Why Do the Religious Reject Science While Embracing the Impossible?

[Alexis Jacobi]

If you argue that volition operates outside physical causation, you need to explain how it interfaces with the physical world without violating those constraints. Simply saying “we don’t know” doesn’t address the inconsistency.

Volition, it seems to me, cannot be entirely separated from physical causation. Man — and all animals which have various forms of volition of sorts similar to man’s volition — is ensconced within a material-biological structure. If we give volition to man, we must also give volition to animals — especially those known to be super-intelligent. (The New Caledonia crow comes to mind).

But the realm of ideas, the realm of what is metaphysical, and going further, what is supernatural, is also entirely real and, at least it can be conceived as such, independent of brains, independent of the vehicles necessary for physical and biological manifestation. Did “ideas” exist before the swirling primordial gasses coalesced? Will they still exist after everything dissolves or freezes? In this sense the realm of what is metaphysical is conceived of as “pre-existent” and also as “eternal”. Also, there is the concept of a “pattern” or something that guides or channels everything that does become manifest, into that which it becomes. Things “happen” and take shape — indeed unbelievable things such as our own manifestation and conscious awareness arise. What came to be and “was” remains existent on some level even when it no longer is. And what is there, latently, conceptually, was there before it became manifest. That is, a pattern, a principle, a form.

Thought of in that way, the “guiding force” of what does take shape, and how it takes shape, is understood as being thoroughly invisible. It does not “exist” in tangible, concrete form and cannot be located. And yet it is there. It is evident.

If man is seen as constrained absolutely within manifest, tangible realness, and indeed that is where we find ourselves, we are certainly conditioned and in this sense controlled by causation (as conceived by physics). Therefore if there is “genuine volition” it must be distinguished from animal volition of the sort that crow accesses and uses for getting around in the world. So then, it is only in “higher volition” where “genuine choice” could be said to enter the picture. (And that is where “man’s cubic centimeter of chance” could be said to enter in.

How does “the realm of ideas” interface with what I could describe as physically-based animal volition? One must consider, then, intelligences and entities that are non-physical and non-manifest. As we all realize that was how “the angelic realm” was indeed conceived, and an entire “picture” (the Great Chain of Being) was conceived as an enormous gradient — from an invisible, non-material “realm” down into the most solid and tangible manifestations. And note: man was understood as “amphibious” in that he was ensconced in the lowest region (that which he fell into) but could access the higher, intelligible, non-manifest realm.

These “pictures” exist, still, for us as a graveyard of meaning. One need look no further than those “eternal meanings” and values as expressed through Shakespearean worldview. Consider Macbeth on the heath approached by and coming under the influence of malevolence, and then participating in the descent into “material mire”. We know this prospect is real, but we simply can no longer conceive of evil’s emissaries as tangible, personified hags or through, let’s say, poetical pictures. (But in no sense are we done with tangible personifications of evil, and in some sense they are even mire real, more present, and more powerful).

The realm of those neuronic events within the brain must then be conceived and understood as coming under the influence (what terms to use here?) of that which we conceive as being non-manifest, invisible and metaphysical. How? Within the idea solidities of modern physics — BigMike is an emissary — that ‘interface’ cannot be conceived. It is outside of what is conceivable.

Unless I am mistaken, his position would be, is, the only conceivable platform for a True Atheism. Personally, I do not have enough experience of the conceptual order of men who are fully under the sway of this new physicalist absolutism. My larger apprehension of “it” (an absolutist interpretive model) involves my sense of what it necessarily destroys: a conceptual order where meaning & value — what has meaning and what we value — had come into existence through. When the conceptual order collapses, the meaning can no longer stand.

In the physicalist conceptual realm, when events and consciousness are reduced to physics descriptions, all the old assignations of value-hierarchies must fall away, be dissolved. Thus BigMike’s concerned humanism is a relic, an ephemeral shadow, from another conceptual world order.
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[Immanuel Can]

...while physics doesn’t claim to have all the answers, its principles—especially conservation laws—still constrain what can reasonably be claimed about causation.

On what basis would you assume that? For it is surely no more than an assumption. One cannot use the laws of physics to prove that physics is all that exists: that would be pure assumption. So one would need some separate verification that physics was the total and comprehensive cataloguing of all that is real.

And what argument of that sort would you have?

So if we don't know whether or not volition can initiate a causal chain, then why would you expect that we would grant you that it cannot? It can't be physics, because the all-sufficiency of physics is the thing that needs proving.

Simply saying “we don’t know” doesn’t address the inconsistency.

What reason do you have for thinking there's anything "inconsistent" here? "Inconsistent" with the assumption of the all-sufficiency of physics, sure; but that's manifestly just your own a priori assumption, not an argument. Nobody needs to think that's so: and common-sensically, none of us believes it is, either. We all live as if volition does, indeed, account for initiating causal chains.

You critique physics as inadequate for investigating the mind, yet physical systems like the brain demonstrably obey the same fundamental laws governing all matter and energy.

