Kant & Indirect Moral Duty to Animals

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here I am exposing the ignorance of those who merely cherry picked bits and pieces and thereupon proceed to condemn Kant based on their limited knowledge.

He [p-realist] who is cruel to animals [tortures them] becomes hard [murderous] also in his dealings with men [targets anti-p-realists]. We [wise anti-p-realists] can judge [using FSK-d judgement] the heart of a man by his treatment of animals [animal-treatment-proper FSK]. - Immanuel Kant

Kant also said, in the same lecture:

"Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man.... Our duties toward animals are merely indirect duties toward humanity.... Vivisectionists, who use living animals for their experiments, certainly act cruelly, although their aim is praiseworthy, and they can justify their cruelty, since animals must be regarded as man’s instruments."

Kant was a speciesist shithead.

As usual you are insulting your own intelligence and intellect by not widening your perspective in seeking a more balanced view.

That Kant stated we have an INDIRECT DUTIES to non-human animals imply we still have a moral duty, albeit an indirect one.
Kant did not state we do not have a moral duty at all to non-human animals.

Kant explained his position very clearly in
Of Duties To Animals And Spirits
IMMANUEL KANT Lectures on ethics EDITED BY PETER HEATH University of Virginia AND ]. B. SCHNEEWIND Johns Hopkins University TRANSLATED BY PETER HEATH: page 212

Our author here goes on to speak of duties to beings that are above us and beneath us. 27:459
But since all animals exist only as means, and not for their own sakes, in that they have no self-consciousness, whereas man is the end, such that I can no longer ask: Why does he exist?, as can be done with animals, it follows that we have no immediate duties to animals; our duties towards them are indirect duties to humanity.

Since animals are an analogue of humanity, we observe duties to mankind when we observe them as analogues to this, and thus cultivate our duties to humanity.
If a dog, for example, has served his master long and faithfully, that is an analogue of merit; hence I must reward it, and once the dog can serve no longer, must look after him to the end, for I thereby cultivate my duty to humanity, as I am called upon to do; so if the acts of animals arise out of the same principium from which human actions spring, and the animal actions are analogues of this, we have duties to animals, in that we thereby promote the cause of humanity.

So if a man has his dog shot, because it can no longer earn a living for him, he is by no means in breach of any duty to the dog, since the latter is incapable of judgement, but he thereby damages the kindly and humane qualities in himself, which he ought to exercise in virtue of his duties to mankind.
Lest he extinguish such qualities, he must already practise a similar kindliness towards animals; for a person who already displays such cruelty to animals is also no less hardened towards men.
We can already know the human heart, even in regard to animals.
Thus Hogarth, in his engravings,* also depicts the beginnings of cruelty, where already the children are practising it upon animals, e.g., by pulling the tail of a dog or cat; in another scene we see the progress of cruelty, where the man runs over a child; and finally the culmination of cruelty in a murder, at which point the rewards of it appear horrifying.
This provides a good lesson to children.

The more we devote ourselves to observing animals and their behaviour, the more we love them, on seeing how greatly they care for their young; in such a context, we cannot even contemplate cruelty to a wolf.
" ['The Stages of Cruelty', 1751 - Tr.]

Leibnitz put the grub he had been observing back on the tree with its
leaf, lest he should be guilty of doing any harm to it.
It upsets a man to destroy such a creature for no reason, and this tenderness is subsequently transferred to man.
In England, no butcher, surgeon or doctor serves on the twelve-man jury, because they are already inured to death. 27:460
So when anatomists take living animals to experiment on, that is certainly cruelty, though there it is employed for a good purpose; because animals are regarded as man's instruments, it is acceptable, though it is never so in sport.
If a master turns out his ass or his dog, because it can no longer earn its keep, this always shows a very small mind in the master.
The Greeks were high-minded in such matters, as is shown by the fable of the ass, which pulled by accident at the bell of ingratitude.
Thus our duties to animals are indirectly duties to humanity.

The duties to other spiritual beings are merely negative.
We should never meddle in such actions as imply a commercium, or intercourse, with other beings.
All such actions are of a kind that makes men fanatical, visionary and superstitious, and are contrary to the dignity of mankind; for that dignity includes the healthy use of reason, and if one is given to things of that sort, the sound use of reason is impossible.
There may always be such beings, and all that is said of them may be true, but we are not acquainted with them, and cannot have dealings with them.

In regard to evil spirits, the situation is the same.
We have just as good an idea of evil as we do of good, and refer everything evil to Hell, as we attribute everything good to Heaven.
If we personify this perfect evil, we have the idea of the Devil; and have only to imagine that such a being may have influence over us, that he appears at night and stalks abroad, to be plagued with phantoms that abolish the rational use of our powers.
So our duties to such beings are negative.

Our author goes on to discuss duties to inanimate objects.
These also allude, indirectly, to our duties towards men.
The human impulse to destroy things that can still be used is very immoral.
No man ought to damage the beauty of nature; even though he cannot use it, other people may yet be able to do so, and though he has no need to observe such a duty in regard to the thing itself, he does in regard to others.

Thus all duties relating to animals, other beings and things have an indirect reference to our duties towards mankind.

Thus Kant did not ignore moral consideration for non-human animals totally but assert that how humans treat animals will indirectly reflect on their own moral standings.

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Comment from AI [wr]:

................
"Yes, while Kant does not believe in direct moral duties to animals, he does argue for indirect duties to animals. This means that treating animals with kindness is not primarily for the sake of the animals themselves, but rather for the sake of cultivating human virtues.

