Hedonism & Morality

[Iwannaplato]

I presented the Critique to AI. It accepts those criticisms but I challenged that the Hedonic Calculus still face other limitations.

Well, I was hoping you yourself would respond to those criticisms. But, ok, the AI accepts the critique but has problems with the Hedonic calculus.

1) Did CIN advocate that specific form of Hedonism? If he did could you link to it?
2) If it accepts those criticisms, it accepts a core denial of its position. We could then, once agreeing that hedonism need not be locked into Benthem/Hedonic caluculus, more forward and see if other hedomistic approachs might work, see if there is a way to come up with a practical system.

[Veritas Aequitas]

This is the big problem with hedonic calculus, the attempt to measure that which has no quantitiy and is immeasurable. For some reason you didn't highlight that in your own analysis. Could it be something to do with the specious bullshit made up numbers that pass for "measurements" in your own theory?

There is a difference.
My analyses are on the principles and particular Framework and System not on every acts that has to be made by the individual.

The calculus approach is definitely a good approach to problem solving in general but it is not practical to apply it to every moral action by each individual.

That's entirely missing the point. None of your measurements measures anything that can actually be measured. The AI criticised hedonic calculus for not having any actual true numbers to be based on. But your own thing uses the same Hallucinated Numerals system of measurement. Your misdirectional blather changes nothing about this problem.

AI wrote above:

Subjectivity of Pleasure and Pain:
Pleasure and pain are highly subjective experiences that vary from person to person. It's difficult to quantify them objectively, as different individuals may value different types of pleasure and pain differently.
Bentham's attempt to create a universal scale for measuring pleasure and pain is challenged by this inherent subjectivity.

Where did it state, "not having any actual true numbers to be based on."
The problem is "Pleasure and pain are highly subjective experiences that vary from person to person".

To avoid being stuck and to progress with subjectivity, I had always been inclined to objectifying or quantifying the qualitative or subjective based on some sort of intersubjective consensus via various research scales.
There are many scientific research that are based on a scale and degrees for low to high that had been accepted by the majority and put into practice, e.g.

From AI[wR]:

Likert Scale: This is the most common type of scale, where respondents choose from a range of options, such as "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Each option is assigned a numerical value, typically from 1 to 5 or 1 to 7.

Semantic Differential Scale: This scale uses pairs of opposite adjectives, such as "good" and "bad," "hot" and "cold," etc.
Respondents rate their perception on a scale between the two adjectives

Visual Analog Scale (VAS): This scale uses a line with labeled endpoints, such as "no pain" and "worst possible pain."
Respondents mark a point on the line to indicate their level of pain or other subjective experience.

Borg Scale of Perceived Exertion (RPE): This scale is specifically used to measure perceived exertion during physical activity.
It ranges from 6 (no exertion) to 20 (maximal exertion).

These scales are often used in surveys, questionnaires, and other research methods to gather subjective data on topics such as pain, satisfaction, quality of life, and perceived effort.

Here are a few examples of research findings based on scale ratings that have been put into practice:

1. Patient Satisfaction Surveys:
Finding: Patients who rate their satisfaction with healthcare providers higher are more likely to adhere to treatment plans and have better health outcomes.
Practice: Hospitals and clinics use patient satisfaction surveys to identify areas for improvement, such as communication, bedside manner, and wait times. This feedback helps healthcare providers enhance their services and improve patient experiences.

2. Product and Service Evaluation:
Finding: Customer satisfaction ratings are strongly correlated with brand loyalty and repeat business.
Practice: Companies use customer satisfaction surveys to measure customer sentiment and identify areas for product or service improvement. This data helps businesses make informed decisions to enhance customer experiences and drive sales.

3. Employee Engagement Surveys:
Finding: Employees who feel engaged and satisfied with their jobs are more productive and less likely to leave the company.
Practice: Organizations use employee engagement surveys to assess employee morale, job satisfaction, and perceived organizational support. This information helps HR departments implement strategies to improve employee retention and productivity.

4. Pain Assessment:
Finding: Self-reported pain ratings on a scale of 0 to 10 can be used to monitor pain intensity and guide treatment decisions.
Practice: Healthcare providers use pain scales to assess pain levels in patients, especially those who may have difficulty communicating their pain verbally, such as infants or individuals with cognitive impairments. This information helps in tailoring pain management strategies.

5. Quality of Life Assessments:
Finding: Quality of life assessments can help measure the impact of chronic illnesses and treatments on patients' overall well-being.
Practice: Healthcare providers use quality of life assessments to evaluate the effectiveness of treatments and interventions, such as chemotherapy or rehabilitation. This information can help in making informed decisions about treatment plans and end-of-life care.

These are just a few examples of how scale ratings have been used to inform research and improve practices in various fields.
By quantifying subjective experiences, these scales provide valuable insights that can lead to positive changes and better outcomes.
...........

See, you are so ignorant what is really out there re quantification [objectifying] of the qualitative [subjective].
You are a sore loser who hinder progress within humanity with your constipated sense of knowledge.

The problem with the Hedonic Calculus is every individual is expected to do a calculation every time [use Excel or an App] before they have made a moral related decision or action.
In addition, I do not agree with Hedonism reliance on pleasure and pain as the moral drivers.