Actually, you're amphibolizing "brain" and "mind" here. I understand that as a Physicalist, your assumption would be that the "brain" IS the "mind," and the "mind" is nothing but "brain." But nobody in the field of Philosophy of Mind seems to think that. They all identify the mind-brain distinction as probably the most important controversy in the field. Have you done any reading on that?

Neuroscience doesn’t claim that synapses and biochemistry alone capture the richness of human experience,

Here again you blend the language of mind..."richness of human experience" with the language of brain "synapses and biochemistry." But you show that you, too, are aware there's an important distinction. Brain is physical, extended in space, possessed of mass and size, divisible, mappable, and so on. But "experience" or "mind" is qualitative, not physical, not divisible, conscious, personal, and so on. You know the difference, but seem desperately earnest to simply collapse mind into brain.

You should listen to that intuition of yours, that's telling you that something is being missed in that account, something vitally important.

but it does demonstrate that thoughts, emotions, and decisions correlate with measurable physical processes.

They "coincide," not "correlate." No neuroscientist claims that the relationship is explicable in strictly physical terms...far from it. What we should expect from an entirely physical "mind" is a complete 1:1 relation with the physical world. But that's not at all what we find.

We can locate the amigdala or the cerebral cortex or the frontal lobe...but we can't locate the experience, the consciousness, the self, the site of reason, and so on. These continually elude neuroscience, because of neuroplasticity. Brains are different, and can be different, and can function differently...nothing's simple in the mind-brain realm.

Physics doesn’t aim to explain the subjective texture of love or hate, but it does constrain the mechanics of how those feelings arise and translate into action.

Actually, it doesn't. It only losely describes what happens in some brains after the feelings and inclinations have arisen. In other words, it starts explaining (and only roughly) once the "electricity" is already in the "cord," and on its way to the "lawnmower." But as to why the "electricity," (i.e. the motivation) began in the first place, well, for that, the brain expert has to ask the experiencer. The volition is not caused by the brain, obviously: it's caused by something prior to the activity of the brain.

If it were otherwise, the brain would simply generate all our experience with no volition, no external incentive, no "experiencer," and no personal explanations of motive. But that's not how it is, and not how any of us lives, or can live.

Without a clear explanation of how non-physical volition adheres to or bypasses these principles, your argument doesn’t rise above speculation.

That critique would apply to, say, the heliocentric view of the galaxy, as well. Before it could be proved, it was still right; that human beings had not yet discovered the means to prove it right made no difference. It was still the best model of our universe, even if everybody was still convinced of geocentrism.

So whether the mind and brain are distinct is not going to depend on whether or not you and I, or neuroscience itself, can explain it fully. And, of course, none of us can. But the explanation that best fits all the proof we have is a much better explanation than one what assumptively cuts out half the data and pretends it simply doesn't exist...which is what the simplistic physical-brain explanation would do. It would have to give up trying to account for personhood, consciousness, individuality, rationality, morality, logic, experience...and science itself, which is a social phenomenon and a mind phenomenon, not merely some structure or region of everybody's physical brain.

Physicists, as you say, don’t prove truths—they reject falsities.

No, I don't say that. Falsificationism turns out to be as flawed as Verificationism. We know that now. But it does point to an important reality: namely, that if there's no method that might in extremis, prove a theory false, neither is there any way to know if it's true.

Immanuel, do you have objections to any of the handful of conservation laws,

Of course not. So long as they are only applied to physical entities, they seem excellent descriptions of observed regularities (which are what is means by "scientific laws": no more). What I do object to is the extending of the terms of physical science to non-physical realities...and any sensible person should do the same, unless they want to live in a world governed not in any part by voliton and choice, but rather purely by the alleged inevitabilities of physical motion. And who'd want to live there? Who could?

You can't, so why should we?

[BigMike]

Immanuel, your response is a parade of contradictions and evasions. Let’s dissect this nonsense with some sharp analogies to clarify just how absurd your claims are.

First, you assert that physics is "not the right paradigm" for investigating the mind, as if the mind somehow floats free of the brain, unbound by physical laws. That’s akin to saying the functioning of a computer’s software has nothing to do with its hardware. Sure, the software operates at a different level of abstraction, but every operation is ultimately rooted in physical processes: electrical signals, transistors, and circuits. To claim the mind operates outside the brain while still influencing it is like insisting that your Word document types itself without any activity in the processor—sheer magical thinking.

Second, you claim we "don’t know" how volition interfaces with the brain and then leap to the conclusion that this ignorance justifies non-physical explanations. That’s like saying, “We don’t fully understand gravity, so maybe fairies are involved.” The absence of a complete explanation isn’t license to inject untestable metaphysics. Science builds from what we observe—conservation laws, causal interactions, and neural activity. Your claim of a "mind" exerting force without any physical mechanism is no different than suggesting psychic powers move objects—fascinating for fantasy but utterly baseless in reality.

