independent object is incoherent. Knowability, whether partial or complete, inherently involves the human mind. If the ultimate object of IR is indeed absolutely mind-independent, then any assertion of its partial knowability entails a contradiction. To claim knowability of something posited as unknowable is an oxymoron.

Thus, IR cannot coherently maintain both the absolute mind-independence of its ultimate object and the possibility of its partial knowability, reinforcing its vulnerability to Kant's critique and underscoring its conceptual limitations.
Note earlier I had referred to the WIKI's definition of
-Philosophical Realism
[url=https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_an ... ct_realism[/url]
which are critical to the above.

If you are intellectually honest to seek the "truth" you should post the above ChatGpt-to-Me [VA] in full as a counter to your 'God's' [ChatGpt] response and ask it to comment on it.

This is what I meant by digging into the deeper nuances of the issue.
Atla
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Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Atla »

Nothing new, the idiot still pretends that only Kant's take exists.

Even the word "know" is a Kantian trademark now.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Mon Dec 09, 2024 5:20 pm Nothing new, the idiot still pretends that only Kant's take exists.
Even the word "know" is a Kantian trademark now.
You are a coward and prefer to be an ostrich.

I suggested, with reference that ChatGpt response to you, you post my comments-to-ChatGpt and ChatGpt-response-to-me in full as below to your ChatGpt for its comments.
It won't take 30 seconds, Do it.
VA to ChatGpt
My comments:
The ultimate object of Indirect Realism [IR] whether monist and dualist is the same as Kant's noumenon or ultimately the thing-in-itself.
Since the noumenon is 100% unknowable, the ultimate object of IR is 100% unknowable.
There is no question of the absolute mind-independent ultimate-object of IR can be partially knowable via the human conditions.
[/quote]

ChatGPT's Response:
ChatGPT Wrote
Your comments are well-aligned with Kant's transcendental idealist framework and offer a clear critique of monist indirect realism from that perspective. Here's a concise analysis to support your point:

Kant's Core Claim: The Unknowability of the Noumenon
For Kant, the noumenon or thing-in-itself is not merely unknown but fundamentally unknowable due to the limits of human cognition. Our knowledge is confined to appearances (phenomena), structured by the forms of sensibility (space and time) and the categories of the understanding.
Any claim to partial knowledge of the noumenon would involve overstepping the bounds of possible experience and thus be unjustifiable within Kant’s system.
Indirect Realism and Its Ultimate Object

Both monist and dualist versions of indirect realism posit a reality that exists independently of perception and triggers sense data. This reality, often understood as the "ultimate object," is effectively equivalent to Kant's noumenon.
Since indirect realism acknowledges a separation between the perceived world and the ultimate reality, it must concede that the latter (the noumenal realm) lies beyond the direct grasp of perception or empirical knowledge.

No Partial Knowability of the Ultimate Object

From a Kantian perspective, any claim that the "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable is incoherent because even mediated access (via sense data or physical processes) pertains strictly to phenomena, not to the noumenon.
The noumenon, being entirely beyond the scope of human conditions of cognition, cannot be known, even indirectly or partially.

Conclusion: The Limitations of Indirect Realism
Whether monist or dualist, indirect realism (IR) must ultimately face the same critique Kant levels at any claim to noumenal knowledge: it is speculative and lacks justification. Additionally, IR, as a subset of philosophical realism, asserts the absolute mind-independence of the external world, claiming that it exists regardless of human perception or cognition.

Even without explicit reference to the noumenon, IR’s claim to partial knowability of its absolutely mind-independent object is incoherent. Knowability, whether partial or complete, inherently involves the human mind. If the ultimate object of IR is indeed absolutely mind-independent, then any assertion of its partial knowability entails a contradiction. To claim knowability of something posited as unknowable is an oxymoron.

Thus, IR cannot coherently maintain both the absolute mind-independence of its ultimate object and the possibility of its partial knowability, reinforcing its vulnerability to Kant's critique and underscoring its conceptual limitations.
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Dec 10, 2024 3:57 am
Atla wrote: Mon Dec 09, 2024 5:20 pm Nothing new, the idiot still pretends that only Kant's take exists.
Even the word "know" is a Kantian trademark now.
You are a coward and prefer to be an ostrich.

I suggested, with reference that ChatGpt response to you, you post my comments-to-ChatGpt and ChatGpt-response-to-me in full as below to your ChatGpt for its comments.
It won't take 30 seconds, Do it.
VA to ChatGpt
My comments:
The ultimate object of Indirect Realism [IR] whether monist and dualist is the same as Kant's noumenon or ultimately the thing-in-itself.
Since the noumenon is 100% unknowable, the ultimate object of IR is 100% unknowable.
There is no question of the absolute mind-independent ultimate-object of IR can be partially knowable via the human conditions.
ChatGPT's Response:
ChatGPT Wrote
Your comments are well-aligned with Kant's transcendental idealist framework and offer a clear critique of monist indirect realism from that perspective. Here's a concise analysis to support your point:

Kant's Core Claim: The Unknowability of the Noumenon
For Kant, the noumenon or thing-in-itself is not merely unknown but fundamentally unknowable due to the limits of human cognition. Our knowledge is confined to appearances (phenomena), structured by the forms of sensibility (space and time) and the categories of the understanding.
Any claim to partial knowledge of the noumenon would involve overstepping the bounds of possible experience and thus be unjustifiable within Kant’s system.
Indirect Realism and Its Ultimate Object

Both monist and dualist versions of indirect realism posit a reality that exists independently of perception and triggers sense data. This reality, often understood as the "ultimate object," is effectively equivalent to Kant's noumenon.
Since indirect realism acknowledges a separation between the perceived world and the ultimate reality, it must concede that the latter (the noumenal realm) lies beyond the direct grasp of perception or empirical knowledge.

No Partial Knowability of the Ultimate Object

From a Kantian perspective, any claim that the "ultimate object" of indirect realism is partially knowable is incoherent because even mediated access (via sense data or physical processes) pertains strictly to phenomena, not to the noumenon.
The noumenon, being entirely beyond the scope of human conditions of cognition, cannot be known, even indirectly or partially.

Conclusion: The Limitations of Indirect Realism
Whether monist or dualist, indirect realism (IR) must ultimately face the same critique Kant levels at any claim to noumenal knowledge: it is speculative and lacks justification. Additionally, IR, as a subset of philosophical realism, asserts the absolute mind-independence of the external world, claiming that it exists regardless of human perception or cognition.

Even without explicit reference to the noumenon, IR’s claim to partial knowability of its absolutely mind-independent object is incoherent. Knowability, whether partial or complete, inherently involves the human mind. If the ultimate object of IR is indeed absolutely mind-independent, then any assertion of its partial knowability entails a contradiction. To claim knowability of something posited as unknowable is an oxymoron.

Thus, IR cannot coherently maintain both the absolute mind-independence of its ultimate object and the possibility of its partial knowability, reinforcing its vulnerability to Kant's critique and underscoring its conceptual limitations.
Why don't you just accept that you are too retarded for philosophy? The AI already told you

"Your comments are well-aligned with Kant's transcendental idealist framework and offer a clear critique of monist indirect realism from that perspective."
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Tue Dec 10, 2024 4:52 am Why don't you just accept that you are too retarded for philosophy? The AI already told you

"Your comments are well-aligned with Kant's transcendental idealist framework and offer a clear critique of monist indirect realism from that perspective."
That is a strawman.
You are the retarded one in not reading the full explanation.

There are two points:
1. The ultimate object of IR is the same as Kant's noumenon.
2. That there is an absolute real ultimate object of IR is incoherent as AI stated:
Even without explicit reference to the noumenon [Kant's], IR’s claim to partial knowability of its absolutely mind-independent object is incoherent.
Knowability, whether partial or complete, inherently involves the human mind. If the ultimate object of IR is indeed absolutely mind-independent, then any assertion of its partial knowability entails a contradiction. To claim knowability of something posited as unknowable is an oxymoron.
I still insist you asked your chatGpt why the counter [ChatGpt-to-me] is different from its response to you.
It will expose to you the fact that because you asked kindi questions to ChatGpt in ignorance of Kantianism that you get kindi answers from ChatGpt.
Atla
Posts: 9936
Joined: Fri Dec 15, 2017 8:27 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Atla »

Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Dec 10, 2024 5:33 am
Atla wrote: Tue Dec 10, 2024 4:52 am Why don't you just accept that you are too retarded for philosophy? The AI already told you

"Your comments are well-aligned with Kant's transcendental idealist framework and offer a clear critique of monist indirect realism from that perspective."
That is a strawman.
You are the retarded one in not reading the full explanation.