My moral system targets to improve the moral quotient of each individual so that they are morally competent and their spontaneous acts are naturally moral without having to do any deliberations, deciding or calculations.
This is like a well-trained person in any skill [sports, etc.] who do not have to calculate or deliberate on any action to be skillful i.e. its unconscious competence.
If they ended up somehow with something immoral, then they will study the root causes to avoid such mistakes in future and this is done on an iterative and continuous basis.

[Iwannaplato]

There is a difference.
My analyses are on the principles and particular Framework and System not on every acts that has to be made by the individual.

In the same ways that ANY subjective category can be batched so can Benthem's Hedonic Calculas. It could easy be combined with consequentialism and use generalized trends and tendencies to evaulate rules, guidelines, where tax monies are allocated and more. You don't have to run around measure each person's reaction to every single stimuli. Further the whole thing is a kind of strawman in that you are disimissing hedonism but focusing your criticism on one possible variation of it. I don't know if CIN was advocating for specifically Benthem's HC approach or not, but if we look at the thread it is as if Hedonism period is being dismissed by a focus on one version of one person's approach.

And then ironically you seem aware of the diversity of approaches to using subjective data, which you defend your own approach with.

Given you occasionally mention the principle of charity, it would be best if you used your own knowledge of the most defensible Hedonism, which is not what you presented. You actually used a critique of Hedonism that, as FDP rightly pointed out, gives your position problems. Then while insulting him for pointing this out, you come up with a defense that could have been used to present a vastly better version of Hedonism.

If you quoted CIN and showed that he was advocating for the Benthem's Hedonic calculas then you could have a thread focused on arguing against that. But instead it's as if the thread is a critique of Hedonism in general, and clearly you know ways that Hedonism could be better presented.

Or you found them quickly enough when FDP pointed out the problem.

In fact one could easily combine Hedonism and you FSERC system and do exactly what you say you do in relation to yours, without requiring one to focus on every act of every individual. And if that FSERC became more popular than yours - which it arguably is nowadays - then you would have to acknowledge that it is more objective.

[FlashDangerpants]

In fact one could easily combine Hedonism and you FSERC system and do exactly what you say you do in relation to yours, without requiring one to focus on every act of every individual. And if that FSERC became more popular than yours - which it arguably is nowadays - then you would have to acknowledge that it is more objective.

You can apply VA's exact methodology to any old shit you want, it isn't the almost-science he likes to pass it off as, it's pure pseudo-science. The only thing you have to bother to do is collect more than one person, make a list of all the things in your subject, sort them into an order, and the call your list the "-proper" version of that thing.

You could make a list of all the dingy fuck dumps in Bangkok, assemble a collection of "experts" (pervert sex tourists who've been to all the sex clubs and seen all the donkey stuff) and as long as you make up some criteria for all the perverts to agree about, they can sort your brothels into an ordered list, rated out from 1.00000 to 99.99999 (the Adjusted FuckNo! to FuckYeah! scale - AFNFY for short) then you have created the Emerged System of Reality or whatever bullshit that is for Bangkok brothels.

Doing hedonic calculus the VA way is just a matter of making a list of nice things and making up a "science" of sorting them into an order of niceness by awarding ice cream 76 nices and giving sloppy Bangkok blowjobs either more or less than 76 nices. It's a stupid thing to do, but VA really really likes using lists, it has like 78 nices, and he would choose list making over blowjobs any day.

[promethean75]

Yeah, what's the name of that 'disorder' (ironic when it's a fetish for ordering things) on the OCD spectrum where you have to organize, arrange, categorize, and classify everything or you go crazy?

I would like to see how VA arranges things in his cabinets. I would expect to find a taxonomy of perfectly arranged cans of soup according to kingdom, phylum, genus, etc.

In the medicine cabinet, assorted items are organized in a linear fashion from left to right according to the order in which they are used. Face wash > shaving cream > aftershave > toothpaste > mouthwash > comb, and so forth.

[CIN]

Doing hedonic calculus the VA way is just a matter of making a list of nice things and making up a "science" of sorting them into an order of niceness by awarding ice cream 76 nices and giving sloppy Bangkok blowjobs either more or less than 76 nices. It's a stupid thing to do, but VA really really likes using lists, it has like 78 nices, and he would choose list making over blowjobs any day.

Don't knock it, Flash. Poor old VA probably gets a lot of pleasure from doing it his way, and as a card-carrying hedonist, I approve of that. It's like Ricky Gervais says: when you're stupid, it's not you that feels the pain, it's everyone around you.

I suppose I'm going to have to come in here and refute all his criticisms of hedonism, which is easy enough, but he won't accept any of my refutations, and I won't get much pleasure from doing it. I'd really rather go to my room and play one of my board games. Oh well.

[Veritas Aequitas]

There is a difference.
My analyses are on the principles and particular Framework and System not on every acts that has to be made by the individual.

In the same ways that ANY subjective category can be batched so can Benthem's Hedonic Calculas. It could easy be combined with consequentialism and use generalized trends and tendencies to evaulate rules, guidelines, where tax monies are allocated and more. You don't have to run around measure each person's reaction to every single stimuli. Further the whole thing is a kind of strawman in that you are disimissing hedonism but focusing your criticism on one possible variation of it. I don't know if CIN was advocating for specifically Benthem's HC approach or not, but if we look at the thread it is as if Hedonism period is being dismissed by a focus on one version of one person's approach.