Third, you conflate gaps in current neuroscience with evidence for your position. That’s like arguing that because meteorology can’t perfectly predict the weather, storms must have supernatural causes. Neuroscience demonstrates clear correlations between physical brain activity and mental states. The fact that we can’t yet decode every detail of consciousness doesn’t mean we should abandon evidence-based inquiry in favor of dualistic wishful thinking.

Finally, your claim that volition causes "electricity in the cord" (neuronal activity) without adhering to physical causation is laughable. Neurons don’t fire because of abstract intentions; they fire because of precise electrochemical processes. To suggest otherwise is like saying your car starts because you "decided" to drive, ignoring the ignition system, fuel combustion, and engine mechanics. Your position denies the observable mechanisms while offering no explanation for how non-physical volition bypasses these established principles without violating conservation laws.

Your closing argument—“Who’d want to live in a world governed by physical motion?”—is a rhetorical flourish with no substance. Whether or not you like it, we do live in such a world, as evidenced by the predictable regularity of natural laws. Dismissing the constraints of physics to preserve your concept of volition isn’t just scientifically baseless—it’s intellectually lazy. If you reject the implications of conservation laws, you owe us more than your distaste for them; you owe us a coherent mechanism for how volition interacts with the brain without defying them. Without that, your argument is indistinguishable from fantasy.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel, your response is a parade of contradictions and evasions.

Mike, this is several times now you've seen fit to commence your response with some such uncharitable aspersion cast on my character. I find that disharmonious with the spirit of honest discussion with which we have engaged this topic. I cannot insist that you begin more charitably, of course; but it doesn't seem to help your case at all, nor to further the cause of reasonable debate. Perhaps you should forgo that habit.

In any case, nothing could be further from the truth. My response was actually not contradictory, and evaded nothing at all. You and I just don't happen to agree on the fundamental assumption here, namely, that physics is bound to be all that exists in the universe. That's your faith position, I can see. But it's not more than that. And so let us start from this: either your supposition is right, or my supposition is right, or a third supposition is right; and the debate will rest on the quality of arguments and evidence, not on personal remarks directed at the speaker of a position that challenges ours.

Fair enough?

First, you assert that physics is "not the right paradigm" for investigating the mind,

That seems very obvious, does it not? The idea that mind can be collapsed into mere physics is not warranted by anything you've suggested so far, and it's having a horrible time as a comprehensive explanation of mind phenomena. I think that's enough for us to recognize it's the wrong paradigm.

That’s akin to saying the functioning of a computer’s software has nothing to do with its hardware.

Now you're a "Functionalist"? Computers are a singularly poor analogy for the brain. No computer can exist or do anything without a builder and a programmer. So are you willing to concede that the human brain also needs these things?

Second, you claim we "don’t know" how volition interfaces with the brain and then leap to the conclusion that this ignorance justifies non-physical explanations.

It doesn't. What it does do, though, is justify us realizing that physical explanations are dusty, and we need some other kind of explanation. That's fair enough.

Third, you conflate gaps in current neuroscience with evidence for your position.

I don't. What I point out, though, is that the sort of tidy 1:1 relationship that "brain" advocates like yourself would lead us to expect has simply refused to show up. The empirical data shows quite clearly that the mind-brain link is not predictable in the way a purely physical link would cause us to expect.

...dualistic...

You've come up with this epithet several times now, which I find interesting. Do you have a way of knowing that the right explanation of brain and mind will inevitably have to be monistic? Please present this evidence, if you have any. If you don't, why should it concern us whether the right explanation turns out to be monist, or dualistic, or trinitarian, or polyform for that matter? Why don't we just go for the right kind of explanation?

Finally, your claim that volition causes "electricity in the cord" (neuronal activity) without adhering to physical causation is laughable.

You should stop laughing. We have zero evidence that we can answer a question like "Why do you love Sylvia" by saying, "Because of the neurons." Such an explanation would be obviously reductionaly and truly risible in a way everybody could see.

Your closing argument—“Who’d want to live in a world governed by physical motion?”—is a rhetorical flourish with no substance.

I'm merely pointing to your inconsistency, in this regard. You don't live like you're in a determined universe; so why should we take your argument seriously when you say that's what you believe we have? Live like it, and maybe we'll believe you...except that NOBODY can, so that's not going to happen.

[Alexis Jacobi]

What I do object to is the extending of the terms of physical science to non-physical realities...and any sensible person should do the same, unless they want to live in a world governed not in any part by voliton and choice, but rather purely by the alleged inevitabilities of physical motion. And who'd want to live there? Who could?

You can't, so why should we?

Odd, our ideas about life, the concept model that we hold to, becomes a constraint to those models of living & experiencing that we now (must) term as mystical.

The word mystic is interesting:

[Middle English mystik, from Latin mysticus, from Greek mustikos, from mustēs, initiate; see mystery.]

There is always within the process of spirituality (a loose term certainly) an element that depends on initiation: to have been exposed to other modes of living that (perhaps) defy or contradict conventions.

