Why Do the Religious Reject Science While Embracing the Impossible?

[BigMike]

Which interpretation of 4D determinism do you subscribe to btw?

1: The Big bang happened so and so, and everything that came after was determined by it, including the choice I just made.
2: I just made this choice, which determines that the Big Bang too must have happened so and so.
3: Both 1 and 2 are valid perspectives on the greater consistent whole.
4: Other

Atla, none of these interpretations make sense in the context of determinism as grounded in science. Determinism isn’t about retrocausality or choices determining past events—it’s about causality flowing forward through time, consistent with conservation laws and the fundamental forces of nature.

The valid interpretation is this: The Big Bang established the initial conditions of the universe, and everything that has happened since—including your so-called "choice"—is a causally determined outcome of those conditions. There’s no "perspective" that allows for backward causation (#2) or dual perspectives (#3). These ideas aren’t interpretations of determinism; they’re philosophical noise that misrepresents its principles.

If you’re asking which framework to discuss, stick to the one that aligns with established physics: forward causality governed by determinism. If you want to entertain speculative interpretations like #2 or #3, we’re operating in fantasy, not science. Let’s not waste time on irrelevant detours.

Are you saying that conservation laws aren't time-symmetric?

No, Atla, I’m not saying that. In fact, the conservation of energy is derived directly from Noether's theorem, which links conservation laws to symmetries in nature. Conservation of energy follows from the symmetry of physical laws under time translation—it reflects that the laws of physics don’t change over time.

However, time symmetry doesn’t mean causality flows backward or that choices determine past events. Conservation laws operate within the framework of forward causality, ensuring consistency in how physical properties like energy and momentum are exchanged. Invoking time symmetry to imply retrocausality is a fundamental misunderstanding of how these principles function. Let’s stick to what the physics actually says.

[Skepdick]

No, Atla, I’m not saying that. In fact, the conservation of energy is derived directly from Noether's theorem, which links conservation laws to symmetries in nature. Conservation of energy follows from the symmetry of physical laws under time translation—it reflects that the laws of physics don’t change over time.

Contradiction.

I have expressed the current state of the foundation of all empirical science—excluding purely axiomatic deductive disciplines like mathematics and logic.

However, time symmetry doesn’t mean causality flows backward or that choices determine past events.

It's exactly what it means. It implies inability to distinguish effect from cause. What you recognize as "effect" in time-forward fashion is a cause in time-reversed fashion.

If the laws of physics were time-symmetric your choise of time-directionality is arbitrary.

[FlashDangerpants]

Flash, let’s make this simple: either you accept that I have expressed the current state of the foundation of all empirical science—excluding purely axiomatic deductive disciplines like mathematics and logic—and we can discuss things like free will and other related topics from there. Or we stop here and now, agreeing that we live in fundamentally different realities.

"purely"?

I am referencing axioms in science in the same terms as Thomas Kuhn among others. It's not my problem if your education is lacking and your hubris is showing.

I’m not here to entertain endless philosophical posturing that avoids engaging with the core premises. If you’re unwilling to ground this discussion in the established scientific framework, there’s no point in continuing.

I am engaging with your core premises. They lack foundation due to assumptions you make for which there is no reason to suppose completeness or sufficiency. In other words, you have a dogma problem.

Choose wisely.

Sorry bud, but it looks like you've decided not to do that.

Flash, let me spell this out for you: an axiom is a self-evident truth or a starting point in a logical or mathematical system, something assumed without needing empirical evidence. A hypothesis, on the other hand, is a proposed explanation grounded in observation and experimentation, subject to testing and falsification. Conservation laws, which I’ve referenced, are not axioms—they are empirically derived and have stood up to rigorous testing in every scientific discipline.

Help me out here, is the truth that conservation laws will continue to apply in new ways to new subjects as they have to all previous subjects ... self evident? Or is it falsifiable?

Please explain by what method of direct empirical investigation you have shown that the laws of conservation are the only way to explain the firing of some specific neuron involved in decision making.

Demonstrate, if you are able, how you avoided axiomatic reasoning when you ruled out any future advancements in the realm of the sciences that might show that some outcomes involving agent choice could prove logically unpredictable in advance.

