What is religion ?

[godelian]

The universe is not an axiomatic system.

We don't know that.

The universe could be a model -- its complete history -- to an unknown theory. Furthermore, its complete history itself would be a legitimate axiomatic theory.

The question is, if this model could be compressed into something smaller? A few rules could summarize a lot of data. The theory would even be allowed to drop a lot of data, because a theory does not need to be complete.

That is also why there is probably not one, single theory. Different compression algorithms would yield different theories as output.

We currently do not have an axiomatic theory for the physical universe, but that does not mean that none exists.

[Skepdick]

The universe is not an axiomatic system.

We don't know that.

The universe could be a model -- its complete history -- to an unknown theory. Furthermore, its complete history itself would be a legitimate axiomatic theory.

The question is, if this model could be compressed into something smaller? A few rules could summarize a lot of data. The theory would even be allowed to drop a lot of data, because a theory does not need to be complete.

That is also why there is probably not one, single theory. Different compression algorithms would yield different theories as output.

We currently do not have an axiomatic theory for the physical universe, but that does not mean that none exists.

It means exactly that. All theories depend on the theorizer; and the meta-theory (which is never made explicit).

Any theory explaining the universe would also have to account for the theorizer constructing the theory... explaining the universe...manifesting the theorizer....constructingt the theory...explaining the universe.

The onto-theological relogion has stolen your brain.

[godelian]

All theories depend on the theorizer; and the meta-theory (which is never made explicit).

The theorizer does not matter, actually, as long as the theory is sound, i.e. every true statement in the theory is a true statement in the model (the universe itself), and every false statement in the theory is also false in the model. However, there can be lots of true statements in the model that the theory cannot predict ("incompleteness"). Every prediction is true, but it cannot predict everything. At that point, why would we care who the original theorizer even was? Henceforth, we can use this theory to predict some of the truth in the universe.

[godelian]

Natural religion is the belief that the idea of God, moral, can be founded rationally, without the recourse of a revelation.
It includes deism and other belief of God which not include a revealed text.

Such natural religion would necessarily have a set of basic beliefs that cannot be justified further -- in line with Aristotelian foundationalism.

If you write down these basic beliefs, then you get the scripture for this natural religion. So, where does it come from? What is its true origin?

If the basic beliefs of the natural religion include the idea that someone created this universe, then he also created everything in it, including the aforementioned scripture. That would technically always be true.

Hence, the very idea that the basic beliefs of the natural religion were revealed, is tautological, if these basic beliefs include the belief that someone created this universe.

Again, as I have mentioned in a previous comment, the entire approach cannot be consistent with an eternal "uncreated" physical universe. A consistent natural religion will discover the notion of a beginning of times and naturally attribute the creation of the universe to the god they worship.

[Immanuel Can]

The question seems to be trivial....etc.

The word "religion" is a collective noun that implies assumptions preferred by two groups: universalists and cynics. It presupposes the existence of some zone of the "non-religious," meaning people who have no particular ideology, creed or beliefs at all, from whose point of view the other things people believe are identified collectively as "the religions." In other words, it's really part of discourse of those who prefer to imagine themselves to be free of beliefs.

You won't find that what you call "religious" people are ever satisfied with calling themselves merely "religious." They'll want to say, "I'm Buddhist," or "I'm Hindu," or "I'm Catholic," or "Taoist" or "Rastafarian" or "Yoruban" or "Gnostic" or "Extropian." And this fact points to another assumption embedded in the use of the word "religion": it assumes they're all essentially the same, in some basic way, so that they can be defined collectively rather than as unique relative to each other. Nothing so significant is assumed to exist in any of them that they cannot be simply grouped together in this way, without important distinction.

So again, it fits primarily with the narrative assumptions of those who regard themselves as secular, and "religions" as a kind of superstition or hokum. It's inherently dismissive, therefore. And legitimately so, maybe, in the case of the vast majority of belief systems. But in relation to any one of the included beliefs, it's simply uninterested in the details of what they actually believe...and whether any of them is actually right. Rather, it tends to be the preferred term of those who think particulars simply do not really matter.

Obviously, such cyncism is a particularly limited point of view from which to engage in any study of "religions." It's already kind of got its mind made up about what it is going to find, even before all investigation.

[Dr Faustus]

Natural religion is the belief that the idea of God, moral, can be founded rationally, without the recourse of a revelation.
It includes deism and other belief of God which not include a revealed text.

