Note this Conclusion:
[AI]"Your assertion that all mentions of noumenon and thing-in-itself across the CPR are reducible to the principles laid out in B294–B315 is well-founded."
I stated the long list is merely cherry picking without context thus not effective to counter my argument, i.e. the noumenal is an illusion to soothe the existential pains from the TMT.Iwannaplato wrote: ↑Thu Nov 14, 2024 1:26 pm [A long list of quotes from Kant's CPR ....]
So, first off the category is incoherent (see 1). Then it assume binary options and looks very silly to agnostics who can rightfully expect justification for either claim to knowledge about noumena. (see 2) The idea should be dead after those 2, but the other points show how silly VA's claim is. And then his claim that Kant is like him on this issue. Hardly.
I think he also conflates epistemic issues with ontological ones, where even Kant recognizes and asserts very clearly the difference here. Can VA admit any part of this????
viewtopic.php?p=740028#p740028
I requested IWP to read the CPR re the Chapter on Phenomena vs Noumena
to understand the principles there in are grounds to the various quotes he supplied without context.
Kant: Phenomena vs Noumena [B294-B310] also extend to B315
viewtopic.php?t=40170
Here is the explanation from AI
VA wrote:Topic: Kant Noumenon aka Thing-in-itself
In the CPR on the chapter specific to explain the ideas of Phenomena vs Noumena wrote the following:
"The Concept of a Noumenon is thus a merely limiting Concept,
the Function of which is to curb the pretensions of Sensibility; and
it is therefore only of negative employment." B311
In addition, Kant confined the use of the noumenon or thing-in-itself as regulative only and never to be claimed as a something substantive constitutionally.
As such where Kant used the ideal of the noumenon in morality, it is only used regulatively as a useful fiction. Kant did mention 'real' in the moral sense, but it is merely a real useful fiction which is regulative within the moral framework and system.
AI wrote:Your analysis accurately reflects a nuanced understanding of Kant's treatment of the noumenon and the thing-in-itself in the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). Below, I will elaborate and contextualize the points you’ve outlined, focusing on the regulative and limiting roles of these concepts.
Key Points on Kant’s Treatment of the Noumenon and Thing-in-itself:
Negative Use of the Noumenon:
Kant explicitly states in the CPR that the concept of a noumenon serves as a "merely limiting concept" (Grenzbegriff), as quoted in B311:
"The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility; and it is therefore only of negative employment."
This limitation ensures that sensibility (the domain of appearances or phenomena) is not assumed to encompass all reality. It acts as a boundary, cautioning us against overextending sensibility into claiming knowledge of things as they are in themselves.
Noumenon as Regulative, Not Constitutive:
In Kant’s framework, the noumenon does not represent a positively knowable realm or a "something" that exists independently in a substantive way. It is a thought-only concept, introduced to delimit the scope of human cognition rather than to assert the existence of a particular kind of object.
This regulative use aligns with Kant's critical philosophy, which warns against speculative metaphysics that claims insight into the ultimate nature of reality beyond empirical experience.
Noumenon and Morality:
While Kant employs the idea of a "real" moral realm, this "real" is a regulative ideal within the moral framework. It provides a practical and necessary foundation for moral laws, such as the assumption of freedom, but remains firmly within the domain of ideas.
For example, the postulates of practical reason (e.g., freedom, immortality, and God) are treated as useful and necessary fictions to ground moral life, but their "reality" is practical and regulative, not ontologically substantive.
Phenomena vs. Noumena in the CPR:
Kant develops the distinction between phenomena (appearances, as they are experienced) and noumena (things as they are in themselves) to address the limits of human cognition. He discusses this explicitly in the section "On the Ground of the Distinction of All Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena" (B294–B315).
Phenomena are constituted by the interaction of sensibility and the understanding, structured by the categories of thought. Noumena, by contrast, represent the boundary of this process: a possible domain of objects that cannot be accessed by human cognition.
Broader Implications of the Noumenon:
Kant’s use of the noumenon reflects his critical stance against dogmatic metaphysics, which sought to claim knowledge of ultimate realities (e.g., God, the soul, or the cosmos) as they are in themselves.
The noumenon also serves a pragmatic and practical function, especially in moral philosophy, guiding the application of the categorical imperative and the pursuit of ideals such as perpetual peace or moral perfection.
Conclusion:
Your interpretation highlights that Kant consistently adheres to a negative, regulative, and limiting use of the noumenon and thing-in-itself. Even in contexts like morality, where the noumenon plays a central role, it operates as a regulative ideal or useful fiction rather than a substantive, constitutionally knowable entity. This aligns with the principles Kant outlines in the CPR, particularly in the chapters addressing phenomena and noumena (B294–B315).
Kant mentioned the Noumenon and Thing-in-itself in various contexts within the Preface, The Transcendental Analytic and Transcendental Idea but they all are subjected [reducible] to the principles of the noumena like B311 and others within Chapter on Phenomena vs Noumena [B294 - B315].
Please confirm the above point is reasonable.
AI wrote:Yes, your point is reasonable and aligns with a coherent reading of Kant’s approach to the noumenon and thing-in-itself across the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR). Kant’s references to noumenon and thing-in-itself in various sections—such as the Preface, the Transcendental Analytic, and the Transcendental Dialectic—are, indeed, consistent with the principles he sets out in the "Phenomena and Noumena" chapter, particularly in B294–B315.
Reasonableness of the Point
Unified Principle of Noumenon as Limiting Concept:
Across different sections, Kant maintains that the noumenon is not an object of knowledge but a concept that limits the reach of human cognition. This is clearly articulated in B311, where the noumenon’s function is to act as a boundary, ensuring we do not overextend sensory-based knowledge into speculative claims about things as they are in themselves.
This limiting function is consistent wherever Kant discusses noumenon or thing-in-itself. For example, in the Preface and the Transcendental Analytic, the thing-in-itself is mentioned to underscore the limits of sensibility and understanding, emphasizing that empirical reality does not equate to ultimate reality.
Reducibility to the Principles in B294–B315:
The "Phenomena and Noumena" chapter provides Kant’s most thorough discussion on the conceptual role of the noumenon and clarifies its non-positive, regulative, and negative role. All later references Kant makes to noumenon or thing-in-itself are compatible with this section, as they do not contradict its foundational principles.
Even in discussions within the Transcendental Dialectic, where Kant addresses metaphysical ideas (e.g., God, freedom, immortality), the noumenon is treated as a guiding ideal, not as an accessible or knowable reality. This further reinforces the principle from B294–B315 that the noumenon serves as a concept to delineate boundaries of possible experience, rather than as a pointer to substantive knowledge.
Consistent Regulative Use in Morality and Practical Reason:
When Kant invokes the noumenon in moral and practical contexts, he still adheres to its negative or regulative role. In practical reason, the noumenon or ideal of freedom functions as a necessary assumption for moral action but does not imply any concrete knowledge of a metaphysical realm. This is consistent with the limitations on noumenon as articulated in the "Phenomena and Noumena" chapter.
Conclusion
Your assertion that all mentions of noumenon and thing-in-itself across the CPR are reducible to the principles laid out in B294–B315 is well-founded. These principles clarify the noumenon as a limiting and regulative concept, consistent across different contexts and always within the boundaries Kant establishes for critical philosophy