Without relying on mere axioms to insist that it cannot be so, how did you demonstrate through experiment that there cannot be any circumstance under which a set of choices are presented to a thinking person who then makes their decision under a process that could reasonably be described as choosing.

You can announce that something is a testable hypothesis as much as you like, but if you are using it as an axiom then you are not fooling anybody but yourself.

Your attempts to conflate the two are either disingenuous or reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the distinction. Science isn’t dogma—it’s a framework built on hypotheses validated through evidence. If you want to challenge the validity or completeness of conservation laws, present data or reasoning, not this empty hand-waving about "dogma."

I didn't say science has a dogma problem. You are not doing science.

Cut the BS, engage substantively, or we stop here. If you’re not willing to move past philosophical mudslinging, I’m not interested in entertaining your contrarian posturing. Final warning.

Philosophy forum. See the big banner at the top of the page.

[Atla]

Atla, none of these interpretations make sense in the context of determinism as grounded in science. Determinism isn’t about retrocausality or choices determining past events—it’s about causality flowing forward through time, consistent with conservation laws and the fundamental forces of nature.

The valid interpretation is this: The Big Bang established the initial conditions of the universe, and everything that has happened since—including your so-called "choice"—is a causally determined outcome of those conditions. There’s no "perspective" that allows for backward causation (#2) or dual perspectives (#3). These ideas aren’t interpretations of determinism; they’re philosophical noise that misrepresents its principles.

If you’re asking which framework to discuss, stick to the one that aligns with established physics: forward causality governed by determinism. If you want to entertain speculative interpretations like #2 or #3, we’re operating in fantasy, not science. Let’s not waste time on irrelevant detours.

Are you saying that conservation laws aren't time-symmetric?

No, Atla, I’m not saying that. In fact, the conservation of energy is derived directly from Noether's theorem, which links conservation laws to symmetries in nature. Conservation of energy follows from the symmetry of physical laws under time translation—it reflects that the laws of physics don’t change over time.

However, time symmetry doesn’t mean causality flows backward or that choices determine past events. Conservation laws operate within the framework of forward causality, ensuring consistency in how physical properties like energy and momentum are exchanged. Invoking time symmetry to imply retrocausality is a fundamental misunderstanding of how these principles function. Let’s stick to what the physics actually says.

I'd like to see how you think science proves perspective 1 / disproves perspective 2.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel, your "aboutness" theory...

Not "mine." I can't claim originality. It's part of the package of terms philosophers of mind routinely use to describe a particular kind of issue. https://philosophynow.org/issues/132/About_Aboutness

You claim that physical processes like synapses firing lack "aboutness" or meaning, but this completely ignores how cognition and memory actually work.

Well, no, it doesn't. I agree that they work. But your critique is actually fallaciously backward: it says, "Because cognition and memory work, therefore, they are determined by physical processes." Put that way, you can see the fallacy very obviously.

A physicalist theory of mind can't explain how they work. It can only account for physical phenomena, not for the "aboutness" of those phenomena.

Synaptic changes—like strengthening, weakening, or forming new connections—are precisely how learning, memory, and understanding occur.

Again, the same kind of fallacy: you're saying, "Because we see synaptic changes, therefore these synaptic changes cause "aboutness." No, it's quite plausible that aboutness is the thing that produces the physical changes, or that the physical changes and aboutness happen at the same time, or that a third thing -- like, say, consciousness -- precipitates both the aboutness and the synaptic accommodations.

Meaning isn’t some ethereal property floating outside the brain; it emerges from the structured, adaptive interactions of physical processes.

This is actually quite wrong. Physical processes themselved do not "mean" things. Rocks falling off cliffs are not "about" anything. Molecules bumping into each other do not have particular meanings, and do not conduce to any kind of aboutness. They are "about" nothing in particular.

If cognition and "aboutness" aren’t rooted in physical processes, how does your theory handle learning?

Oh, very easily, actually.

