compatibilism

[Alexiev]

No, of course not. Animals are creatures of instinct, rather than of decision. And they manifest no symptoms of higher consciousness, such as self-awareness, the ability to abstract, moral consideration or philosophical reflection. But they do have brains, and they do have a limited sort of mind, as well. However, it does not seem to range much beyond the rudimentary level of instinct and survival, even in the case of more sophisticated mammals, such as chimps or dolphins.

This is so obviously naive and incorrect that it hardly needs contradiction. Here's a current New Yorker article about birds' ability to learn and use language:

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024 ... 9265051239

Of course anyone who has ever owned a dog recognizes their volition, which is obvious. You call your dog. He looks at you, and it's clear he's making a decision (using free will). "Should I come (as I'm supposed to), or should I run off and enjoy a few more minutes of freedom?" he seems to ask himself. "Instinct" (a silly word that simply means behavior we don't understand) has little to do with it. Instead, he's weighing the consequences of each potential decision.

The notion that non-human animals are somehow programmed for survival is a silly one. I read where someone wrote that wild animal babies don't cry, because if they did they would be eaten by predators. But, of course, animal babies do cry, and they often are eaten by predators. Ignorance about non-human animals seems endemic, Immanuel. Take comfort that it is not just you.

[Immanuel Can]

No, of course not. Animals are creatures of instinct, rather than of decision. And they manifest no symptoms of higher consciousness, such as self-awareness, the ability to abstract, moral consideration or philosophical reflection. But they do have brains, and they do have a limited sort of mind, as well. However, it does not seem to range much beyond the rudimentary level of instinct and survival, even in the case of more sophisticated mammals, such as chimps or dolphins.

This is so obviously naive and incorrect that it hardly needs contradiction.

Far from it.

If animals had any higher-level cognitive functions, where is their culture? Where is their philosophy? How do we even know they know themselves as "selves," rather than merely feeling themselves to be instinctual cogs in a collective machine? We've got no such evidence at all. So the burden is on anybody who says animals have higher-level cognitions to show where these higher-level cognitions are manifest.

Of course anyone who has ever owned a dog recognizes their volition, which is obvious.

Yes. I agree. But then, I never said that animals lack lower-level cognitive functions, so I'm not sure whom you are arguing against there... There's certainly a difference between alternatives produced by instinct and what we would call a "decision." For a true "decision" is not merely made on instinct, but rather on the weighing of contrary considerations, often with a view to some "higher" value.

The notion that non-human animals are somehow programmed for survival is a silly one.

Well, that's not an idea you'll find in what I said. And yet, Determinists readily assert such a notion with regard to human beings.

Ironic, isn't it?

[Immanuel Can]

A brain is just a piece of meat, if there's no mind in it. Even corpses still have brains.

This is not the first time that you seem unable to tell the difference between alive and dead.

Yes, it's an equivocation, really. Yes, we use the word 'brain' to describe both living and dead 'brain stuff'. But it is not the same matter.

Okay. Well, we know where to find the brain matter. How do we find the mind matter?

Note: I'm not arguing that matter is the only substance.

I accept your caveat.

Okay, then: what is "mind substance"? How do we locate some of that?

[Alexiev]

Yes. I agree. But then, I never said that animals lack lower-level cognitive functions, so I'm not sure whom you are arguing against there... There's certainly a difference between alternatives produced by instinct and what we would call a "decision." For a true "decision" is not merely made on instinct, but rather on the weighing of contrary considerations, often with a view to some "higher" value.

The more we learn about non-human animals, the more we recognize that "instinct" (innate, genetically programmed modes of behavior) is less important than was once thought. If you read the New Yorker article I linked, you will see that birds' songs are not "instinctive". Instead, they are learned. By the way, one interesting tidbit from the article you can use in your anti-abortion discussions, human babies cry differently at birth based on the language of their mothers. Apparently crying is not fully "instinctive", but is also learned in the womb.

Many non-human animals appear to learn languages. The article talks about how certain monkeys have different cries warning about approaching predators depending on whether the predator is a hawk, a snake, or a leopard. Young monkeys often use the cries incorrectly, but learn the correct usage. Clearly, these cries are a form of language, and are not "instinctive".

One more interesting tidbit from the article (which I highly recommend): some birds are monogamous socially (i.e mate and rear children as a monogamous pair) while promiscuous sexually. They have open marriages!

[Immanuel Can]

Yes. I agree. But then, I never said that animals lack lower-level cognitive functions, so I'm not sure whom you are arguing against there... There's certainly a difference between alternatives produced by instinct and what we would call a "decision." For a true "decision" is not merely made on instinct, but rather on the weighing of contrary considerations, often with a view to some "higher" value.

...birds' songs are not "instinctive". Instead, they are learned.

