The Future of Government

[mickthinks]

... governance is about crafting environments...

I don't understand what "crafting" can mean if there is no free will. To craft requires both skill and will, I think.

[FlashDangerpants]

It seems like a misunderstanding of the entire free will debate to try and make the thing relevant to other topics such as ethics and politics. A descriptive theory that is there to explain how we come to experience the world as it appears to us should probably not be used prescriptively to re-evaluate how we ought to to see the world.

[BigMike]

... governance is about crafting environments...

I don't understand what "crafting" can mean if there is no free will. To craft requires both skill and will, I think.

Ah, great point! It seems counterintuitive at first, but "crafting" here isn’t about individual will so much as understanding and applying cause-effect relationships that lead to desired outcomes. Think of it like designing a river’s path: while no one controls the water itself, we can shape its course using predictable forces.

In a deterministic system, “skill” is really about understanding the patterns in human behavior—social, economic, psychological—and arranging conditions that reliably encourage positive results. Crafting environments, then, is less about individual choice and more about building structures that align with the forces shaping human actions. It’s about skillful use of knowledge, not the exercise of will.

[BigMike]

It seems like a misunderstanding of the entire free will debate to try and make the thing relevant to other topics such as ethics and politics. A descriptive theory that is there to explain how we come to experience the world as it appears to us should probably not be used prescriptively to re-evaluate how we ought to to see the world.

Alright, let’s consider that for a second. The debate about free will might seem like it belongs exclusively in the realm of philosophy or personal introspection. But here’s the twist: if our behaviors are indeed shaped by deterministic processes—biological, environmental, societal—then we can’t ignore how that impacts our systems of ethics and governance. It’s not just a curiosity; it’s foundational.

Think of it this way: traditional governance systems assume people are making free, independent choices, and that assumption shapes everything from our legal system to economic policies. But if the reality is that our choices are heavily influenced by factors beyond individual control, then wouldn’t we be wise to reconsider the systems built on that outdated premise? This isn’t about prescribing a rigid new morality; it’s about ensuring our structures reflect the way we actually function.

[mickthinks]

... governance is about crafting environments...

I don't understand what "crafting" can mean if there is no free will. To craft requires both skill and will, I think.

Ah, great point! It seems counterintuitive at first, but "crafting" here isn’t about individual will so much as understanding and applying cause-effect relationships that lead to desired outcomes. Think of it like designing a river’s path: while no one controls the water itself, we can shape its course using predictable forces.

In a deterministic system, “skill” is really about understanding the patterns in human behavior—social, economic, psychological—and arranging conditions that reliably encourage positive results. Crafting environments, then, is less about individual choice and more about building structures that align with the forces shaping human actions. It’s about skillful use of knowledge, not the exercise of will.

By replacing “crafting” with “shaping” “building” and “arranging”, you are missing the point here. They are all just different words for agency, and agency entails free will.

[FlashDangerpants]

It seems like a misunderstanding of the entire free will debate to try and make the thing relevant to other topics such as ethics and politics. A descriptive theory that is there to explain how we come to experience the world as it appears to us should probably not be used prescriptively to re-evaluate how we ought to to see the world.

Alright, let’s consider that for a second. The debate about free will might seem like it belongs exclusively in the realm of philosophy or personal introspection. But here’s the twist: if our behaviors are indeed shaped by deterministic processes—biological, environmental, societal—then we can’t ignore how that impacts our systems of ethics and governance. It’s not just a curiosity; it’s foundational.

I think you are carelessly crossing the boundary between a descriptive account and a prescriptive one without adequate consideration. A quick aside: a descriptive account of a phenomenon recognises its own limits, it tells us what we see when we look at something and attempts nothing beyond that. A prescriptive accounting goes beyond that and tells us what to do.

Taken descriptively, the difference between free will and determinism is not important at all, it cannot make any difference to the world as it is because we only live in one world. Imagine there are billions of parallel worlds in other sci-fi dimensions that are impossible for us to reach or interact with. All of them start with the same big bang as this world you are in now. Strong determinism tells you that all those worlds are exactly the same as each other down to the very finest detail. Free will says they would over time become massively different to each other.

Now blink and those billions of other worlds are gone, never in fact there. The available reality of what you and the free will crowd are arguing about went away with them, because those imaginary worlds are what you are really arguing about. A moot question of whether this world might have been different to the way it is. A question in other words of nothing more than how to describe this world we live, in with differing degrees of contingency.