Such natural religion would necessarily have a set of basic beliefs that cannot be justified further -- in line with Aristotelian foundationalism.

If you write down these basic beliefs, then you get the scripture for this natural religion. So, where does it come from? What is its true origin?

If the basic beliefs of the natural religion include the idea that someone created this universe, then he also created everything in it, including the aforementioned scripture. That would technically always be true.

Hence, the very idea that the basic beliefs of the natural religion were revealed, is tautological, if these basic beliefs include the belief that someone created this universe.

Again, as I have mentioned in a previous comment, the entire approach cannot be consistent with an eternal "uncreated" physical universe. A consistent natural religion will discover the notion of a beginning of times and naturally attribute the creation of the universe to the god they worship.

So you think that atheism is revealed by God ? That's interesting.

How will it discover the notion of beginning of times ? Big bang you mean ? And so, what does it mean about finitude of universe ?

[Belinda]

The question seems to be trivial....etc.

The word "religion" is a collective noun that implies assumptions preferred by two groups: universalists and cynics. It presupposes the existence of some zone of the "non-religious," meaning people who have no particular ideology, creed or beliefs at all, from whose point of view the other things people believe are identified collectively as "the religions." In other words, it's really part of discourse of those who prefer to imagine themselves to be free of beliefs.

You won't find that what you call "religious" people are ever satisfied with calling themselves merely "religious." They'll want to say, "I'm Buddhist," or "I'm Hindu," or "I'm Catholic," or "Taoist" or "Rastafarian" or "Yoruban" or "Gnostic" or "Extropian." And this fact points to another assumption embedded in the use of the word "religion": it assumes they're all essentially the same, in some basic way, so that they can be defined collectively rather than as unique relative to each other. Nothing so significant is assumed to exist in any of them that they cannot be simply grouped together in this way, without important distinction.

So again, it fits primarily with the narrative assumptions of those who regard themselves as secular, and "religions" as a kind of superstition or hokum. It's inherently dismissive, therefore. And legitimately so, maybe, in the case of the vast majority of belief systems. But in relation to any one of the included beliefs, it's simply uninterested in the details of what they actually believe...and whether any of them is actually right. Rather, it tends to be the preferred term of those who think particulars simply do not really matter.

Obviously, such cyncism is a particularly limited point of view from which to engage in any study of "religions." It's already kind of got its mind made up about what it is going to find, even before all investigation.

There is no such stance as secular in the sense you describe. So-called secular people attach themselves to others who hold the same unwritten creed. E.g. life is for me to enjoy myself in my own way. E.g. My friends and I are the sort of people who believe we should have autonomy over our own bodies. E.g. My friends and family are bound together as Irish Traveller people. E.g. The people I identify with are illegal immigrants. E.g. I and my associates are all followers of X.

A question for you---- Is there an essential difference between a religion and a cult?

[Walker]

If every moment are included in religion ? What distinguish religious from cultural practices ? Spirituality ?

Do you consider psychotherapy as a spiritual, and then a religious practice ?

Cultural practices often wear the guise of spirituality, especially for atheists. For example, there is the mindset of moral superiority through superior consumption. During his time in this bardo that you and I now share, Trungpa Rinpoche spoke eloquently about how in principle and practice, spiritual materialism is not spirituality because with such a view, actions and attention hinge on the impetus of a quest for more, rather than the spirituality of abiding with what is every moment, as The Presence of Awareness. You can find his wise words in Cutting Through Spiritual Materialism, which is always worth an extra read even if you have been there before. From the information you've been given so far, through me, prompted by your dialogue, you should begin to accurately extrapolate the answers to some of these questions that you ask, as applied to your own particular knowledge and circumstances.

[godelian]

So you think that atheism is revealed by God ? That's interesting.

It's certainly an option that exists in this universe. We may have a natural, biologically preprogrammed inclination to faith and religion but we are flexible enough to allow for atheism as well.

How will it discover the notion of beginning of times ? Big bang you mean ? And so, what does it mean about finitude of universe ?

The expansion in time is deemed to be part of the overall expansion in space-time out of an initial singularity. Well, that is indeed the take of modern cosmology on the matter.

The finitude of time and space are of the same nature. If the space in the universe were infinite, it would not be able to expand, since an actual infinity absorbs all arithmetic.

