compatibilism

[Immanuel Can]

It's silly of Immanuel Can to pretend or believe he can answer the Problem of Evil which no theologian has ever satisfactorily answered

Well, I certainly never said I had exhausted that question. The Bible itself calls the existence of evil a great "mystery," so it's not surprising if it can only be partly accounted for by any mortal explainer. That is, in fact, why our need for the Ultimate Judge is so great -- apart from the wisdom of God, there will be no full accounting for evil.

But what I have done is much more modest. I have responded to such challenges as I have been given with the reasoned explanations I have, so far as they can go. If they are not up to your "satisfaction," that's unfortunate -- but it does not at all imply that no such answer is possible, nor does it give one reason to suppose that God cannot do, to full "satisfaction," what I can do to only partial "satisfaction."

And there the matter rests.

Hume summarizes Epicurus's version of the problem as follows: "Is [god] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

Well, that isn't terribly bright of him, is it? I mean, if this gloss on Hume were all he said, he would be rather a simpleton about the question of evil. He would be asking us to assume that God could have no sufficient reason for allowing any evil. That surely has to be the supposition of his question -- that God is obligated not to allow any evil to exist at all, and hence that He's either failing through inability or lack of moral commitment?

But I have already dealt with this simple allegation on several occasions; and it is not difficult. It must be clear to any thinking person that there COULD be reasons why the allowance of the option of humans doing evil could be necessary. And the traditional answer to what that might be is very straightforward: freedom. If man is allowed to choose to obey God, then by definition of the concept "choice" he must also have access to at least one alternative. And that alternative has to be to disobey (in some form) as well as to obey. And while it's not a permanent necessity for such an alternative to be present, it must be present no less than one time to each person, or "choice" is not even an illusion, but an utter impossibility.

Could freedom be a sufficient good that God would be warranted in allowing the possibility of His creatures choosing to do evil instead? I think the answer is very obviously "yes." Freedom is certainly one of the highest good, if not THE highest good we know. With freedom comes not only the possibility of choice, but also of individuality, personal will, self, identity, rationality, autonomy, and above all, genuine relationship. If there is no other way that mankind can enter into voluntary, genuine relationship with God, then his being granted, for a time, the option of doing other-that-God-wills (which is the definition of evil, we might say) is a necessary step, and ultimately requisite for the highest goods mankind can come to know.

So there is an answer for that putatively unsolvable paradox, B. I hope you find it "satisfying." But if you don't, you'll still need to consider whether or not it's at least largely right. In any case, we know that Hume's or Epicurius's dilemma is not a serious one. It's just a false dichotomy.

I can imagine that a benevolent and all powerful God would allow some small evils (such as colds in the head, comparatively insignificant careless mistakes, trusting all politicians, failing to turn the other cheek when one feels insulted, and so forth)so as to allow us scope to learn. But no good God would allow the Holocaust, burning to death of hospital patients connected to their drips, burying one terrified small boy in rubble, agonised unassisted dying, overflowing inefficient orphanages , slavery, and so forth----- so as to teach us some bloody lesson.

It's not about a lesson. It's about what happens when one willfully severs oneself from the Source of all goodness, truth, light, life, health, joy, wisdom, mercy and well-being. When one does that, one starts to generate the opposite. And what you mention, the Holocaust, orphanages, slavery, and so on, these are human doings, not God's. They're the sort of thing that happens when a creature uses his or her freedom to reject God and to go his/her own way. And if you think about that, you'll realize how naturally the consequences follow.

You are the only theologian I ever heard of who has so lightly brushed aside the Problem of Evil.

"Lightly brushed aside"? Hardly. I've simply pointed out to you what God says about the problem of evil. And I've pointed out that it's a profound mystery, as well. But if I refused even to try to respond to your objection, I'm sure you would accuse me of being evasive -- and rightly so, perhaps. So I must needs at least attempt a rational explanation of what I cannot fully explain, or I'm failing to take your challenge seriously.

So which do you want -- me to say nothing, and ignore your question, or me to attempt an answer? If I do the latter, am I guilty of treating your challenge "lightly"? But then if I do not attempt an answer, am I guilty of ignoring you, or of failing to think through a serious question myself?

