Giving Up Philosophical Realism, What is there to Lose?

[Veritas Aequitas]

What has you got to lose if you were to give up the ideology of philosophical realism? i.e. giving up the belief of an absolutely human independent reality and accept a relative human independent reality?
Nothing!!
except for the cognitive dissonance rearing its ugly head which is very psychologically painful.

Here is the discussion related to the OP

Philosophical realism – .. is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

For those who do not like the term 'mind' use 'human.'

There is a nuanced point, i.e. between
philosophical realism - cling to an absolutely transcendental mind-independent reality and
philosophical empirical realism - based on a relatively empirical mind-independent reality.
The terms 'absolutely' vs. 'relatively' is critical.

How do you prove [demonstrate, justify] there is a reality that is absolutely independent from humans? i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Consider the following argument.
Premise: We can't prove the existence of a reality absolutely independent from humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, reality is not absolutely independent from humans.
Do you think the premise entails the conclusion? Or, to put it another way, do you think it possible that, even if we can't prove the existence of a reality absolutely independent from humans, it may exist anyway?

It is obvious the statements above are valid and practical.

It is an evolutionary default [of Primal Reason] that the majority [philosophical realists and theists] will jump to the conclusion such an absolutely independent reality exists, especially an independent God.
It is the same with the secular [as driven by evolution] to spontaneously jumped the conclusion there has to be something real out there, else they will suffer from cognitive dissonances.

The evolutionary default was adapted from this one example among others;
When our original ancestors went out to hunt and they heard a cracking sound [broken dry twig] somewhere from the bushes, they had jumped to the conclusion there was a sable-toothed tiger on the prowl.
This jumping to conclusion in the absence of evidence but merely based on blind belief there is certainly a tiger there had saved lives and was adapted within our ancestors and is still embedded in the present human DNA.
In fact, all those humans whose tribal members did not speculate on the belief of 'the certainty of a sable toothed tiger even without evidence' would have likely been killed eventually.
If our ancestors had not run away from merely belief without direct evidence, the human species could have gone the way of the Dodo.

Thus your "it may exist anyway" is merely a trigger of the above evolutionary primal instinct which was more suitable for the primal period than our modern times.

When we are in the know, we should face the cognitive dissonances, rationalize it and suspend judgement.

"In ancient philosophy, skepticism was understood as a way of life associated with inner peace." WIKI

As I had explained, those philosophical realists who do not suspend judgment has brought forth much philosophical issues, failures and problems that hinder the humanity's progress.
The Failures of Philosophical Realism
viewtopic.php?t=43061

Therefore, it is optimal to suspend judgment and limit reality to what is empirically possible, verifiable and justifiable, i.e. a FSERC based reality.

What has you got to lose if you were to give up the ideology of philosophical realism? i.e. giving up the belief of an absolutely human independent reality and stay with a relatively human independent reality?
Nothing!!
except for the cognitive dissonance rearing its ugly head is is very psychologically painful.

which Kant highlighted your "it may exist anyway" [noumenal] is an illusion where the cognitive dissonances mocks and torments him:

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. CPR B397

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

Here is chat with AI:

[WIKI] "Philosophical realism – usually not treated as a position of its own but as a stance towards other subject matters – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder."

Kant argued a reality [noumena or thing-in-itself] that is absolutely mind independent is illusory and so it is false.
Philosophical Realism claims the what is most real is the noumena or thing-in-itself.
Kant demonstrated the noumena or thing-in-itself is illusory and false.
As such even if philosophical realists give up the belief of philosophical realism, there is nothing real that is lost. What they are giving up is merely a belief in an illusion, a misguided speculation.

ChatGpt Responded:

You're accurately identifying Kant's critique of philosophical realism’s commitment to an absolutely mind-independent reality. Kant argued that the notion of the noumenon (thing-in-itself), understood as a reality completely separate from and unaffected by human perception or cognition, is ultimately an illusion or, at best, a regulative concept—useful for guiding inquiry but not something we can meaningfully claim to know or exist independently in the way philosophical realists suggest.

For Kant, the problem with philosophical realism lies in its presumption that we can access or assert the existence of a "true" reality (the noumenon) entirely independent of any cognitive structuring by the human mind. This assumption is illusory because, in Kant’s framework, everything we know and experience is conditioned by the structures of human perception and understanding—such as space, time, and the categories of the mind. As a result, the thing-in-itself remains unknowable and, in a sense, "false" or speculative when it is posited as a substantial reality that stands apart from our cognition.