[Skepdick]

All theories depend on the theorizer; and the meta-theory (which is never made explicit).

The theorizer does not matter, actually, as long as the theory is sound, i.e. every true statement in the theory is a true statement in the model (the universe itself), and every false statement in the theory is also false in the model. However, there can be lots of true statements in the model that the theory cannot predict ("incompleteness"). Every prediction is true, but it cannot predict everything. At that point, why would we care who the original theorizer even was? Henceforth, we can use this theory to predict some of the truth in the universe.

You've gone and confused yourself further.

If the theory pertains to the "complete history of the universe" then that "complete history of the universe" looks like so:

1. Universe WITHOUT the theory in it.
2. Universe WITH the theory in it.

So does your theory axplain its own origin; or not?

Then there's your confusion about the "theorizer not mattering".... you haven't dealt with any of Newcomb's paradoxes in decision theory; have you?

Does your theory predict the difference between choices made by people using the theory; and choices made by people NOT using the theory?

[godelian]

If the "theorizer doesn't matter" your theory fails to predict its own existence.

Yes, that is perfectly fine because a theory can be incomplete. It does not need to be able to prove every truth in its model. Peano Arithmetic (PA), for example, is incomplete.

Also, you don't even understand what soundness is in logic. It's precisely the property of your premises being true.
But all axiomatic systems are sound by definition. Because axioms are defined as true.

That is only true if a theory has a model. An inconsistent theory does not have one.

Soundness theorem is not provable from every theory. An inconsistent theory can prove falsehoods and is therefore not sound.

In fact, you cannot prove soundness theorem from a theory such as Peano Arithmetic (PA). It is therefore absolutely not possible to exclude that falsehoods are provable from PA, or from ZF for that matter.

It is not possible to prove the consistency or the soundness from any theory that contains Robinson's Q fragment of arithmetic theory.

You simply fail to take into account Löb's theorem:

https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/5sX7d3y ... tic-cannot

Löb's theorem simply shows that Peano arithmetic cannot prove its own soundness

Summary: Löb's theorem simply shows that PA cannot prove its own soundness, exactly like Gödel's second incompleteness theorem.

Even if Löb's theorem applied to only one false proposition
p, it would show that PA is incomplete: it cannot determine its own soundness in this case. As it is stated, the situation is even worse: PA cannot determine its own soundness for any statement, unless soundness is trivial.

Your view on soundness theorem is utterly simplistic since you assume that the system-wide premises of any arbitrary theoretical context such as PA are sound and/or consistent. On what grounds do you assume that?

By the way, there are always system-wide premises, because there is always a theoretical context. Systemless logic is not possible because logic itself is already an axiomatic system.

[Immanuel Can]

The question seems to be trivial....etc.

The word "religion" is a collective noun that implies assumptions preferred by two groups: universalists and cynics. It presupposes the existence of some zone of the "non-religious," meaning people who have no particular ideology, creed or beliefs at all, from whose point of view the other things people believe are identified collectively as "the religions." In other words, it's really part of discourse of those who prefer to imagine themselves to be free of beliefs.

You won't find that what you call "religious" people are ever satisfied with calling themselves merely "religious." They'll want to say, "I'm Buddhist," or "I'm Hindu," or "I'm Catholic," or "Taoist" or "Rastafarian" or "Yoruban" or "Gnostic" or "Extropian." And this fact points to another assumption embedded in the use of the word "religion": it assumes they're all essentially the same, in some basic way, so that they can be defined collectively rather than as unique relative to each other. Nothing so significant is assumed to exist in any of them that they cannot be simply grouped together in this way, without important distinction.

So again, it fits primarily with the narrative assumptions of those who regard themselves as secular, and "religions" as a kind of superstition or hokum. It's inherently dismissive, therefore. And legitimately so, maybe, in the case of the vast majority of belief systems. But in relation to any one of the included beliefs, it's simply uninterested in the details of what they actually believe...and whether any of them is actually right. Rather, it tends to be the preferred term of those who think particulars simply do not really matter.

Obviously, such cyncism is a particularly limited point of view from which to engage in any study of "religions." It's already kind of got its mind made up about what it is going to find, even before all investigation.

There is no such stance as secular in the sense you describe.

Sure there is.