Quite a bind you have me in: if I answer, I'm "light." If I fail to answer, I'm ignorant and unresponsive. Which would you prefer me to be?

There is an entire book in the OT devoted to the Problem of Evil.

More than one, in fact: but I assume you're referring to The Book of Job?

[Belinda]

It's silly of Immanuel Can to pretend or believe he can answer the Problem of Evil which no theologian has ever satisfactorily answered

Well, I certainly never said I had exhausted that question. The Bible itself calls the existence of evil a great "mystery," so it's not surprising if it can only be partly accounted for by any mortal explainer. That is, in fact, why our need for the Ultimate Judge is so great -- apart from the wisdom of God, there will be no full accounting for evil.

But what I have done is much more modest. I have responded to such challenges as I have been given with the reasoned explanations I have, so far as they can go. If they are not up to your "satisfaction," that's unfortunate -- but it does not at all imply that no such answer is possible, nor does it give one reason to suppose that God cannot do, to full "satisfaction," what I can do to only partial "satisfaction."

And there the matter rests.

Hume summarizes Epicurus's version of the problem as follows: "Is [god] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?

Well, that isn't terribly bright of him, is it? I mean, if this gloss on Hume were all he said, he would be rather a simpleton about the question of evil. He would be asking us to assume that God could have no sufficient reason for allowing any evil. That surely has to be the supposition of his question -- that God is obligated not to allow any evil to exist at all, and hence that He's either failing through inability or lack of moral commitment?

But I have already dealt with this simple allegation on several occasions; and it is not difficult. It must be clear to any thinking person that there COULD be reasons why the allowance of the option of humans doing evil could be necessary. And the traditional answer to what that might be is very straightforward: freedom. If man is allowed to choose to obey God, then by definition of the concept "choice" he must also have access to at least one alternative. And that alternative has to be to disobey (in some form) as well as to obey. And while it's not a permanent necessity for such an alternative to be present, it must be present no less than one time to each person, or "choice" is not even an illusion, but an utter impossibility.

Could freedom be a sufficient good that God would be warranted in allowing the possibility of His creatures choosing to do evil instead? I think the answer is very obviously "yes." Freedom is certainly one of the highest good, if not THE highest good we know. With freedom comes not only the possibility of choice, but also of individuality, personal will, self, identity, rationality, autonomy, and above all, genuine relationship. If there is no other way that mankind can enter into voluntary, genuine relationship with God, then his being granted, for a time, the option of doing other-that-God-wills (which is the definition of evil, we might say) is a necessary step, and ultimately requisite for the highest goods mankind can come to know.

So there is an answer for that putatively unsolvable paradox, B. I hope you find it "satisfying." But if you don't, you'll still need to consider whether or not it's at least largely right. In any case, we know that Hume's or Epicurius's dilemma is not a serious one. It's just a false dichotomy.

I can imagine that a benevolent and all powerful God would allow some small evils (such as colds in the head, comparatively insignificant careless mistakes, trusting all politicians, failing to turn the other cheek when one feels insulted, and so forth)so as to allow us scope to learn. But no good God would allow the Holocaust, burning to death of hospital patients connected to their drips, burying one terrified small boy in rubble, agonised unassisted dying, overflowing inefficient orphanages , slavery, and so forth----- so as to teach us some bloody lesson.

You are the only theologian I ever heard of who has so lightly brushed aside the Problem of Evil. There is an entire book in the OT devoted to the Problem of Evil.

I did refer to Job whose troubles were natural evils not moral evils---he was a good and pious man. Poor old Job got no answer, so he just kept on praying.

If God had been both good and all powerful he would and could have intervened. But there was no sign of him in the gas chambers.
If you were to identify God and love, then I'd agree with you.But I don't agree with any God that is identified with power.
Alternatively if you were to posit the Devil besides God, then I'd agree this is reasonable and would encourage us to be good. But in that case God would not be all powerful would he.

[attofishpi]

Well, I certainly never said I had exhausted that question. The Bible itself calls the existence of evil a great "mystery," so it's not surprising if it can only be partly accounted for by any mortal explainer. That is, in fact, why our need for the Ultimate Judge is so great -- apart from the wisdom of God, there will be no full accounting for evil.