And then ironically you seem aware of the diversity of approaches to using subjective data, which you defend your own approach with.

Given you occasionally mention the principle of charity, it would be best if you used your own knowledge of the most defensible Hedonism, which is not what you presented. You actually used a critique of Hedonism that, as FDP rightly pointed out, gives your position problems. Then while insulting him for pointing this out, you come up with a defense that could have been used to present a vastly better version of Hedonism.

If you quoted CIN and showed that he was advocating for the Benthem's Hedonic calculas then you could have a thread focused on arguing against that. But instead it's as if the thread is a critique of Hedonism in general, and clearly you know ways that Hedonism could be better presented.

Or you found them quickly enough when FDP pointed out the problem.

In fact one could easily combine Hedonism and you FSERC system and do exactly what you say you do in relation to yours, without requiring one to focus on every act of every individual. And if that FSERC became more popular than yours - which it arguably is nowadays - then you would have to acknowledge that it is more objective.

Blabbering again.

Note in the OP it deal with the objections to Hedonism in general. I mentioned Hedonic Calculus on the side.
Hedonism is already contingent with a human-based FSERC.
In general I do not agree with Hedonism's main principle i.e. grounding on pleasure and pain for moral purposes; it is make worse with its Hedonic Calculus in the case of Bentham's version.

The general opinion is the future of Hedonism is bleak.

Since you are so pro with Hedonism show me where it is practiced noticeably and is positive in the present?

[Veritas Aequitas]

These are just a few examples of how scale ratings have been used to inform research and improve practices in various fields.
By quantifying subjective experiences, these scales provide valuable insights that can lead to positive changes and better outcomes.

Despite the point and AI listing examples where it has positively benefited mankind, I see people mocking such approaches and that is intellectually and rationally immature. FDP is one good example and he is bankrupt of ideas on the progress of humanity.

The point is when faced with subjectivity [inevitable and ubiquitous] how can we move forward to make progress if we do NOT have any objective standards to ground on.
I don't deny objectifying of the subjective can be a double edged sword; it is up to rational and morally competent people to use it positively and optimally.

[FlashDangerpants]

These are just a few examples of how scale ratings have been used to inform research and improve practices in various fields.
By quantifying subjective experiences, these scales provide valuable insights that can lead to positive changes and better outcomes.

Despite the point and AI listing examples where it has positively benefited mankind, I see people mocking such approaches and that is intellectually and rationally immature. FDP is one good example and he is bankrupt of ideas on the progress of humanity.

The point is when faced with subjectivity [inevitable and ubiquitous] how can we move forward to make progress if we do NOT have any objective standards to ground on.
I don't deny objectifying of the subjective can be a double edged sword; it is up to rational and morally competent people to use it positively and optimally.

They aren't quantifiable. You are substituting a proxy and measuring that. If you aren't smart enough to understand this there is no hope for you.

Also, you have just accidentally confessed that you know that morality isn't objective and that you are deliberately manufacturing false "objectivity" to compensate.

[Peter Holmes]

Even if we could objectively quantify pleasure, pain, happiness, unhappiness, and so on - even if there could be scalar measurements of these things - none of this would entail moral conclusions.

[CIN]

There are several arguments against hedonism:
Moore's heap of filth. G.E. Moore argued that pleasure cannot be the only good because there are some things that are good even if they produce no pleasure. For example, he argued that it would be better for a beautiful world to exist than a heap of filth, even if no one ever experienced either world. This suggests that beauty is good in itself, not just because it produces pleasure.

All this shows is that some people, including Moore, think that beauty is good in itself. The fact that people think this is no evidence that it is true.

The problem of false pleasures. Some pleasures are not good. For example, the pleasure of getting drunk may be enjoyable in the moment, but it can have negative consequences in the long run.

Easily answered. The pleasure of getting drunk is intrinsically good, but may be instrumentally bad.

The difficulty of defining pleasure. There is no universally agreed-upon definition of pleasure. What one person finds pleasurable, another person may find unpleasant. This makes it difficult to use pleasure as the basis of a moral theory.

First of all, let's be more accurate: instead of saying 'pleasure' and 'pain', we should really say 'pleasantness' and 'unpleasantness'. There is a distinction to be drawn between pain and unpleasantness; pain (noun) is unpleasant (adjective), therefore the unpleasantness of pain is a property of the pain, and is not identical with it. What we are concerned with in hedonism is not pain as such, but the unpleasantness of pain, and of other experiences. If there are people who find certain physical pains pleasant (I don't know whether there are or not), then for those people those pains are (other things being equal) not bad, but good.

Secondly, the fact that people find different things pleasant or unpleasant is irrelevant, since we're not talking about those things, but about pleasantness and unpleasantness themselves. And since everyone experiences pleasantness and unpleasantness, we all know what we're talking about (if we're honest), so there really is no problem. We don't need a definition to tell us what pleasantness and unpleasantness are, we all know that already. Do we need a definition to tell us what yellow is? I don't think so. We recognise yellow when we see it, and that's good enough.

