BigMike wrote: ↑Sat Nov 23, 2024 11:53 pm
Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Sat Nov 23, 2024 11:42 pm
BigMike wrote: ↑Sat Nov 23, 2024 11:05 pm
Cognitions are
not immaterial; they are the result of physical processes in the brain—neural activity governed by the laws of physics.
It's actually you that's missing the point. That cognitions
issue in physical symptoms, you can prove; that the physical symtoms cause the cognitions, you cannot prove, and cannot even make plausible.
Immanuel, your assertion is absurd. Cognitions don’t “issue in” physical symptoms
You don't know that. Rather, you're assuming it. But what you've forgotten is that physical events don't *mean* anything, in the sense that they don't have propositional content, linguistic coherence, or a particular implication attached.
A rock falling off a cliff doesn't "mean" anything in particular. It does not invite us to any conclusion beyond itself: we can't derive from it that the gods are angry, or that luck is against us, or that to be or not to be is the question. An avalanche, an earthquake, or the rubbing together of atoms does not have
meaning. It's not a message. It's not a sign.
But cognitions are. They are always
about something. (Philosophers use the term "aboutness" to indicate this.) Cognitions always have meaning beyond the mere firing of synapses. One thinks
about Shakespeare, or
about suffering, or
about the price of eggs. Aboutness is an ineradicable feature of thinking...but physical events have no
aboutness. They just are themselves, and nothing further.
So when the synapses fire, we have no demonstration of what is causing what. Are the cognitions firing the synapses, or the synapses firing the cognitions, or some other thing firing both? We have absolutely no way to know. But we do know that that the synaptic firing, considered as a physical event, is not "about" anything. The consciousness associated with it has
aboutness.
Your argument has
aboutness. The accidental or random firing of synapses are mere physical events that signify nothing but the buzzing of meaningless electricity. But your argument depends utterly on its
meaning, its
aboutness.
So is your argument "about" Determinism? Or is it just the physical-causal firing of synapses, absent any "aboutness"? If it's the latter, as you insist, then it has no meaning. But if it has meaning, then it's not merely a physical event, a physical-causal firing of synapses: and maybe it is both a thing produced by a consciousness and directed to a counsciousness, and can be debated as to meaning.
Which is it? Your continuing to debate shows that you know which it is.