Learing is primarily a cognitive, not physical. It's a change of mind; and the contemporanous brain changes are merely facilitators to that activity, not the total explanation for that activity...and certainly physical changes offer us no explanation for what the learning is "about." We can't deduce from particular synaptic link that a particular person has just learned "about" Relativity Theory. All we can deduce is that he/she has learned something. But it might as easily be Quantum Theory, or lumberjacking or basket weaving. We have no idea from our analysis of the neurons what "aboutness" is being acquired by the learner. Only he/she can tell us that, and that requires a mind, a person, a meaningful linguistic act, and so on, which physical phenomena cannot afford us.

How do synaptic modifications encode memories or facilitate reasoning?

That's a question that the world's great neuroscientists would love you to answer.

Are you suggesting that this is somehow divorced from the physical structure of the brain?

Partially. What I'm pointing to is the fact that we find a physical event in the brain happens contemporaneously with a cognition, but that it offers us no ability to understand what that cognitive activity is "about."

The idea that synaptic firings “aren’t about anything” because they are physical is laughable.

Actually, it's painfully obvious and easy to test. Every neuroscientist knows it.

But you can test it yourself. If I tell you that a persons brain has just fired at neuron site X+2, can you tell me what she was thinking about?

No?

Well, then, you see my point.

[Immanuel Can]

Actually, no. We know for certain that every causal chain has to have a beginning point, because mathematically, a causal chain of infinite regressions never starts; the conditions for it to begin are never met.

My comment was that a new causal chain is a very poor way to make any sort of decision. Your reply didn't seem relevant to that comment at all, instead making irrelevant asserts (nether of which I agree with).

Then I cannot see what you meant at all. What is it about "new" that makes a causal chain bad? If you recognize and agree with the infinite regress critique, as you say, then it's inevitable that EVERY decision was once "new" in this sense.

[BigMike]

"purely"?

I am referencing axioms in science in the same terms as Thomas Kuhn among others. It's not my problem if your education is lacking and your hubris is showing.


I am engaging with your core premises. They lack foundation due to assumptions you make for which there is no reason to suppose completeness or sufficiency. In other words, you have a dogma problem.


Sorry bud, but it looks like you've decided not to do that.

Flash, let me spell this out for you: an axiom is a self-evident truth or a starting point in a logical or mathematical system, something assumed without needing empirical evidence. A hypothesis, on the other hand, is a proposed explanation grounded in observation and experimentation, subject to testing and falsification. Conservation laws, which I’ve referenced, are not axioms—they are empirically derived and have stood up to rigorous testing in every scientific discipline.

Help me out here, is the truth that conservation laws will continue to apply in new ways to new subjects as they have to all previous subjects ... self evident? Or is it falsifiable?

Please explain by what method of direct empirical investigation you have shown that the laws of conservation are the only way to explain the firing of some specific neuron involved in decision making.

Demonstrate, if you are able, how you avoided axiomatic reasoning when you ruled out any future advancements in the realm of the sciences that might show that some outcomes involving agent choice could prove logically unpredictable in advance.

Without relying on mere axioms to insist that it cannot be so, how did you demonstrate through experiment that there cannot be any circumstance under which a set of choices are presented to a thinking person who then makes their decision under a process that could reasonably be described as choosing.

You can announce that something is a testable hypothesis as much as you like, but if you are using it as an axiom then you are not fooling anybody but yourself.

Your attempts to conflate the two are either disingenuous or reveal a fundamental misunderstanding of the distinction. Science isn’t dogma—it’s a framework built on hypotheses validated through evidence. If you want to challenge the validity or completeness of conservation laws, present data or reasoning, not this empty hand-waving about "dogma."

I didn't say science has a dogma problem. You are not doing science.

Cut the BS, engage substantively, or we stop here. If you’re not willing to move past philosophical mudslinging, I’m not interested in entertaining your contrarian posturing. Final warning.

Philosophy forum. See the big banner at the top of the page.

Flash, let’s start with a basic clarification of the scientific method, which you seem to misunderstand. Science never proves anything definitively—it never has. Instead, science operates by formulating hypotheses, testing them through observation and experimentation, and eliminating those that fail. What remains is the most robust explanation given the evidence at hand, subject to revision if future evidence demands it. Science disproves false statements; it does not deliver eternal truths.