Now, I don’t want to get too freaky here, but CG Jung developed the idea of an “acausal connecting principle” between events and occurrences which could have no (scientifically understood) connection or causal relationship. For him that principle had much to do with the emergence of meaning.

What are “non-physical realities” above and outside of conceptual thought? Once one has admitted the possibility of an acausal connecting force, one is in the realm of an intelligence that makes connections. One could then speculate that here, in this world, other forces and powers can and do operate. If you asked 10 people if they have had or do have experiences in life that fall into that acausal category, you would find that a mystic’s mind-set is perhaps even rather common.

Now, here is the interesting thing: If an acausal principle does “exist”, what governs it and its function? But let’s go further: Is it possible to, let’s say, call forth (evoke, invoke) such manifestations? For myself I have concluded that yes, one can. But what “science” governs this existential magic? (for want of a better word). What is serendipity? what is providence? when an acausal principle is understood as being real?

Strangely, but necessarily according to its own value-set, the scientistic-physicalist mode of thought must reduce any awareness of contrary layers to our reality as being hallucinated and “mystical” in the negative sense.

What is interesting when I read IC’s rationally-couched defenses of what is ultimately an impossible position to hold — the picture, the story presented in the Gospel narratives — that he is setting up a larger protective barrier against “hardcore rationalism” but not really defining or referring to the sort of experience that mystics actually live. His is an “academic Christianity” that only goes so far into mystical experience. He certainly offers nothing that explains how a contrary mode (as against scientism and rationalist physicalism) might actually function as a viable, productive mode.

[BigMike]

First, you assert that physics is "not the right paradigm" for investigating the mind,

That seems very obvious, does it not? The idea that mind can be collapsed into mere physics is not warranted by anything you've suggested so far, and it's having a horrible time as a comprehensive explanation of mind phenomena. I think that's enough for us to recognize it's the wrong paradigm.

It’s not obvious at all. Physics doesn’t claim to “collapse” the mind; it explains the processes underpinning it. The “horrible time” you mention is simply the challenge of complexity, not evidence against physical explanations. Rejecting the paradigm without offering a coherent alternative is neither scientific nor logical—it’s avoiding the hard questions.

That’s akin to saying the functioning of a computer’s software has nothing to do with its hardware.

Now you're a "Functionalist"? Computers are a singularly poor analogy for the brain. No computer can exist or do anything without a builder and a programmer. So are you willing to concede that the human brain also needs these things?

The analogy illustrates that complex systems operate on physical substrates. The brain’s "builder" is evolution—a deterministic process, not an external designer. Your shock is misplaced; the comparison doesn’t imply mysticism, just causality.

Second, you claim we "don’t know" how volition interfaces with the brain and then leap to the conclusion that this ignorance justifies non-physical explanations.

It doesn't. What it does do, though, is justify us realizing that physical explanations are dusty, and we need some other kind of explanation. That's fair enough.

Calling physical explanations "dusty" doesn’t justify abandoning them. They’re supported by evidence, unlike the undefined “other kind of explanation” you propose. Vague alternatives aren’t fair—they’re evasions.

Third, you conflate gaps in current neuroscience with evidence for your position.

I don't. What I point out, though, is that the sort of tidy 1:1 relationship that "brain" advocates like yourself would lead us to expect has simply refused to show up. The empirical data shows quite clearly that the mind-brain link is not predictable in the way a purely physical link would cause us to expect.

The lack of a tidy 1:1 relationship reflects complexity, not evidence against physical causation. Complex systems like weather or ecosystems are similarly unpredictable, yet entirely physical. Neuroscience's challenges don’t validate non-physical explanations.

...dualistic...

You've come up with this epithet several times now, which I find interesting. Do you have a way of knowing that the right explanation of brain and mind will inevitably have to be monistic? Please present this evidence, if you have any. If you don't, why should it concern us whether the right explanation turns out to be monist, or dualistic, or trinitarian, or polyform for that matter? Why don't we just go for the right kind of explanation?

The evidence for monism is the lack of any observed non-physical causation. Conservation laws and neuroscience explain mind as emergent from brain activity. Dualistic or other non-physical explanations remain speculative without evidence.

Finally, your claim that volition causes "electricity in the cord" (neuronal activity) without adhering to physical causation is laughable.

You should stop laughing. We have zero evidence that we can answer a question like "Why do you love Sylvia" by saying, "Because of the neurons." Such an explanation would be obviously reductionaly and truly risible in a way everybody could see.

Love is complex, but it’s still rooted in neural activity shaped by biology and experience. Saying "because of neurons" oversimplifies, but dismissing their role entirely ignores the evidence.

Your closing argument—“Who’d want to live in a world governed by physical motion?”—is a rhetorical flourish with no substance.

I'm merely pointing to your inconsistency, in this regard. You don't live like you're in a determined universe; so why should we take your argument seriously when you say that's what you believe we have? Live like it, and maybe we'll believe you...except that NOBODY can, so that's not going to happen.

Living in a determined universe doesn’t negate actions or beliefs—it explains them. Recognizing determinism doesn’t change how we act; it clarifies why we do. Your argument mistakes understanding for denial.