But what I have done is much more modest. I have responded to such challenges as I have been given with the reasoned explanations I have, so far as they can go. If they are not up to your "satisfaction," that's unfortunate -- but it does not at all imply that no such answer is possible, nor does it give one reason to suppose that God cannot do, to full "satisfaction," what I can do to only partial "satisfaction."

And there the matter rests.


Well, that isn't terribly bright of him, is it? I mean, if this gloss on Hume were all he said, he would be rather a simpleton about the question of evil. He would be asking us to assume that God could have no sufficient reason for allowing any evil. That surely has to be the supposition of his question -- that God is obligated not to allow any evil to exist at all, and hence that He's either failing through inability or lack of moral commitment?

But I have already dealt with this simple allegation on several occasions; and it is not difficult. It must be clear to any thinking person that there COULD be reasons why the allowance of the option of humans doing evil could be necessary. And the traditional answer to what that might be is very straightforward: freedom. If man is allowed to choose to obey God, then by definition of the concept "choice" he must also have access to at least one alternative. And that alternative has to be to disobey (in some form) as well as to obey. And while it's not a permanent necessity for such an alternative to be present, it must be present no less than one time to each person, or "choice" is not even an illusion, but an utter impossibility.

Could freedom be a sufficient good that God would be warranted in allowing the possibility of His creatures choosing to do evil instead? I think the answer is very obviously "yes." Freedom is certainly one of the highest good, if not THE highest good we know. With freedom comes not only the possibility of choice, but also of individuality, personal will, self, identity, rationality, autonomy, and above all, genuine relationship. If there is no other way that mankind can enter into voluntary, genuine relationship with God, then his being granted, for a time, the option of doing other-that-God-wills (which is the definition of evil, we might say) is a necessary step, and ultimately requisite for the highest goods mankind can come to know.

So there is an answer for that putatively unsolvable paradox, B. I hope you find it "satisfying." But if you don't, you'll still need to consider whether or not it's at least largely right. In any case, we know that Hume's or Epicurius's dilemma is not a serious one. It's just a false dichotomy.

I can imagine that a benevolent and all powerful God would allow some small evils (such as colds in the head, comparatively insignificant careless mistakes, trusting all politicians, failing to turn the other cheek when one feels insulted, and so forth)so as to allow us scope to learn. But no good God would allow the Holocaust, burning to death of hospital patients connected to their drips, burying one terrified small boy in rubble, agonised unassisted dying, overflowing inefficient orphanages , slavery, and so forth----- so as to teach us some bloody lesson.

You are the only theologian I ever heard of who has so lightly brushed aside the Problem of Evil. There is an entire book in the OT devoted to the Problem of Evil.

I did refer to Job whose troubles were natural evils not moral evils---he was a good and pious man. Poor old Job got no answer, so he just kept on praying.

If God had been both good and all powerful he would and could have intervened. But there was no sign of him in the gas chambers.
If you were to identify God and love, then I'd agree with you.But I don't agree with any God that is identified with power.
Alternatively if you were to posit the Devil besides God, then I'd agree this is reasonable and would encourage us to be good. But in that case God would not be all powerful would he.

I find you both rather fascinating, particularly you Belinda.

[Immanuel Can]

I did refer to Job whose troubles were natural evils not moral evils---

The natural-moral distinction is an important one. They don't employ the term "evil" in the same way, of course. But both may be related. That's a big discussion.

Poor old Job got no answer,

You think? So you stopped reading after chapter Job 37? Because Job 38:1 says, "Then the Lord answered Job from the whirlwind..." That answer goes on for a few chapters, so it's pretty hard to miss...

Maybe you just didn't understand the answer. Is that possible?

If God had been both good and all powerful he would and could have intervened.

In Job? Or at Auschwitz?

What would you have expected him to do? (Serious question: see if you can be specific. If you were God, and you saw either situation, exactly what would you do?)

If you were to identify God and love, then I'd agree with you.

Why?

Why would you agree with "God is love," and yet charge Him with cruelty? How does that make sense?

Alternatively if you were to posit the Devil besides God, then I'd agree this is reasonable and would encourage us to be good.

How would the presence of a Devil "encourage us to be good"? That seems counterintuitive, does it not? Wouldn't that be like saying, "the presence of Stalin encourages us to respect human life"?

But in that case God would not be all powerful would he.