Conservation laws, such as the conservation of energy, are not axioms—they are hypotheses derived from centuries of empirical testing, including through Noether's theorem. These laws have never been falsified despite being foundational to countless scientific disciplines. This isn’t dogma; it’s the result of a methodical process of testing and refinement.

Now, to your questions:

1. Is it self-evident that conservation laws will always apply?
No, it’s not self-evident—it’s a hypothesis continuously supported by evidence. That’s the difference between a scientific hypothesis and an axiom: hypotheses remain open to falsification, while axioms are taken as self-evident starting points.

2. How do conservation laws explain neuron firing?
Conservation laws don’t directly explain neuron firing—they underpin the physics and chemistry that govern these processes. Neurons operate through electrochemical reactions, which are themselves governed by the conservation of charge and energy. Conservation principles provide the foundational framework within which such phenomena occur.

3. How did I rule out future advancements?
I didn’t. Science expects advancements; that’s why all hypotheses remain open to falsification. However, it’s on you to present plausible mechanisms or evidence for such advancements, not on me to entertain baseless speculation. If you think conservation laws could fail or that "choosing" defies determinism, show your evidence. Otherwise, your argument is a non-starter.

Lastly, "philosophy forum" or not, serious discussion requires engaging substantively with the ideas presented. If your contribution is limited to misrepresenting the scientific method and throwing around baseless accusations, this conversation will quickly cease to be worth anyone’s time.

[BigMike]

Are you saying that conservation laws aren't time-symmetric?

No, Atla, I’m not saying that. In fact, the conservation of energy is derived directly from Noether's theorem, which links conservation laws to symmetries in nature. Conservation of energy follows from the symmetry of physical laws under time translation—it reflects that the laws of physics don’t change over time.

However, time symmetry doesn’t mean causality flows backward or that choices determine past events. Conservation laws operate within the framework of forward causality, ensuring consistency in how physical properties like energy and momentum are exchanged. Invoking time symmetry to imply retrocausality is a fundamental misunderstanding of how these principles function. Let’s stick to what the physics actually says.

I'd like to see how you think science proves perspective 1 / disproves perspective 2.

Atla, science doesn’t “prove” perspective 1 or disprove perspective 2 because science doesn’t deal in proof—it deals in evidence and falsification. Perspective 1 is consistent with forward causality as observed in all empirical evidence and governed by conservation laws. Perspective 2, however, implies retrocausality, which lacks any supporting evidence and contradicts our current understanding of physics.

The conservation of energy, derived from Noether's theorem and tied to time symmetry, supports the idea that physical laws remain constant as time progresses. This framework aligns with forward causality—cause leads to effect. Retrocausality, as implied by perspective 2, would require evidence of effects influencing causes, something that has never been observed in nature and would fundamentally violate the framework established by conservation laws.

If you think perspective 2 is valid, the burden is on you to present evidence demonstrating retrocausality or a mechanism that could explain how it operates without violating established physics. Otherwise, we have no reason to take it seriously within the current scientific framework.

[BigMike]

Immanuel, your "aboutness" theory...

Not "mine." I can't claim originality. It's part of the package of terms philosophers of mind routinely use to describe a particular kind of issue. https://philosophynow.org/issues/132/About_Aboutness

You claim that physical processes like synapses firing lack "aboutness" or meaning, but this completely ignores how cognition and memory actually work.

Well, no, it doesn't. I agree that they work. But your critique is actually fallaciously backward: it says, "Because cognition and memory work, therefore, they are determined by physical processes." Put that way, you can see the fallacy very obviously.

A physicalist theory of mind can't explain how they work. It can only account for physical phenomena, not for the "aboutness" of those phenomena.

Synaptic changes—like strengthening, weakening, or forming new connections—are precisely how learning, memory, and understanding occur.

Again, the same kind of fallacy: you're saying, "Because we see synaptic changes, therefore these synaptic changes cause "aboutness." No, it's quite plausible that aboutness is the thing that produces the physical changes, or that the physical changes and aboutness happen at the same time, or that a third thing -- like, say, consciousness -- precipitates both the aboutness and the synaptic accommodations.

