Why Do the Religious Reject Science While Embracing the Impossible?

[FlashDangerpants]

The other “interesting” thing is that BM’s philosophy is presented as something beneficial.

He's not even doing that well. He is trying to use the same thing both to describe how the world comes to be the way that it is (an adequate use for it) but also to explain how the world can be better than it is (an improper use for it). The second use undermines the first.

But we see this same shit all the time. The guy who thought he can prove that the world is a simulation usually also thinks he can show some important way you ought to react to that.

[BigMike]

Imagine a river with an intricate delta—a vast network of branching streams and tributaries. Each drop of water flows through this network, but its path is determined entirely by the topology of the delta, the angle of the terrain, and the volume of water pushing behind it. At every fork, the water doesn't "choose" where to go; it simply follows the path dictated by gravity, pressure, and the physical constraints of the branching channels.

Now, imagine the nervous system as a similar branching network. Signals, like the water, flow through this neural delta, guided by the connections between neurons, the strength of synaptic pathways, and the electrochemical conditions present at the moment. The "choices" you think you make are not decisions but the inevitable result of how the signals travel through the predefined structure of your neural pathways.

Just as the river cannot pause at a fork and decide to flow left or right, your nervous system doesn't evaluate "choices" independently—it operates based on input and its preexisting architecture. The outcome is as inevitable as the river's path through the delta, revealing that what we perceive as "free will" is simply the unfolding of predetermined processes within the brain. The illusion of free choice stems from our inability to consciously observe the forces shaping the flow.

Cute story.

And, since it denies the reality of the cognitive faculties we require in order to know whether or not it was true, it leaves us with no way to know. We're not allowed to use our brains (because their revelations to us are allegedly just products of prior forces acting on us), so we can't criticize the story. Very convenient, that.

But neither have you the slightest reason to suppose it's true: so it's just as well you begin with the word "imagine." Imagining it is all that's possible to do...according to Determinism.

Immanuel, the irony in your critique is striking. Determinism doesn’t deny the reality of cognitive faculties—it explains them. It shows that cognition, like every other process in the universe, is governed by causality. The fact that your brain processes this discussion is not evidence against determinism; it's a testament to it. Those processes happen predictably and deterministically, enabling us to reason, communicate, and even argue about determinism itself.

To claim that determinism undermines our ability to critique the concept is a misstep. Determinism doesn’t negate thinking—it simply reveals that thinking arises as a result of prior causes. You’re conflating determinism with nihilism, but they’re not the same. Determinism doesn’t say "we can’t think," it says "our thoughts are determined." That’s not a weakness of the argument—it’s the entire premise.

As for whether there’s “reason to suppose it’s true,” determinism rests on the observation that every effect has a cause. This principle underpins every science that studies the natural world. If you wish to argue against determinism, you must propose either randomness or uncaused effects as alternatives—neither of which supports the concept of free will or the coherent, consistent reasoning you're trying to defend.

“Imagine” is an invitation to understand, not to fabricate. The analogy of the river delta simplifies the concept for clarity. The deterministic framework isn’t just imagined; it’s derived from the very physical laws that govern reality. To dismiss it as mere fantasy is to ignore the causal relationships that make your dismissal possible.

[Alexiev]

Alexiev, the point is not that determinism is some grand solution that transforms our lives overnight—it’s that it changes how we understand the foundation of human behavior, morality, and society. Your analogy to a gambler not knowing the order of cards misses the mark because it equates ignorance of outcomes with the illusion of freedom. The gambler feels suspense because they lack knowledge, but that ignorance doesn’t mean the shuffle wasn't fully determined. Similarly, the fact that we don’t know what our choices will be until we “make” them doesn’t mean those choices aren’t the result of prior causes.

You say determinism doesn’t help us predict or understand, but that’s simply not true. A deterministic framework does away with mysticism and focuses on causality—understanding the "why" behind actions. If people commit moral transgressions, we can focus on addressing the causes instead of relying on archaic notions of blame and retribution. Your appeal to shame, guilt, and ethical beliefs as immutable aspects of the human experience ignores the fact that these, too, are products of deterministic forces—cultural, psychological, and neurological. They can evolve as our understanding deepens.

Blaming someone for their actions, while emotionally satisfying, is counterproductive if the goal is to create a kinder, better world. A deterministic worldview isn’t about excusing harmful behavior but about addressing its root causes. It opens the door to reformative justice, evidence-based policy, and a more compassionate society. To dismiss this as a “religious faith” is ironic, given how determinism demands rigorous empirical grounding while your argument rests on the inertia of traditional beliefs.

The claim that determinism offers “no there there” is a deflection. It’s not about arriving at a utopia but about dismantling harmful illusions that shape our systems of governance, morality, and justice. If you find the walls of determinism intimidating, it’s not because there’s nothing beyond them—it’s because they challenge the comforting simplicity of free will and all the assumptions built upon it. That discomfort doesn’t invalidate the perspective; it underscores its transformative potential.

Causality is mystical enough, without your help or mine. The "why" is beyond the realm of physics, which concentrates on "how".

Where is the "rigorous empirical grounding" leading you to believe that a deterministic worldview will "dismantle harmful illusions"? Which illusions are "harmful"? Are illusions harmful by definition? Or might they sometimes be beneficial? I happen to like illusions -- I like fiction, mythology, and fantasy. I don't think they're harmful at all.

Determinism occasionally helps us predict and understand, mainly in the realm of pure physics. When it comes to human behavior, economics (as just one example) operates on the assumption of rational choices. These choices may be "determined" but by looking at them as choices instead of brain waves, economists are able to make predictions. Literary critics don't examine brain waves; they examine literature. The deterministic framework is useless in examining those things most important to us: love, friendship, beauty, art, etc. On these subjects, poetry is more enlightening than science. Why assume that science is more enlightening in terms of politics or morality or justice? I doubt it is.

In C.S. Lewis's "Voyage of the Dawn Treader" the earth children meet a star in human form. (From memory) One child says, "in our world, stars are balls of exploding gas."

The star replies, "That's what stars are made of, not what they are."

The modernist worldview is that the whole is understood by its parts. Sometimes that works. Other times, per the Walt Whitman poem I quoted earlier, the whole is something that cannot be "added, divided, and measured." Whitman looked up at the "mystical, moist night air" and perceived something that cannot be described in numbers (although for a talent like Whitman's, words work pretty well).

Your claim that determinism makes me uncomfortable is incorrect. The tenor of all of my posts is that I think it is irrelevant and indeterminate.

[BigMike]

Causality is mystical enough, without your help or mine. The "why" is beyond the realm of physics, which concentrates on "how".

Where is the "rigorous empirical grounding" leading you to believe that a deterministic worldview will "dismantle harmful illusions"? Which illusions are "harmful"? Are illusions harmful by definition? Or might they sometimes be beneficial? I happen to like illusions -- I like fiction, mythology, and fantasy. I don't think they're harmful at all.

Determinism occasionally helps us predict and understand, mainly in the realm of pure physics. When it comes to human behavior, economics (as just one example) operates on the assumption of rational choices. These choices may be "determined" but by looking at them as choices instead of brain waves, economists are able to make predictions. Literary critics don't examine brain waves; they examine literature. The deterministic framework is useless in examining those things most important to us: love, friendship, beauty, art, etc. On these subjects, poetry is more enlightening than science. Why assume that science is more enlightening in terms of politics or morality or justice? I doubt it is.

In C.S. Lewis's "Voyage of the Dawn Treader" the earth children meet a star in human form. (From memory) One child says, "in our world, stars are balls of exploding gas."

The star replies, "That's what stars are made of, not what they are."

The modernist worldview is that the whole is understood by its parts. Sometimes that works. Other times, per the Walt Whitman poem I quoted earlier, the whole is something that cannot be "added, divided, and measured." Whitman looked up at the "mystical, moist night air" and perceived something that cannot be described in numbers (although for a talent like Whitman's, words work pretty well).