In Kantian terms, if philosophical realists were to give up the belief in a mind-independent noumenon, they wouldn’t lose anything that could be considered objectively real within the bounds of human knowledge.
What would be relinquished is the commitment to an unconditioned, inaccessible "reality" beyond experience—an idea Kant would argue is an ungrounded speculation rather than an actionable truth. In other words, relinquishing belief in such a noumenon only gives up an illusory concept, not something substantively real within our empirical or conceptual framework. This underscores Kant’s view that any claim to knowledge must remain within the limits of possible experience, making transcendental realism untenable while upholding the practical coherence of empirical realism within his idealist framework.

However, if philosophical realists were give up philosophical realism [real noumena], it is not totally a lost cause if they accept the noumena and thing-in-itself as a useful illusion to be used regulatively only. In this case, they will have to accept Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.

ChatGpt Response:

Precisely. If philosophical realists were to reframe their view of the noumenon or thing-in-itself as a regulative ideal rather than a substantive reality, they could align more closely with Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism. In this reframing, the noumenon would no longer represent a separate, fully independent reality “out there,” but would instead serve as a guiding concept, a useful illusion that helps structure our pursuit of knowledge and moral progress without claiming an actual mind-independent existence.

By adopting this approach, philosophical realists would essentially be shifting from a metaphysical realism to Kant’s empirical realism. They would retain the commitment to an empirical world that is real and knowable within the limits of human cognition while discarding the insistence on an inaccessible, independent reality beyond these limits. This would resolve many of the philosophical issues Kant identified with transcendental realism, including the paradox of claiming knowledge about something fundamentally beyond knowledge.

Under this Kantian framework, the noumenon or thing-in-itself serves as a conceptual boundary, reminding us of the limits of knowledge rather than asserting a distinct realm that exists absolutely independently. It becomes a regulative concept—something we can use to guide and refine inquiry, morality, and the pursuit of ideals, rather than an object of knowledge itself.

In accepting this framework, philosophical realists would preserve the practical and empirical benefits of realism, while also avoiding the problematic implications of asserting knowledge about an unknowable, mind-independent reality. This shift would be more consistent with Kant’s synthesis, where empirical realism affirms the objective validity of our experiences within the framework of human cognition, and transcendental idealism places necessary limits on our claims about reality itself.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Atla]

which Kant highlighted your "it may exist anyway" [noumenal] is an illusion where the cognitive dissonances mocks and torments him:

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. CPR B397

In the sense that we can't prove "absolute" mind-independence, we equally can't prove "relative" mind-independence either.

Kant pretended to be one of the wisest of men, but here he was just an illogical twat who couldn't even understand the above simple truth. "Absolute" mind-independence mocked and tormented him, "relative" mind-independence he embraced wholeheartedly.

[Iwannaplato]

The evolutionary default was adapted from this one example among others;
When our original ancestors went out to hunt and they heard a cracking sound [broken dry twig] somewhere from the bushes, they had jumped to the conclusion there was a sable-toothed tiger on the prowl.
This jumping to conclusion in the absence of evidence but merely based on blind belief there is certainly a tiger there had saved lives and was adapted within our ancestors and is still embedded in the present human DNA.
In fact, all those humans whose tribal members did not speculate on the belief of 'the certainty of a sable toothed tiger even without evidence' would have likely been killed eventually.
If our ancestors had not run away from merely belief without direct evidence, the human species could have gone the way of the Dodo.