[Immanuel Can]

Physics doesn’t claim to “collapse” the mind;

No, but you do, it seems. Every explanation for human behaviour gets reduced to, "the brain did it." There's no space left for a consciousness, or volition, or truth, or logic or science in that.

Rejecting the paradigm without offering a coherent alternative...

I'm offering one. You're rejecting it. And you can. But it has nothing to do with reasons, just with preference.

That’s akin to saying the functioning of a computer’s software has nothing to do with its hardware.

Now you're a "Functionalist"? Computers are a singularly poor analogy for the brain. No computer can exist or do anything without a builder and a programmer. So are you willing to concede that the human brain also needs these things?

The analogy illustrates that complex systems operate on physical substrates.

All it tells us is that computers are the product of human intelligence...yet another quantity you have to reduce to "brain."

The brain’s "builder" is evolution

Well, that's one of our other differences. I don't see any way "evolution" accounts for any of this. It certainly can't be described in logical or plausible evolutionary steps at all. Rather, even hardcore Evolutionists have been forced to speak of "epiphenomenality," rather than of "evolution of consciousness." In fact, evolution is such a bad answer to that question that even somebody like Nagel, who's about as Atheistic as anyone, has pointed out its many obvious intractible contradictions. See "Mind and Cosmos."

Second, you claim we "don’t know" how volition interfaces with the brain and then leap to the conclusion that this ignorance justifies non-physical explanations.

It doesn't. What it does do, though, is justify us realizing that physical explanations are dusty, and we need some other kind of explanation. That's fair enough.

Calling physical explanations "dusty" doesn’t justify abandoning them.

Let me put it another way, then: they don't work. That's pretty dusty.

Third, you conflate gaps in current neuroscience with evidence for your position.

I don't. What I point out, though, is that the sort of tidy 1:1 relationship that "brain" advocates like yourself would lead us to expect has simply refused to show up. The empirical data shows quite clearly that the mind-brain link is not predictable in the way a purely physical link would cause us to expect.

The lack of a tidy 1:1 relationship reflects complexity,

You like that answer, don't you?

No, it reflects a very serious problem. It means that brain physiology is not turning out to correspond to brain activity in the tidy way that your theory would invite us to expect. If physiology is the total answer, it should be terribly easy to map that out consistently. There's nothing particularly slippery about physical entities in themselves. They stay where you expect them to be, usually.

...dualistic...

You've come up with this epithet several times now, which I find interesting. Do you have a way of knowing that the right explanation of brain and mind will inevitably have to be monistic? Please present this evidence, if you have any. If you don't, why should it concern us whether the right explanation turns out to be monist, or dualistic, or trinitarian, or polyform for that matter? Why don't we just go for the right kind of explanation?

The evidence for monism is the lack of any observed non-physical causation.

Au contraire, I observe it in you, right now. And so would you, if you reflected a moment.

What is causing your fingers to tap the keyboard? It's your brain, you say...yes, but what's iducing your brain to tell your fingers to do that? It's not the brain telling the brain, obviously. And it's not the toast you ate last night, either. It's an argument. But what is an argument? A non-physical reality. And what is that argument doing? It's provoking a consciousness (yet another non-physical reality) to get excited, then to tell the brain to move the fingers.

Voila. It's not even hard.

Finally, your claim that volition causes "electricity in the cord" (neuronal activity) without adhering to physical causation is laughable.

You should stop laughing. We have zero evidence that we can answer a question like "Why do you love Sylvia" by saying, "Because of the neurons." Such an explanation would be obviously reductionaly and truly risible in a way everybody could see.

Love is complex,

There it is again. I wonder if there's a latinate phrase for it...the "reductio ad complexium"?

Saying "because of neurons" oversimplifies,

As does the whole physicalist explanation, of course.

but dismissing their role entirely

I guess you should talk to somebody who did that.

Living in a determined universe doesn’t negate actions or beliefs

It removes them completely from any explanation of why things happen. And we're back again to "the synapses did it".

Recognizing determinism doesn’t change how we act;

Right. It doesn't. The most hardcore Determinist finds himself utterly unable to live as if his own next move is predetermined, or as if he hasn't got a mind of his own, or that fate will take care of his dinner for him. So why take seriously a postulate that nobody lives out or can live out? That's pretty good empirical refutation, actually; because what we're trying to explain is human behaviour. And nobody behaves like a Determinist.

[BigMike]

Immanuel, do you have objections to any of the handful of conservation laws,

Of course not. So long as they are only applied to physical entities, they seem excellent descriptions of observed regularities (which are what is means by "scientific laws": no more). What I do object to is the extending of the terms of physical science to non-physical realities...and any sensible person should do the same, unless they want to live in a world governed not in any part by voliton and choice, but rather purely by the alleged inevitabilities of physical motion. And who'd want to live there? Who could?

You can't, so why should we?