Your claim that determinism makes me uncomfortable is incorrect. The tenor of all of my posts is that I think it is irrelevant and indeterminate.

Alexiev, you raise a poetic and deeply human objection, and I respect that, but your response overlooks a key point: determinism doesn’t strip life of its richness—it explains the processes that underpin it. The fact that causality feels "mystical" or unknowable in its ultimate origins is precisely what determinism acknowledges. It’s not trying to answer the “why” of existence in a metaphysical sense; it focuses on the “how” of events unfolding, including the behaviors and beliefs we hold dear.

Your fondness for illusions—fiction, mythology, fantasy—doesn't conflict with determinism; it aligns with it. Our capacity for storytelling, imagination, and symbolic thought are deterministic outcomes of evolution and culture. The distinction lies in recognizing that these cherished illusions are not independent of the causal forces that created them. Determinism doesn’t demand we discard art or beauty—it invites us to see them as emergent phenomena, intricately woven into the fabric of causality.

When I say determinism dismantles harmful illusions, I’m not talking about fiction or myth as art; I’m talking about the illusions embedded in governance, justice, and morality that perpetuate harm. The illusion of free will underpins retributive justice systems that focus on punishment instead of understanding and rehabilitation. It justifies social inequalities by attributing outcomes to personal merit or failure rather than systemic causes. These are the illusions determinism challenges—not the imaginative realms of poetry or the stars.

As for economics or literary criticism, you’re right: they operate at a different level of abstraction. But that doesn’t negate determinism; it complements it. Economists assume rational actors because it simplifies models, just as literary critics analyze themes rather than neural impulses. These frameworks work because they abstract from the complexity of the underlying systems—not because determinism is irrelevant, but because they don’t need to address it directly to be useful.

You cite C.S. Lewis’s charming metaphor about stars, but let’s extend it. Knowing that stars are "balls of exploding gas" doesn’t rob them of wonder—it deepens it. Understanding the mechanisms of nuclear fusion doesn’t diminish their beauty; it reveals an intricate dance of physics that, in its own way, is as awe-inspiring as myth. Similarly, understanding human behavior as deterministic doesn’t strip life of its meaning. It enriches it by showing how everything—love, friendship, art, morality—emerges from the same natural laws that govern the cosmos.

Your claim that determinism is irrelevant misses its transformative potential. It’s not about discarding what makes life meaningful; it’s about using deeper understanding to build systems—of justice, governance, and morality—that align with the realities of human nature. You don’t have to abandon Whitman’s mystical, moist night air; determinism invites you to marvel at the conditions that make such experiences possible. Far from irrelevant, it’s the thread that connects it all.

[Immanuel Can]

Determinism doesn’t deny the reality of cognitive faculties—it explains them.

It explains them AWAY, out of all existence, actually. Just as you have already affirmed, several times, it means that cognition is nothing more than the effect of some physical precondition, and thus is utterly unrelated to truth. The whole explanation of why Mike thinks what Mike thinks is, "Physical preconditions made him think that." But "physical preconditions" might plausibly induce an individual to "think" anything at all, true or false. "Physical preconditions" have no particular interest in creating truth.

So you've destroyed the credibility of all cognitive faculties: and yet you hope to appeal to those same faculties in order to make your case.

The fact that your brain processes this discussion is not evidence against determinism; it's a testament to it.

This is what I mean about its impossibility of falsification...or of justification. The Determinist says, of everything, "That's evidence I'm right." And because he's denied that your cognitions are truth-related, you are deprived of the cognitive basis to reject the view.

Determinism doesn’t negate thinking—it simply reveals that thinking arises as a result of prior causes.

Which means it's not truth-apt. It's only prior-causes-apt. It will produce only whatever the prior causes induced, not what was true.