This is confused in a number of ways:
1) instincts handle threats like this fine; no beliefs are necessary. This can be seen in animals.
2) humans (and predators) are often hunting, so the mere presence of an animal that breaks a twig could be positive or negative (or neutral). So, often a human or animal would want more information before making a decision. In VA's example it is specifically in a hunting situation. It would be absurd for humans to run away at the sound of any broken twig.
3) in other VA arguments the presence of the belief in morals as default in humans is considered evidence it is objective. Here it is evidence it is wrong. It's an evolutionary default, so it's wrong.
4) Animals do not have any belief in a mind independent world, and yet they manage to avoid predators.
5) One bizarre thing about this scenario is that VA interprets it as necessary to belief that threats are mind-independent. A threat is a threat. One need not have an ontological committment to one metaphysics to avoid threats. Why would a supposedly false belief be more effective than a true one? Especially given that one need have neither to effective deal with both predators and prey, as shown by animals.
6) In VAs example/analogy the supposedly non-existent thing is only contingently non-existent. There were animals that could kill humans. Humans might mistakenly think one was there when there wasn't one, but the category is real.
7) They had direct evidence that something was there. It was not sufficient evidence to be certain, but the analogy/explanation fails for this reason also. Hearing is as direct as any other sense.
Speculate is a ridiculous verb here. If they actually ran away without getting more evidence - apart from not being good hunters - they did not speculate. They ran just in case. And unless they were morons, they did not assume that it was a tiger but rather, if they had any belief, that it might be. In fact a flight reaction based on the sound of a broken twig would be due to instinctive reactions, not ratiocination or speculation. Just as our animal brothers and sisters would react.

The deer hears a twig break. It does not speculate. It does not form a belief. It does not refer to a philosophical realist belief in an absolutely mind-independent reality. It instinctively protects itself against potential threats.

An even bigger confusion becomes obvious when one notes that many indigenous and shamanic groups had metaphysical anti-realistic stances. Vastly more so than modern humans do. One wouldn't expect this if you believed VA's hypothesis above. His whole ad hom insult mind reading primitive default you realists have approach to discussing the issue.

Many indigenous and shamanic cultures see reality as something that’s not “out there” independent and separate from us but actually influenced by our thoughts, feelings, and perceptions. This is pretty different from the modern Western idea that there’s an objective, mind-independent reality that exists the same way, no matter what.

In these traditional views, everything in the world is deeply connected. They might see a river, a tree, or even a mountain as being alive in its own way, with a spirit or consciousness. This belief, called animism, is common in many indigenous cultures and means that humans and nature aren’t just connected physically but spiritually, too. So, the way people relate to nature, with respect and intention, is thought to have a real impact on the world around them. For example, the Ojibwe people view their relationships with animals, plants, and even rocks as part of a living web, where each being plays a role, and everyone’s attitudes and actions affect the whole system.

This isn't some hippy-dippy attitude limited to ya oughta respect nature; it goes deeper. It's ontological not consequentialist. Shamans in many cultures, for instance, believe they can access spiritual dimensions or truths that can affect real-world outcomes. During rituals or journeys, shamans enter altered states of consciousness to connect with these spiritual forces, seeking guidance or healing for individuals or the community. So, rather than seeing visions or spiritual experiences as just in your head, these communities might see them as real insights that can change things in the physical world.

For many indigenous people, the idea that there’s a strict line between the “inner world” (our thoughts and feelings) and the “outer world” (objective reality) is false. Reality is a mass of connections, where your internal state—your intentions, beliefs, and respect—can affect the health of the land, animals, and even community relationships. It even affects what you experience and do not experience.

So, in a lot of these traditions, reality isn’t separate from us. Instead, it’s seen as a living, breathing system that responds to how we perceive and interact with it.The inner world and outer world are not separate but part of an intermixed reality. This view isn't just compatible with metaphysical anti-realism. It believes that reality is not absolutely independent of our minds but instead affected by and responsive to human perception and belief.

But in VA's view it is only now we are on the cusp of more people understanding that reality is not absolutely mind-independent. Whereas in fact the very people's who were called primitives were antirealists and still are where there cultures remain intact.

[Veritas Aequitas]

which Kant highlighted your "it may exist anyway" [noumenal] is an illusion where the cognitive dissonances mocks and torments him:

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. CPR B397

In the sense that we can't prove "absolute" mind-independence, we equally can't prove "relative" mind-independence either.

Kant pretended to be one of the wisest of men, but here he was just an illogical twat who couldn't even understand the above simple truth. "Absolute" mind-independence mocked and tormented him, "relative" mind-independence he embraced wholeheartedly.

This is the "proof" which can be confirmed personally and intersubjectively.

When you see an apple on the desk, the trees out there, the people around you, they are empirically mind independent from you i.e. based on your's and others' personal realization of reality and also a FSERC reality..
Because somehow you the subject is involved, such a mind-independence cannot be absolutely mind-independent [exists regardless of whether there are humans or not] but merely relatively mind-independent, i.e. relative to the subject.