Hedonism does not take into account the importance of other things in life, such as love, friendship, and justice.

This just begs the question of whether there are other intrinsic goods than pleasure. It's very typical of even professional philosophers that they simply accept the common opinion that there are other intrinsic goods without supporting evidence or argument.

Hedonism can be difficult to put into practice. It can be hard to know how to maximize pleasure in all situations.

This is another error that philosophers have fallen into: confusing theory with practicality. It is no refutation of a theory to show that it is difficult, or even impossible, to put into practice.

Hedonism can lead to a selfish and self-centered way of life. If pleasure is the only good, then there is no reason to care about the well-being of others.

This is an obvious non sequitur. 'Pleasure is the only good' does not entail 'my pleasure is the only good.' There is nothing in hedonism that says that I cannot or should not aim to give pleasure to others.

In addition to the limitations discussed above, hedonism also faces a number of challenges from contemporary moral philosophy. For example, virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of character and virtue, rather than pleasure. And utilitarianism emphasizes the importance of maximizing happiness, rather than pleasure.

The fact that a lot of philosophers believe in virtue ethics is no evidence that virtue ethics is true. And utilitarianism is a variety of hedonism, so if utilitarianism is true, then so is hedonism.

Oversimplification of Value: Hedonism reduces the complex spectrum of human values to a singular dimension of pleasure and pain. Many argue that other factors like knowledge, beauty, love, and justice also possess intrinsic value, independent of their hedonic consequences.

As I've already pointed out, this begs the question of whether there are other intrinsically valuable things than pleasantness. I really find it rather depressing that philosophers simply accept that there are other things, on no better basis than the fact that many people think there are.

Incommensurability of Values: Hedonism struggles to account for situations where different types of pleasure or pain are incommensurable. For example, is the short-term pleasure of a guilty pleasure comparable to the long-term satisfaction of a virtuous act?

I would challenge the view that there are different types of pleasantness and unpleasantness. I can easily understand what it means for the pleasantness of different experiences to differ in intensity and/or duration, but I do not understand what it would mean for different experiences to have different kinds of pleasantness. As far as I can see, if an experience is pleasant, then that is all that can be said: we cannot go on to say 'this experience has this kind of pleasantness rather than that kind.' What kinds would these be? If anyone thinks that there are different kinds of pleasantness or unpleasantness, it is up to them to say what those different kinds are. I think that if you try it, you will only be able to describe different kinds of pleasant and unpleasant experiences, not different kinds of pleasantness or unpleasantness.

I think what is happening here is that people are misattributing incommensurable qualities of the experiences themselves to the pleasantness or unpleasantness of those experiences. To take the example given: suppose the 'short-term pleasure of a guilty pleasure' is the pleasantness of eating a chocolate cake when we know we are supposed to be dieting, and suppose the 'long-term satisfaction of a virtuous act' is the pleasantness of feeling virtuous because last week you gave a substantial donation to a charity to help with flood relief, and you are still finding this pleasant to think about. The two experiences are obviously in many ways incommensurable: there is no analogue in the second experience to the tastiness of the cake, the sweetness as you eat it, the chocolatey smell, and so on. Likewise there is no analogue in the first experience to the feeling of satisfaction at having helped people in need. But none of these is a property of the pleasantness of either experience. I would argue that all the incommensurability is to be found in properties of those experiences other than their pleasantness; and if I am right, this objection to hedonism fails.

Quality vs. Quantity of Pleasure: Hedonism often focuses on the quantity of pleasure, neglecting the quality of experiences. Some argue that higher-order pleasures, such as intellectual or aesthetic pursuits, are more valuable than lower-order pleasures, even if they may not be as intense.

There are really three assertions here:
1. that pleasures can have different qualities
2. that these qualities can be ordered hierarchically, so that there are higher and lower order pleasures
3. that the supposed higher order pleasures are more valuable than the supposed lower order pleasures.
I would answer point 1 as I did for incommensurability: I think the qualities here are not different qualities of pleasantness, but of the experiences absent their pleasantness. As for points 2 and 3, these seem to me to be merely appealing to a common prejudice, generally on the part of intellectuals, against experiences in which they don't generally participate, and which they look down on. Once again, no evidence or argument is provided to justify this supposed hierarchical ordering of pleasures: I think all we are seeing here is snobbishness.

The Paradox of Hedonism: The pursuit of pleasure as an ultimate goal can paradoxically lead to frustration and dissatisfaction. Excessive focus on pleasure can hinder one's ability to appreciate life's simple joys and can lead to neglecting other important aspects of well-being.

This objection is not actually against hedonism as a philosophical theory, it is merely a cautionary note aimed at those who try too hard to get pleasant experiences; therefore it is irrelevant to whether the theory is true or not.

Moral Considerations: Hedonism can sometimes justify actions that are morally questionable if they lead to personal pleasure, even if they harm others. This raises concerns about the ethical implications of a purely pleasure-based morality.

This again commits the error of assuming that hedonism prescribes pleasant experiences only for oneself. Prudential hedonism is only one variant of hedonism, and not the variant I subscribe to.

While hedonism offers a simple and intuitive framework for understanding value, it is a limited perspective that fails to capture the full richness and complexity of human experience.