If you wish to argue against determinism, you must propose either randomness or uncaused effects as alternatives—neither of which supports the concept of free will or the coherent, consistent reasoning you're trying to defend.

That's why I "must" not do it. That, and the fact that it's false, of course. No, I don't need to appeal to randomness as the alternative, and you're right to point out that random-causality is just another form of causality, and arguably a worse one. Rather, the right critique is not that will is "uncaused" or "random," but that will is itself capable of initiating a causal chain, and thus belongs in the catalogue of original causes of events.

And that is exactly how we talk. When we ask, "Why did you reply to this post," Mike might say, "I felt like it." And that's a proper explanation, and all we need, of why Mike did it. But when Mike goes further, and says, "Well, the reason I felt like it was because of six molecules that were in a piece of toast I ate this morning," then we rightly raise an eyebrow at Mike, and say, "Well, now you've departed the realm of what we know, what we all suppose to be the case, what we accept as a reasonable starting point of explanation, and the realm of the reasonable itself."

“Imagine” is an invitation to understand, not to fabricate.

When one "imagines" something, it's because one is being offered a speculative fantasy, not an explanation or a piece of evidence. One can easily "imagine" things that are false. For example, there's nothing internally inconsistent about saying, "Pixies made me do it," and it's impossible to test, because it's Deterministic, and because "pixies" are said to be magical and invisible. But the "imagining" there does not do any work of generating truth.

The deterministic framework isn’t just imagined; it’s derived from the very physical laws that govern reality.

That's a non-sequitur. It does not follow at all. "Laws" do not give us Determinism. Suppositions give us Determinism. There is no possible proof of Determinism, in fact, because "proof" itself is only perceived if those six molecules of toast eaten at breakfast induce the belief that it's proof.

[Alexiev]

Alexiev, you raise a poetic and deeply human objection, and I respect that, but your response overlooks a key point: determinism doesn’t strip life of its richness—it explains the processes that underpin it. The fact that causality feels "mystical" or unknowable in its ultimate origins is precisely what determinism acknowledges. It’s not trying to answer the “why” of existence in a metaphysical sense; it focuses on the “how” of events unfolding, including the behaviors and beliefs we hold dear.

Your fondness for illusions—fiction, mythology, fantasy—doesn't conflict with determinism; it aligns with it. Our capacity for storytelling, imagination, and symbolic thought are deterministic outcomes of evolution and culture. The distinction lies in recognizing that these cherished illusions are not independent of the causal forces that created them. Determinism doesn’t demand we discard art or beauty—it invites us to see them as emergent phenomena, intricately woven into the fabric of causality.

When I say determinism dismantles harmful illusions, I’m not talking about fiction or myth as art; I’m talking about the illusions embedded in governance, justice, and morality that perpetuate harm. The illusion of free will underpins retributive justice systems that focus on punishment instead of understanding and rehabilitation. It justifies social inequalities by attributing outcomes to personal merit or failure rather than systemic causes. These are the illusions determinism challenges—not the imaginative realms of poetry or the stars.

As for economics or literary criticism, you’re right: they operate at a different level of abstraction. But that doesn’t negate determinism; it complements it. Economists assume rational actors because it simplifies models, just as literary critics analyze themes rather than neural impulses. These frameworks work because they abstract from the complexity of the underlying systems—not because determinism is irrelevant, but because they don’t need to address it directly to be useful.

You cite C.S. Lewis’s charming metaphor about stars, but let’s extend it. Knowing that stars are "balls of exploding gas" doesn’t rob them of wonder—it deepens it. Understanding the mechanisms of nuclear fusion doesn’t diminish their beauty; it reveals an intricate dance of physics that, in its own way, is as awe-inspiring as myth. Similarly, understanding human behavior as deterministic doesn’t strip life of its meaning. It enriches it by showing how everything—love, friendship, art, morality—emerges from the same natural laws that govern the cosmos.