Meaning isn’t some ethereal property floating outside the brain; it emerges from the structured, adaptive interactions of physical processes.

This is actually quite wrong. Physical processes themselved do not "mean" things. Rocks falling off cliffs are not "about" anything. Molecules bumping into each other do not have particular meanings, and do not conduce to any kind of aboutness. They are "about" nothing in particular.

If cognition and "aboutness" aren’t rooted in physical processes, how does your theory handle learning?

Oh, very easily, actually.

Learing is primarily a cognitive, not physical. It's a change of mind; and the contemporanous brain changes are merely facilitators to that activity, not the total explanation for that activity...and certainly physical changes offer us no explanation for what the learning is "about." We can't deduce from particular synaptic link that a particular person has just learned "about" Relativity Theory. All we can deduce is that he/she has learned something. But it might as easily be Quantum Theory, or lumberjacking or basket weaving. We have no idea from our analysis of the neurons what "aboutness" is being acquired by the learner. Only he/she can tell us that, and that requires a mind, a person, a meaningful linguistic act, and so on, which physical phenomena cannot afford su.

How do synaptic modifications encode memories or facilitate reasoning?

That's a question that the world's great neuroscientists would love you to answer.

Are you suggesting that this is somehow divorced from the physical structure of the brain?

Partially. What I'm pointing to is the fact that we find a physical event in the brain happens contemporaneously with a cognition, but that it offers us no ability to understand what that cognitive activity is "about."

The idea that synaptic firings “aren’t about anything” because they are physical is laughable.

Actually, it's painfully obvious and easy to test. Every neuroscientist knows it.

But you can test it yourself. If I tell you that a persons brain has just fired at neuron site X+2, can you tell me what she was thinking about?

No?

Well, then, you see my point.

Immanuel, your response ignores significant advancements in neuroscience that directly undermine your claims. Some neuroscientists have already demonstrated that they can "read" what someone is thinking by analyzing their brain activity. Functional MRI (fMRI) studies, for example, have been used to reconstruct visual images people are seeing or even identify the semantic content of thoughts. This is evidence that specific patterns of neural activity correlate with specific thoughts and perceptions—clear links between physical brain processes and "aboutness."

Your claim that synaptic activity doesn’t "mean" anything is a philosophical relic, not a scientific observation. Meaning doesn’t arise from individual synapses firing in isolation but from the complex, organized structure of neural networks. Just as the arrangement of letters in a sentence conveys meaning, the patterns of neural activity encode the "aboutness" you claim is beyond physical explanation.

The notion that "aboutness" is independent of physical processes fails to explain how learning, memory, and reasoning emerge in individuals whose brains have undergone observable changes tied to these activities. You say the physical changes "facilitate" but don’t "explain" cognition—yet neuroscience continues to show that these physical changes are the mechanism of cognition, not merely a coincidental accompaniment.

Your analogy about neuron firing at site X+2 is outdated. We are increasingly able to interpret what specific neural activity represents, and the idea that physical processes can’t convey "aboutness" is being steadily eroded by empirical evidence. Dismissing this as unexplainable is not an argument—it’s an unwillingness to engage with the reality that science is closing the gap between brain activity and cognition.

Are you rejecting our current foundational scientific hypotheses without presenting evidence? I need to know.

[Atla]

No, Atla, I’m not saying that. In fact, the conservation of energy is derived directly from Noether's theorem, which links conservation laws to symmetries in nature. Conservation of energy follows from the symmetry of physical laws under time translation—it reflects that the laws of physics don’t change over time.

However, time symmetry doesn’t mean causality flows backward or that choices determine past events. Conservation laws operate within the framework of forward causality, ensuring consistency in how physical properties like energy and momentum are exchanged. Invoking time symmetry to imply retrocausality is a fundamental misunderstanding of how these principles function. Let’s stick to what the physics actually says.

I'd like to see how you think science proves perspective 1 / disproves perspective 2.