I can't see the logic for that. You'd have to explain. It's not obvious to me.

[iambiguous]

You're not cracking up on me, are you?

Stooge behavior on your part.

Even so, it's beyond my control. And then this part: From the Big Bang to...emojis?

Of course, "bullshit" is often in the mind of the beholder here. But then this thread explores the extent to which the minds of the beholders themselves are or are not autonomous.

Sure, which can be said about anything anyone says.

Yes, say the deterrminists, exactly!

Some things you respond as if there is at least the possibility of us reasoning or understand or communicating. Other times you pull out the conversation stoppers.

Conversation stopper: "That's definitely not how I think about that!"

And when did I ever say I would not respond to any real-world conflagrations that did not revolve around abortion?

In ILP. I pointed out why I chose another scenario. You said abortion was a perfectly good scenario and refused to respond to my post. I agree, it's a perfectly good scenario, but the problem for me is I don't judge Mary for getting an abortion. So, I chose a situation where I do hold someone responsible for their actions. You refused to respond to that post.

Is this in reference to the man with the hammer again?!

But really, please, copy and paste or link me to the post where this all unfolded. I've explained a zillion times why [to me] abortion is the mother of all conflicting goods. On the other hand, how on Earth would I go about demonstrating even to myself that I had or did not have free will in coming to that conclusion.

To wit:

And all I asked of others here is that -- click -- if their own memory is still largely intact, would they please attempt to note what they themselves believe you were attempting to convey with that example.

Actually you asked for the gist of the argument. Earlier you gave reasons why you weren't going to read the posts. We went through this once before and 1) it's two forums not three 2) I gave you easy links precisely after you asked Phyllo and you opted not to use them. There was no bullshit in my reaction.

Why don't you just copy and paste the example of the man with the hammer? I'll read it.

Why didn't use the fucking links it took me time to find and give you?

I opened the first link you suggested was the least I could do. And responded to it. But it wasn't even a post directed to me at all!

You can't even lift you endlesslessly productive fingers and use the search function above for 'hammer' in this thread. 6 letters.
viewtopic.php?p=732442#p732442
that post and the one directly afterward.

Same thing. I've told you I rarely read posts from you that are not directed at, uh, explaining me to everyone else here?

And I would not be at all shocked if science and philosophy came around to your own conclusions here. But over and again it seems [to me] that commitment revolves more around exchanges with those like VA here.

And that is just not the sort of philosophical exchanges I pursue in regard to meaning, morality and metaphysics.

So, don't respond to me and I won't respond to you.

What? That makes no sense. I haven't complained that you're responded to me. I was pointing out that what you complained never happened, happened. That you have gotten responses that were not in theoretical clouds, and that you opted not to read them...and continued to complain that everyone is responding up in the theoretical clouds.

It makes considerable sense to me, however.

And, yet again no explanation about why it makes sense to you. No interaction with what I wrote. The VA school of philosophy. Repeat an assertion and avoid interacting with what other people say.

Oh, yeah, I forgot about that. Why? Just lucky, I guess.

[iambiguous]

Okay, but this thread focuses less on what the objectivists think about compatibilism and more on resolving one way or the other whether anything that any of us think about anything at all we could have freely opted otherwise.

Why would it, then you should have named the thread "do we have libertarian free will?", not "compatibilism", and mention the above in the OP.

Well -- click -- we are still more or less in two different discussions here. Yes, my brain could have -- if it could have -- called the thread that. But my point then revolves more around those who insist that even though "I" was determined to name it Compatibilism -- could not have not named it that -- I am still responsible for it. Whereas, from my frame of mind, others holding me responsible for that are themselves compelled by their own brains to do so. For some hard determinists it's all or nothing. If the brain is but more matter then it's the laws of matter that sustain it here too. Then it's Mother Nature all the way down and all the way up. To God, some declare.

Over and over again many hard determinists here will note that it's not what we accuse others of or what they accuse us of, but whether the accusations themselves reflect autonomous or wholly determined exchanges. Same with coming up with definitions. If they reflect the only possible manner in which individuals are able to define something, what does it mean for others to accuse them of being wrong. They're wrong only because they were never able to be right. And even those who are right are right only because they were never able to be wrong.