Your claim that determinism is irrelevant misses its transformative potential. It’s not about discarding what makes life meaningful; it’s about using deeper understanding to build systems—of justice, governance, and morality—that align with the realities of human nature. You don’t have to abandon Whitman’s mystical, moist night air; determinism invites you to marvel at the conditions that make such experiences possible. Far from irrelevant, it’s the thread that connects it all.

Except that determinism DOESN'T "explain the processes that underpin it (life and the world)". If it did -- as it does to some extent in physics -- that would be great. But as I've pointed out repeatedly, when it comes to human behavior your brand of determinism is simply another mystical proposition, not an explanation. What insights does determinism provide for understanding human behavior or the human condition? Very few. Maybe some day we'll be able to predict or explain behavior by looking at physics. But we aren't even close now. That's the high wall I mentioned earlier.

[Alexis Jacobi]

One thing that has not come up — yet — is BM’s diet recommendations for “better man” and “better world”.

Now, I gather that IC feels toast may support a balanced, progressive-tending arrangement of the molecules in our New Man. But is it possible that, say, a single anchovy with 1/2 of a blackberry ingested at an opportune moment might set in motion a cascade, a caravan, of molecular events that quite literally puts our world in Order?!

Maybe, just maybe, it could matter how those foodstuffs are arranged on the plate — and here an aesthetic element enters in.

Will you haphazardly drop the anchovy and the blackberry at random? or skillfully and by dint of profound strategy align them on the plate in accord with an advanced food presentation schema that tips the molecular scales toward happy outcomes in that man, in our world, and in our Universe?

These are things these conversations pull forth out of me — an entire epiphenomena of emergent questions.

[BigMike]

Determinism doesn’t deny the reality of cognitive faculties—it explains them.

It explains them AWAY, out of all existence, actually. Just as you have already affirmed, several times, it means that cognition is nothing more than the effect of some physical precondition, and thus is utterly unrelated to truth. The whole explanation of why Mike thinks what Mike thinks is, "Physical preconditions made him think that." But "physical preconditions" might plausibly induce an individual to "think" anything at all, true or false. "Physical preconditions" have no particular interest in creating truth.

So you've destroyed the credibility of all cognitive faculties: and yet you hope to appeal to those same faculties in order to make your case.

The fact that your brain processes this discussion is not evidence against determinism; it's a testament to it.

This is what I mean about its impossibility of falsification...or of justification. The Determinist says, of everything, "That's evidence I'm right." And because he's denied that your cognitions are truth-related, you are deprived of the cognitive basis to reject the view.

Determinism doesn’t negate thinking—it simply reveals that thinking arises as a result of prior causes.

Which means it's not truth-apt. It's only prior-causes-apt. It will produce only whatever the prior causes induced, not what was true.

If you wish to argue against determinism, you must propose either randomness or uncaused effects as alternatives—neither of which supports the concept of free will or the coherent, consistent reasoning you're trying to defend.

That's why I "must" not do it. That, and the fact that it's false, of course. No, I don't need to appeal to randomness as the alternative, and you're right to point out that random-causality is just another form of causality, and arguably a worse one. Rather, the right critique is not that will is "uncaused" or "random," but that will is itself capable of initiating a causal chain, and thus belongs in the catalogue of original causes of events.

And that is exactly how we talk. When we ask, "Why did you reply to this post," Mike might say, "I felt like it." And that's a proper explanation, and all we need, of why Mike did it. But when Mike goes further, and says, "Well, the reason I felt like it was because of six molecules that were in a piece of toast I ate this morning," then we rightly raise an eyebrow at Mike, and say, "Well, now you've departed the realm of what we know, what we all suppose to be the case, what we accept as a reasonable starting point of explanation, and the realm of the reasonable itself."

“Imagine” is an invitation to understand, not to fabricate.

When one "imagines" something, it's because one is being offered a speculative fantasy, not an explanation or a piece of evidence. One can easily "imagine" things that are false. For example, there's nothing internally inconsistent about saying, "Pixies made me do it," and it's impossible to test, because it's Deterministic, and because "pixies" are said to be magical and invisible. But the "imagining" there does not do any work of generating truth.