Here's a breakdown of Kant's argument:

Indirect Duties: Kant suggests that our duties to animals are indirect, meaning they are rooted in our duties to humanity. By treating animals with kindness, we cultivate virtues like compassion, empathy, and respect for life, which are essential for our moral development as human beings.

Human Virtues: Kant believes that by being kind to animals, we are indirectly promoting human well-being. Cruelty to animals can desensitize us and lead to a decline in our moral character.

Avoiding Cruelty: Kant condemns cruelty to animals as it can harden the human heart and lead to a decline in moral character.

Analogies to Human Actions: Kant suggests that we can learn about human morality by observing animal behavior. Animals, though not rational beings, can exhibit behaviors that are analogous to human virtues and vices. By studying these analogies, we can better understand our own moral obligations.

Therefore, while Kant's view may seem somewhat limited from a contemporary perspective, it does provide a rationale for treating animals with kindness. By doing so, we are not only fulfilling our indirect duties to animals but also promoting our own moral development.

It's important to recognize the historical context in which he wrote. His emphasis on indirect duties to animals, while not fully recognizing their intrinsic value, still provides a moral framework for treating them with kindness and respect."
........

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Veritas Aequitas]

I believe Kant's indirect duty to non-human animals is a very smart, practical move and advocate something that is optimal within known constraints.
Otherwise where do we draw and line;
-since humans still has to rely on 'killing' animals for food,
-pests that are a threat our food and well-being has to be killed,
- billions of small and large non-human animals are inevitable killed within the ordinary living of humans, e.g. insects and others on windscreens, filters, etc.
-billions of non-humans animals like good bacteria and killed naturally in the human body.

As such, morality-proper is most effective to be confined to humans only but provisions to be made for humane considerations to non-human animals.

[CIN]

I believe Kant's indirect duty to non-human animals is a very smart, practical move and advocate something that is optimal within known constraints.
Otherwise where do we draw and line;
-since humans still has to rely on 'killing' animals for food,

Oh, for fuck's sake. I've been vegetarian for 44 years, and I'm in good health. If you think we have to kill animals for food in 2024, you're still living in the Dark Ages.

-pests that are a threat our food and well-being has to be killed,

That has nothing to do with Kant's views. Kant is talking about duties to animals. Killing an animal that you regard as a pest is not carrying out a duty to that animal.

- billions of small and large non-human animals are inevitable killed within the ordinary living of humans, e.g. insects and others on windscreens, filters, etc.

People who, unlike you, have a correct understanding of moral principles, try to kill as few other animals as possible. And there is no evidence that insects are conscious, and if they're not conscious, they have no moral standing.

-billions of non-humans animals like good bacteria and killed naturally in the human body.

Bacteria are not conscious, and therefore have no moral standing.

As such, morality-proper is most effective to be confined to humans only

There is no rational ground for granting moral standing only to humans.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I believe Kant's indirect duty to non-human animals is a very smart, practical move and advocate something that is optimal within known constraints.
Otherwise where do we draw and line;
-since humans still has to rely on 'killing' animals for food,

Oh, for fuck's sake. I've been vegetarian for 44 years, and I'm in good health. If you think we have to kill animals for food in 2024, you're still living in the Dark Ages.

I understand most Hindus are vegetarian but you cannot conclude all vegetarians are above average in terms of health.
There is no absolute to vegetarianism versus non-vegetarismism [omnivorism].
As such, we cannot banned the killing of animals for food.

-pests that are a threat our food and well-being has to be killed,

That has nothing to do with Kant's views. Kant is talking about duties to animals. Killing an animal that you regard as a pest is not carrying out a duty to that animal.

Kant is talking about indirect moral duties to animals.

Your thesis is morality should be extended to all animals as direct duty.
If killing is immoral, then we should not kill any animals at all, i.e. including pests that are animals.
But is it critical we have to kill pest where necessary to ensure our survival.
Therefore your thesis is not tenable.

Kant's view is humans has an indirect moral duty to non-human animals.
As such we need to treat all non-human animals humanely with priority given to humans.

- billions of small and large non-human animals are inevitable killed within the ordinary living of humans, e.g. insects and others on windscreens, filters, etc.

People who, unlike you, have a correct understanding of moral principles, try to kill as few other animals as possible. And there is no evidence that insects are conscious, and if they're not conscious, they have no moral standing.

Insects are classified as 'animals'.
The issue is not about consciousness. Where do you draw line with which animal is conscious and which is not.
As such your thesis, "humans has a direct moral duty to animals" is not tenable.

-billions of non-humans animals like good bacteria and killed naturally in the human body.

Bacteria are not conscious, and therefore have no moral standing.

Note the consciousness issue.
OK, I agree bacteria are not animals, so off topic.

As such, morality-proper is most effective to be confined to humans only

There is no rational ground for granting moral standing only to humans.

No rational grounds??

As I had argued it is a question of facilitating efficiency in terms of moral progress for humanity; it is Occam's - the least the variables, the more efficient.
I have also stated it is not absolute that we exclude animals from the morality set, but we have to extend indirect moral duties to non-human animals.
Whilst we exclude direct moral duties to non-human animals, we must be virtuous* to all animals optimally.
* Virtue is independent from morality and ethics proper; there are >100 elements that is dealt within what is virtue, so it is not efficient to mix virtue with morality-proper.

Also, the survival of the human species in interdependent on non-human animals, thus to insist all non-human animals can be killed would be a disaster, i.e. lead to the extinction of the human species?