[Atla]

which Kant highlighted your "it may exist anyway" [noumenal] is an illusion where the cognitive dissonances mocks and torments him:

In the sense that we can't prove "absolute" mind-independence, we equally can't prove "relative" mind-independence either.

Kant pretended to be one of the wisest of men, but here he was just an illogical twat who couldn't even understand the above simple truth. "Absolute" mind-independence mocked and tormented him, "relative" mind-independence he embraced wholeheartedly.

This is the "proof" which can be confirmed personally and intersubjectively.

When you see an apple on the desk, the trees out there, the people around you, they are empirically mind independent from you i.e. based on your's and others' personal realization of reality and also a FSERC reality..
Because somehow you the subject is involved, such a mind-independence cannot be absolutely mind-independent [exists regardless of whether there are humans or not] but merely relatively mind-independent, i.e. relative to the subject.

Your "proof" is against transcendental realism. Only a philosophical gnat with kindi, bankrupt, shallow and narrow views (you) would think that refuting transcendental realism, also refutes "absolute" mind-independence in general.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The evolutionary default was adapted from this one example among others;
When our original ancestors went out to hunt and they heard a cracking sound [broken dry twig] somewhere from the bushes, they had jumped to the conclusion there was a sable-toothed tiger on the prowl.
This jumping to conclusion in the absence of evidence but merely based on blind belief there is certainly a tiger there had saved lives and was adapted within our ancestors and is still embedded in the present human DNA.
In fact, all those humans whose tribal members did not speculate on the belief of 'the certainty of a sable toothed tiger even without evidence' would have likely been killed eventually.
If our ancestors had not run away from merely belief without direct evidence, the human species could have gone the way of the Dodo.

This is confused in a number of ways:

I won't bother to respond to all the strawmen points.


Suggest you read my above again, i.e.;

• 1. The evolutionary default was adapted from this one example among others;
  
  2. When our original ancestors went out to hunt and they heard a cracking sound [broken dry twig] somewhere from the bushes, they had jumped to the conclusion there was a sable-toothed tiger on the prowl.
  
  3. This jumping to conclusion in the absence of evidence but merely based on blind belief there is certainly a tiger there had saved lives and was adapted within our ancestors and is still embedded in the present human DNA.
  
  4. In fact, all those humans whose tribal members did not speculate on the belief of 'the certainty of a sable toothed tiger even without evidence' would have likely been killed eventually.
  
  5. If our ancestors had not run away from merely belief without direct evidence, the human species could have gone the way of the Dodo.

I have responded to the critical points here:
viewtopic.php?p=739473#p739473
i.e.

Your whole lot of counters here is a mess because you are confused and did not take into my complete philosophical stance.

I differentiated between,
1. Philosophical realism - absolutely mind-independent
2. Philosophical empirical realism - relatively mind-independent

Philosophical realists insist moral elements cannot be objective because they are not absolutely mind-independent, but this has no credibility because it is grounded on an illusion driven from an evolutionary default [re sable-toothed tigers].

On the other hand, I claim objectivity is based on 2. Philosophical empirical realism - relatively mind-independent, where a credible moral FSERC is possible.
On this basis morality is objective, i.e. FSERC objectivity.
Mirror neurons are objective per the scientific FSERC and when inputted into the moral FSERC, they form objective FSERC moral facts.

The evolutionary default was adapted from this one example among others;
When our original ancestors went out to hunt and they heard a cracking sound [broken dry twig] somewhere from the bushes, they had jumped to the conclusion there was a sable-toothed tiger on the prowl.
This jumping to conclusion in the absence of evidence but merely based on blind belief there is certainly a tiger there had saved lives and was adapted within our ancestors and is still embedded in the present human DNA.

1) the problem with this argument is that animals are quite capable of defending themselves and treating sounds like this as potential threats, but there is no evidence they think there is a mind-independent reality 2) more importantly the only reason this is an effective or necessary characteristic of humans - reacting to sounds as potential threats, is because there are predators out there. Your analogy includes the reality of the thing that in relation to realism/antirealism you deny.

Strawman!!
I have stated many time, the sense of externalness [the external sound of a possible tiger] adapted by via our ancestors was ideologized by philosophical realists as a dogmatic ideology.
Animals do not ideologize.
Philosophical antirealists oppose the the externalness [jumping to conclusion] as an ideology, i.e. with absoluteness.
Philosophical antirealists [Kantian] do not grasp it as an ideology but merely accept it is within human nature to jump to conclusion but the conclusion need not be absolute but merely relatively mind-independent.

If our ancestors did not run away from merely belief without direct evidence, the human species could have gone the way of the Dodo.

And animals run away without having taken some stand on realism/antirealism.

Animals do not ideologize but humans do, e.g. philosophical realism.
Philosophical antirealism is not an ideology per se but merely an objection.

[Veritas Aequitas]

In the sense that we can't prove "absolute" mind-independence, we equally can't prove "relative" mind-independence either.

Kant pretended to be one of the wisest of men, but here he was just an illogical twat who couldn't even understand the above simple truth. "Absolute" mind-independence mocked and tormented him, "relative" mind-independence he embraced wholeheartedly.

This is the "proof" which can be confirmed personally and intersubjectively.

When you see an apple on the desk, the trees out there, the people around you, they are empirically mind independent from you i.e. based on your's and others' personal realization of reality and also a FSERC reality..
Because somehow you the subject is involved, such a mind-independence cannot be absolutely mind-independent [exists regardless of whether there are humans or not] but merely relatively mind-independent, i.e. relative to the subject.

Your "proof" is against transcendental realism. Only a philosophical gnat with kindi, bankrupt, shallow and narrow views (you) would think that refuting transcendental realism, also refutes "absolute" mind-independence in general.

You are kicking your own ar-se.
Transcendental Realism is exactly philosophical realism which believe in an absolutely mind-independence reality, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
There is no difference in fundamental [i.e. absolute mind independence] between Philosophical Realism, transcendental realism, direct/indirect realism.

[Atla]

This is the "proof" which can be confirmed personally and intersubjectively.

When you see an apple on the desk, the trees out there, the people around you, they are empirically mind independent from you i.e. based on your's and others' personal realization of reality and also a FSERC reality..
Because somehow you the subject is involved, such a mind-independence cannot be absolutely mind-independent [exists regardless of whether there are humans or not] but merely relatively mind-independent, i.e. relative to the subject.

Your "proof" is against transcendental realism. Only a philosophical gnat with kindi, bankrupt, shallow and narrow views (you) would think that refuting transcendental realism, also refutes "absolute" mind-independence in general.

You are kicking your own ar-se.
Transcendental Realism is exactly philosophical realism which believe in an absolutely mind-independence reality, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
There is no difference in fundamental [i.e. absolute mind independence] between Philosophical Realism, transcendental realism, direct/indirect realism.

Everyone who isn't a philosophical gnat with kindi, bankrupt, shallow and narrow views, knows that transcendental realism isn't exactly philosophical realism. Just ask your AI buddy.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Your "proof" is against transcendental realism. Only a philosophical gnat with kindi, bankrupt, shallow and narrow views (you) would think that refuting transcendental realism, also refutes "absolute" mind-independence in general.

You are kicking your own ar-se.
Transcendental Realism is exactly philosophical realism which believe in an absolutely mind-independence reality, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
There is no difference in fundamental [i.e. absolute mind independence] between Philosophical Realism, transcendental realism, direct/indirect realism.

Everyone who isn't a philosophical gnat with kindi, bankrupt, shallow and narrow views, knows that transcendental realism isn't exactly philosophical realism. Just ask your AI buddy.

Done already.

Classes of Realism
viewtopic.php?t=42601

[Atla]

You are kicking your own ar-se.
Transcendental Realism is exactly philosophical realism which believe in an absolutely mind-independence reality, i.e. it exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.
There is no difference in fundamental [i.e. absolute mind independence] between Philosophical Realism, transcendental realism, direct/indirect realism.

Everyone who isn't a philosophical gnat with kindi, bankrupt, shallow and narrow views, knows that transcendental realism isn't exactly philosophical realism. Just ask your AI buddy.

Done already.

Classes of Realism
viewtopic.php?t=42601

Yes and the AI clearly stated that transcendental realism isn't exactly philosophical realism. The question is why you refuse to comprehend something even when it is clearly spelled out for you.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Everyone who isn't a philosophical gnat with kindi, bankrupt, shallow and narrow views, knows that transcendental realism isn't exactly philosophical realism. Just ask your AI buddy.

Done already.

Classes of Realism
viewtopic.php?t=42601

Yes and the AI clearly stated that transcendental realism isn't exactly philosophical realism. The question is why you refuse to comprehend something even when it is clearly spelled out for you.

