Why Do the Religious Reject Science While Embracing the Impossible?

[accelafine]

And poor Henry can only write one sentence at a time, three if he really, really tries, but they tend to be lacking numerous parts of speech and large spaces are needed (so we can fill in the blanks?). Unfortunately the Big Bang determined that he would be illiterate

It's a pleasure to know that I appear to be off accelafine's "ignore" list. Thanks. Some advice that can improve your writing: use the active case. Write "lack" instead of "be lacking". Also, there's no reason to write "numerous" when "many" is more direct. "Only write" should be "write only", unless you mean to imply that Henry does nothing but write.

Keep the amusing insults, though. They're so "you".

The most pathetic and wanky attempt at an insult I've ever seen. You tried really, really hard though, and spent a lot of time on it so I have to give you credit for that. Pssst. There was a reason to write 'numerous'---I chose to and preferred it. 'Be lacking'? Again, I chose to write it that way because I preferred it. It's subtly different.
As for 'only write'; that's how I would say it, and 'writing' in this format is a lot closer to speech than it is to serious writing i.e. 'conversational'. I'm pretty sure Henry is a lot more articulate in his life than his posts on here would indicate.
Of course your opinion is very important to me, far more so than the numerous awards and prizes I've won for my writing over the years. Those who matter seem to like it for some reason.

You are still on ignore. Unfortunately I get a big red blob (rather like you) when you go out of your way to address me in response to a comment I've made to someone else. Since you are aware that I have you on 'ignore' then this can only be for the purpose of annoying me.
'Ignores' also show up in other people's quotes. Other than that you are so dull that I really can't remember anything about you except that you are odious enough to be on 'ignore'.

[promethean75]

click here

[Alexiev]

You are still on ignore.

Thank you, God!

[Alexiev]

Alexiev, I appreciate your engagement here. Let me address your points one by one because there’s a lot to unpack, and I think clarity is key when we’re dealing with such fundamental ideas.

First, you mention that the "unchanging laws of physics" are human inventions. I’d argue that while the description of these laws—our equations, theories, and terminology—are indeed human constructs, what they describe exists independently of us. Gravity doesn’t stop working because humans didn’t invent calculus until Newton came along. The same applies to the laws governing energy transfer, momentum, and causation. Our understanding is imperfect, sure, but the underlying principles operate regardless of our perception.

Now, about the use of the word "free"—you're absolutely right that in everyday language, freedom often refers to being unconstrained by other people or external circumstances, such as the state of being enslaved. But the philosophical and political discussions around "freedom" and "free will" often conflate this with the idea of being able to act independently of causation, which is where the disagreement lies. I’m saying that even when someone feels free, their actions are still fully caused by preceding conditions—biological, environmental, and yes, physical.

As for why we should avoid blaming individuals for actions predetermined by causes beyond their control, here’s the heart of the matter: blame assumes moral responsibility rooted in some sort of free agency. If someone had no ultimate control over their actions, punishing them as though they did is, at best, misdirected and, at worst, harmful. This doesn’t mean we let harmful actions go unchecked. Far from it. We should respond, but in ways that address the root causes to prevent future harm, rather than perpetuating cycles of retribution.

You point out that society already focuses on external causes to some degree, and I agree. Public health initiatives, education reforms, and rehabilitation programs are examples of this. But the persistent belief in blame as a moral necessity limits how far we take these efforts. When we cling to blame, we often fail to address systemic issues that perpetuate harm, because it’s easier to scapegoat individuals than to overhaul institutions or environments.

Finally, on "evil" behavior—this is where I’d encourage us to shift perspective. Rather than labeling people as "evil," which carries a lot of emotional and moral weight, it’s more productive to examine the conditions that led to their actions. Yes, punishment may sometimes serve as a deterrent, but we should be asking whether there are better, more effective tools for shaping behavior. If we know punishment alone often fails to rehabilitate or deter long-term, why not focus on creating conditions that minimize the likelihood of harmful actions occurring in the first place?

I hope this clarifies where I’m coming from. Let’s continue this conversation—I think it gets at the core of what political philosophy should be about: figuring out how to organize society in the most just, effective way possible.