This attempted approach is completely useless, since even determinists can make everyday choices (like choosing their accusations and definitions). Why, did you think that we can find out if we have free will, this way?

I have no idea what that has to do with the point I'm making. But then the point I'm making is that this is essentially moot because it's just another reflection of an exchange that could never unfold other than as it must. All attempted approaches are interchangeable in a world where all approaches themselves are entirely "scripted" by Mother Nature. Only it has to become Mother Nature precisely because we need to reduce it down to something we an imagine sustains a teleological meaning and purpose re the "human condition"

And gobbledygook right back at you. And while "I" seems clearly created in the mind by the brain, none of us really know what for all practical purposes that actually means in describing our own behaviors. Unless someone here would like to go there.

Lol? Half of Eastern philosophy deals with that topic, although they didn't fully figure it out. Of course some people roughly know how it works. Or imo rather how the the various forms of the I work, imo there are like 6-8 forms. (Even before taking variations like sociopathy and psychopathy and autism and savantism into consideration.)

Right, as though Eastern philosophers are themselves any less the embodiment of the only possible reality. And as though arguing that some know roughly how it words has any real significance when we bring it down to Earth to those like Mary and john and Jane. The 6 to 8 forms then.

Anyway. To summarize, self-aware volition, manifested as part of the "I", usually plays a major role in making everyday choices, but I see no reason to think that it can deviate from determinism.

Unless, of course, Nature has programed you to believe that what you believe about all of this here and now really, really is...what exactly?

Please. I suspect that most of those who come to conclude that human existence is essentially meaningless, that morality is largely a social construct rooted existentially in dasein, that when you're dead it's likely to be forever, and that your entire life is fated and destined, want to be convinced that perhaps that's not the case at all.

So, sure, I come into places like this never entirely ruling out the possibility that someone might succeed in nudging me in a new direction.

But you're wasting your time here, because you already know that you won't be rationally convinced here. And from the looks of it, you're wasting a lot of your time.

I'll have to run this by godot. Then after godot runs it by nature and gets back to me, I'll get back to you. Let's synchronize our mortalities.

Why not just believe that some unforeseeable/inexplicable thing will happen, because the world is infinitely larger and more mysterious than we can know and comprehend? And be done with it?

Hell, I was at or about there in high school. Then -- click -- I found God and Marx and Trotsky and so many other One True Paths that can make the mystery [all the scary parts] go away. Determinism is just one more option, right? And, again, here all you need do is to believe what you either were or were not compelled by your own brain to believe. And long after you and I are both dead and gone, maybe -- maybe -- Mother Nature will have finally come around to compelling philosophers and scientists to concur about what to make of all this.

Well, if human interactions are as I think they are in my head here and now, then my alleged burning need for theistic objectivism like your own take on compatibilism, like the so-called "standard meaning of free will", are all just what they never ever could have been otherwise.

Irrelevant.

Right, I get that part. You tell yourself what is relevant and irrelevant here, but only because you were never able not to profess anything other than that. But that's irrelevant too?

Imo you are very confused that you bring this absolute-level deterministic view into every everyday human interaction. That's why we need two levels of philosophy, not just here but in all of philosophy.

Of course, I don't do that at all. In fact -- click -- I start out acknowledging that the odds my assessment of compatibilism "here and now" is the optimal [let alone the only rational] one is staggeringly remote. Just more or less as staggeringly remote as yours is?

And the fact is that even given free will, I always make this crucial distinction between embodying an "absolute-level deterministic" description of either/or world and the is/ought world.

We can't live like this:

- Honey, could you pass me the salt?
- Honey, I'm made of 10^28 atoms, which one are you asking? And how could one atom pass you the salt? Honey, you make absolutely no sense.

Of course, what doesn't change at all is the fact that "somehow" the human brain with its trillions and trillions of cells and atoms and sub-atomic particles, is able to sustain this in part autonomously. "I" is the real deal in everyday interactions with others? Up to a point anyway.

[iambiguous]

Uh, you skipped a few points.

You didn't make a point. All you did is list websites. And I already know how to Google. Absent a question, a comment, or -- God forbid -- some original insight from you, I've got no idea why you want to send me to websites, or what question I'm supposed to answer.

Does anyone here actually believe that he believes this? And I'm Including you, IC.