[CIN]

People who, unlike you, have a correct understanding of moral principles, try to kill as few other animals as possible. And there is no evidence that insects are conscious, and if they're not conscious, they have no moral standing.

Insects are classified as 'animals'.
The issue is not about consciousness.

The issue is very definitely about consciousness. If an entity lacks consciousness, it cannot experience pleasure or pain; if an entity cannot experience pleasure or pain, it cannot matter to the entity what happens to it, and if it doesn't matter to the entity what happens to it, there's no reason for it to matter to us. Conversely, if the entity does feel pleasure and/or pain, then it does matter to the entity what happens to it, because pleasure is likeable and pain is unlikeable, and because it matters to the entity, it should also matter to us. This is the whole basis of morality: ideally we should try to give pleasure to all beings that can feel pleasure, and prevent pain to all beings that feel pain. As Bentham said: "The question is not, Can they reason? nor can they talk? but can they suffer?"

Where do you draw line with which animal is conscious and which is not.

Clearly all mammals are conscious, and can feel pleasure and pain, as well as emotions such as fear. You only have to watch a dog for a while to know that.

It's obviously harder to know whether reptiles, birds, fish and insects feel pleasure or pain, but they all have nociceptors, so it's entirely possible that they feel pain. The moral thing to do about such creatures is to avoid doing things to them that we know would cause pain in mammals.

As such your thesis, "humans has a direct moral duty to animals" is not tenable.

It certainly is tenable, as I have just shown.

There is no rational ground for granting moral standing only to humans.

No rational grounds??

As I had argued it is a question of facilitating efficiency in terms of moral progress for humanity; it is Occam's - the least the variables, the more efficient.

This is circular. You are justifying the restriction of moral standing to humans on the grounds that doing so will lead to moral progress for humans (and no other creatures). This is a circular argument, and therefore invalid.

[Veritas Aequitas]

People who, unlike you, have a correct understanding of moral principles, try to kill as few other animals as possible. And there is no evidence that insects are conscious, and if they're not conscious, they have no moral standing.

Insects are classified as 'animals'.
The issue is not about consciousness.

The issue is very definitely about consciousness. If an entity lacks consciousness, it cannot experience pleasure or pain; if an entity cannot experience pleasure or pain, it cannot matter to the entity what happens to it, and if it doesn't matter to the entity what happens to it, there's no reason for it to matter to us. Conversely, if the entity does feel pleasure and/or pain, then it does matter to the entity what happens to it, because pleasure is likeable and pain is unlikeable, and because it matters to the entity, it should also matter to us.
This is the whole basis of morality: ideally we should try to give pleasure to all beings that can feel pleasure, and prevent pain to all beings that feel pain. As Bentham said: "The question is not, Can they reason? nor can they talk? but can they suffer?"

What about those who get pleasure from pain?
There are many very normal cases where pain is beneficial to humans. e.g. no pains no gains, etc.
Pleasure and pains, like flight or fight are merely secondary features that can be applied alternatively to facilitate basic survival of the individual[s] and therefrom the species.
What is most critical is the will-to-survive and to optimize the will-to-survive we need morality-proper.

Consciousness is a very loose term and to link it up with a couple of other very loose terms will never lead to efficiency especially in morality and ethics.

Where do you draw line with which animal is conscious and which is not.

Clearly all mammals are conscious, and can feel pleasure and pain, as well as emotions such as fear. You only have to watch a dog for a while to know that.

It's obviously harder to know whether reptiles, birds, fish and insects feel pleasure or pain, but they all have nociceptors, so it's entirely possible that they feel pain. The moral thing to do about such creatures is to avoid doing things to them that we know would cause pain in mammals.

As I had stated above, pain and pleasure, consciousness are merely secondary variables to the will-to-survive achieving its optimality with morality.
To optimize the will-to-survive for the individual human[s] and humanity, it is most efficient to exclude non-human-animals from from morality but to provide humane considerations to them.

As such your thesis, "humans has a direct moral duty to animals" is not tenable.

It certainly is tenable, as I have just shown.

Note my counter above.
Morality has to be universal.
We cannot apply on a universal basis the 'no harm (killing) principle' as an imperative to non-human animals that are a threat to the human species.
It is possible, say, there emerge insects could be eat all the leaves and shoots of all plants; we don't kill and exterminate such insects because to do so would create tremendous pains
to billions and billions of them?

As such your thesis, "humans has a direct moral duty to non-human-animals" is not tenable.

As I had argued it is a question of facilitating efficiency in terms of moral progress for humanity; it is Occam's - the least the variables, the more efficient.

This is circular. You are justifying the restriction of moral standing to humans on the grounds that doing so will lead to moral progress for humans (and no other creatures). This is a circular argument, and therefore invalid.

By including non-human animals into the human moral equation will hinder moral progress for humans.

How can "justifying the restriction of moral standing to humans on the grounds that doing so will lead to [facilitate and expedite] moral progress for humans."

Moral progress for humans will have a side-effect of more humane considerations for non-human animals. i.e. via indirect moral duties.

If say, all humans were psychopaths [extreme amoralists], they will kill non-human animals for the fun of it [driven blindly] in the most inhumane manner, without any empathy for them.

However, if the average moral quotient [competence] of humans are increased due to efficiency, humans will not kill non-human animals arbitrary, for the fun of it, for sports, etc. but kill them only where necessary with rationality, compassion and wisdom.

[CIN]

Insects are classified as 'animals'.
The issue is not about consciousness.