The deterministic framework isn’t just imagined; it’s derived from the very physical laws that govern reality.

That's a non-sequitur. It does not follow at all. "Laws" do not give us Determinism. Suppositions give us Determinism. There is no possible proof of Determinism, in fact, because "proof" itself is only perceived if those six molecules of toast eaten at breakfast induce the belief that it's proof.

Your critique is eloquent, but it overlooks a crucial point: determinism doesn’t render cognition meaningless; it explains the mechanisms behind it. To say that cognition is "unrelated to truth" under determinism is to misunderstand how truth functions in such a framework. Truth, as we understand it, is a correspondence between internal representations and external reality. Determinism doesn’t deny this; it simply reveals that the process of achieving that correspondence is governed by physical causes. The fact that some physical processes produce accurate models of the world while others produce errors is a testament to how determinism works in shaping cognition, not evidence against it.

Your argument that determinism "explains cognition away" misunderstands the nature of explanation. Saying that cognition arises from prior causes doesn’t negate its validity—it situates it within a causal framework. Truth is not some ethereal, free-floating entity; it’s an emergent property of deterministic systems that align internal representations with external conditions. The brain, shaped by evolution and experience, is remarkably adept at achieving this alignment, even if it operates deterministically.

Your appeal to "will as an original cause" doesn’t resolve the problem—it merely shifts it. If the will initiates causal chains, what determines the will? To say "I felt like it" as an explanation only works if you stop digging. Once you do, you find that the "feeling" arose from prior causes—neurochemical states, environmental stimuli, and personal history. Saying the will is a “first cause” is no different from invoking magical pixies—it introduces an unexplained and untestable entity into the equation.

Your toast analogy is clever but misses the mark. Determinism doesn’t reduce explanations to molecules in toast; it provides a framework for understanding why those molecules, in interaction with the rest of the system, influenced a particular thought. It doesn’t deny that higher-level abstractions like “feeling like it” are meaningful; it shows that these abstractions arise from, and are consistent with, underlying causes.

Finally, to argue that determinism is a "supposition" rather than a conclusion derived from evidence is to ignore the entire scientific enterprise. The predictive power of physics, chemistry, and biology rests on the assumption of causality—that events have causes, and that these causes operate according to discoverable laws. Determinism is the logical extension of this principle, not an arbitrary leap.

The accusation that determinism is unfalsifiable misses the point. Determinism doesn’t claim that any belief is "true" merely because it exists; it claims that beliefs arise from causes and can be evaluated based on their correspondence to observed reality. The fact that we can discuss and critique determinism itself is evidence of the deterministic processes enabling rational discourse, not a contradiction of them. To dismiss this as mere "toast molecules" is to trivialize the profound explanatory power of a causal framework.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Your toast analogy is clever but misses the mark.

I agree, quite clever. But the import of this conversation demands more. If an anchovy and 1/2 of a blackberry is ineffective for the change we desire, well then, perhaps a roasted iguana paw, the liver of a chipmunk and a syrup of sweet melon might get things moving properly ….

Who can say? How can we know unless we resolve to take chances, today, and to modify our alimentary habits to accord with Nature’s higher design?

[Immanuel Can]

Your critique is eloquent,

Thank you. And thank you for your thoughtful replies.

... but it overlooks a crucial point: determinism doesn’t render cognition meaningless; it explains the mechanisms behind it.

I'm not "ignoring" it. I'm refuting it. Determinism does not at all explain the mechanisms behind cognition. Instead, it attributes them to a kind of just-so-story, an imagining (as you have called it) that cognition means nothing but physical causality. You've killed the "person" behind the cognition, imagining him or her to be no more than an electrical cord connnecting physical cause to a physical result. But that's wholly imaginary, and totally devoid of demonstration or even evidence.

To say that cognition is "unrelated to truth" under determinism is to misunderstand how truth functions in such a framework. Truth, as we understand it, is a correspondence between internal representations and external reality.