This objection really answers itself. The purpose of hedonism as a theory is, indeed, to provide a framework for understanding value: that is all it is intended to do, and it is absurd to criticise it for not doing things it is not meant to do.

War [killing of human is inevitable] in the first place is immoral to begin with.
Cowardice in war is in a way, moral, i.e. the avoidance to be killed by humans.

Cowardice in war is not refusing to kill people, it is trying to save yourself and to hell with anyone else. You are confusing being a coward with being a conscientious objector, which is utterly different.

As I stated, war [inevitable killing of humans] is immoral in the first place.
Soldiers are thus engaging in immoral activities.
Soldiers who are highly moral as human beings had been evidenced to shoot off target when facing their enemies thus avoiding having to kill humans.

So I suppose that if you had been the British Prime Minister in 1940, instead of fighting the Nazis you would have surrendered to them and then stood by and watched as they took away the 300,000 Jews then living in Britain to the concentration camps and gas chambers. And you would then have been complicit in mass cruelty and genocide.

Unconditional pacifism is a very naive doctrine. It is based on the assumption that going to war can never prevent an evil greater than the war itself. This assumption is false.

As I said, it it too messy to deal with morality that include non-human species.

ROFL. Well, sorry if the messiness of the universe offends your aesthetic sense. Perhaps you should ask the Almighty if he would alter the universe so that you find it more tidy and aesthetically pleasing. Meanwhile I will continue to deal with the universe as it actually is, messy or not.

You missed the point.
Having to deal with too many variables is messy, i.e. not efficient and not adopting Occam.
You deny this?

It's stupid and irrelevant. If it is morally required to get into messy situations, then that is what you should do. Morality trumps everything, including messiness.

There is no way, non-human animals can feel pain & pleasure like humans do which is highly exceptional.

Prove it.

It is obvious, non-human animals do not have the same capacity nervous system like humans that of humans.
Some higher non-human animals may have the same expressions of pleasure and pains as humans but such experience wears off immediate the stimuli is absent.

If they experience pleasantness or unpleasantness at all, then we ought to treat them well.

The material point here is that whether non-humans experience pleasantness and/or unpleasantness has no effect on the correctness of my theory. If they do, the theory says we should treat them well. If they don't, the theory says that it doesn't matter how we treat them. The theory thus covers all possible situations.

Show me where Hedonism has been put fully into practice with some reasonable or possible success.
I have checked with AI, it only show some practices in ancient times but none in the present.

As I have said before, we are discussing ethical theory. All you are doing by introducing stuff about practices is dodging the issue.

[Iwannaplato]

Here is a presentation on Refutation of Hedonism and its limitations based on the given website and some additional information I found on the web:

Refutation of Hedonism
Hedonism is the philosophical theory that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Intrinsic goods are goods that are valued for their own sake, rather than for their instrumental value in producing something else.

There are several arguments against hedonism:
Moore's heap of filth. G.E. Moore argued that pleasure cannot be the only good because there are some things that are good even if they produce no pleasure. For example, he argued that it would be better for a beautiful world to exist than a heap of filth, even if no one ever experienced either world. This suggests that beauty is good in itself, not just because it produces pleasure.

OK, you're an anti-realist. You don't see the problem of this example. What is a world that is never experienced to an metaphysical antirealist? What is not experienced beauty? Talk about a realist mind independent reality. Do you read the arguments you find or get AIs to generate?

The problem of false pleasures. Some pleasures are not good. For example, the pleasure of getting drunk may be enjoyable in the moment, but it can have negative consequences in the long run.

Where is it written that one only looks at the immediate pleasures and pains? I don't see such a naive hedonism anywhere in philosophy, but further it shouldn't just be assumed. Hangovers cause pain, for example. Alcoholism, driving while drunk, cause pain. And so on. This is a strawman hedonism.

The difficulty of defining pleasure. There is no universally agreed-upon definition of pleasure. What one person finds pleasurable, another person may find unpleasant. This makes it difficult to use pleasure as the basis of a moral theory.

That's true of every moral theory. Individuals have different values.

Limitations of Hedonism

Hedonism also faces a number of limitations:

Hedonism does not take into account the importance of other things in life, such as love, friendship, and justice.

No reason the pleasures and pains involved in those complex phenomena cannot be part of hedonism.

Hedonism can be difficult to put into practice. It can be hard to know how to maximize pleasure in all situations.

I don't see any easy to put in practice moral systems. Or has it been easy to put yours in place...so far?

Hedonism can lead to a selfish and self-centered way of life. If pleasure is the only good, then there is no reason to care about the well-being of others.

Wrong. Empathy, which is a natural trait of social mammals including humans means that other people's pain and pleasure affect our pain and pleasure.

The future of hedonism

The future of hedonism seems bleak. Hedonism has been around for centuries, but it has never been a very popular philosophy. This is likely because of the limitations discussed above.

I'm sorry are you saying that hedonism is not popular? Obviously people value hedonism now more than ever, they tend to be embarrassed to call it a moral system because the term itself has become pejorative, but it is an extremely popular value system, supported by tech and corporate culture and goals. It tidily fits with capitalism.