There are two points:
1. The ultimate object of IR is the same as Kant's noumenon.
2. That there is an absolute real ultimate object of IR is incoherent as AI stated:
Even without explicit reference to the noumenon [Kant's], IR’s claim to partial knowability of its absolutely mind-independent object is incoherent.
Knowability, whether partial or complete, inherently involves the human mind. If the ultimate object of IR is indeed absolutely mind-independent, then any assertion of its partial knowability entails a contradiction. To claim knowability of something posited as unknowable is an oxymoron.
I still insist you asked your chatGpt why the counter [ChatGpt-to-me] is different from its response to you.
It will expose to you the fact that because you asked kindi questions to ChatGpt in ignorance of Kantianism that you get kindi answers from ChatGpt.
There was no different response. According to the above quote, you just deceived the AI to think that the knowability of the unknowable is discussed, which is a total strawman. You are still pretending that only Kant's take exists.

You are also too retarded to understand that here the AI used the commonly accepted meaning of absolute mind-independence, not your special meaning where the absolute isn't absolute.
Veritas Aequitas
Posts: 15722
Joined: Wed Jul 11, 2012 4:41 am

Re: Atla: Indirect Realism - U Object Not 100% Unknowable

Post by Veritas Aequitas »

Atla wrote: Tue Dec 10, 2024 3:23 pm
Veritas Aequitas wrote: Tue Dec 10, 2024 5:33 am
Atla wrote: Tue Dec 10, 2024 4:52 am Why don't you just accept that you are too retarded for philosophy? The AI already told you

"Your comments are well-aligned with Kant's transcendental idealist framework and offer a clear critique of monist indirect realism from that perspective."
That is a strawman.
You are the retarded one in not reading the full explanation.

There are two points:
1. The ultimate object of IR is the same as Kant's noumenon.
2. That there is an absolute real ultimate object of IR is incoherent as AI stated:
Even without explicit reference to the noumenon [Kant's], IR’s claim to partial knowability of its absolutely mind-independent object is incoherent.
Knowability, whether partial or complete, inherently involves the human mind. If the ultimate object of IR is indeed absolutely mind-independent, then any assertion of its partial knowability entails a contradiction. To claim knowability of something posited as unknowable is an oxymoron.
I still insist you asked your chatGpt why the counter [ChatGpt-to-me] is different from its response to you.
It will expose to you the fact that because you asked kindi questions to ChatGpt in ignorance of Kantianism that you get kindi answers from ChatGpt.
There was no different response. According to the above quote, you just deceived the AI to think that the knowability of the unknowable is discussed, which is a total strawman. You are still pretending that only Kant's take exists.

You are also too retarded to understand that here the AI used the commonly accepted meaning of absolute mind-independence, not your special meaning where the absolute isn't absolute.
What??
You were the one who insist on the point.
Atla wrote:Stop asking the AI to write strawman lies for you already.
IR typically holds that the "ultimate object" isn't 100% unknowable.
viewtopic.php?p=743417#p743417
I have defined 'absolute' in 'absolutely mind-independent' as
it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not in contrast
to relatively mind-independent where humans are somehow involved.
What is wrong with the above?

The main contention is:
You asked AI to confirm;
-the ultimate object of IR is not the noumenon
-the ultimate object of IR is partially knowable
and AI agree with you on the above.

However when I present your AI's response to ChatGpt, it give me a different response with consideration of the nuances involved.

Surely you should ask your ChatGpt why my ChatGpt counter to it is different on the same issue, who are right?

Again, for philosophy sake;
I still insist you asked your chatGpt why the counter [ChatGpt-to-me] is different from its response to you.
It will expose to you the fact that because you asked kindi questions to ChatGpt in ignorance of Kantianism that you get kindi answers from ChatGpt.
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