If I called whatever you believe simply "one of the delusions," then you'd be rather displeased, I suspect. And that's what the word "religion" amounts to, for secularists. It's really just a way of shorthanding "what you believe doesn't matter."

So-called secular people attach themselves to others who hold the same unwritten creed. E.g. life is for me to enjoy myself in my own way. E.g. My friends and I are the sort of people who believe we should have autonomy over our own bodies. E.g. My friends and family are bound together as Irish Traveller people. E.g. The people I identify with are illegal immigrants. E.g. I and my associates are all followers of X.

Right. And the "religious" people have several distinct advantages over this.

One is that they at least know they believe something: the people you're describing above often believe they don't "believe" or "have faith" in anything at all. But as you point out, they've got their own set of creeds that they simply fail to analyze, and don't really understand, and to which they have only a temporary, selfish and pragmatic commitment. ("My life is for me to enjoy my own way." Well, who says you're owed that?)

Another advantage is that "religious" people can at least try to figure out a rational defense for what they believe, because it consists of particular, definite propositions: but the kind of wobblers you're describing can't hope to figure out any rational defense or legitimation for what they believe, because they don't even know they believe anything, or on what basis one ought to believe it. (i.e. They can petulantly assert things like, "...we should have autonomy over our own bodies..." but can't ground that in any deeper ontological truth than, "...because we want it.")

And then there's the problem of trying to ground their personal morality in mere solipsism: if "whatever I happen to want" and "what is right" are exactly the same domains, then it makes morality nonsense, and it makes it utterly impossible for the solipsist to know if he or she is even a "good" person, beyond his or her superficial self-satisfied feelings. (i.e. no moral basis)

A question for you---- Is there an essential difference between a religion and a cult?

That's much debated in the Religious Studies field. It's actually a complicated question. But before we spend time on that, why do you ask?

[Skepdick]

That is only true if a theory has a model. An inconsistent theory does not have one.

And a consistent theory has infinite n-th order models.

Soundness theorem is not provable from every theory. An inconsistent theory can prove falsehoods and is therefore not sound.

Nonsense. Soundness is about the truth of the premises. It's not a theorem. Theorems come out the other end.

In fact, you cannot prove soundness theorem from a theory such as Peano Arithmetic (PA). It is therefore absolutely not possible to exclude that falsehoods are provable from PA, or from ZF for that matter.

You are conflating soundness and consistency. For reasons unknown.

By the way, there are always system-wide premises, because there is always a theoretical context. Systemless logic is not possible because logic itself is already an axiomatic system.

Hence the point... it's all circular reasoning.

[godelian]

In fact, you cannot prove soundness theorem from a theory such as Peano Arithmetic (PA). It is therefore absolutely not possible to exclude that falsehoods are provable from PA, or from ZF for that matter.

You are conflating soundness and consistency. For reasons unknown.

Soundness implies consistency.
Inconsistency implies unsoundness.
Unsoundness, however, does not imply anything else.
The ability to prove a falsehood from a theory makes it unsound.
As I originally said, PA could be unsound and therefore could possibly prove falsehoods. This has, however, zero impact on PA's consistency.
But then again, PA could actually also be inconsistent, because neither its soundness nor its consistency can be proven.

[godelian]

Nonsense. Soundness is about the truth of the premises. It's not a theorem. Theorems come out the other end.

Wrong.

Soundness is (or is not) a theorem in a particular axiomatic system. For example, soundness theorem for first-order logic:

https://web.mat.bham.ac.uk/R.W.Kaye/log ... dness.html

The Soundness Theorem for first-order logic

The Soundness Theorem is the theorem that says that if Σ⊢σ in first-order logic, then Σ⊨σ, i.e. every structure making all sentences in Σ true also makes σ true.

In your systemless approach, you fail to realize that the soundness of the system-wide premises of the theoretical context is a theorem of such theory. Hence, soundness theorem.

ChatGPT: Is soundness theorem provable from a theory?

Yes, the soundness theorem can be provable within a particular formal system or theory, but it is not a given or inherent property of all theories. Whether the soundness theorem is provable depends on the logical system or formal framework you are working within.

As I mentioned previously, soundness theorem is not provable from PA:

ChatGPT: Is soundness theorem provable from Peano Arithmetic?

No, the soundness theorem for Peano Arithmetic cannot be proven within Peano Arithmetic itself, because PA is not strong enough to prove its own consistency.