Immanuel, your position faces an insurmountable contradiction when it comes to the interaction between the "mind" and the physical brain. Every observed physical change in the universe arises from interactions between two physical entities, adhering to well-established principles like action-reaction and conservation laws. These principles are not arbitrary—they are derived from centuries of observation and experimentation, making them central to our understanding of reality.

For the "mind" to interact with even a single atom in the brain, it must engage through one of the four known fundamental forces: gravity, electromagnetism, or the strong and weak nuclear forces. These are the only forces capable of influencing matter. For instance, if your mind were to excite neurons, it would need to generate a gravitational or electromagnetic field, as these are the forces that mediate interactions in the brain at a macro and molecular level. To generate such a field, the mind would require either mass (to create a gravitational field) or an electric charge (to create an electromagnetic field).

This leads to a critical problem for your argument. If the mind possesses mass or charge, it is inherently a physical entity, subject to the same laws of physics as any other physical object. It would no longer be "non-physical" or "independent" as you suggest, but entirely constrained by physical causality, like every other system in the universe. This would make it neither "free" nor immune to determinism, as it would operate within the deterministic framework of physical interactions.

Alternatively, if the mind lacks mass and charge—remaining non-physical as you argue—it would have no means of interacting with physical matter. It would be unable to excite a single neuron, let alone initiate the complex neural cascades that lead to actions like picking up a pen. Without any observable or theoretical mechanism for this interaction, the claim of a non-physical mind influencing the physical body collapses into a logical impossibility.

Your objection to applying physical laws to the mind seems rooted in discomfort with determinism rather than evidence or logic. Wanting to live in a world governed by "volition and choice" does not make it true. Reality does not conform to preferences. The deterministic laws of physics do not eliminate the richness of human experience; they explain it. Recognizing the brain’s operations as physical doesn’t make our thoughts, emotions, or choices meaningless—it situates them within the natural world.

Unless you can provide a coherent mechanism for how a non-physical mind influences physical matter without violating conservation laws or invoking new forces entirely absent from observation, your claim remains speculative and unsupported. The burden of proof lies with you to explain how this "non-physical" entity interacts with the physical without contradicting the very principles governing interaction in our universe. Until then, the deterministic framework stands unchallenged, not because of dogma, but because of the overwhelming consistency of evidence.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel, your position faces an insurmountable contradiction when it comes to the interaction between the "mind" and the physical brain. Every observed physical change in the universe arises from interactions between two physical entities, adhering to well-established principles like action-reaction and conservation laws. These principles are not arbitrary—they are derived from centuries of observation and experimentation, making them central to our understanding of reality.

They are physical laws, and only purport to pertain to things already known to be physical. About non-physical things, they are silent. Physics can't tell us about morality, or even rationality. It can't tell us about consciousness, about experiencing or feeling or motives, or identity, self or soul, or about anything but what is already physical.

You're using the wrong paradigm. The rules of physics are fine for physics. But the disputed point is whether or not consciousness is merely another case of physics. And when we try to force things like consciousness through a physicalist paradigm, we find the explanations are awkward, ugly and question-begging. So that's pretty clear indication we're working in the wrong paradigm.

For the "mind" to interact with even a single atom in the brain,

Stop.
We don't know what that process is. We don't even understand the first thing about it. The most informed neuroscientists and the most astute philosophers of mind admit they don't.

So I'm going out on a limb here, and saying, you probably don't, either. But if you do, apply for the Nobel Prize. You'll get it for sure.

If the mind possesses mass or charge,

It doesn't, of course.

Alternatively, if the mind lacks mass and charge—remaining non-physical as you argue—it would have no means of interacting with physical matter.

No, it would continue to interact with physical matter, as you see it, in fact, already does. But we would have to admit what all the experts admit, namely, that we really don't know how it does it. But physics isn't giving us any leads on that, or even anything elegant to hope for.

Your objection to applying physical laws to the mind seems rooted in discomfort with determinism

No, just with the absurd weakness of what that paradigm yields, and its total inability to be lived out in the lives of the very people whose behaviour that paradigm is supposed to be being used to unpack. Those are serious hold backs, but they have nothing to do with mere "discomfort." They're bad explanations. Why should we accept bad explanations?

Wanting to live in a world governed by "volition and choice" does not make it true.

Nor does "wanting" physics to describe mind. In both cases, "wanting" has zero to do with anything. Well, except that even "wanting" is a function of consciousness, and consciousness very much seems not to be physical, and not to be open to physicalist explanations. See "Mind and Cosmos."

Time you stopped impugning my motives and just dealt with the facts as outlined above, I would say. Whatever motives I might have or not have, they would not be any more relevant than "wanting" or "discomfort" on either side.

So deal with this, maybe: if consciousness is physical, why does physics fail to describe even the most rudimentary cognitive phenomena in any credible way? Why can nobody live like a Determinist, if Determinism is true? It looks very much like the physicalist paradigm simply isn't applicable, isn't right, and isn't appropriate to the case. But if you think it is, then show it is.

