Dubious wrote: ↑Sun Dec 08, 2024 12:12 am
BigMike wrote: ↑Sat Dec 07, 2024 9:13 pm
Many proponents of free will often hold the belief that their thinking and decision-making originate in an immaterial entity—be it a soul, a mind separate from the body, or some abstract "free will" force—before the brain becomes involved. But this perspective invites two critical questions.
First, how can thinking and decision-making occur without the brain’s involvement? The brain is the organ known to process thoughts, store memories, and drive actions. If these mental processes are happening outside the brain, by what mechanism do they occur? This line of reasoning effectively implies that it’s possible to think without a brain—a claim that seems at odds with everything we know about neuroscience and biology.
Second, if decisions are made by this supposed immaterial entity, how are they translated into physical action? What is the process by which these non-physical choices are communicated to the brain, which then signals the body to act? There’s no clear explanation of how an immaterial decision-maker interfaces with the physical systems that execute actions. It's psychokinesis.
These are glaring gaps in the logic of free will. Without coherent answers to these questions, the idea of free will as something independent of physical processes becomes deeply problematic.
What is intelligence for if not to supervise a modicum of what free will denotes, which does not to any degree void its deterministic underpinnings as that responsible for establishing the open vistas of a free will domain. Within chaos theory, what we endorse as free will becomes a variable capable of multiple values. In effect, determinism doesn't glide on a single monorail of awareness but instead invokes the non-linearity of free will as a process, creating the measured freedom by which determinations can be made.
The greater the intelligence, i.e., its ability to magnify or scrutinize, the more it can consciously filter out the options available creating an artificial separation in its wake labelled as free will. To the extent it exists in ANY organism, it becomes a manifestation of chaos theory, which has long ceased to be as theoretical as it once was.
Your response raises an interesting attempt to reconcile determinism with the subjective experience of free will by invoking intelligence and chaos theory. However, it seems to conflate two fundamentally different ideas: the deterministic nature of processes underlying choice and the perception of choice as free.
Intelligence, as you point out, is indeed a filtering mechanism, refining the available options and creating the appearance of choice. But this filtering doesn’t introduce true freedom in the sense of autonomy from causality. Instead, it operates as an additional layer of complexity within deterministic systems. Chaos theory, while it highlights the non-linearity and unpredictability of complex systems, does not imply the kind of "measured freedom" you describe. Even chaotic systems are deterministic at their core; their outcomes are sensitive to initial conditions but not free from causality.
The notion of free will as a "manifestation of chaos theory" is intriguing but problematic. If the variability of outcomes in a chaotic system can be mistaken for freedom, this is an illusion, not evidence of autonomy. What you describe as an "artificial separation" of options by intelligence underscores this point. The brain's ability to evaluate choices and project consequences is still governed by the underlying laws of physics and biology. This does not create true freedom but rather a deterministic process that feels subjectively like free will.
Your framing of intelligence as magnifying or scrutinizing options supports the argument that free will, as commonly understood, is not independent of deterministic systems but arises as an emergent, yet fully caused, phenomenon. Thus, the deterministic nature of causality remains intact, whether or not chaos theory adds complexity to the pathways of those causes. Ultimately, the idea of free will as an emergent property does not escape the need for physical explanation and causation, leaving it squarely within the deterministic framework.