Some are. Some are the same, year by year. But it's really irrelevant, because all that's required for that is very low-level cognitive functioning, and all with the routine for the species. It's certainly not the case that birds are constantly having to reassess, as humans are, who they are, what their place is in the world, and what the nature of their being is.

Nobody doubts that animals can "learn" after a rudimentary fashion. Even paramecia can "learn" very rudimentary things, such as mobility, light avoidance, and resistance to death. But "learning" of this particular sort is not higher-level cognition: it's involves no self-conceptualization, no abstraction, no moralizing, no aesthetic judgment, no mathematical calculating, no metaphysical questioning...in short, none of the faculties that in human beings are clearest accompaniments of free will.

But more importantly to the present controversy over Compatiblism, if we assume that birds and dogs have "free will," what's our basis for then saying that humans are determined by prior forces, and can't even do what we may wish to believe birds do? That would seem to dispatch Determinism even more thoroughly than if we attributed it only to humans, would it not?

[Iwannaplato]

This is not the first time that you seem unable to tell the difference between alive and dead.

Yes, it's an equivocation, really. Yes, we use the word 'brain' to describe both living and dead 'brain stuff'. But it is not the same matter.

Okay. Well, we know where to find the brain matter. How do we find the mind matter?

Note: I'm not arguing that matter is the only substance.

I accept your caveat.

Okay, then: what is "mind substance"? How do we locate some of that?

My point was that dead brains and live brains are not the same, even in the material. It seems you are a dualist, but you seemed not to notice that live brain matter and dead brain matter are not the same, even without recourse to minds or souls being absent. That question/argument didn't hold.

[Immanuel Can]

My point was that dead brains and live brains are not the same, even in the material.

Okay: if the "material" is different, or "not the same" between dead and alive brains, where is this "mind" stuff located? What is it made of?

[Alexiev]

Some are. Some are the same, year by year. But it's really irrelevant, because all that's required for that is very low-level cognitive functioning, and all with the routine for the species. It's certainly not the case that birds are constantly having to reassess, as humans are, who they are, what their place is in the world, and what the nature of their being is.

Nobody doubts that animals can "learn" after a rudimentary fashion. Even paramecia can "learn" very rudimentary things, such as mobility, light avoidance, and resistance to death. But "learning" of this particular sort is not higher-level cognition: it's involves no self-conceptualization, no abstraction, no moralizing, no aesthetic judgment, no mathematical calculating, no metaphysical questioning...in short, none of the faculties that in human beings are clearest accompaniments of free will.

But more importantly to the present controversy over Compatiblism, if we assume that birds and dogs have "free will," what's our basis for then saying that humans are determined by prior forces, and can't even do what we may wish to believe birds do? That would seem to dispatch Determinism even more thoroughly than if we attributed it only to humans, would it not?

As we've discussed, that depends on whether God's (or anything else's) certain knowledge of the future constitutes determinism, and (as I've claimed) is compatible with free will.

Also, the more we learn about animals, the more we recognize that they do have self-conceptualization, moralizing abilities, and aesthetic judgements. For example, the famous experiment in which capuchin monkeys rejected a cucumber as a reward for a task after seeing another monkey receiving a grape for accomplishing the same task (they were happy with the cucumber reward previously) suggests that monkeys have a sense of "fair play", which is a form of moralizing. Elephants have become accomplished painters and have clearly shown they have language and self-conceptualization. I suppose we can thank Noah for keeping the species going.

[Iwannaplato]

My point was that dead brains and live brains are not the same, even in the material.

Okay: if the "material" is different, or "not the same" between dead and alive brains, where is this "mind" stuff located? What is it made of?

I'm not postulating mind stuff, or saying it doesn't exist. I was critical of the argument that 'they're both brains but one doesn't do anything' so there has to be something else that's now missing. I'm not a materialist, but the no longer functioning of all sorts of things can happen without a mind being removed, unless we want to think computers have minds.

[Immanuel Can]

Some are. Some are the same, year by year. But it's really irrelevant, because all that's required for that is very low-level cognitive functioning, and all with the routine for the species. It's certainly not the case that birds are constantly having to reassess, as humans are, who they are, what their place is in the world, and what the nature of their being is.

Nobody doubts that animals can "learn" after a rudimentary fashion. Even paramecia can "learn" very rudimentary things, such as mobility, light avoidance, and resistance to death. But "learning" of this particular sort is not higher-level cognition: it's involves no self-conceptualization, no abstraction, no moralizing, no aesthetic judgment, no mathematical calculating, no metaphysical questioning...in short, none of the faculties that in human beings are clearest accompaniments of free will.

