Noax wrote: ↑Fri Nov 29, 2024 4:52 pm
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Fri Nov 29, 2024 6:00 amIt seems rather clear, actually.
...you have a big tendency to make up your own alternate definitions for words that are clearly defined.
And yet, in this case, it's you doing that. But on we go.
Using the standard definitions, your arguments don't make sense at all. For example, 'determinism', 'choice' and 'volition': You seem to assume completely different meanings to these words:
Actually, I provided three of the standard definitions, from credible sources. Rather, it seems to be others who are twisting hard to avoid the implications...not me.
Determinism applies only to the pool ball interpretation.
Not at all.
If I am the victim of forces beyond my control, and have no freedom, then what difference does it make to me whether my jailor in the iron cage is called "physical causality" or "quantum events"? None at all, really...except that I might even be in a worse situation in the latter case, because at least in the former I might hope to find some logic in what was controlling me; but in the latter, I can have no hope at all of ever knowing the plans my jailor has for me.
Volition: From oxford: "the faculty or power of using one's will".
Your definition is from a mere non-technical dictionary, of course. Oxford Standard is for
all people, regardless of their knowledge level. Sometimes, thus, its definitions can be a little thin: they can't employ terms which only specialists in a given field have understanding of. But in this case, it's not bad, though a little begging of the question; so on we go.
This requires a connection between will and the means to use it, which almost always involves motor response.
Sure. But just because you want to have "will" and "means" doesn't mean you do. Determinism says you have no will
that can do anything, and no means to change anything.
Naturalism explains volition very well since only a spine is required to connect the two.
That's like saying "a cord explains why I'm mowing my lawn." In Determinism, all the "power" comes from previous physical or quantum causes, and all the action happens as an inevitable result. The cord is me. I have no input of my own, in that sequence: I'm just a conduit of the cause-effect chain, like an electrical cord is the conduit of the power to my lawn mower.
Focus on this term does your stance little good because volition has never been explained in it.
Volition is not a real thing, according to Determinism. So nobody can "account for" it.
But that raises a very interesting question, which so far, nobody has been bold to take up: why or how would impersonal causal precursors coming from my environment instill within me a belief in something that is utterly false? Why would the impersonal and unthinking cosmos generate a being (me, that is) who believes in "volition," a thing that has never existed and never will?
How does the Determinist have an answer to
that one?
Choice: You seem to use the term 'choice' in a way that is in no way distinct from 'free choice'.
I don't, actually. They are synonyms. But sometimes people zing off the adjective "free," and try to claim that we are speaking of some sort of impossible unconditional freedom: and that just fogs the discussion with stupidity, so I sometimes drop the adjective so I don't prime their pump.
It being determined does not mean there is no will.
Yes, it does.
We can add to the list another begging definition then. Not at all. It's manifestly true. If predetermination by causality explains everything, then there's no window for the word "will" to mean anything else but "a delusion that, for some inexplicable reason, predetermined creatures seem to have."
Determinism is not empirically falsifiable...which is not to say it's true, but that it's not subject to scientific test. It's a faith belief.
Nothing in science is proved...
I didn't use that word. Rather, I pointed out that there are no possible conditions under which you can show Determinism to be false, and therefore, none under which you can know it to be true. But Mike, in the OP, seems to think that Determinism is such a certainty that anybody who doesn't believe in it is "rejecting science." Quite the opposite is true, of course.
Determinism would give a huge and insoluble problem to all science. Since Determinism requires that science is not a case of human beings "knowing" things, but rather only of causal forces generating a belief in particular things, how can we trust what science tells us?

There's nothing inherent in the impersonal action of causality that should give us any reason to suppose our beliefs are true at all. Impersonal causality may have randomly "caused" us to believe untrue and silly things...of which science might end up being one...and how would we confirm that it wasn't?
...but faith is a belief in absence of evidence...
You alleged I "made up" definitions. Here, you clearly have. Well, no...you didn't "make it up," because I've seen it many times before. You're merely repeating an absurdly wrong definition popular among the skeptics, because it makes their job very, very easy. But their faith that we won't catch them at it is really ill-founded.
I know of nobody -- and I know many people of faith, and am one -- who would accept that definition.
But even the people who claim they have faith in it insist on acting like Determinism isn't true.
This implies that there is a more correct way to act if determinism is true. [/quote] There is, of course. To act consistently with one's beliefs, stop speaking as if those beliefs are false. Every time the Determinist uses a word like "will," "volition," "agent," "choice," "rationality," and so on, he is appealing to cognitive characteristics that he himself has debunked through Determinism.
That's self-contradiction. And self-contradiction is the
incorrect way to defend one's views. It's irrational.
I would agree that a belief in fatalism would ironically cause one to behave differently.
"Behave" and "differently" are also no part of the furniture of a self-consistent Determinist's explanation. "Behave" means only "do what causal forces made you do," and "differently" makes no sense at all, since all outcomes are inevitable.
But then, even the word "explanation" makes no sense in that world: why "explain," when "explaining" doesn't "change" anything?
Let me quote Big Mike, just to show you that at least here, your view is in the minority and the "definitions" upon which I've been relying are, at least as far as Mike himself is concerned, quite orthodox:
Absolutely, all willpower is an illusion in the sense that it doesn’t cause anything by itself. Your "willpower" has as much ability to affect the physical world as a ghost does to move furniture—none. It cannot push even a single atom, let alone rewire your brain or change your behavior without external inputs driving those changes. What you call “willpower” is simply the perception of a process that’s already underway, not its cause.
Your will isn’t some magical force; it’s an epiphenomenological emergent perception—a side effect of complex neural activity. It feels real, but so does the illusion of the sun rising and setting when, in reality, it’s the Earth rotating. That doesn’t make your will any more capable of initiating change than wishing for a million dollars will make it rain cash.
So no, your thoughts aren’t under your control. They’re the product of deterministic biochemical processes shaped by prior causes. Thinking otherwise is like believing a puppet can pull its own strings—it’s delusional. Willpower is just a nice story you tell yourself to feel in control, but the reality is far less flattering.