Feldman's Modified Hedonism

[Veritas Aequitas]

For those who are pro Hedonism, here is an interesting take on Hedonism.

The two main categories of Hedonism are
1. Philosophical Hedonism,
2. Folk Hedonism - anything goes in the name of pleasure [perjorative].

In general Philosophical Hedonism are trashed with loads of objections from its opponents.
Personally I believe Hedonism-in-general as a way of life is self-defeating.

Feldman termed those trashed-Hedonism as Classical Hedonism, Default Hedonism and or Sensory Hedonism.

To maintain Hedonism as a way of life and morality in modernity, Feldman decides to modify Classical Hedonism to make it more 'palatable' for the masses.

In this book, Pleasure and The Good Life; Concerning The Nature, Varieties, And Plausibility Of Hedonism,
https://www.amazon.com/Pleasure-Good-Li ... 0199297606
he wrote;

So instead of arguing for Hedonism, I operate in another way: I formulate a version of Hedonism; I then subject it to all the main objections I can think of.
I claim that the Good Life is the pleasant life. I claim that pleasure is the Good. Since I make these claims, I am a hedonist.
That hope—the hope for a life Good-in-Itself for the one who lives it—is a hope about the topic of this book.

Here is "a" review:

Fred Feldman, in his book "Pleasure and the Good Life," presents a refined version of hedonism, focusing on attitudinal pleasure rather than sensory pleasure. He argues that our positive and negative attitudes towards things, rather than mere physical sensations, are the primary determinants of our well-being.  

Key Points of Feldman's Modified Hedonism:

Attitudinal Pleasure: Feldman emphasizes the importance of our attitudes towards things, such as beliefs, desires, and hopes. Positive attitudes, like joy, contentment, and satisfaction, contribute to a good life, while negative attitudes, like sadness, frustration, and despair, diminish it.  
Intrinsic Value of Attitudes: Feldman argues that positive attitudes have intrinsic value, meaning they are valuable in themselves, not merely as means to some other end.
Desert-Adjusted Hedonism: Feldman introduces the concept of "desert" to account for moral considerations. He suggests that the value of a person's pleasure or pain is influenced by their moral worthiness. A morally deserving person's pleasure is more valuable than that of a morally undeserving person.  
Truth-Adjusted Hedonism: Feldman acknowledges the importance of truth in evaluating the value of pleasure. He argues that pleasures derived from false beliefs are less valuable than those based on true beliefs.

Feldman's modified hedonism offers a more nuanced and sophisticated approach to understanding well-being. By focusing on attitudinal pleasure and incorporating moral considerations, he aims to address some of the traditional criticisms of hedonism.

However, his theory is not without its challenges. Critics argue that it may be difficult to accurately measure the value of different attitudes and that it may overemphasize the role of moral desert in determining well-being.
Nonetheless, Feldman's work provides a valuable contribution to the ongoing debate about the nature of happiness and the good life.

The above is merely information for those interested.

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[Veritas Aequitas]

Pleasure and The Good Life
Concerning The Nature, Varieties, And Plausibility Of Hedonism
Fred Feldman


CONTENTS of the Book
Introduction 1
1. The Quest for the Good Life 7
1.1 Pleasure and the Good Life 7
1.2 Clarification of “the Good Life” 8
1.3 What is the Question about the Good Life? 12
1.4 Why Should We Be Interested in this Question? 14
1.5 What are the Main Sorts of Answer that have been Given? 15
2. Hedonism: A Preliminary Formulation 21
2.1 Problems Concerning the Formulation of Hedonism 21
2.2 Default Hedonism 25
2.3 The Hedonism of Aristippus 30
Appendix A: Another Defective Formulation 35
3. Classic Objections to Hedonism 38
3.1 The Argument from Worthless Pleasures 38
3.2 The Argument from False Pleasures 41
3.3 The Argument from Unconscious Pleasures 43
3.4 Brentano's Cigar 45
3.5 The Argument from Nonexistent Pleasures 49
3.6 Moore's Heap of Filth 51
3.7 Ross's “Two Worlds” Objection 52
4. Attitudinal Hedonism 55
4.1 Attitudinal Pleasure 55
4.2 Measuring Attitudinal Pleasures and Pains 63
4.3 Formulating Attitudinal Hedonism 66
4.4 The Objects of Enjoyment; Mill's Hedonism 71
Appendix B: Reflections on the Attitudinal/Sensory
Distinction 79
B.1 The Nature of Sensory Pleasures 79
B.2 The Delightfulness of Pleasure, the Awfulness of Pain 81
B.3 Painful Pleasures, Pleasant Pains 83
B.4 Masochism 85
Appendix C: The Hedonism of Epicurus 91
C.1 The Evidence concerning Epicurean Hedonism 91
C.2 Static Pleasure 95
C.3 The Formulation of Epicurean Hedonism 98
C.4 A Vision of the Good Life according to Epicurean Hedonism 102
C.5 Why I Find Epicurean Hedonism Implausible 103
5. Replies to Some Objections 108
5.1 False Pleasures: A Problem for IAH? 109
5.2 Unconscious Pleasures: A Problem for IAH? 114
5.3 The Objection from Worthless Pleasures 117
6. Hedonism and the Shape of a Life 124
6.1 The Shape of a Life 124
6.2 Shape of Life and Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism 129
6.3 Hedonism Unscathed 131
7. G. E. Moore, Hedonist? 142
7.1 Moore's Pluralism 143
7.2 A Moorean Form of Hedonism 148
7.3 The Equivalence of MDAIAH to Moore's Theory 155
7.4 Problems for MDAIAH 157
Appendix D: Darwall on Valuing Activity 160
8. But is it Really “Hedonism”? 168
8.1 A Historical Account of Hedonism 169
8.2 Moore's Criterion of Hedonism 170
8.3 Hedonism and “Pleasant Lives” 171
8.4 Basic Intrinsic Value States and Hedonism 172
8.5 Some Hard Cases 182
8.6 ‘Pleasure is the Good’ 184
8.7 Monism and Pluralism in Axiology 184
8.8 Axiological Taxonomy 186
9. Problems about Beauty and Justice 188
9.1 Moore's Heap of Filth 188
9.2 A Problem about Justice 189
9.3 A Hedonistic Reply to the Heap of Filth 190
9.4 A Hedonistic Reply to Ross's “Two Worlds” Objection 192
9.5 Atomism 197

10. Themes and Puzzles 199
10.1 Themes 199
10.2 My Vision of the Good Life 201
10.3 Unresolved Puzzles 205
Bibliography 207
Index 213

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes: