But philosophical realism is full of holes and thus cannot be credible nor objective to denounce morality is not objective.
I have proven:
Why Philosophical Realism is Illusory
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The evolved sense of mind-independence or externalness is nevertheless useful for basic survival [since 200K years ago] but to adopt it ideologically as philosophical realism with 'my way or the highway' attitude in modern times is delusional.
Since the emergence of philosophy, philosophical realism has been countered as full of holes [philosophical] not very realistic for modern living, culminating in Kant's alternative to philosophical realism, i.e. empirical realism.
In the CPR Kant wrote:
What are the 'failures', here AI [wR] listing of failures of philosophical realism:Kant wrote:"Hitherto it has been assumed that all our Knowledge must conform to Objects. [i.e. philosophical realism]
But all attempts to extend our Knowledge of Objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of Concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in Failure."
I am sure there are many more failures of philosophical realism and its hindrances to the progress of humanity, notably to expedite moral progress plus others.Kant's critique of philosophical realism highlighted several foundational issues, which he argued had led to failure in our pursuit of knowledge of mind-independent objects. Here’s a breakdown of some key failures that philosophical realism encountered, according to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason:
Radical Skepticism (Veil of Perception):
Philosophical realism presumes that our senses give us access to an external, mind-independent reality. However, this leads to a gap between appearances and things-in-themselves, creating a “veil” between the mind and the world. Since we can only access the world through sensory representations, realism struggles to bridge this gap. Radical skepticism emerges because if we cannot confirm that our perceptions correspond to a reality independent of our minds, then we cannot have certain knowledge of that reality.
Metaphysical Dogmatism:
Realism's attempt to assert knowledge of things-in-themselves often leads to metaphysical dogmatism—the assumption that certain features or essences of reality can be known independently of experience. This is problematic because it relies on speculative metaphysics to assert knowledge claims beyond empirical verification, ultimately resulting in unverifiable assertions that can’t be meaningfully confirmed or denied.
Failure of Rationalism in Extending Knowledge:
Rationalists, who sought to establish knowledge about the world through pure reason alone, failed to substantiate claims about the nature of mind-independent reality. Kant argued that reason cannot extend knowledge of objects beyond the limits of experience. Attempts to grasp absolute realities, like the concept of a soul or an uncaused cause (e.g., God), led only to contradictions and illusions.
Antinomies of Pure Reason:
Realism’s attempt to describe the absolute nature of the universe led Kant to identify a series of antinomies—paradoxes that arise when we try to apply pure concepts of reason to the world as if it existed independently of our perception. For example, reason tells us both that the universe must have a beginning (a finite past) and that it must be infinite, with no beginning. These contradictory conclusions suggest that the objects of metaphysical inquiry (such as the universe as a whole) cannot be known as mind-independent realities but are instead limited to how we perceive and conceptualize them.
Failure to Ground Knowledge in Necessary and Universal Principles:
Realism could not account for the universal and necessary structure of knowledge. Kant argued that empirical observations alone cannot yield necessary truths, and that to achieve universal knowledge, cognition must be structured by a priori concepts (such as space, time, and causality) that the mind imposes on experience. Realism’s failure here lies in assuming that mind-independent objects could provide such necessary principles, when in Kant’s view, only the structures of our own minds make such knowledge possible.
Dependency on Correspondence Theory of Truth:
Realism relies on the idea that truth involves a one-to-one correspondence between our beliefs and mind-independent facts. However, Kant argued that we lack direct access to things-in-themselves, making it impossible to verify that our concepts or perceptions match external reality. Thus, philosophical realism’s notion of truth as correspondence with an independent reality is ultimately incoherent, as it presupposes an unknowable object as the standard of truth.
Incoherence of Absolute Mind-Independence:
Philosophical realism’s commitment to absolute mind-independence is itself incoherent within Kant’s framework. For Kant, the very concepts we use to structure knowledge (such as substance, causality, unity, etc.) are not given by objects but are conditions of human cognition. Thus, trying to know things “in themselves” outside of these cognitive structures leads to incoherent or meaningless statements, as such knowledge would have to be entirely devoid of the concepts and categories that make experience possible.
Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” shifts the framework by asserting that knowledge is structured by the mind’s own a priori forms and categories. Rather than our cognition conforming to an unknowable external reality, the objects of our experience conform to the way our mind organizes experience. This avoids the pitfalls of realism by rooting knowledge in the conditions of possible experience rather than in an inaccessible, mind-independent realm.
My point is:
For anyone to reject blindly or oppose my
Reality: Emergence & Realization Prior to Perceiving, Knowing & Describing
viewtopic.php?t=40145
based on the ideology of philosophical realism, they ought to be aware their philosophical realism is full of holes, thus lack the credibility to counter my above view which can be verified and justified empirically.
Anyone to counter the above?
Discuss??
Views??
etc: Morality instead of 'moral'.