Nobody thinks we "act independently of causation". We make our choices for a variety of reasons -- one of which might be we think certain behaviors are wicked. Why would eliminating such "causes" be a good thing? Why would it improve human society? It seems likely that the elimination of "moral responsibility" as a "cause" would make things worse, not better.

[BigMike]

Alexiev, I appreciate your engagement here. Let me address your points one by one because there’s a lot to unpack, and I think clarity is key when we’re dealing with such fundamental ideas.

First, you mention that the "unchanging laws of physics" are human inventions. I’d argue that while the description of these laws—our equations, theories, and terminology—are indeed human constructs, what they describe exists independently of us. Gravity doesn’t stop working because humans didn’t invent calculus until Newton came along. The same applies to the laws governing energy transfer, momentum, and causation. Our understanding is imperfect, sure, but the underlying principles operate regardless of our perception.

Now, about the use of the word "free"—you're absolutely right that in everyday language, freedom often refers to being unconstrained by other people or external circumstances, such as the state of being enslaved. But the philosophical and political discussions around "freedom" and "free will" often conflate this with the idea of being able to act independently of causation, which is where the disagreement lies. I’m saying that even when someone feels free, their actions are still fully caused by preceding conditions—biological, environmental, and yes, physical.

As for why we should avoid blaming individuals for actions predetermined by causes beyond their control, here’s the heart of the matter: blame assumes moral responsibility rooted in some sort of free agency. If someone had no ultimate control over their actions, punishing them as though they did is, at best, misdirected and, at worst, harmful. This doesn’t mean we let harmful actions go unchecked. Far from it. We should respond, but in ways that address the root causes to prevent future harm, rather than perpetuating cycles of retribution.

You point out that society already focuses on external causes to some degree, and I agree. Public health initiatives, education reforms, and rehabilitation programs are examples of this. But the persistent belief in blame as a moral necessity limits how far we take these efforts. When we cling to blame, we often fail to address systemic issues that perpetuate harm, because it’s easier to scapegoat individuals than to overhaul institutions or environments.

Finally, on "evil" behavior—this is where I’d encourage us to shift perspective. Rather than labeling people as "evil," which carries a lot of emotional and moral weight, it’s more productive to examine the conditions that led to their actions. Yes, punishment may sometimes serve as a deterrent, but we should be asking whether there are better, more effective tools for shaping behavior. If we know punishment alone often fails to rehabilitate or deter long-term, why not focus on creating conditions that minimize the likelihood of harmful actions occurring in the first place?

I hope this clarifies where I’m coming from. Let’s continue this conversation—I think it gets at the core of what political philosophy should be about: figuring out how to organize society in the most just, effective way possible.

Nobody thinks we "act independently of causation". We make our choices for a variety of reasons -- one of which might be we think certain behaviors are wicked. Why would eliminating such "causes" be a good thing? Why would it improve human society? It seems likely that the elimination of "moral responsibility" as a "cause" would make things worse, not better.

Alexiev, thanks for clarifying your perspective—it helps sharpen the discussion. Let’s dig into this idea that no one thinks we act independently of causation and explore what it means to eliminate or rethink "moral responsibility" as a driving cause for behavior.

When you say no one thinks we act independently of causation, I’d agree that few would deny we’re influenced by reasons, experiences, and external conditions. But the issue isn’t whether people acknowledge influences; it’s about the deeper assumption that individuals possess ultimate agency over their actions—that, despite those influences, they could somehow have chosen differently in a given moment. That’s the crux of free will in the traditional sense. If our choices are fully caused by prior conditions, then what we call "moral responsibility" becomes a label we apply to people for things they had no ultimate control over.

Now, you raise an important question: why would eliminating causes like a belief in wickedness or moral responsibility improve society? I’d argue it’s not about eliminating causes altogether—causes are inevitable—but about replacing unproductive ones with better ones. Moral responsibility, as it’s commonly understood, often leads to blame-based systems that focus on punishing individuals instead of addressing root causes. For example, if someone commits a crime, our first instinct is often to blame and punish them. But what if we focused on the conditions that led to that crime—poverty, lack of education, mental health issues—and worked to change those conditions instead?