How come your skull is so thick?

I stated the fundamentals are the same which is the critical point in this case.
Transcendental realism [labelled by Kant] is another description of philosophical realism where to Kant both are 100% the same.

[Iwannaplato]

I won't bother to respond to all the strawmen points.

Because they are not strawman arguments and it's convenient to avoid them. As usual he makes a claim that something is a strawman without demonstrating how or, here, even mentioning it.

Suggest you read my above again, i.e.;

Exactly, you lack the skills or interest in interacting with other people's points. You can only repeat your assertions.

I have responded to the critical points here:
viewtopic.php?p=739473#p739473
i.e.

No, you didn't, and I specifically added points and also pointed out that your timeline is false and confused. Indigenous groups were, in the main, metaphysical antirealists and did not believe in a mind independent reality. This counters your ridiculous example of the hunter and also counters the, they were stuck in a then necessary philosophical realism. This is wrong on many counts.

Your whole lot of counters here is a mess because you are confused and did not take into my complete philosophical stance.

Empty global evaluation with no interaction.

I differentiated between,
1. Philosophical realism - absolutely mind-independent
2. Philosophical empirical realism - relatively mind-independent

Duh.

Philosophical realists insist moral elements cannot be objective because they are not absolutely mind-independent, but this has no credibility because it is grounded on an illusion driven from an evolutionary default [re sable-toothed tigers].

I love how you refer to your own silly example when in this circular way.

On the other hand, I claim objectivity is based on 2. Philosophical empirical realism - relatively mind-independent, where a credible moral FSERC is possible.
On this basis morality is objective, i.e. FSERC objectivity.
Mirror neurons are objective per the scientific FSERC and when inputted into the moral FSERC, they form objective FSERC moral facts.

Snore. You've said this a thousand time. Nothing to counter what I wrote.

The evolutionary default was adapted from this one example among others;
When our original ancestors went out to hunt and they heard a cracking sound [broken dry twig] somewhere from the bushes, they had jumped to the conclusion there was a sable-toothed tiger on the prowl.
This jumping to conclusion in the absence of evidence but merely based on blind belief there is certainly a tiger there had saved lives and was adapted within our ancestors and is still embedded in the present human DNA.

1) the problem with this argument is that animals are quite capable of defending themselves and treating sounds like this as potential threats, but there is no evidence they think there is a mind-independent reality 2) more importantly the only reason this is an effective or necessary characteristic of humans - reacting to sounds as potential threats, is because there are predators out there. Your analogy includes the reality of the thing that in relation to realism/antirealism you deny.

Strawman!!
I have stated many time, the sense of externalness [the external sound of a possible tiger] adapted by via our ancestors was ideologized by philosophical realists as a dogmatic ideology.

Precisely and this was incorect.

Animals do not ideologize.

And yet they avoid predators. Your assumption was that our ancestors needed a metaphysical belief to avoid threats. This is false in two ways: they don't need it, given instincts. They didn't have it, given what we know about indigenous belief systems.

Nothing at all about indigenous antirealism.

You are a coward. None of you posturing and insults and repeating your positions fools me in the least about this. The signal comes through the noise.

[Atla]

Done already.

Classes of Realism
viewtopic.php?t=42601

Yes and the AI clearly stated that transcendental realism isn't exactly philosophical realism. The question is why you refuse to comprehend something even when it is clearly spelled out for you.

How come your skull is so think?

I stated the fundamentals are the same which is the critical point in this case.
Transcendental realism [labelled by Kant] is another description of philosophical realism where to Kant both are 100% the same.

For the 100th time:

Is Kant's transcendental realism synonymous with philosophical realism, or is it a category within philosophical realism but isn't synonymous with it? Summary only.

Kant's transcendental realism is not synonymous with general philosophical realism. Rather, it is a category within it, but with specific characteristics. In transcendental realism, Kant critiques the view that objects exist independently in the exact way we perceive them, which he contrasts with his own position, transcendental idealism. In transcendental realism, the mind passively perceives a reality that exists independently, without the structuring influence of the mind’s categories. Philosophical realism broadly asserts that a reality exists independently of perception, but it doesn't inherently include the Kantian framework of transcendental critique, making the two related but not equivalent.

You know you've been strawmanning p-realists for a decade now, yes?