Determinism, and the physical causes it implicates, have no views about truth. That's definitional, in fact: a physical force has neither personal identity nor will of its own. What it generates, it generates...regardless of the relation to truthfulness.

Magic mushrooms are physical, and use physical and chemical processes. But they produce hallucinations, delusions, confusions...How do you prove that Determinism does any better than that?

The fact that some physical processes produce accurate models of the world while others produce errors is a testament to how determinism works in shaping cognition, not evidence against it.

There it is again. Every contrary fact is returned, by the Determinist, as merely confirming his model. But that's only because he's just-soed it into place. He's given no evidence, no demonstration or proof of his claim...he's merely adopted an unfalsifiable imagining, and now can't see things any other way.

But in trusting his own cognitions, and in appealing to those of other people, he's actually effectively abandoned what Determinism logically would require of him.

Saying that cognition arises from prior causes doesn’t negate its validity...

"Validity"? It has nothing whatsoever to do with the formal logical property known as "validity." Rather, the vexed question is how to show that Determinism is in any way true.

The brain, shaped by evolution and experience,

Wait.

Now you're attributing to the allegedly impersonal and purposeless force called "evolution," the inclination and ability to aim at truth? Why would we assume that truth has anything to do with survival? False beliefs are often more survival-serving than true ones.

If the will initiates causal chains, what determines the will?

The person. This is what "volition" means: it means that humans are not just dumb terminals in a Deterministic chain of forces, but are rather agents...persons capable of inaugurating actions upon the world by way of their own volition. The only reason you can't descibe "causes" for that is that they are not the mere product of mere physical precursors. So you will NEVER find an explanation for volition in Determinism, because Determinism is wrong.

To say "I felt like it" as an explanation only works if you stop digging. Once you do, you find that the "feeling" arose from prior causes...

That is precisely what we DO NOT find. We have no such knowledge or ability, and never have had. The closest science has ever come is to identify some environmental and genetic markers as somewhat contributory to the agent's selection of options...never anything close to Deterministic closure.

Your toast analogy is clever but misses the mark. Determinism doesn’t reduce explanations to molecules in toast;

Not literally, of course. But it has to say things that, if unpacked, are every bit as reductional and silly.

Why did Mike write? Well, we could say "toast," or we could say, "unknown physical forces for which we are unable to test." But the latter answer, though longer, isn't any better. We should save our breath, and just say, "toast."

Finally, to argue that determinism is a "supposition" rather than a conclusion derived from evidence is to ignore the entire scientific enterprise.

No, this has zero to do with science denial. In fact, Determinism, by implication, denies that the scientist has any cognitions he can trust, which is a huge attack on science.

The predictive power of physics, chemistry, and biology rests on the assumption of causality

Yes, but also on the reliability of the cognitions of the physicist, the chemist, the biologist, and everybody to whom they address their research. And that's a thing which Determinism would induce us to believe is nothing but the accidental coming together of impersonal, physical forces with no regard to truth.

Your problem in that is jumping from mere physical phenomena, and assuming (without proving, of course) that human volition just another case of physical causality. But what if, as we all naturally believe, physical causality is not the only kind of causality; volitional causality is every bit as legitimate, every bit as much a node of decision for a person, and every bit as legitimate a starting explanation as "physical causes" are for merely physical phenomena?

The accusation that determinism is unfalsifiable misses the point.

Hardly. Any unfalsifiable belief is not scientific.

Determinism doesn’t claim that any belief is "true" merely because it exists; it claims that beliefs arise from causes and can be evaluated based on their correspondence to observed reality.

And yet Determinism is not based on observation, but on the gratuitious supposition that human beings are just another kind of physical effect of physical causes.

The fact that we can discuss and critique determinism itself is evidence of the deterministic processes enabling rational discourse...

Determinism isn't at all contributing to that. In fact, Determinism would induce us to suppose that maybe we're both crazy, and just squirting irrational thoughts to which we are induced by the impersonal forces of chemical, physical, physiological pressures.