You suggest that eliminating moral responsibility as a cause might make things worse. But does that assumption hold up? Societies that focus less on retributive justice and more on rehabilitation and systemic change—think Norway’s prison system—tend to have lower recidivism rates and less overall crime. Why? Because they address the actual causes of harmful behavior instead of relying on blame and punishment as deterrents.

Finally, let’s not conflate eliminating blame with eliminating accountability. Accountability means taking steps to prevent future harm and addressing the consequences of actions, but it doesn’t require moral condemnation. A deterministic approach doesn’t say, “Anything goes”; it says, “Let’s understand why things happen and respond in ways that work.”

I’d love to hear more about why you think moral responsibility is indispensable, though, and whether you see alternative ways to maintain social order without it. This conversation feels like it’s getting to the heart of what makes political philosophy both fascinating and deeply relevant.

[promethean75]

You know I love you guys but Mike B is murdering ya'll n*ggaz in this thread. Even if he is an arse (not saying he is I'm saying you guys might be saying he is), he's still wrecking ya'll's shit.

[Alexiev]

Alexiev, thanks for clarifying your perspective—it helps sharpen the discussion. Let’s dig into this idea that no one thinks we act independently of causation and explore what it means to eliminate or rethink "moral responsibility" as a driving cause for behavior.

When you say no one thinks we act independently of causation, I’d agree that few would deny we’re influenced by reasons, experiences, and external conditions. But the issue isn’t whether people acknowledge influences; it’s about the deeper assumption that individuals possess ultimate agency over their actions—that, despite those influences, they could somehow have chosen differently in a given moment. That’s the crux of free will in the traditional sense. If our choices are fully caused by prior conditions, then what we call "moral responsibility" becomes a label we apply to people for things they had no ultimate control over.

Now, you raise an important question: why would eliminating causes like a belief in wickedness or moral responsibility improve society? I’d argue it’s not about eliminating causes altogether—causes are inevitable—but about replacing unproductive ones with better ones. Moral responsibility, as it’s commonly understood, often leads to blame-based systems that focus on punishing individuals instead of addressing root causes. For example, if someone commits a crime, our first instinct is often to blame and punish them. But what if we focused on the conditions that led to that crime—poverty, lack of education, mental health issues—and worked to change those conditions instead?

You suggest that eliminating moral responsibility as a cause might make things worse. But does that assumption hold up? Societies that focus less on retributive justice and more on rehabilitation and systemic change—think Norway’s prison system—tend to have lower recidivism rates and less overall crime. Why? Because they address the actual causes of harmful behavior instead of relying on blame and punishment as deterrents.

Finally, let’s not conflate eliminating blame with eliminating accountability. Accountability means taking steps to prevent future harm and addressing the consequences of actions, but it doesn’t require moral condemnation. A deterministic approach doesn’t say, “Anything goes”; it says, “Let’s understand why things happen and respond in ways that work.”

I’d love to hear more about why you think moral responsibility is indispensable, though, and whether you see alternative ways to maintain social order without it. This conversation feels like it’s getting to the heart of what makes political philosophy both fascinating and deeply relevant.

We humans are subject to the laws of physics -- like everything else in the universe. But we are also subject to the laws and mores of our cultures. Without culture, we would be different creatures. The most significant facet of culture is language, without which we would be unable to elucidate the laws of physics (among other things). In a sense, culture is "supernatural". In other words, it allows us to transcend our biology. Were it not for language, our brain synapses would operate in quite a different way. Without ethics and morals, we might behave quite differently.

Our biological and cultural evolutions arose together (at least that's the best guess). Bipedalism led to the use of tools, which created evolutionary advantages for brains adapted to using tools. Language was advantageous, which led to the development of certain parts of our brains. Our brains developed language -- but language also developed our brains.