Atla, science doesn’t “prove” perspective 1 or disprove perspective 2 because science doesn’t deal in proof—it deals in evidence and falsification. Perspective 1 is consistent with forward causality as observed in all empirical evidence and governed by conservation laws. Perspective 2, however, implies retrocausality, which lacks any supporting evidence and contradicts our current understanding of physics.

The conservation of energy, derived from Noether's theorem and tied to time symmetry, supports the idea that physical laws remain constant as time progresses. This framework aligns with forward causality—cause leads to effect. Retrocausality, as implied by perspective 2, would require evidence of effects influencing causes, something that has never been observed in nature and would fundamentally violate the framework established by conservation laws.

If you think perspective 2 is valid, the burden is on you to present evidence demonstrating retrocausality or a mechanism that could explain how it operates without violating established physics. Otherwise, we have no reason to take it seriously within the current scientific framework.

You are pushing your philosophical axiom, "forward causation", while rejecting the symmetrical axiom, "retrocausation", for no logical reason. But neither really make sense.

We can't prove that causality has a direction at all, because we are unable to leave the present. We always look at the result of an empirical experiment in the present, and then theorize a causal chain backwards in time and/or forwards in time. Perspective 2 is just as consistent with all known empirical evidence, as perspective 1 is. Bet you didn't know that about determinism.

[BigMike]

I'd like to see how you think science proves perspective 1 / disproves perspective 2.

Atla, science doesn’t “prove” perspective 1 or disprove perspective 2 because science doesn’t deal in proof—it deals in evidence and falsification. Perspective 1 is consistent with forward causality as observed in all empirical evidence and governed by conservation laws. Perspective 2, however, implies retrocausality, which lacks any supporting evidence and contradicts our current understanding of physics.

The conservation of energy, derived from Noether's theorem and tied to time symmetry, supports the idea that physical laws remain constant as time progresses. This framework aligns with forward causality—cause leads to effect. Retrocausality, as implied by perspective 2, would require evidence of effects influencing causes, something that has never been observed in nature and would fundamentally violate the framework established by conservation laws.

If you think perspective 2 is valid, the burden is on you to present evidence demonstrating retrocausality or a mechanism that could explain how it operates without violating established physics. Otherwise, we have no reason to take it seriously within the current scientific framework.

You are pushing your philosophical axiom, "forward causation", while rejecting the symmetrical axiom, "retrocausation", for no logical reason. But neither really make sense.

We can't prove that causality has a direction at all, because we are unable to leave the present. We always look at the result of an empirical experiment in the present, and then theorize a causal chain backwards in time and/or forwards in time. Perspective 2 is just as consistent with all known empirical evidence, as perspective 1 is. Bet you didn't know that about determinism.

Application approved!

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel, your "aboutness" theory...

Not "mine." I can't claim originality. It's part of the package of terms philosophers of mind routinely use to describe a particular kind of issue. https://philosophynow.org/issues/132/About_Aboutness

You claim that physical processes like synapses firing lack "aboutness" or meaning, but this completely ignores how cognition and memory actually work.

Well, no, it doesn't. I agree that they work. But your critique is actually fallaciously backward: it says, "Because cognition and memory work, therefore, they are determined by physical processes." Put that way, you can see the fallacy very obviously.

A physicalist theory of mind can't explain how they work. It can only account for physical phenomena, not for the "aboutness" of those phenomena.

Synaptic changes—like strengthening, weakening, or forming new connections—are precisely how learning, memory, and understanding occur.

Again, the same kind of fallacy: you're saying, "Because we see synaptic changes, therefore these synaptic changes cause "aboutness." No, it's quite plausible that aboutness is the thing that produces the physical changes, or that the physical changes and aboutness happen at the same time, or that a third thing -- like, say, consciousness -- precipitates both the aboutness and the synaptic accommodations.

Meaning isn’t some ethereal property floating outside the brain; it emerges from the structured, adaptive interactions of physical processes.

This is actually quite wrong. Physical processes themselved do not "mean" things. Rocks falling off cliffs are not "about" anything. Molecules bumping into each other do not have particular meanings, and do not conduce to any kind of aboutness. They are "about" nothing in particular.