But I'm even more mystified about what all this has to do with Compatibilism. Now, there's a real mystery...

Not anymore a mystery than trying to reconcile an omniscient God with human autonomy. Or a loving, just and merciful God with this:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_of_earthquakes
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_l ... _eruptions
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_t ... l_cyclones
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_tsunamis
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_landslides
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fires
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_epidemics
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_deadliest_floods
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_t ... ore_deaths
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lists_of_diseases
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_extinction_events

[Iwannaplato]

double

[Iwannaplato]

Okay -- click -- I clicked on that first link of yours above. And the first thing I notice is that it is not even in response to something I posted at all but something that FJ posted.

Yup, that's why I linked it later when you said no one was coming out of the clouds. And then there's the one in ILP. I understand that you didn't necessarily see this post originally. I decided to just investigate the issue with FJ since you refused to respond in ILP and had opted not to respond to posts earlier in this thread-ones that did quote you.

But great you partly responded.

Note: it's two posts in a row. Did you read both posts?

You can't even lift you endlesslessly productive fingers and use the search function above for 'hammer' in this thread. 6 letters.
viewtopic.php?p=732442#p732442
that post and the one directly afterward.

I also earlier said it was two posts in a row. So please read both posts.

I've explained a zillion times why [to me] abortion is the mother of all conflicting goods.

Sure, and you've also said you could discuss compatibilism in relation to other moral issues. Did you read my reasons for not wanting to start with the abortion issue, for example given that I don't judge abortion as immoral? Did you read any of that in ILP where you specifically refused to consider my arguments because it wasn't abortion while saying elsewhere that you would discuss other moral issues?

Again, as though in thinking this, believing this, that in and of itself makes it true?

That was a statement of my position. Why not read the two posts, then interact with the full position?

And, of course, for each of us as individuals, there are the things we do that others consider dangerous...but we do them anyway. Perhaps because we were never able not to, or perhaps because we are a sociopath or a psychopath, or perhaps because in, say, being on one or another One True Path, we rationalize it. "By any means necessary", is how some objectivists will put it.

Sometimes in this and other of his threads he hsa made the distinction between intellectual contraptions and, in my words, down to earth, practical applications of ideas. Well, I see it as perfectly reasonable to isolate a rapist from society. I don't hold a table responsible for his raping. I don't hold non-rapists responsibile. I might hold, for example, his parents or someone who sexually abused him parly responsible and take measures in relation to them also.

Compelled to or not, what this sounds like to me

Please respond to what I say, not your psychoanalysis of me.

The person we punish is not empty of traits, even in determinism. He, in this case, is someone who has the desire to rape and lived it out. While the causes go back to the Big Bang and perhaps beyond, and even though they are inevitable, this does not mean that his nature has nothing to do with his acts. He is the one who rapes. He has qualities that lead to rape.

Not sure I understand this.

Are you saying ultimately the causes of a rape do go back to the Big Bang and beyond?

Yes, the causes go back to wherever causes started.

That the rape was inevitable but punishing the rapist is not?

No.

The act of rape is a manifestation of the laws of matter, but our reactions to it allow for considerable individual "freedom".

No, not saying that.

What some determinists will argue is that nature has everything to do with both our acts and our reactions to the acts of others.

They all will. I am not saying anything different.

Please read both posts and interact with the arguments there. Not what you think about my psychology.

And this was very strange

Same thing. I've told you I rarely read posts from you that are not directed at, uh, explaining me to everyone else here?

So, you mainly want to read posts where I am explaining you to everyone here? Maybe you messed up the negative here, fine, let me know. But oddly this is a response to a link that discusses the issue and seems to be a reason you won't respond to it...because I'm not explaining you to everyone.

[Atla]

Well -- click -- we are still more or less in two different discussions here. Yes, my brain could have -- if it could have -- called the thread that. But my point then revolves more around those who insist that even though "I" was determined to name it Compatibilism -- could not have not named it that -- I am still responsible for it. Whereas, from my frame of mind, others holding me responsible for that are themselves compelled by their own brains to do so. For some hard determinists it's all or nothing. If the brain is but more matter then it's the laws of matter that sustain it here too. Then it's Mother Nature all the way down and all the way up. To God, some declare.