The issue is very definitely about consciousness. If an entity lacks consciousness, it cannot experience pleasure or pain; if an entity cannot experience pleasure or pain, it cannot matter to the entity what happens to it, and if it doesn't matter to the entity what happens to it, there's no reason for it to matter to us. Conversely, if the entity does feel pleasure and/or pain, then it does matter to the entity what happens to it, because pleasure is likeable and pain is unlikeable, and because it matters to the entity, it should also matter to us.
This is the whole basis of morality: ideally we should try to give pleasure to all beings that can feel pleasure, and prevent pain to all beings that feel pain. As Bentham said: "The question is not, Can they reason? nor can they talk? but can they suffer?"

What about those who get pleasure from pain?

The pleasure is good, the pain is bad.

There are many very normal cases where pain is beneficial to humans. e.g. no pains no gains, etc.

In such cases the pain is intrinsically bad but instrumentally good.

These are beginner's objections that show that you've never even tried to understand how philosophical hedonism works.

Pleasure and pains, like flight or fight are merely secondary features that can be applied alternatively to facilitate basic survival of the individual[s] and therefrom the species.

On the contrary, pleasure and pain are so fundamental that they have been harnessed by nature as drivers of evolution: activities that make it more likely that genes will be passed on, e.g. sex and eating healthy food, are pleasant, while activities that make it less likely, e.g. getting injured or eating unhealthy food, are unpleasant. This only works because pleasure is good (i.e. merits a pro-response) and pain is bad (i.e. merits an anti-response).

What is most critical is the will-to-survive and to optimize the will-to-survive we need morality-proper.

Firstly, the will to survive is not always good. The will to survive in an animal which is in constant pain is not a good thing. You will never get your ethics right until you understand the fundamental importance of defining 'good' and working out what it applies to.

Secondly, morality is not about survival or the will to survive. That's pretty much the creed of the Nazis. It's about respecting living things and being kind to them, and if you don't know that, you don't know nuffin.

Consciousness is a very loose term and to link it up with a couple of other very loose terms will never lead to efficiency especially in morality and ethics.

Frankly, the guy who came up with the term 'morality-proper' has a damn cheek to criticise anyone else for the looseness of their terms. And efficiency is not a fundamental good; an efficient gas chamber is not a good thing, Adolf.

To optimize the will-to-survive for the individual human[s] and humanity, it is most efficient to exclude non-human-animals from from morality but to provide humane considerations to them.

The creed of the plantation owner: ideally you should treat your slaves humanely, but the efficient running of the plantation is more important. Evil bollocks.

As such your thesis, "humans has a direct moral duty to animals" is not tenable.

It certainly is tenable, as I have just shown.

Note my counter above.
Morality has to be universal.
We cannot apply on a universal basis the 'no harm (killing) principle' as an imperative to non-human animals that are a threat to the human species.
It is possible, say, there emerge insects could be eat all the leaves and shoots of all plants; we don't kill and exterminate such insects because to do so would create tremendous pains
to billions and billions of them?

As such your thesis, "humans has a direct moral duty to non-human-animals" is not tenable.

Okay, several things.

First, morality is never universal: there are always objects to be excluded, e.g. tables, chairs, stars, rocks...

Second, your own moral system is not universal, because you do not allow direct duties to non-humans.

Third, you assume that I think all non-human species have moral standing, but this is not true; I exclude all non-humans that do not feel pleasure and/or pain. This may or may not include insects.

Fourth, if insects do feel pleasure and/or pain, then we should factor them into our moral thinking, just as we should mammals. Would this be difficult? Certainly. But you cannot refute an ethical theory just because it would be difficult to put into practice, you can only refute it by showing that it is false at the theoretical level.

Finally, you derive a universal conclusion from a particular case (insects). This is invalid.

[Iwannaplato]

The people who were critical of Kant are critical because he sees animals merely as means, and the indirect duty Kant suggests we have in relation to animals they see as not enough. They disagree with you and they are correct that he does not have the view of animals they consider a moral duty. This doesn't make them stupid and you look stupid when you say that.

You coudl argue in support of Kant's position, of course. And they can argue criticially of his. But it is as there is not a value difference there when you write a post calling them stupid, quote Kant where he clearly has different values than them. And note Kant is talking about natural reactions that people tend to be born with. In some other thread with another focus you might well be talking about an oughtness not to kill other life forms, which is also built in and at a certain point most children identify with animals and would find it hard to watch an animal be tortured and killed. You can Kant have different ways of determining what an oughtness is and someone using your methods - at least the ones you use in some threads (but not others) - could come up with a VA type argument for why not killing animals is a similar leve direct oughtness, especially now that we can replace animal proteins with non-animals proteins and nutrition.

Now, note. My point is not that the people you are calling stupid are correct. My point is that your OP acts as a kind of denial that there are different, and significantly different values expressed by them and you. Mix this is with the 'Kant is the Bible' attitude you have, of course you have to start calling them stupid when in fact they are not being stupid but rather passionate about their differences with Kant - real ones. They are correct about those differences. And it's obvious that Kant was speciesist as one of them said. Does that make Kant wrong or does that mean that everyone should have their position? From the little you quoted of them, not so far.

What we have here is an arguement between two groups or moral realists - such disagreements have in the past lead to all sorts of violence and ignoring an oughtnesses to kill that you posit. I point this out given your habit of based-on-nothing arguing that antirealists are less likely to kill, spitting in the science FSERC methodogies and basing conclusions on the VA's intuition FSERC.

[Veritas Aequitas]

What about those who get pleasure from pain?

The pleasure is good, the pain is bad.

There are many very normal cases where pain is beneficial to humans. e.g. no pains no gains, etc.

In such cases the pain is intrinsically bad but instrumentally good.

These are beginner's objections that show that you've never even tried to understand how philosophical hedonism works.

I had covered 'hedonism' quite reasonably but because it is full of holes, I have not given it the attention I have given to Kantian and other serious philosophies.

Hedonism goes to the extreme of "Hedonistic Calculus".
https://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/calculus.html

Here are some serious objections with Hedonism:
https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/#H5

Ultimately;

6. The Future of Hedonism
The future of hedonism seems bleak. The considerable number and strength of the arguments against Prudential Hedonism’s central principle (that pleasure and only pleasure intrinsically contributes positively to well-being and the opposite for pain) seem insurmountable. Hedonists have been creative in their definitions of pleasure so as to avoid these objections, but more often than not find themselves defending a theory that is not particularly hedonistic, realistic or both.
https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/#H6

The above are the reason why I think Hedonism is not realistic and practical to optimize the well-being and flourishing of the individuals and humanity.

Pleasure and pains, like flight or fight are merely secondary features that can be applied alternatively to facilitate basic survival of the individual[s] and therefrom the species.

On the contrary, pleasure and pain are so fundamental that they have been harnessed by nature as drivers of evolution: activities that make it more likely that genes will be passed on, e.g. sex and eating healthy food, are pleasant, while activities that make it less likely, e.g. getting injured or eating unhealthy food, are unpleasant. This only works because pleasure is good (i.e. merits a pro-response) and pain is bad (i.e. merits an anti-response).

Per Evolutionary Psychology, the basic evolutionary drive is this;
1. All living things are "programmed" to survive [live] at all costs till the inevitable to pass on genes, preserve the species.
2. To facilitate 1, all living things are 'programmed' with;
3. Will-to-live
4. The 4Fs, Food, fight or flight, F..ck [fornicate, reproduce].
5. Avoid negative stimuli, attract to positive
6. Pain and pleasure [conscious, sentient beings] with developed nervous system
7. ...

Taking into account the evolutionary timeline starting from abiogenesis, I don't think the first one-celled organism would be endowed with a nervous system that deal with pleasure and pain. Rather they are triggered to attract to whatever is positive to survival and avoid whatever is negative to survival.

Note comment from AI:

You're absolutely right. Early single-celled organisms wouldn't have a complex nervous system capable of experiencing pleasure or pain as we humans do. Their responses to stimuli would be much simpler, driven by basic chemical and electrical signals.
These organisms would have evolved mechanisms to:
Attract to positive stimuli: This could include seeking out nutrients, light, or other beneficial conditions.
Avoid negative stimuli: This could involve moving away from harmful substances, predators, or unfavorable environments.
These responses are essential for survival and reproduction, and they form the foundation of more complex behaviors that have evolved over millions of years.

My point is Pain and Pleasure cannot be the sole and primary motivators for all human actions.

What is most critical is the will-to-survive and to optimize the will-to-survive we need morality-proper.

Firstly, the will to survive is not always good. The will to survive in an animal which is in constant pain is not a good thing. You will never get your ethics right until you understand the fundamental importance of defining 'good' and working out what it applies to.

What?
The universal standard is the will-to-survive till the inevitable.

Secondly, morality is not about survival or the will to survive. That's pretty much the creed of the Nazis. It's about respecting living things and being kind to them, and if you don't know that, you don't know nuffin.

As with the above, morality is grounded on the will-to-survive and morality is to ensure optimal survival till the inevitable.
Morality is critical to survival, else if we allow evil to fester, that would lead to the extinction of the human species, i.e. genocide via cheap and easily accessible WMDs.
Are you aware, Islam condone the extermination of the human species on [sinful] Earth since they are guaranteed eternal survival in paradise?

Consciousness is a very loose term and to link it up with a couple of other very loose terms will never lead to efficiency especially in morality and ethics.

Frankly, the guy who came up with the term 'morality-proper' has a damn cheek to criticise anyone else for the looseness of their terms. And efficiency is not a fundamental good; an efficient gas chamber is not a good thing, Adolf.

When did I assert 'efficiency' is absolutely good.
Note I had argued efficiency [double sided sword] is a virtue which must be independent from morality-proper.

To optimize the will-to-survive for the individual human[s] and humanity, it is most efficient to exclude non-human-animals from from morality but to provide humane considerations to them.

The creed of the plantation owner: ideally you should treat your slaves humanely, but the efficient running of the plantation is more important. Evil bollocks.

What is that.
Me: treat all humans morally, treat non-human animals humanely optimally.

It certainly is tenable, as I have just shown.

Note my counter above.
Morality has to be universal.
We cannot apply on a universal basis the 'no harm (killing) principle' as an imperative to non-human animals that are a threat to the human species.
It is possible, say, there emerge insects could be eat all the leaves and shoots of all plants; we don't kill and exterminate such insects because to do so would create tremendous pains
to billions and billions of them?

As such your thesis, "humans has a direct moral duty to non-human-animals" is not tenable.

Okay, several things.

First, morality is never universal: there are always objects to be excluded, e.g. tables, chairs, stars, rocks...

You missed my point re Universal.
What I stated is moral principles and moral standard [compass] must be universal.
If the moral standard is 'No humans are to be killed by humans' it has to be universal, but only a standard and guide.
In practice, one can kill but should always strive toward the universal standard.