In addition to the limitations discussed above, hedonism also faces a number of challenges from contemporary moral philosophy. For example, virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of character and virtue, rather than pleasure. And utilitarianism emphasizes the importance of maximizing happiness, rather than pleasure.

All the various moral systems face challenges from others. That holds for all of them, including yours, which is not very popular at all and therefore not that objective according to your own criteria.

[CIN]

I don't know if CIN was advocating for specifically Benthem's HC approach or not...

I draw a clear distinction between the theory of hedonism and its practice. In theory we should use the hedonic calculus if we want to work out the best action. In practice this is often impossible, so I advocate using rules of thumb where the evidence suggests that these are likely to increase happiness (or as I prefer to call it, net pleasantness) and reduce unhappiness.

People who think the impracticality of the hedonic calculus is an argument against hedonism as a theory are confused. Whether the theory is correct depends on whether it fits the facts, not on whether it is easy or even possible to put into practice.

[Iwannaplato]

I don't know if CIN was advocating for specifically Benthem's HC approach or not...

I draw a clear distinction between the theory of hedonism and its practice. In theory we should use the hedonic calculus if we want to work out the best action. In practice this is often impossible, so I advocate using rules of thumb where the evidence suggests that these are likely to increase happiness (or as I prefer to call it, net pleasantness) and reduce unhappiness.

People who think the impracticality of the hedonic calculus is an argument against hedonism as a theory are confused. Whether the theory is correct depends on whether it fits the facts, not on whether it is easy or even possible to put into practice.

Yes, being hard to work out in practice can be an important issue to raise - what do we do about this - but I agree that it's not a valid critique at the theory level, especially in VA and his AI's hands. I've noticed that both VA and AI often accept the fallacy of consequences'. And Kant's system seems to depend on doing that. Kant's aware of this and places those conclusions in another bucket, but there's a lot of that other bucket in Kant.

[Veritas Aequitas]

As I have said before, we are discussing ethical theory. All you are doing by introducing stuff about practices is dodging the issue.

You are lost with what is ultimate with philosophy, i.e. as in the typical accusation that philosophy is "armchair mental masturbation" i.e. focusing on theory only.

As Kant had stated, philosophy strive to realize the vision and mission of humanity, i.e.
1. Who am I? [know thyself]
2. What can I know? [epistemology]
3. What can I do? [Morality & Ethics]
4. What can I hope for? Progressing toward the Ideal of Perpetual Peace.

Your counter to confine Hedonism as a theory is a sham and not in accordance with philosophy-proper.
The point is whatever you theorize must be practical eventually to contribute to the progress of humanity towards the ideal of perpetual peace.

There are several arguments against hedonism:
Moore's heap of filth. G.E. Moore argued that pleasure cannot be the only good because there are some things that are good even if they produce no pleasure. For example, he argued that it would be better for a beautiful world to exist than a heap of filth, even if no one ever experienced either world. This suggests that beauty is good in itself, not just because it produces pleasure.

All this shows is that some people, including Moore, think that beauty is good in itself. The fact that people think this is no evidence that it is true.

Note this from IEP

ALL Hedonistic theories identify pleasure and pain as the only important elements of whatever phenomena they are designed to describe.
If Hedonistic theories identified pleasure and pain as merely two important elements, instead of the only important elements of what they are describing, then they would not be nearly as unpopular as they all are.
However, the claim that pleasure and pain are the only things of ultimate importance is what makes Hedonism distinctive and philosophically interesting.
https://iep.utm.edu/Hedonism/

Moore was countering against Hedonism's claim "pleasure and pain as the only important elements" by arguing there are other elements e.g. 'beauty' besides 'pleasure & pain'.

Moore's argument went out of fashion;

The demise of these arguments was partly due to mounting objections against them, but mainly because arguments more suited to the task of refuting Prudential Hedonism were developed.
Ibid IEP

The difficulty of defining pleasure. There is no universally agreed-upon definition of pleasure. What one person finds pleasurable, another person may find unpleasant. This makes it difficult to use pleasure as the basis of a moral theory.

First of all, let's be more accurate: instead of saying 'pleasure' and 'pain', we should really say 'pleasantness' and 'unpleasantness'. There is a distinction to be drawn between pain and unpleasantness; pain (noun) is unpleasant (adjective), therefore the unpleasantness of pain is a property of the pain, and is not identical with it. What we are concerned with in hedonism is not pain as such, but the unpleasantness of pain, and of other experiences. If there are people who find certain physical pains pleasant (I don't know whether there are or not), then for those people those pains are (other things being equal) not bad, but good.

Secondly, the fact that people find different things pleasant or unpleasant is irrelevant, since we're not talking about those things, but about pleasantness and unpleasantness themselves. And since everyone experiences pleasantness and unpleasantness, we all know what we're talking about (if we're honest), so there really is no problem. We don't need a definition to tell us what pleasantness and unpleasantness are, we all know that already. Do we need a definition to tell us what yellow is? I don't think so. We recognise yellow when we see it, and that's good enough.

I wrote somewhere, we are evolved with what is initially 'A: what is positive to survival= attract & BL what is negative = avoid'. Therefrom our ancestors were evolved with a nervous system of pleasure and pain from that basic.
Pleasantness and Unpleasantness is a 3rd level which is more complex, but it can be very sensitive that instead of leading what is positive [A] originally, it could lead to negative B.
E.g. presumably Hitler feel good and pleasant to exterminate all Jews.
My point is without first principles, things are likely to go awry, so resorting to Pleasantness and Unpleasantness is not recommended without the trail to its origins.