Of course it is a logical error to suggest that all cultural traits that are widespread are inevitably advantageous to the species. Nonetheless, we ignore our history and our received culture at our peril. If personal moral responsibility is so widespread that it is universal in human societies, mightn't it have some benefits? Isn't eliminating thousands of years of tradition and received wisdom dangerous (and conceited)? Do you and your supporters really know better than all of those moral philosophers who have puzzled out these questions for centuries? If personal moral responsibility is a fiction, mightn't it be a useful fiction?

[attofishpi]

You know I love you guys but Mike B is murdering ya'll n*ggaz in this thread. Even if he is an arse (not saying he is I'm saying you guys might be saying he is), he's still wrecking ya'll's shit.

You are so f'ing biased. So long as someones view aligns with yours you put all reasoning aside and allow the smoke to be blown up your arse.

Contrary to that, whenever someone's view does not align with yours, you skim over and don't pay due diligence to what is being presented.

I think that's true of many "philosophers" on this forum.

[Alexis Jacobi]

You know I love you guys but Mike B is murdering ya'll n*ggaz in this thread. Even if he is an arse (not saying he is I'm saying you guys might be saying he is), he's still wrecking ya'll's shit.

Explain. It does not seem at all like that from my perspective.

[BigMike]

We humans are subject to the laws of physics -- like everything else in the universe. But we are also subject to the laws and mores of our cultures. Without culture, we would be different creatures. The most significant facet of culture is language, without which we would be unable to elucidate the laws of physics (among other things). In a sense, culture is "supernatural". In other words, it allows us to transcend our biology. Were it not for language, our brain synapses would operate in quite a different way. Without ethics and morals, we might behave quite differently.

Our biological and cultural evolutions arose together (at least that's the best guess). Bipedalism led to the use of tools, which created evolutionary advantages for brains adapted to using tools. Language was advantageous, which led to the development of certain parts of our brains. Our brains developed language -- but language also developed our brains.

Of course it is a logical error to suggest that all cultural traits that are widespread are inevitably advantageous to the species. Nonetheless, we ignore our history and our received culture at our peril. If personal moral responsibility is so widespread that it is universal in human societies, mightn't it have some benefits? Isn't eliminating thousands of years of tradition and received wisdom dangerous (and conceited)? Do you and your supporters really know better than all of those moral philosophers who have puzzled out these questions for centuries? If personal moral responsibility is a fiction, mightn't it be a useful fiction?

Alexiev, thank you again for engaging so deeply with this. You’ve brought up critical points that deserve careful thought, and I’d like to refine my response in light of them.

First, let’s address the matter of tradition and knowledge. You’re absolutely right that I shouldn’t shy away from acknowledging what we, collectively, know now that philosophers of the past could not have known. While I’m not claiming to surpass their insights in every respect—many of their contributions remain foundational—it’s undeniable that our understanding of the universe has grown. The conservation laws of physics, for example, and the modern understanding of causation and determinism weren’t fully developed concepts in their time. This means we are in a position to evaluate some of their ideas, like the notion of individuals as "first movers," with tools they simply didn’t have.

Now, let’s focus on moral responsibility. Traditionally, it has been tied to the belief that individuals possess ultimate control over their actions—a belief rooted in the idea that they are "first movers," capable of initiating actions independently of prior causes. But this notion directly contradicts the conservation laws of physics and everything we now know about how the universe operates. If there are no "first movers," then the foundation of moral responsibility—deserving praise or blame—is fundamentally flawed. This doesn’t mean we abandon accountability or social order, but it does mean we need to rethink the systems that rely on these outdated assumptions.

You also mentioned the risk of abandoning tradition too hastily, and I appreciate the wisdom in that caution. My argument isn’t for a wholesale rejection of moral responsibility but for a careful reevaluation. What aspects of it can be reframed in light of what we now know about causation, and what aspects no longer serve us? For instance, accountability can remain a valuable concept, but reframed to focus on future-oriented solutions—prevention, rehabilitation, and systemic change—rather than backward-looking blame.

Finally, let’s consider whether moral responsibility as a "useful fiction" is still relevant. If it leads to systems of retributive justice that fail to deter harm or address root causes, is it still useful? Or might we now benefit more from systems based on evidence, understanding, and the principles of causation? Just as societies moved beyond the divine right of kings when it no longer served them, it’s worth questioning whether the traditional notion of moral responsibility has reached a similar point.