[BigMike]

Immanuel, your position faces an insurmountable contradiction when it comes to the interaction between the "mind" and the physical brain. Every observed physical change in the universe arises from interactions between two physical entities, adhering to well-established principles like action-reaction and conservation laws. These principles are not arbitrary—they are derived from centuries of observation and experimentation, making them central to our understanding of reality.

They are physical laws, and only purport to pertain to things already known to be physical. About non-physical things, they are silent. Physics can't tell us about morality, or even rationality. It can't tell us about consciousness, about experiencing or feeling or motives, or identity, self or soul, or about anything but what is already physical.

You're using the wrong paradigm. The rules of physics are fine for physics. But the disputed point is whether or not consciousness is merely another case of physics. And when we try to force things like consciousness through a physicalist paradigm, we find the explanations are awkward, ugly and question-begging. So that's pretty clear indication we're working in the wrong paradigm.

For the "mind" to interact with even a single atom in the brain,

Stop.
We don't know what that process is. We don't even understand the first thing about it. The most informed neuroscientists and the most astute philosophers of mind admit they don't.

So I'm going out on a limb here, and saying, you probably don't, either. But if you do, apply for the Nobel Prize. You'll get it for sure.

If the mind possesses mass or charge,

It doesn't, of course.

Alternatively, if the mind lacks mass and charge—remaining non-physical as you argue—it would have no means of interacting with physical matter.

No, it would continue to interact with physical matter, as you see it, in fact, already does. But we would have to admit what all the experts admit, namely, that we really don't know how it does it. But physics isn't giving us any leads on that, or even anything elegant to hope for.

Your objection to applying physical laws to the mind seems rooted in discomfort with determinism

No, just with the absurd weakness of what that paradigm yields, and its total inability to be lived out in the lives of the very people whose behaviour that paradigm is supposed to be being used to unpack. Those are serious hold backs, but they have nothing to do with mere "discomfort." They're bad explanations. Why should we accept bad explanations?

Wanting to live in a world governed by "volition and choice" does not make it true.

Nor does "wanting" physics to describe mind. In both cases, "wanting" has zero to do with anything. Well, except that even "wanting" is a function of consciousness, and consciousness very much seems not to be physical, and not to be open to physicalist explanations. See "Mind and Cosmos."

Time you stopped impugning my motives and just dealt with the facts as outlined above, I would say. Whatever motives I might have or not have, they would not be any more relevant than "wanting" or "discomfort" on either side.

So deal with this, maybe: if consciousness is physical, why does physics fail to describe even the most rudimentary cognitive phenomena in any credible way? Why can nobody live like a Determinist, if Determinism is true? It looks very much like the physicalist paradigm simply isn't applicable, isn't right, and isn't appropriate to the case. But if you think it is, then show it is.

Immanuel, your argument collapses under the weight of its own contradictions. You assert that physical laws only apply to physical entities, but you simultaneously claim that your "non-physical mind" interacts with the physical world. This interaction would necessarily involve pushing atoms, altering their momentum, or otherwise influencing their state. The problem is, any such action is governed by physical laws—conservation of energy and momentum being paramount. If your non-physical mind "kicks" an atom into motion, it must transfer energy or momentum to that atom. Where does this energy come from, if not from the physical realm?

If the mind is truly non-physical and lacks mass, charge, or any other physical properties, it has no means of interacting with the physical at all. Physical changes—such as an atom moving—require interactions mediated by one of the four known forces (gravity, electromagnetism, or the nuclear forces). These interactions require that something physical, with measurable properties, exerts influence. If your mind lacks these properties, it cannot push atoms. To claim otherwise is to suggest a magical exception to the laws of physics, which have never been observed to fail.

You argue that consciousness falls outside the domain of physical science. However, the moment you claim it interacts with the physical world, such as influencing neurons to fire, it is no longer exempt from physical laws. This isn't a "paradigm mismatch"; it's a refusal to address the clear causal relationships demanded by every interaction in the universe. To say your mind "kicks" an atom while denying it alters momentum or obeys conservation laws is to speak in metaphysical riddles, not rational arguments.

Your non-physical mind, as you describe it, either follows the laws of physics and is part of the physical world, or it has no measurable influence on physical matter and is irrelevant to the brain's functioning. You can’t have it both ways. By asserting interaction without providing a mechanism that adheres to physical principles, you create an incoherent explanation that explains nothing at all.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Immanuel, your argument collapses under the weight of its own contradictions.

The ultra-rational argument of the Pharisees not only collapses but kills the argument …

…yet the Jesusonian argument self-resurrects perennially!

[attofishpi]

[BigMike]

Immanuel, the flaw in your argument isn’t just a matter of intellectual inconsistency—it’s dangerous because it erodes the foundation of rational inquiry. By claiming that your non-physical mind can interact with the physical world without adhering to the laws governing physical interactions, you’re effectively introducing a false assumption into your reasoning. And from a false assumption, ex falso quodlibet, anything can follow. If we allow ourselves to believe that exceptions to conservation laws or physical causation exist, without evidence, then the door is open to justify any claim, no matter how unfounded or absurd.