Hedonism does not take into account the importance of other things in life, such as love, friendship, and justice.

This just begs the question of whether there are other intrinsic goods than pleasure. It's very typical of even professional philosophers that they simply accept the common opinion that there are other intrinsic goods without supporting evidence or argument.

I have argued even with the term intrinsic Good there are full of problems:
"Good" within Moral Philosophy
viewtopic.php?t=42955

How do you know 'good in itself' is true or even if it exists objectively as real?
Note Kant's argument, a thing-in-itself is a transcendental illusion.

Hedonism can be difficult to put into practice. It can be hard to know how to maximize pleasure in all situations.

This is another error that philosophers have fallen into: confusing theory with practicality. It is no refutation of a theory to show that it is difficult, or even impossible, to put into practice.

see above re practicality is imperative in philosophy.

Hedonism can lead to a selfish and self-centered way of life. If pleasure is the only good, then there is no reason to care about the well-being of others.

This is an obvious non sequitur. 'Pleasure is the only good' does not entail 'my pleasure is the only good.' There is nothing in hedonism that says that I cannot or should not aim to give pleasure to others.

I have read the WIKI, SEP and IEP articles on Hedonism and prepared all the various types and sub-types of Hedonism.

Axiological Hedonism is the view that pleasure is the sole source of intrinsic value. WIKI
Thus the objection above is valid.
What is your choice of Hedonism among the wide variety of Hedonism?

In addition to the limitations discussed above, hedonism also faces a number of challenges from contemporary moral philosophy. For example, virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of character and virtue, rather than pleasure. And utilitarianism emphasizes the importance of maximizing happiness, rather than pleasure.

The fact that a lot of philosophers believe in virtue ethics is no evidence that virtue ethics is true. And utilitarianism is a variety of hedonism, so if utilitarianism is true, then so is hedonism.

The principles used are not feasible to be practical [based on objections presented] to contribute to the effective progress of humanity.

Oversimplification of Value: Hedonism reduces the complex spectrum of human values to a singular dimension of pleasure and pain. Many argue that other factors like knowledge, beauty, love, and justice also possess intrinsic value, independent of their hedonic consequences.

As I've already pointed out, this begs the question of whether there are other intrinsically valuable things than pleasantness. I really find it rather depressing that philosophers simply accept that there are other things, on no better basis than the fact that many people think there are.

?? note Hedonism as defined is confined to pleasure and pains, thus it ignore other elements that could be good in itself.

Incommensurability of Values: Hedonism struggles to account for situations where different types of pleasure or pain are incommensurable. For example, is the short-term pleasure of a guilty pleasure comparable to the long-term satisfaction of a virtuous act?

I would challenge the view that there are different types of pleasantness and unpleasantness. I can easily understand what it means for the pleasantness of different experiences to differ in intensity and/or duration, but I do not understand what it would mean for different experiences to have different kinds of pleasantness. As far as I can see, if an experience is pleasant, then that is all that can be said: we cannot go on to say 'this experience has this kind of pleasantness rather than that kind.' What kinds would these be? If anyone thinks that there are different kinds of pleasantness or unpleasantness, it is up to them to say what those different kinds are. I think that if you try it, you will only be able to describe different kinds of pleasant and unpleasant experiences, not different kinds of pleasantness or unpleasantness.

I think what is happening here is that people are misattributing incommensurable qualities of the experiences themselves to the pleasantness or unpleasantness of those experiences. To take the example given: suppose the 'short-term pleasure of a guilty pleasure' is the pleasantness of eating a chocolate cake when we know we are supposed to be dieting, and suppose the 'long-term satisfaction of a virtuous act' is the pleasantness of feeling virtuous because last week you gave a substantial donation to a charity to help with flood relief, and you are still finding this pleasant to think about. The two experiences are obviously in many ways incommensurable: there is no analogue in the second experience to the tastiness of the cake, the sweetness as you eat it, the chocolatey smell, and so on. Likewise there is no analogue in the first experience to the feeling of satisfaction at having helped people in need. But none of these is a property of the pleasantness of either experience. I would argue that all the incommensurability is to be found in properties of those experiences other than their pleasantness; and if I am right, this objection to hedonism fails.

As above, you cannot ignore the practical and experience.
Also, pleasantness and unpleasantness are the sub-sub of the original intent of pleasure and pain thus likely to conflate pain[negative to survival] with pleasure[positive to survival] thus threatened the extermination of the human species.

Quality vs. Quantity of Pleasure: Hedonism often focuses on the quantity of pleasure, neglecting the quality of experiences. Some argue that higher-order pleasures, such as intellectual or aesthetic pursuits, are more valuable than lower-order pleasures, even if they may not be as intense.