Second, your own moral system is not universal, because you do not allow direct duties to non-humans.

See above. You got the wrong sense of 'universal'.

Third, you assume that I think all non-human species have moral standing, but this is not true; I exclude all non-humans that do not feel pleasure and/or pain. This may or may not include insects.

As I said, it it too messy to deal with morality that include non-human species.

Fourth, if insects do feel pleasure and/or pain, then we should factor them into our moral thinking, just as we should mammals. Would this be difficult? Certainly. But you cannot refute an ethical theory just because it would be difficult to put into practice, you can only refute it by showing that it is false at the theoretical level.

Finally, you derive a universal conclusion from a particular case (insects). This is invalid.

There is no way, non-human animals can feel pain & pleasure like humans do which is highly exceptional.
This is why it is wiser to exclude non-human animals from morality [as defined] but treat them as optimally humane as possible.
What can go wrong with this?

My focus with morality-proper as defined is focused on getting rid of evil.

[Veritas Aequitas]

And it's obvious that Kant was speciesist as one of them said. Does that make Kant wrong or does that mean that everyone should have their position? From the little you quoted of them, not so far.

Speciesism-in-general is a derogatory term of favoring one's species and anything goes [up the worst tortures] with other species. If I simply accept mine or Kant's morality is 'speciesism' that would imply I condone or encourage the arbitrary killing and torture of non-human animals.

Kant's provision for indirect duties to non-human animals is definitely not 'speciesism' in the above sense; it is preferable to use the term 'speciesism'.

Rather, I would prefer to define morality in detail as confining to the human species only but do not accept the term [label] 'speciesism' for Kant or the like.

[CIN]

What about those who get pleasure from pain?

The pleasure is good, the pain is bad.

There are many very normal cases where pain is beneficial to humans. e.g. no pains no gains, etc.

In such cases the pain is intrinsically bad but instrumentally good.

These are beginner's objections that show that you've never even tried to understand how philosophical hedonism works.

I had covered 'hedonism' quite reasonably but because it is full of holes, I have not given it the attention I have given to Kantian and other serious philosophies.

Hedonism goes to the extreme of "Hedonistic Calculus".
https://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/calculus.html

Here are some serious objections with Hedonism:
https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/#H5

Ultimately;

6. The Future of Hedonism
The future of hedonism seems bleak. The considerable number and strength of the arguments against Prudential Hedonism’s central principle (that pleasure and only pleasure intrinsically contributes positively to well-being and the opposite for pain) seem insurmountable. Hedonists have been creative in their definitions of pleasure so as to avoid these objections, but more often than not find themselves defending a theory that is not particularly hedonistic, realistic or both.
https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/#H6

The above are the reason why I think Hedonism is not realistic and practical to optimize the well-being and flourishing of the individuals and humanity.

I refuse to debate with the authors of articles who are not present in this forum. Don't pass the buck. If you think you can refute hedonism, do it here. Don't be so lazy, do the work. You are of course free to quote other authors, but you must take ownership of their arguments for the purposes of this forum and reproduce them here; I will not debate with people in absentia.

Pleasure and pains, like flight or fight are merely secondary features that can be applied alternatively to facilitate basic survival of the individual[s] and therefrom the species.

On the contrary, pleasure and pain are so fundamental that they have been harnessed by nature as drivers of evolution: activities that make it more likely that genes will be passed on, e.g. sex and eating healthy food, are pleasant, while activities that make it less likely, e.g. getting injured or eating unhealthy food, are unpleasant. This only works because pleasure is good (i.e. merits a pro-response) and pain is bad (i.e. merits an anti-response).

Per Evolutionary Psychology, the basic evolutionary drive is this;
1. All living things are "programmed" to survive [live] at all costs till the inevitable to pass on genes, preserve the species.
2. To facilitate 1, all living things are 'programmed' with;
3. Will-to-live
4. The 4Fs, Food, fight or flight, F..ck [fornicate, reproduce].
5. Avoid negative stimuli, attract to positive
6. Pain and pleasure [conscious, sentient beings] with developed nervous system
7. ...

Taking into account the evolutionary timeline starting from abiogenesis, I don't think the first one-celled organism would be endowed with a nervous system that deal with pleasure and pain. Rather they are triggered to attract to whatever is positive to survival and avoid whatever is negative to survival.

Note comment from AI:

You're absolutely right. Early single-celled organisms wouldn't have a complex nervous system capable of experiencing pleasure or pain as we humans do. Their responses to stimuli would be much simpler, driven by basic chemical and electrical signals.
These organisms would have evolved mechanisms to:
Attract to positive stimuli: This could include seeking out nutrients, light, or other beneficial conditions.
Avoid negative stimuli: This could involve moving away from harmful substances, predators, or unfavorable environments.
These responses are essential for survival and reproduction, and they form the foundation of more complex behaviors that have evolved over millions of years.

My point is Pain and Pleasure cannot be the sole and primary motivators for all human actions.

I'm not claiming that it is. Humans can be motivated by many things, including an irrational belief in Kant. Nor am I claiming that pleasure and pain are motivators for organisms that don't feel pleasure and pain (which would be absurd). All I claim is that pleasure is intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad, and that nothing else is either of these. If an organism is motivated to act by something else, then that something else is not intrinsically good or bad, and therefore has no intrinsic value.

What is most critical is the will-to-survive and to optimize the will-to-survive we need morality-proper.