I have no idea what that has to do with the point I'm making. But then the point I'm making is that this is essentially moot because it's just another reflection of an exchange that could never unfold other than as it must. All attempted approaches are interchangeable in a world where all approaches themselves are entirely "scripted" by Mother Nature. Only it has to become Mother Nature precisely because we need to reduce it down to something we an imagine sustains a teleological meaning and purpose re the "human condition"

Right, as though Eastern philosophers are themselves any less the embodiment of the only possible reality. And as though arguing that some know roughly how it words has any real significance when we bring it down to Earth to those like Mary and john and Jane. The 6 to 8 forms then.

Unless, of course, Nature has programed you to believe that what you believe about all of this here and now really, really is...what exactly?

Imo: Again, the "I" is a part of the brain, and according to the deterministic laws of matter, you could have made the everyday choice to give your thread a fitting title. The problem wasn't with the ability to make choices here.
Again, your ability to make everyday choices is also a part of Mother Nature. You also write that script.
Again, what the "only possibly reality" is, does also hinge on what kind of everyday choices Mary makes, which does hinge somewhat on the version of the human "I" that Mary had at that point.
Again, Nature mostly programs me, but I also program Nature a litte by making everyday choices.

Well I think we can conclude this exchange. Imo like many determinists themselves, you seem to think that a distant point in the past, the Big Bang, has Absolute Authority over everything. But I disagree, imo this horrific take is based on the outdated Newtonian absolute conception of time. But Einstein has shown that all spacetime perspectives are equal, so I'm also programming the determinism of the "only possible reality". My everyday choices may not have cosmic significance on the order of the Big bang's significance, but they are quite relevant to my own life.

And imo this is what the laws of matter actually say. The question is how far we can go with making everyday choices, because we can't deviate from the laws of matter. The issue of determinisim is an infinite regress..

The above could be summarized as the attitude: "whatever I choose to do and am able to do, is the determined only possible reality".
The other attitude: "the Big Bang has 100% control over me and I'm nothing" is so psychologically destructive and imo not even correct.

I just remembered that there was a time when I also struggled with this issue. Because we are all "taught" the latter attitude, even though now I think that it has been outdated for a century, or rather never even made sense. And let's not even get into QM, it seems to seriously reinstate the importance of our perspective, even in a somewhat cosmic sense.

[Belinda]

I did refer to Job whose troubles were natural evils not moral evils---

The natural-moral distinction is an important one. They don't employ the term "evil" in the same way, of course. But both may be related. That's a big discussion.

Poor old Job got no answer,

You think? So you stopped reading after chapter Job 37? Because Job 38:1 says, "Then the Lord answered Job from the whirlwind..." That answer goes on for a few chapters, so it's pretty hard to miss...

Maybe you just didn't understand the answer. Is that possible?

If God had been both good and all powerful he would and could have intervened.

In Job? Or at Auschwitz?

What would you have expected him to do? (Serious question: see if you can be specific. If you were God, and you saw either situation, exactly what would you do?)

If you were to identify God and love, then I'd agree with you.

Why?

Why would you agree with "God is love," and yet charge Him with cruelty? How does that make sense?

Alternatively if you were to posit the Devil besides God, then I'd agree this is reasonable and would encourage us to be good.

How would the presence of a Devil "encourage us to be good"? That seems counterintuitive, does it not? Wouldn't that be like saying, "the presence of Stalin encourages us to respect human life"?

But in that case God would not be all powerful would he.

I can't see the logic for that. You'd have to explain. It's not obvious to me.

"The whirlwind" is still a real phenomenon in that country where there are small whirls that seem to randomly pick up dead bushes and sand and whirl them with no general movement that tends in the one direction. You will understand that with my liking for existentialism I interpret the Whirlwind as the array of meaningless events that we must perforce make up our own minds about. Job did exactly that; in his circumstances he decided to worship his traditional God. I have heard that Jews in Nazi death camps did likewise.
I did think that the distinction between moral and natural evil is related . But Sartre made the distinction Being for-itself (pour-soi) is the mode of existence of consciousness, consisting in its own activity and purposive nature; being in-itself (en-soi) is the self-sufficient, lumpy, contingent being of ordinary things.