Determinism doesn 't "make discussion possible" so to speak: its stultifies it. It leaves us with no basis upon which to take discussion seriously at all.

[BigMike]

Immanuel, your argument masks a fundamental clash with the conservation laws that govern physical systems. Let me illuminate how your reasoning, particularly regarding "volitional causality" and its independence from physical causality, runs counter to these principles.

The conservation laws—most notably the conservation of energy and momentum—state that in a closed system, energy and momentum are neither created nor destroyed, only transferred or transformed. If human volition, as you argue, initiates causal chains independently of physical causes, it would imply the creation of new energy or momentum in the system without any prior physical input. This directly violates these foundational laws of physics.

When you assert that "the person" or "volition" acts as an original cause, you effectively propose a system where causation occurs without an antecedent transfer of energy or information. This idea introduces a form of dualism that physics does not support. If a "will" could act as a first cause, where is the energy or force driving this action coming from? Conservation principles demand that any change in a physical system has a physical antecedent, which determinism aligns with seamlessly. Volitional causality, on the other hand, requires a breach in this chain.

You suggest that "volitional causality" is an equally legitimate form of causation, distinct from physical causality. However, such causation would necessarily operate outside the constraints of physical laws—laws that apply universally, from subatomic particles to neurons in the brain. Your argument doesn't explain how such a causative mechanism could exist without breaking these laws. By positing a causation that isn’t bound by physical constraints, you venture into metaphysics while claiming to critique determinism scientifically.

Your appeal to "unprovable physical forces" and the dismissive reduction to "toast" overlooks the empirical success of deterministic models in explaining complex systems, including human cognition. Neural activity, behavior, and decision-making processes adhere to causal patterns that align with conservation laws. These patterns don’t deny the richness of human experience—they provide the framework within which that richness unfolds.

Finally, your claim that determinism undermines trust in cognition misrepresents the role of deterministic processes in cognition. Determinism doesn’t erode trust; it explains why our brains evolved to model reality effectively. The alignment of our internal models with external reality—an alignment shaped by deterministic evolutionary pressures—allows us to survive, thrive, and engage in rational discourse. The conservation laws ensure that every thought, every word we exchange, is causally rooted in prior states of the system, maintaining coherence and consistency.

In summary, your conception of "volitional causality" contradicts the conservation laws, which are empirically validated and foundational to all physical science. Determinism, grounded in these laws, doesn’t diminish the significance of human thought and action—it situates them within the unbroken causal web of the universe. Your argument, while rhetorically engaging, falters when held against the rigor of these principles.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Truth, as we understand it, is a correspondence between internal representations and external reality.

Truth is not some ethereal, free-floating entity; it’s an emergent property of deterministic systems that align internal representations with external conditions.

I stand in awe …

[Alexis Jacobi]

Your critique is eloquent,

Thank you. And thank you for your thoughtful replies.

Ok, this “polite” crap has place but please pleeeeze don’t let it go to excesses.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Magic mushrooms are physical, and use physical and chemical processes. But they produce hallucinations, delusions, confusions...How do you prove that Determinism does any better than that?

They have often as well brought out life-changing insight. According to those who have used them and their accounts of their experiences.

And the interesting backdrop here is the question of truth.

In fact it is interesting to consider entheogens as causal agents (from “outside”) that distupt or put into question determined habits.

[Alexis Jacobi]

Determinism would induce us to suppose that maybe we're both crazy, and just squirting irrational thoughts to which we are induced by the impersonal forces of chemical, physical, physiological pressures.

I didn’t want to have to be the one to say it …

Determinism doesn't "make discussion possible" so to speak: its stultifies it. It leaves us with no basis upon which to take discussion seriously at all.

The reason I am so successful as a solvent to the stultifying is due, as I have alluded, to my culinary secrets!

Another reason to invest in The Course. It’s all there. A ripe fruit ready for consumption … and revolutionary change!