Firstly, the will to survive is not always good. The will to survive in an animal which is in constant pain is not a good thing. You will never get your ethics right until you understand the fundamental importance of defining 'good' and working out what it applies to.

What?
The universal standard is the will-to-survive till the inevitable.

The will to survive has nothing to do with morality. In fact it often prompts people to behave immorally, e.g. by showing cowardice in war.

Secondly, morality is not about survival or the will to survive. That's pretty much the creed of the Nazis. It's about respecting living things and being kind to them, and if you don't know that, you don't know nuffin.

As with the above, morality is grounded on the will-to-survive and morality is to ensure optimal survival till the inevitable.

Rubbish. If you think the purpose of morality is to ensure survival, you haven't even begun to understand what morality is about. Soldiers who go to war to defend their country are sacrificing their own survival for the sake of a moral duty, which shows that survival and morality are not connected in the way you suggest.

Morality is critical to survival, else if we allow evil to fester, that would lead to the extinction of the human species, i.e. genocide via cheap and easily accessible WMDs.

You are drawing a false inference. The fact that morality is important for the survival of the human race does not entail that this is what morality is really about; it is just a side benefit of morality.

Are you aware, Islam condone the extermination of the human species on [sinful] Earth since they are guaranteed eternal survival in paradise?

Which is entirely logical from their point of view. I don't share their point of view.

As I said, it it too messy to deal with morality that include non-human species.

ROFL. Well, sorry if the messiness of the universe offends your aesthetic sense. Perhaps you should ask the Almighty if he would alter the universe so that you find it more tidy and aesthetically pleasing. Meanwhile I will continue to deal with the universe as it actually is, messy or not.

There is no way, non-human animals can feel pain & pleasure like humans do which is highly exceptional.

Prove it.

[Atla]

Thus Kant did not ignore moral consideration for

Kant was a solipsist, he never had a moral philosophy. He just was the kind of solipsist who pretended not to be a solipsist, pretended that other people existed, pretended to have a moral philosophy.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I had covered 'hedonism' quite reasonably but because it is full of holes, I have not given it the attention I have given to Kantian and other serious philosophies.

Hedonism goes to the extreme of "Hedonistic Calculus".
https://philosophy.lander.edu/ethics/calculus.html

Here are some serious objections with Hedonism:
https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/#H5

Ultimately;

6. The Future of Hedonism
The future of hedonism seems bleak. The considerable number and strength of the arguments against Prudential Hedonism’s central principle (that pleasure and only pleasure intrinsically contributes positively to well-being and the opposite for pain) seem insurmountable. Hedonists have been creative in their definitions of pleasure so as to avoid these objections, but more often than not find themselves defending a theory that is not particularly hedonistic, realistic or both.
https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/#H6

The above are the reason why I think Hedonism is not realistic and practical to optimize the well-being and flourishing of the individuals and humanity.

I refuse to debate with the authors of articles who are not present in this forum. Don't pass the buck. If you think you can refute hedonism, do it here. Don't be so lazy, do the work. You are of course free to quote other authors, but you must take ownership of their arguments for the purposes of this forum and reproduce them here; I will not debate with people in absentia.

My intention is not to debate by throwing out links; they are merely references that are are objections with the remark The future of hedonism seems bleak..
If I am given such information regarding to Kant, I will seriously dig into it to ensure there is no significant objections that would discredit my views.

As I had stated, my reading of Hedonism is that Hedonism is full of holes, thus I would not want to waste time preparing a detailed counter.

Here's from AI [wR] summarizing from;
https://iep.utm.edu/hedonism/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hedonism/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedonism
which are the most popular philosophical resources at present.

Here is a presentation on Refutation of Hedonism and its limitations based on the given website and some additional information I found on the web:

Refutation of Hedonism
Hedonism is the philosophical theory that pleasure is the only intrinsic good. Intrinsic goods are goods that are valued for their own sake, rather than for their instrumental value in producing something else.

There are several arguments against hedonism:
Moore's heap of filth. G.E. Moore argued that pleasure cannot be the only good because there are some things that are good even if they produce no pleasure. For example, he argued that it would be better for a beautiful world to exist than a heap of filth, even if no one ever experienced either world. This suggests that beauty is good in itself, not just because it produces pleasure.

The problem of false pleasures. Some pleasures are not good. For example, the pleasure of getting drunk may be enjoyable in the moment, but it can have negative consequences in the long run.

The difficulty of defining pleasure. There is no universally agreed-upon definition of pleasure. What one person finds pleasurable, another person may find unpleasant. This makes it difficult to use pleasure as the basis of a moral theory.

Limitations of Hedonism

Hedonism also faces a number of limitations:

Hedonism does not take into account the importance of other things in life, such as love, friendship, and justice.

Hedonism can be difficult to put into practice. It can be hard to know how to maximize pleasure in all situations.

Hedonism can lead to a selfish and self-centered way of life. If pleasure is the only good, then there is no reason to care about the well-being of others.

The future of hedonism

The future of hedonism seems bleak. Hedonism has been around for centuries, but it has never been a very popular philosophy. This is likely because of the limitations discussed above.

In addition to the limitations discussed above, hedonism also faces a number of challenges from contemporary moral philosophy. For example, virtue ethics emphasizes the importance of character and virtue, rather than pleasure. And utilitarianism emphasizes the importance of maximizing happiness, rather than pleasure.

The above is reasonable to give you a clue that to focus on Hedonism is a waste of time.

My point is Pain and Pleasure cannot be the sole and primary motivators for all human actions.