But more importantly to the present controversy over Compatiblism, if we assume that birds and dogs have "free will," what's our basis for then saying that humans are determined by prior forces, and can't even do what we may wish to believe birds do? That would seem to dispatch Determinism even more thoroughly than if we attributed it only to humans, would it not?

As we've discussed, that depends on whether God's (or anything else's) certain knowledge of the future constitutes determinism, and (as I've claimed) is compatible with free will.

Knowledge, of course, has nothing to do with Determinism: Determinism requires that something *makes* a person do what they do, not merely knows that they will do it.

But nothing here "depends" in the way you say. If birds are "free," then so are humans; because humans routinely perform far more sophisticated cognitive tasks than any bird ever can.

Also, the more we learn about animals, the more we recognize that they do have self-conceptualization, moralizing abilities, and aesthetic judgements. For example, the famous experiment in which capuchin monkeys rejected a cucumber as a reward for a task after seeing another monkey receiving a grape for accomplishing the same task (they were happy with the cucumber reward previously) suggests that monkeys have a sense of "fair play", which is a form of moralizing. Elephants have become accomplished painters and have clearly shown they have language and self-conceptualization.

Are you actually pretending any of this is concommitant with what human beings do?

What's your evidence for the elephantine conception of "selfhood?" And just how "accomplished" are their paintings? Renoir level? David level? And capuchin monkeys like grapes better than cucumbers? Who would have guessed?

Could you be serious now?

[Immanuel Can]

My point was that dead brains and live brains are not the same, even in the material.

Okay: if the "material" is different, or "not the same" between dead and alive brains, where is this "mind" stuff located? What is it made of?

I'm not postulating mind stuff, or saying it doesn't exist.

Well, you say that dead brains are "different" in "materials" than live ones. I just want to know what "materials" are being added or subtracted; for that, surely would be the "materials" to which you allude.

[Alexiev]

Are you actually pretending any of this is concommitant with what human beings do?

What's your evidence for the elephantine conception of "selfhood?" And just how "accomplished" are their paintings? Renoir level? David level? And capuchin monkeys like grapes better than cucumbers? Who would have guessed?

Could you be serious now?

The experiment shows that capuchin monkeys have a sense of fair play, which is a form of morality. Many experiments with elephants show they use language (their children have unique names to which they respond), and at least one elephant painted very attractive abstract paintings. Experiments also show that some animals are self-aware.

https://elephantartgallery.com/

https://www.cam.ac.uk/research/news/ele ... telligence

Wittgenstein famously said, "If a lion could talk, we couldn't understand it." However, that's clearly not correct. There are (or were in the not distant past) people who could understand lions. They worked in circuses and were called "lion tamers".

So all of this is "concomitant" with what human beings do, although not identical.

[phyllo]

I'm pointing out that difference, in fact: the difference is the presence of mind within the brain.

That's not the only difference.

Because it's analytic. That means it's definitionally true. If the meat can perform operations like "perceiving" or "choosing" or "making decisions," then you've already conceded the evidence.

If it was only a question of definitions, then the definitions "choice" and "decision" would clearly establish that determinists have choices and make decisions.

Since you don't accept that, then there must be more to it.

For the Determinist, there are no authentic cases of what you are calling "internal factors." They're all epiphenomenal.

Stop putting words into the mouths of determinists.

I am. And if you're understanding the debate, you should be too, I think.

Maybe you don't understand what I am debating.

Well, you speak of "internal factors," but when I asked you what they were, you listed phenomena of consciousness. So it seems you were meaning consciousness.

You claim that it's "phenomena of consciousness". I never said that.

Animals are creatures of instinct, rather than of decision.

When a rat is running in a maze, it's making decisions.

If not, then you are redefining the meaning of the word "decision".

[phyllo]

Are you actually pretending any of this is concommitant with what human beings do?

Yeah, that's just what Iambiguous does .. he denies that what animals do is applicable to humans.

But what animals do, demonstrates what brains do ... without free-will, without soul, without consciousness.

[Immanuel Can]

Are you actually pretending any of this is concommitant with what human beings do?

What's your evidence for the elephantine conception of "selfhood?" And just how "accomplished" are their paintings? Renoir level? David level? And capuchin monkeys like grapes better than cucumbers? Who would have guessed?

Could you be serious now?

The experiment shows that capuchin monkeys have a sense of fair play, which is a form of morality.

No, it doesn't. It shows that they prefer grapes. That's all.

But let's pretend you're right: that capuchins have some refined sense of morality. Humans obviously have a much more refined sense of morality. So then, Determinism is not true, in either case. Both capuchins and humans have freedom in respect to their moral conclusions, and humans obviously have more freedom in that area. Is that the argument you're trying to make?

Thus, your argument does not serve any conclusion that Compatiblism works. It just doesn't work...even by your own argument.