The concept of solipsism arise from the dogmatic ideology of philosophical realism [direc/indirect realism, scientific realism][absolute mind-independence] which is grounded on an illusion, thus delusional.
Here is a discussion to support my point:The Incoherence of Solipsism
https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#H7
With the belief in the essential privacy of experience eliminated as false, the last presupposition underlying solipsism is removed and solipsism is shown as foundationless, in theory and in fact. One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is, a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all.
Read more at the link above.
The above merely exposed your ignorance and being an ultracrepidarian and a philosophical gnat.Atla wrote: ↑Sun Nov 03, 2024 10:32 amAtla the KG wrote:How was Jacobi's solipsistic charge countered by Kant himself?No need to go further, Kant absolutely didn't refute Jacobi's charge. He just emphasized the importance of assuming stuff in our solipsistic minds, out of practical necessity. And his lie worked, the rest is history.ChatGpt wrote:Kant directly addressed Jacobi's concerns about solipsism in his later writings, particularly in his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here’s how Kant himself countered Jacobi’s interpretation:
1. Clarifying Empirical Realism and Transcendental Idealism
Kant was careful to distinguish between what he called empirical realism and transcendental idealism. In his view, transcendental idealism merely states that we can only know things as they appear to us (phenomena) and not as they are in themselves (noumena). This did not mean that external objects do not exist or that we are isolated within our own minds. Instead, he argued that empirical realism (the belief in a stable, external, objective world) is fully compatible with transcendental idealism, as it pertains to how we experience the world rather than what exists.
Kant emphasized that we do experience a shared, structured world of empirical objects in space and time, which exists independently of any one individual’s mind. This shared experience among rational beings, he argued, refuted Jacobi’s interpretation of his system as solipsistic.
I highlighted to ChatGpt the following;
The Incoherence of Solipsism
https://iep.utm.edu/solipsis/#H7
Atla insisted [relying on an incoherent concept] Kant's Transcendental Idealism /Empirical Realism is solipsistic, but it is countered as otherwise.ChatGpt wrote:Jacobi’s charge of solipsism is indeed questionable, especially considering that solipsism itself may lack coherence as a philosophical concept. Solipsism asserts that only one's own mind is certain to exist, which becomes challenging to defend within a coherent philosophical or scientific framework, particularly when viewed through the lens of scientific antirealism.
Kant’s empirical realism, which emphasizes a shared phenomenal world structured by space, time, and our cognitive faculties, aligns well with scientific antirealism. Scientific antirealism acknowledges that while we interact with and model an empirical world, our scientific theories do not necessarily reveal the ultimate nature of things-in-themselves but rather provide practical, coherent ways of organizing our observations. This perspective supports Kant’s idea that objective knowledge is attainable in the phenomenal realm without making metaphysical claims about the noumenal world.
Under this view, Kant’s empirical realism not only avoids the pitfalls of solipsism but also aligns with the credibility of scientific antirealism, offering a framework that upholds practical realism.
His framework enables intersubjective consistency and empirical knowledge without assuming that our representations mirror things as they exist independently of perception.
Thus, Kant’s response to Jacobi is both more realistic and more objectively credible, aligning with a system that acknowledges the limits of knowledge while maintaining a structured, shared reality.
What is critical with Kant's view is whether it contribute to the progress of humanity, and it really does.
Discuss??
Above??