So, to circle back: no, I’m not claiming to know better than all philosophers of the past in every respect. But there are things we—and I—know now that they didn’t. And if we’re to make progress, it’s our responsibility to use that knowledge to build on their work, refine it, and adapt it to the world we live in today. What are your thoughts on this? Do you see ways to preserve the constructive aspects of moral responsibility while discarding those that no longer align with our understanding of causation?

[promethean75]

"We humans are subject to the laws of physics -- like everything else in the universe. But we are also subject to the laws and mores of our cultures."

By logical deduction i may infer from your premise that you believe mores and cultures aren't subject to the laws of fizzics?

"So long as someones view aligns with yours you put all reasoning aside and allow the smoke to be blown up your arse."

This observation is exactly right and I wouldn't want it any other way.

[attofishpi]

"So long as someones view aligns with yours you put all reasoning aside and allow the smoke to be blown up your arse."

This observation is exactly right and I wouldn't want it any other way.

..it won't get ya high dude, trust me i've had many a bong shoved up my arse.

[Alexiev]

"We humans are subject to the laws of physics -- like everything else in the universe. But we are also subject to the laws and mores of our cultures."

By logical deduction i may infer from your premise that you believe mores and cultures aren't subject to the laws of fizzics?

"So long as someones view aligns with yours you put all reasoning aside and allow the smoke to be blown up your arse."

This observation is exactly right and I wouldn't want it any other way.

I'm thinking of the common distinction between "natural" and "artificial". Mountains are natural. Skyscrapers are artificial. Synapses firing in our brains are natural -- but the language that influences and causes their firing is artificial (in other words, man-made).

That's what I meant by claiming culture is "supernatural". Does it exist ONLY in our brains? Maybe. But without it, our brains would be very different. Language (for example) is just sort of out there, and whatever laws influence its development are unclear. Of course BM thinks even culture can be "reduced" to physics. He may be right -- but there's no evidence that he is because it has yet to be successfully so reduced.

Politics is cultural -- and trying to reduce it to physics is (so far) unsuccessful.

[BigMike]

"We humans are subject to the laws of physics -- like everything else in the universe. But we are also subject to the laws and mores of our cultures."

By logical deduction i may infer from your premise that you believe mores and cultures aren't subject to the laws of fizzics?

"So long as someones view aligns with yours you put all reasoning aside and allow the smoke to be blown up your arse."

This observation is exactly right and I wouldn't want it any other way.

I'm thinking of the common distinction between "natural" and "artificial". Mountains are natural. Skyscrapers are artificial. Synapses firing in our brains are natural -- but the language that influences and causes their firing is artificial (in other words, man-made).

That's what I meant by claiming culture is "supernatural". Does it exist ONLY in our brains? Maybe. But without it, our brains would be very different. Language (for example) is just sort of out there, and whatever laws influence its development are unclear. Of course BM thinks even culture can be "reduced" to physics. He may be right -- but there's no evidence that he is because it has yet to be successfully so reduced.

Politics is cultural -- and trying to reduce it to physics is (so far) unsuccessful.

Your distinction between the natural and artificial is an important line of thought. Let’s unpack your claims, particularly your suggestion that culture, language, and politics may resist being reduced to physics or causation in the same way as natural phenomena.

You describe culture as “supernatural” in the sense that it is man-made—emerging from human interaction rather than existing independently like mountains or rivers. It’s an evocative metaphor, but let’s examine what’s actually implied here. Culture, while emergent and complex, doesn’t exist outside the laws of physics. It is the product of human brains—natural systems governed entirely by biological, chemical, and physical processes—interacting within the constraints of their environment. The fact that culture feels intangible or "out there" reflects its complexity, not a detachment from physical cause.

Now, you argue that language and culture influence brain activity and development, which is absolutely correct. But the direction of causation doesn’t end there—it’s bidirectional. Language arises because human brains evolved specific capacities, but once language exists, it reshapes how brains develop and operate. This feedback loop is fascinating, but it doesn’t circumvent the laws of physics; rather, it exemplifies how complex causation can look when layers of emergence are involved.