This is as far as you can go with a descriptive accounting of the matter. You think we are destined to experience the illusion of choice. Henry thinks that one of the ways to misuse your free will is to waste your day imagining you can be without it and have no responisbilities any more. Dennet and his compatibilist buddies argue that the positions are less contradictory than they appear when described without care, and Wittgenstein says the entire question is impossible to ask without making a mistake that renders the question unanswerable.

Think of it this way: traditional governance systems assume people are making free, independent choices, and that assumption shapes everything from our legal system to economic policies. But if the reality is that our choices are heavily influenced by factors beyond individual control, then wouldn’t we be wise to reconsider the systems built on that outdated premise? This isn’t about prescribing a rigid new morality; it’s about ensuring our structures reflect the way we actually function.

Once you adopt the crusading prescriptive approach you can't really stop halfway like that. "heavily influenced by factors beyond individual control" is a bit of a cop out really. And why are we resorting to language of making choices by way of prudential persuasion? You are looking to operate people like puppets here, so be bold and say so.

[BigMike]

By replacing “crafting” with “shaping” “building” and “arranging”, you are missing the point here. They are all just different words for agency, and agency entails free will.

Alright, let’s dive deeper. Agency, as we traditionally think of it, does imply a kind of autonomy. But under determinism, “agency” shifts from being about unconstrained free will to being the complex result of various forces and influences—biological, environmental, social—acting on an individual. The word choices here, like "shaping" and "building," don’t actually imply freedom from causality; they describe a process that’s more like engineering outcomes based on consistent rules than exerting autonomous control.

Imagine how an engineer uses known principles to construct a bridge—it’s not that the materials “choose” to behave in a certain way. Instead, their properties and responses are predictable and governable within certain parameters. In the same way, under a deterministic model, “agency” is about creating structures or environments where predictable patterns of human behavior emerge, not about individual freedom in the traditional sense. So, agency here is less about willful freedom and more about the predictability of reactions within a specific design.

[mickthinks]

Imagine how an engineer uses known principles to construct a bridge—it’s not that the materials “choose” to behave in a certain way

The materials don’t choose but the engineer does. If I understand your analogy, we citizens are represented by the materials. Who then is represented by the engineer? Is that … God?

[godelian]

It seems you edited out the part of my response that tackles what I see as the strongest scientific challenge to free will: the conservation laws. That’s the crux of my argument here.

Libet’s work, as you correctly note, doesn’t claim to *disprove* free will.

Libet's work is backed by experimental research. You have, however, not provided an experimental test report for "challenge to free will: the conservation laws". Can you provide a reference to such publication?

Alright, let’s focus on the fundamentals of the scientific method here.

Science isn’t actually in the business of proving concepts outright; it’s more about trying to *disprove* or challenge them. Theories stand as long as they withstand attempts to knock them down.

The challenge must still be produced under the form of an experimental test report. If we cannot test anything, then there is no a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, concerning your "challenge to free will: the conservation laws", you still need to come up with something that can be tested.

[BigMike]

Imagine how an engineer uses known principles to construct a bridge—it’s not that the materials “choose” to behave in a certain way

The materials don’t choose but the engineer does. If I understand your analogy, we citizens are represented by the materials. Who then is represented by the engineer? Is that … God?

In this analogy, we aren’t talking about an engineer with ultimate authority or, say, a "godlike" overseer. Instead, the "engineering" in governance refers to applying knowledge about human behavior and social structures to shape policies and institutions that encourage constructive outcomes—without relying on free will as a driving force.

Imagine it more like a collaborative, data-driven approach to governance. Society acts as the “engineer,” if you will, by developing systems based on empirical evidence and a deep understanding of cause-effect relationships. There’s no singular, godlike “decider” here, but rather a collective process that uses science, psychology, and data to craft conditions that reliably lead to good outcomes. It’s less about a single agent imposing will and more about harnessing predictable dynamics to build a more stable, equitable society.

[BigMike]

Libet's work is backed by experimental research. You have, however, not provided an experimental test report for "challenge to free will: the conservation laws". Can you provide a reference to such publication?

Alright, let’s focus on the fundamentals of the scientific method here.

Science isn’t actually in the business of proving concepts outright; it’s more about trying to *disprove* or challenge them. Theories stand as long as they withstand attempts to knock them down.

The challenge must still be produced under the form of an experimental test report. If we cannot test anything, then there is no a scientific hypothesis. Therefore, concerning your "challenge to free will: the conservation laws", you still need to come up with something that can be tested.

Alright, let’s talk about what "testable" really means here, especially when it comes to fundamental principles like conservation laws.

The thing is, conservation laws aren’t hypothetical concepts waiting for experimental validation—they’re already tested continuously across countless experiments in physics, from particle collisions in accelerators to chemical reactions and gravitational studies. Every time energy and momentum behave as conserved quantities, they confirm these principles. In fact, every scientific experiment involving energy or momentum is, in essence, an ongoing "test" of conservation laws. They hold up every single time, forming the bedrock of modern physics.

Now, let’s apply this to free will. For free will to be scientifically plausible as an “independent force,” it would need to present an observable instance where energy or momentum is generated without a prior cause, thus violating these conservation principles. Such a violation would have to show energy appearing out of nowhere to affect brain activity—something that would directly counter the conservation laws that Noether’s theorem ties to time symmetry.

So, while there isn’t a specific “experimental test report” challenging free will against conservation laws, conservation is inherently part of every testable, validated framework in physics. The absence of any observed violation reinforces that physical processes—including those in the brain—don’t accommodate uncaused, independent inputs.

[godelian]

Now, let’s apply this to free will. For free will to be scientifically plausible as an “independent force,” it would need to present an observable instance where energy or momentum is generated without a prior cause, thus violating these conservation principles. Such a violation would have to show energy appearing out of nowhere to affect brain activity—something that would directly counter the conservation laws that Noether’s theorem ties to time symmetry.

You still did not describe a test that anybody could carry out to test your hypothesis.

So, while there isn’t a specific “experimental test report” challenging free will against conservation laws, conservation is inherently part of every testable, validated framework in physics.

If nothing can be tested, then there is no scientific hypothesis.

[BigMike]

Now, let’s apply this to free will. For free will to be scientifically plausible as an “independent force,” it would need to present an observable instance where energy or momentum is generated without a prior cause, thus violating these conservation principles. Such a violation would have to show energy appearing out of nowhere to affect brain activity—something that would directly counter the conservation laws that Noether’s theorem ties to time symmetry.

You still did not describe a test that anybody could carry out to test your hypothesis.

So, while there isn’t a specific “experimental test report” challenging free will against conservation laws, conservation is inherently part of every testable, validated framework in physics.

If nothing can be tested, then there is no scientific hypothesis.

Alright, let's get to the heart of the physics here. The argument rests on this: "Free will is an illusion because it is incompatible with the conservation laws of physics."

Now, if you'd like to counter that, your task is to show either (1) that free will doesn’t actually conflict with conservation laws, or (2) that the conservation laws themselves are somehow not universally applicable—or you might present another framework altogether that reconciles the two. If you can’t, then my challenge remains on the table.

[godelian]

Alright, let's get to the heart of the physics here. The argument rests on this: "Free will is an illusion because it is incompatible with the conservation laws of physics."

Now, if you'd like to counter that, your task is to show either (1) that free will doesn’t actually conflict with conservation laws, or (2) that the conservation laws themselves are somehow not universally applicable—or you might present another framework altogether that reconciles the two. If you can’t, then my challenge remains on the table.

I don't see what measurable inputs are supposed to lead to what measurable outputs in your experiment. What exactly are you measuring in your test?

Up till now, you have not demonstrated that your hypothesis can actually be tested.

[henry quirk]

what if a deterministic framework doesn’t strip us of responsibility and accountability but actually grounds it in something more stable than subjective, free-floating “choices”?

First, our choices, as individual free wills, aren't free-floating.

Second, it's pretty clear adhering to a deterministic framework does strip away responsibility and accountability. It's the modern equivalent of the Devil made me do it!

if we know that people’s actions are shaped by their environments, biology, upbringing

I don't think we know this. Moreover, I don't think we are shaped or directed or determined by environment, genes, or upbringing. Influenced by, yes; informed by, yes. Constrained by, no.

It’s not about seeing people as “meat machines,”

Adopting a deterministic (and therefore a strictly materialistic) model of man can only end with man (seen, treated) as a meat machine.