If cognition and "aboutness" aren’t rooted in physical processes, how does your theory handle learning?

Oh, very easily, actually.

Learing is primarily a cognitive, not physical. It's a change of mind; and the contemporanous brain changes are merely facilitators to that activity, not the total explanation for that activity...and certainly physical changes offer us no explanation for what the learning is "about." We can't deduce from particular synaptic link that a particular person has just learned "about" Relativity Theory. All we can deduce is that he/she has learned something. But it might as easily be Quantum Theory, or lumberjacking or basket weaving. We have no idea from our analysis of the neurons what "aboutness" is being acquired by the learner. Only he/she can tell us that, and that requires a mind, a person, a meaningful linguistic act, and so on, which physical phenomena cannot afford su.

How do synaptic modifications encode memories or facilitate reasoning?

That's a question that the world's great neuroscientists would love you to answer.

Are you suggesting that this is somehow divorced from the physical structure of the brain?

Partially. What I'm pointing to is the fact that we find a physical event in the brain happens contemporaneously with a cognition, but that it offers us no ability to understand what that cognitive activity is "about."

The idea that synaptic firings “aren’t about anything” because they are physical is laughable.

Actually, it's painfully obvious and easy to test. Every neuroscientist knows it.

But you can test it yourself. If I tell you that a persons brain has just fired at neuron site X+2, can you tell me what she was thinking about?

No?

Well, then, you see my point.

Immanuel, your response ignores significant advancements in neuroscience that directly undermine your claims.

Actually, no.

Some neuroscientists have already demonstrated that they can "read" what someone is thinking by analyzing their brain activity.

Let's see your citations for that. I'm certain you're either misreading research, or not having any and just bluffing. But we can see which it is.

Meaning doesn’t arise from individual synapses firing in isolation but from the complex, organized structure of neural networks.

"Arises," you say? Or "emerges"? All these words you Physicalists use...never saying what exact process you're implying. You have not the foggiest idea HOW that could happen. So asserting it amounts to firing a blank.

The notion that "aboutness" is independent of physical processes

Not quite what I said. I said they're contemporaneous, not "independent," but go on...

...fails to explain how learning, memory, and reasoning emerge...

There it is again. "Emerge." But you can't explain what you mean by "emerge." So you're just speculating wildly, not explaining or accounting for the relation between brain and "aboutness" or meaning.

You say the physical changes "facilitate" but don’t "explain" cognition—yet neuroscience continues to show that these physical changes are the mechanism of cognition, not merely a coincidental accompaniment.

Again, I never said "coincidental accompaniment." But what I did point out is that saying a physiological event happened does not give you even the slightest means to say what the thought indicated thereby was "about," far less what it "meant."

I would say that the physical and mind phenomena are roughly (but far from precisely) coordinated. And, as I've pointed out before, people with different brain structure can often perform all the same cognitions as one with a regular brain structure -- so there's no way there's the sort of simplistic 1:1 ratio between brain structure and cognition that the Physicalists hope we will assume. But I do not deny that mental events are always accompanied in some way by brain events. Still, this gives us no way to know which is causing which, or how. And we certainly know it's not 1:1 simple.

Your analogy about neuron firing at site X+2 is outdated. We are increasingly able to interpret what specific neural activity represents,...

Oh, you can, can you?

Then what is the thought in my head if I have a firing of six particular neurons in the cerebral cortex? Can you tell?

If you cannot, then you're simply wrong about that, and empirically so.

[FlashDangerpants]

Flash, let’s start with a basic clarification of the scientific method, which you seem to misunderstand. Science never proves anything definitively—it never has. Instead, science operates by formulating hypotheses, testing them through observation and experimentation, and eliminating those that fail. What remains is the most robust explanation given the evidence at hand, subject to revision if future evidence demands it. Science disproves false statements; it does not deliver eternal truths.

If you have what it takes, you should present your case that your scientific vision is axiom-free in the philosophy of science sub and see what Will Bouwman has to say about it. I don't recommend trying to condescend as you have there though.