There are really three assertions here:
1. that pleasures can have different qualities
2. that these qualities can be ordered hierarchically, so that there are higher and lower order pleasures
3. that the supposed higher order pleasures are more valuable than the supposed lower order pleasures.
I would answer point 1 as I did for incommensurability: I think the qualities here are not different qualities of pleasantness, but of the experiences absent their pleasantness. As for points 2 and 3, these seem to me to be merely appealing to a common prejudice, generally on the part of intellectuals, against experiences in which they don't generally participate, and which they look down on. Once again, no evidence or argument is provided to justify this supposed hierarchical ordering of pleasures: I think all we are seeing here is snobbishness.

Note Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs.
What is pleasurable at the basic level of needs has no effect when humans evolved through the various levels.
Also, Maslow's theory suggests that humans have a hierarchy of needs, and lower-level needs must be satisfied before higher-level needs become motivating. This challenges the hedonistic idea that pleasure is the sole intrinsic good.

The Paradox of Hedonism: The pursuit of pleasure as an ultimate goal can paradoxically lead to frustration and dissatisfaction. Excessive focus on pleasure can hinder one's ability to appreciate life's simple joys and can lead to neglecting other important aspects of well-being.

This objection is not actually against hedonism as a philosophical theory, it is merely a cautionary note aimed at those who try too hard to get pleasant experiences; therefore it is irrelevant to whether the theory is true or not.

Morality is about actions and experience to progress, not mere theory.
Where your theory focus on pleasure, when applied it will trigger people to chase pleasure which a never ending cycle of sufferings.
Note addictions [drugs and other harmful activities] what is pleasure initially get numbed which entail greater efforts which cause irreparable damage.

Moral Considerations: Hedonism can sometimes justify actions that are morally questionable if they lead to personal pleasure, even if they harm others. This raises concerns about the ethical implications of a purely pleasure-based morality.

This again commits the error of assuming that hedonism prescribes pleasant experiences only for oneself. Prudential hedonism is only one variant of hedonism, and not the variant I subscribe to.

The above objection is valid to Hedonism whichever is applicable.
What is your variant of Hedonism?

While hedonism offers a simple and intuitive framework for understanding value, it is a limited perspective that fails to capture the full richness and complexity of human experience.

This objection really answers itself. The purpose of hedonism as a theory is, indeed, to provide a framework for understanding value: that is all it is intended to do, and it is absurd to criticise it for not doing things it is not meant to do.

Note my argument above, philosophy thus philosophy of Hedonism must be translatable to actions and the practical to facilitate the progress of humanity and avoiding its extinction.

War [killing of human is inevitable] in the first place is immoral to begin with.
Cowardice in war is in a way, moral, i.e. the avoidance to be killed by humans.

Cowardice in war is not refusing to kill people, it is trying to save yourself and to hell with anyone else. You are confusing being a coward with being a conscientious objector, which is utterly different.

You missed my point.
It is moral because its ultimate consequence is no human is killed, so indirectly meet the objective of morality.

As I stated, war [inevitable killing of humans] is immoral in the first place.
Soldiers are thus engaging in immoral activities.
Soldiers who are highly moral as human beings had been evidenced to shoot off target when facing their enemies thus avoiding having to kill humans.

So I suppose that if you had been the British Prime Minister in 1940, instead of fighting the Nazis you would have surrendered to them and then stood by and watched as they took away the 300,000 Jews then living in Britain to the concentration camps and gas chambers. And you would then have been complicit in mass cruelty and genocide.

Unconditional pacifism is a very naive doctrine. It is based on the assumption that going to war can never prevent an evil greater than the war itself. This assumption is false.

You missed my point again.
The main aim of morality is to avoid all wars.
But if war is declared, then one got to do one's duty of war.

It was a natural unfoldment of the inherent moral function within all humans that the UN was formed to prevent future wars; there is moral progress but unfortunately if competency is not enough. This is a reason why we need to recognize the objective inherent moral function within all humans to expedite its unfoldment and degree of competency.

You missed the point.
Having to deal with too many variables is messy, i.e. not efficient and not adopting Occam.
You deny this?

It's stupid and irrelevant. If it is morally required to get into messy situations, then that is what you should do. Morality trumps everything, including messiness.

You don't agree with the Principles of Occam Razor?
Point is if one is thrown into a messy situation, we must apply Occam to ensure resolving the mess is effective.

It is obvious, non-human animals do not have the same capacity nervous system like humans that of humans.
Some higher non-human animals may have the same expressions of pleasure and pains as humans but such experience wears off immediate the stimuli is absent.

If they experience pleasantness or unpleasantness at all, then we ought to treat them well.

The material point here is that whether non-humans experience pleasantness and/or unpleasantness has no effect on the correctness of my theory. If they do, the theory says we should treat them well. If they don't, the theory says that it doesn't matter how we treat them. The theory thus covers all possible situations.

Why mess up with whether they do or not.
It is effective [rationalized] just to leave non-human-animals out of human morality but deal with them humanely and optimally.

Show me where Hedonism has been put fully into practice with some reasonable or possible success.
I have checked with AI, it only show some practices in ancient times but none in the present.

As I have said before, we are discussing ethical theory. All you are doing by introducing stuff about practices is dodging the issue.

Note above where I argue experiences and practices is imperative within philosophy. Here is not a "jerk-circle". The human species is trending toward extinction with the easy accessible and cheaper WMDs.

I have no time to review and edit this long post, it may contain errors and omissions; [pardon the grammar] will correct it if pointed out.