Your perspective undermines the very basis of science, which relies on the consistent application of principles that have been rigorously tested and observed. Conservation laws are not arbitrary—they’re the backbone of how we understand energy, motion, and interaction. If we abandon them to accommodate an unverified and undefined concept like a non-physical mind, we’re left with no boundary between credible explanations and pure fantasy. Suddenly, claims of telekinesis, perpetual motion machines, or miracles become just as valid, because the structure of evidence-based reasoning collapses.

This isn’t merely a theoretical risk. Historically, abandoning rational frameworks to embrace unfounded beliefs has led to real harm. Consider how pseudoscience, rooted in similarly unprovable assumptions, has fueled destructive ideologies, medical quackery, and the rejection of scientific progress. Your argument for a non-physical mind that bypasses physical laws could be co-opted to justify all manner of harmful beliefs. If the mind is exempt from causation, why not assume diseases can be cured with thought alone? Why not claim disasters are caused by the collective "negative energy" of human minds? These are not slippery slopes—they are direct consequences of discarding the rigorous application of evidence and logic.

Moreover, your stance has profound ethical implications. By suggesting that the mind operates outside deterministic causation, you imply that people’s actions are entirely self-originating, which justifies blaming individuals for circumstances beyond their control. This perspective fuels punitive justice systems, entrenches inequality, and ignores the societal and environmental factors shaping human behavior. Determinism, by contrast, offers a framework for addressing root causes, fostering empathy, and creating systems of accountability that are fair and constructive.

In short, your perspective is not only logically unsound but perilously regressive. It invites a rejection of the principles that have allowed humanity to advance and solve problems collectively. When we introduce false assumptions, especially ones that defy well-tested physical laws, we’re not just being inconsistent—we’re undermining the intellectual integrity that safeguards truth, progress, and justice.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel, your argument collapses under the weight of its own contradictions.

You keep saying things like that, but it turns out they're never true.

You assert that physical laws only apply to physical entities,

That's definitionally true. If they applied to other things, they'd be called "other thing laws."

If your non-physical mind "kicks" an atom into motion, it must transfer energy or momentum to that atom. Where does this energy come from, if not from the physical realm?

I keep pointing out the obvious: nobody knows that. You certainly don't. But you still managed to kick your fingers into action, provoked by nothing more material than an argument.

Marvel at the mystery of how you did it.

You argue that consciousness falls outside the domain of physical science.

Clearly it does.

However, the moment you claim it interacts with the physical world, such as influencing neurons to fire, it is no longer exempt from physical laws.

That's ex post facto. Of course your fingers are physical. How did you make them move?

Here's the kind of difference in argument you and I are presently having:

Question: Why did Caesar cross the Rubicon?

IC's Answer: Because he decided it was going to be better for him and for Rome if he did.

Mike's answer: Caesar crossed the Rubicon because of synapses, synaptic fluid, electricity and meat.

Which one is the sensible answer, and which one is in the right category of explanation, isn't hard to detect. You're just circling the drain, lamenting the fact that physicalist explanations are useless in regard to human volition and action. But just because you want physics to answer this question doesn't mean it can.

Or, to take another example, did you ever watch The Big Bang Theory? The show, I mean.

It really had only one gag, if you noticed. It was this: it does'n't matter how brilliant of a physicist you might be...it won't help you figure out how to get a girl. In that realm, it will just make you stupid. That was the gag. The whole thing was based on the characters' category error, essentially. In the lab, they were geniuses; in the bar, they were hopeless. And that's life: you can't exposit mental phenomena by way of physics.

Or, to put it poetically:

Come, now, you most careful layers of T-squares,
You tedious extractors of square roots and cube roots,
You stooping squinters through microscopes,
You merciless probers and meticulous dissectors,
You would-be plotters of the curves of life,
Mathematically sure or else unbelieving;
You scorners of all but what mechanics
Can drearily prove: I challenge you,
Even in your pride, even in your own citadel,
Using those very instruments in which alone
You have such almighty faith,
Draw for me now the design, the plan
Of the universe; tell me how this earth, a star, is hung,
Diurnally turning for the refreshment of darkness and dew;
With your unfailing knowledge instruct me now
Who sensitively fringed the retiring gentian's beauty;
Or with your calipers, infallibly certain, bound for me
The mystic wild parabola of love.

Archibald MacLeish

[Dubious]

Immanuel, your argument collapses under the weight of its own contradictions.

The ultra-rational argument of the Pharisees not only collapses but kills the argument …

…yet the Jesusonian argument self-resurrects perennially!

...which only proves that one irrevocably returns to the point of origin and perennially repeat what has already been said. It's essential, therefore, that one cuts this Gordian Knot of idiot arguments invariably emanating from the supreme master of absurdity lovingly called Immanuel, including all such theists who cannot understand that without a functioning brain there can be no thought, period. However, in the case of Immanuel, a special case indeed, I submit if he were comatose, his intelligence would be dramatically enhanced.