Your statement that “whatever laws influence [culture and language] are unclear” is key. You’re right that reducing culture or politics to physics is an enormous scientific and philosophical challenge. However, the absence of a complete model doesn’t imply that such reduction is impossible. For centuries, people believed life itself couldn’t be reduced to physical processes, until advances in biology and chemistry demonstrated otherwise. Culture and politics are dauntingly complex systems, but they remain systems grounded in physical causation. If physics governs the movement of particles and energy, and those particles and energies make up humans and their interactions, then culture and politics must ultimately obey those laws, even if we can’t yet map the steps comprehensively.

Consider the example of language. It may seem "out there," yet every word spoken or written is physically encoded—air vibrations for speech, patterns of light for writing, or neural signals in the brain. The rules of grammar and syntax, the evolution of dialects, even the way we adopt new words—all of it reflects physical realities: the structure of our vocal cords, the shapes of our brains, and the environments in which we live and communicate.

The same reasoning applies to politics. Politics is cultural, yes, but culture emerges from interactions between humans who are themselves physical entities embedded in physical environments. The development of political systems—hierarchies, laws, institutions—is shaped by tangible factors like geography, resource availability, and technological advances. Even the ideas that drive politics—justice, equality, power—are expressions of the brain’s physical capacities for abstraction and reasoning.

You seem to suggest that the lack of a fully successful reduction so far is evidence against reducibility. I would frame it differently. The complexity of culture and politics means we need better tools and theories to bridge the gap between microscopic causes (physics) and macroscopic phenomena (social systems). But complexity doesn’t negate causality; it just makes it harder to trace.

So, if the claim is that culture and politics are somehow not caused deterministically or operate outside the bounds of physics, I’d respectfully challenge that. What’s needed isn’t the assertion that they are irreducible but a clear articulation of what makes them appear so—and whether those obstacles are practical (our current limits in understanding) or conceptual (a genuine disconnection from physical causation). If you think there’s something fundamentally "non-physical" about culture or politics, I’d be curious to hear what you think that is and how it operates.

To me, culture and politics are profound examples of how physical processes give rise to the astonishing complexity of human behavior and interaction. They don’t escape the laws of physics—they are the intricate dance of those laws playing out on a human stage. What are your thoughts? Could culture and politics have causal origins outside physical processes, or are we simply confronting their emergent complexity?

[Alexiev]

You seem to suggest that the lack of a fully successful reduction so far is evidence against reducibility. I would frame it differently. The complexity of culture and politics means we need better tools and theories to bridge the gap between microscopic causes (physics) and macroscopic phenomena (social systems). But complexity doesn’t negate causality; it just makes it harder to trace.

So, if the claim is that culture and politics are somehow not caused deterministically or operate outside the bounds of physics, I’d respectfully challenge that. What’s needed isn’t the assertion that they are irreducible but a clear articulation of what makes them appear so—and whether those obstacles are practical (our current limits in understanding) or conceptual (a genuine disconnection from physical causation). If you think there’s something fundamentally "non-physical" about culture or politics, I’d be curious to hear what you think that is and how it operates.

To me, culture and politics are profound examples of how physical processes give rise to the astonishing complexity of human behavior and interaction. They don’t escape the laws of physics—they are the intricate dance of those laws playing out on a human stage. What are your thoughts? Could culture and politics have causal origins outside physical processes, or are we simply confronting their emergent complexity?

That's not what I've claimed at all. Instead, I've claimed that reductionist explanations of complex cultural phenomena have not yet been successful. Science is as science does. What good does it do to claim that some day physics may explain everything? Even popular reductionist explanations (like evolutionary psychology) fail to meet low scientific standards. Evolutionary psychology tends to restate the obvious and ignore cultural differences. It is also contaminated with logical errors, like assuming the antecedent. To examine ethical or legal systems by studying physics is unenlightening. On the other hand, if we study ethics or political systems by examining the history and development of ethics and political systems we might actually learn something.