Just as methods of historical inquiry are suited to historical questions but not to metaphysical ones, the scientific method is suitable for answering scientific questions. Once you go beyond the sort of questions science is actually geared to answer, you have committed to that which is merely science inspired. You have not thought through whether you are trying to use physics to answer questions of metaphysics. So let's take a very brief look at that matter...

You have a habit of writing grand absolute statements such as from your OP "Science tells us that everything—from the formation of galaxies to the workings of our brains—is governed by immutable physical laws" but under questioning they all turn out to be just tacit contingencies, accepted for now because they don't conflict with available evidence. Perhaps you would benefit from only describing your positions in the terms you will actually defend them. Also, be honest with me now, if you saw evidence that the laws of physics were not immutable, you wouldn't consider mutability as an answer but would be looking for a new law of physics that would incorporate the unexplained data and retain the immutability axiom. That's just exactly how science does operate, and I am not at all saying it should not.

You insist that failure to draw the same conclusions that you do from the available evidence raises a question of "How do proponents of religion reconcile their belief in physically impossible concepts with the reality of a universe governed by deterministic laws". Yet the deterministic laws are of course not an actually tested hypothesis, nor can you describe a test for that, and as I have explained above, nor would such a test count for anything at all. It appears to be one of those self-evident truths necessary for the inquiries of science to make any sense at all. There's a word for those.

There is no actual requirement of cognitive dissonance for a person to agree with almost all you present but refuse to accept the metaphysical implications you insist upon. One need only understand that science doesn't answer non-scientific questions and then your argument largely evaporates.

Conservation laws, such as the conservation of energy, are not axioms—they are hypotheses derived from centuries of empirical testing, including through Noether's theorem. These laws have never been falsified despite being foundational to countless scientific disciplines. This isn’t dogma; it’s the result of a methodical process of testing and refinement.

Now, to your questions:

1. Is it self-evident that conservation laws will always apply?
No, it’s not self-evident—it’s a hypothesis continuously supported by evidence. That’s the difference between a scientific hypothesis and an axiom: hypotheses remain open to falsification, while axioms are taken as self-evident starting points.

2. How do conservation laws explain neuron firing?
Conservation laws don’t directly explain neuron firing—they underpin the physics and chemistry that govern these processes. Neurons operate through electrochemical reactions, which are themselves governed by the conservation of charge and energy. Conservation principles provide the foundational framework within which such phenomena occur.

3. How did I rule out future advancements?
I didn’t. Science expects advancements; that’s why all hypotheses remain open to falsification. However, it’s on you to present plausible mechanisms or evidence for such advancements, not on me to entertain baseless speculation. If you think conservation laws could fail or that "choosing" defies determinism, show your evidence. Otherwise, your argument is a non-starter.

Hopefully you are intelligent enough to now realise that I didn't need any of that stuff for very much. All that is required to invalidate your position is a healthy regard for difference between contingent and absolute knowledge claims, and your consent to recognise the difference. We then just move to put some of your absolute claims into the contingent column by making you fight about whether they are axiomatic and that's the end game.

Lastly, "philosophy forum" or not, serious discussion requires engaging substantively with the ideas presented. If your contribution is limited to misrepresenting the scientific method and throwing around baseless accusations, this conversation will quickly cease to be worth anyone’s time.

I am sure you will declare that this is all I have done. But it isn't.

[henry quirk]

If determinism is true, as the evidence overwhelmingly supports, blame itself is meaningless because actions are the result of preceding causes.

Exactly. As you say every atom, every synapse in your brain, every fleeting thought you believe you’ve “freely” chosen is simply the inevitable consequence of these laws in motion. So, what's all this falderal about reforming the justice system? Why lambast the religious?

As you say blame itself is meaningless because everything we think, say, do, feel, is all causally inevitable. None of it can have unfolded in any other way. So why argue for a reformation which, by your admission, is impossible? Why take folks to task who, by your own admission, cannot be other than what they are?

[henry quirk]

Deterministic systems don’t "figure out" how to defy predictions—they follow fixed rules.

Exactly. So what's all this falderal about education and learning? We are deterministic systems, yes? We can't, by your own admission, figure out anything.