I'm not claiming that it is. Humans can be motivated by many things, including an irrational belief in Kant. Nor am I claiming that pleasure and pain are motivators for organisms that don't feel pleasure and pain (which would be absurd).
All I claim is that pleasure is intrinsically good and pain is intrinsically bad, and that nothing else is either of these.
If an organism is motivated to act by something else, then that something else is not intrinsically good or bad, and therefore has no intrinsic value.

I pass your point to AI, here is it critique:

This claim is a core tenet of hedonism, a philosophical theory that posits pleasure as the sole intrinsic good and pain as the sole intrinsic bad. While this view has its proponents, it faces several criticisms:

Oversimplification of Value: Hedonism reduces the complex spectrum of human values to a singular dimension of pleasure and pain. Many argue that other factors like knowledge, beauty, love, and justice also possess intrinsic value, independent of their hedonic consequences.

Incommensurability of Values: Hedonism struggles to account for situations where different types of pleasure or pain are incommensurable. For example, is the short-term pleasure of a guilty pleasure comparable to the long-term satisfaction of a virtuous act?

Quality vs. Quantity of Pleasure: Hedonism often focuses on the quantity of pleasure, neglecting the quality of experiences. Some argue that higher-order pleasures, such as intellectual or aesthetic pursuits, are more valuable than lower-order pleasures, even if they may not be as intense.

The Paradox of Hedonism: The pursuit of pleasure as an ultimate goal can paradoxically lead to frustration and dissatisfaction. Excessive focus on pleasure can hinder one's ability to appreciate life's simple joys and can lead to neglecting other important aspects of well-being.

Moral Considerations: Hedonism can sometimes justify actions that are morally questionable if they lead to personal pleasure, even if they harm others. This raises concerns about the ethical implications of a purely pleasure-based morality.

While hedonism offers a simple and intuitive framework for understanding value, it is a limited perspective that fails to capture the full richness and complexity of human experience.

Firstly, the will to survive is not always good. The will to survive in an animal which is in constant pain is not a good thing. You will never get your ethics right until you understand the fundamental importance of defining 'good' and working out what it applies to.

What?
The universal standard is the will-to-survive till the inevitable.

The will to survive has nothing to do with morality. In fact it often prompts people to behave immorally, e.g. by showing cowardice in war.

1. The will-to-survive is the primary ground of of well-being and the flourishing of humanity..
2. In sustaining the will-to-survive, all humans are programmed "to kill" for food, self-defense.
3. To survive in more advanced mode necessarily, humans are programmed with self-consciousness, ego, personality, autonomous agency and intelligence.
4. However, within 3, from the selfish or damaged ego, some humans direct the necessary 'to kill' against humans for various purposes, thus potentially defeating 1.
5. It is because of the danger of 4 that humans are subsequently adapted with the moral potential [no killing of humans] to optimize survival of the species.
6. The primary ground of morality is the will-to-survive.

War [killing of human is inevitable] in the first place is immoral to begin with.
Cowardice in war is in a way, moral, i.e. the avoidance to be killed by humans.
The recent and current waves of anti-war protest is an unfoldment and manifestation of the inherent moral potential.

Btw, psychopaths [amoralists] will favor wars because it a pleasure for them to kill humans but that is immoral re objective 1 above.

Rubbish. If you think the purpose of morality is to ensure survival, you haven't even begun to understand what morality is about. Soldiers who go to war to defend their country are sacrificing their own survival for the sake of a moral duty, which shows that survival and morality are not connected in the way you suggest.

You are the one who is ignorant of 'what is morality' in alignment with the empirical evidence from the acts and wants of humanity to date.
As I stated, war [inevitable killing of humans] is immoral in the first place.
Soldiers are thus engaging in immoral activities.
Soldiers who are highly moral as human beings had been evidenced to shoot off target when facing their enemies thus avoiding having to kill humans.

Morality is critical to survival, else if we allow evil to fester, that would lead to the extinction of the human species, i.e. genocide via cheap and easily accessible WMDs.

You are drawing a false inference. The fact that morality is important for the survival of the human race does not entail that this is what morality is really about; it is just a side benefit of morality.

As I had stated you are ignorant of what morality-proper is in alignment with human nature.

Are you aware, Islam condone the extermination of the human species on [sinful] Earth since they are guaranteed eternal survival in paradise?

Which is entirely logical from their point of view. I don't share their point of view.

This why acknowledging the truth of the above is critical and the solution is morality-proper that is grounded in survival.

As I said, it it too messy to deal with morality that include non-human species.

ROFL. Well, sorry if the messiness of the universe offends your aesthetic sense. Perhaps you should ask the Almighty if he would alter the universe so that you find it more tidy and aesthetically pleasing. Meanwhile I will continue to deal with the universe as it actually is, messy or not.

You missed the point.
Having to deal with too many variables is messy, i.e. not efficient and not adopting Occam.
You deny this?

There is no way, non-human animals can feel pain & pleasure like humans do which is highly exceptional.

Prove it.

It is obvious, non-human animals do not have the same capacity nervous system like humans that of humans.
Some higher non-human animals may have the same expressions of pleasure and pains as humans but such experience wears off immediate the stimuli is absent.
For humans it lingers to the extent of seeking pleasure artificially and unnaturally to that point where it threaten their survival.

Show me where Hedonism has been put fully into practice with some reasonable or possible success.
I have checked with AI, it only show some practices in ancient times but none in the present.

My point:
Hedonism is not a feasible moral option.