I don't charge God with cruelty as I don't hope for the existence of a God that can intervene in the history of its own creation. Anyway, in these days of completely destructive climate change such a hope is dangerous.
God is love indicates that the God that is synonymous with love is not all -powerful. Love does not conquer all in one fell swoop, but is that which aspires to be good,just, courageous, honest, and faithful to the end. In everyday terms you usually see love fleetingly in small ways, and you work for love haltingly and fearfully because you are human.

Belief in Devil as a person on the same power-level as the personal God did at one time long ago help people to envisage the struggle to comply with the authorities.
Authorities presumed themselves to be spokesmen for God. (Unless they were Satanists ).

[phyllo]

All attempted approaches are interchangeable in a world where all approaches themselves are entirely "scripted" by Mother Nature.

I have always found Iambiguous' use of the word "interchangeable" to be bizarre.

As if a guy beating his wife and kids is interchangeable with a guy not beating his wife and kids.

Two different situations, two different results. What could "interchangeable" mean in this case?

[Flannel Jesus]

All attempted approaches are interchangeable in a world where all approaches themselves are entirely "scripted" by Mother Nature.

I have always found Iambiguous' use of the word "interchangeable" to be bizarre.

As if a guy beating his wife and kids is interchangeable with a guy not beating his wife and kids.

Two different situations, two different results. What could "interchangeable" mean in this case?

I think what he's getting at, that he's not so great at expressing, is that if physicalist determinism is true, then those macroscopic events would both just be physics playing out. He's saying, if physics produces a bunch of balls bouncing this way, or a bunch of cubes bouncing that way, who cares? What's the difference? It's just physics.

I'm not agreeing with his reasoning, just trying to put it more clearly than he ever could.

[Immanuel Can]

Uh, you skipped a few points.

You didn't make a point. All you did is list websites. And I already know how to Google. Absent a question, a comment, or -- God forbid -- some original insight from you, I've got no idea why you want to send me to websites, or what question I'm supposed to answer.

Does anyone here actually believe that he believes this? And I'm Including you, IC.

It's exactly what you did. Anybody can see it.

[Immanuel Can]

I did refer to Job whose troubles were natural evils not moral evils---

The natural-moral distinction is an important one. They don't employ the term "evil" in the same way, of course. But both may be related. That's a big discussion.

Poor old Job got no answer,

You think? So you stopped reading after chapter Job 37? Because Job 38:1 says, "Then the Lord answered Job from the whirlwind..." That answer goes on for a few chapters, so it's pretty hard to miss...

Maybe you just didn't understand the answer. Is that possible?

If God had been both good and all powerful he would and could have intervened.

In Job? Or at Auschwitz?

What would you have expected him to do? (Serious question: see if you can be specific. If you were God, and you saw either situation, exactly what would you do?)

If you were to identify God and love, then I'd agree with you.

Why?

Why would you agree with "God is love," and yet charge Him with cruelty? How does that make sense?

Alternatively if you were to posit the Devil besides God, then I'd agree this is reasonable and would encourage us to be good.

How would the presence of a Devil "encourage us to be good"? That seems counterintuitive, does it not? Wouldn't that be like saying, "the presence of Stalin encourages us to respect human life"?

But in that case God would not be all powerful would he.

I can't see the logic for that. You'd have to explain. It's not obvious to me.

"The whirlwind" is still a real phenomenon in that country where there are small whirls that seem to randomly pick up dead bushes and sand and whirl them with no general movement that tends in the one direction. You will understand that with my liking for existentialism I interpret the Whirlwind as the array of meaningless events that we must perforce make up our own minds about.

The problem with your theory is that "God spoke out of the whirlwind," and what He said was perfectly articulate, specific and clear. So the problem is that you stopped your reading of Job far too early, it seems.

I don't charge God with cruelty as I don't hope for the existence of a God that can intervene in the history of its own creation.

That would make you a Deist.

But the problem will remain, then. If God is the "absentee landlord" of the Deists, then how do you account for the existence of evil? Who's left to blame? Only mankind. But you say mankind is good, but weak. This "weakness" must be very serious indeed to occasion Holocausts, Holomodors, purges, death marches, Cultural Revolutions, Vietnams...

Anyway, in these days of completely destructive climate change such a hope is dangerous.

That's an odd claim.