Kant's T_Idealism-Empirical_Realism vs Indirect Realism

[Atla]

IR and TI can both be seen as circular, internally consistent philosophies. I told VA years ago that a debate between two such positions requires a next level comparison, a meta-comparison, and even the rules of such a comparison are to be established first.

These things go beyond VA's abilities however, these IR vs TI topics are just for show.

[Veritas Aequitas]

One of the many ironic things is we simply to not have to have some final approach to gaining knowledge or thinking of reality. Direct realism, indirect realism and (in certain niches) antirealism have all produced knowledge that is useful to us. I am not arguing that the discussion can't be useful, but in the end it's a bit like surgeons saying that all surgeons should use the same scalpels for the same steps in the same procedures. When in fact, it's great that each uses those tools they think are best and also makes other adjustments to the procedures given what has worked best for them. Models are for us after all.

As I had stated philosophical realism [comprising direct realism, indirect realism] is ideologized from an evolutionary default which has facilitated basic survival for all organisms since 3.5 billion years ago.
Unfortunately this evolutionary default of externalness and mind-independence has been ideologized by philosophical realists over the last appx 5000 [maybe more] years.

It is only appx 2000 years ago that opposition and rejection of philosophical realism as an ideology emerged loosely and unorganized in different factions.
The more systematic and rational opposition and rejection of philosophical realism via philosophical antirealism came through the more systematic and organized oppositions, objections and counters from Kant which was relatively merely 250 years ago.

Philosophical realism [with direct and indirect realism] is still useful but when it is ideologized to resist the later philosophical antirealists' view, it is problematic [psychologically] and hinder humanity's progress.

By clinging to philosophical realism dogmatically, is like doing brain surgery via trepanation:
"Trepanation is drilling a hole in the skull without damaging the brain, or by modern terms, a craniotomy" Ancient Brain Surgery
in contrast [Kantian philosophical antirealism] to modern methods of brain surgery and other more refined methods to cure brain and mental diseases.

[Veritas Aequitas]

2x

[Veritas Aequitas]

IR and TI can both be seen as circular, internally consistent philosophies. I told VA years ago that a debate between two such positions requires a next level comparison, a meta-comparison, and even the rules of such a comparison are to be established first.

These things go beyond VA's abilities however, these IR vs TI topics are just for show.

Don't resort to excuses which cannot be validated.
If so, Where??

The last time I asked you "where" you gave me this, where:
Atla asked AI what are the weaknesses of IR and Atla provided counters to AI:
viewtopic.php?p=704586#p704586

I then rely on the above and asked AI to respond to your counter in support of Indirect Realism.
The eventual conclusion therefrom where ChatGpt explained clearly and rationally, is this:

Conclusion
These arguments show why TI-ER is more rational and practical than IR, not only from within Kant’s own framework but from a broader general perspective of how we engage with and understand the world.
viewtopic.php?p=734609#p734609

So, it is your turn to counter the above conclusion; show where ChatGpt is wrong.

[Atla]

IR and TI can both be seen as circular, internally consistent philosophies. I told VA years ago that a debate between two such positions requires a next level comparison, a meta-comparison, and even the rules of such a comparison are to be established first.

These things go beyond VA's abilities however, these IR vs TI topics are just for show.

Don't resort to excuses which cannot be validated.
If so, Where??

The last time I asked you "where" you gave me this, where:
Atla asked AI what are the weaknesses of IR and Atla provided counters to AI:
viewtopic.php?p=704586#p704586

I then rely on the above and asked AI to respond to your counter in support of Indirect Realism.
The eventual conclusion therefrom where ChatGpt explained clearly and rationally, is this:

Conclusion
These arguments show why TI-ER is more rational and practical than IR, not only from within Kant’s own framework but from a broader general perspective of how we engage with and understand the world.
viewtopic.php?p=734609#p734609

So, it is your turn to counter the above conclusion; show where ChatGpt is wrong.

You didn't respond there either yourself. I've already beaten the best arguments from ChatGPT long ago, it's your turn to counter things with something better.

Of course that would require that you actually understand TI but you don't.

You don't even know how to write an argument for TI on your own.

[Atla]

The guy can't even pick one from those self-refuting and strawman chatbot arguments and reword it, and present it as his own. That would require some vague understanding of the topic.

[Atla]

It's not very hard to get ChatGPT to say that inidrect realism is both more rational according to science (science of perception), and also could be a more fundamental philosophical consideration. You just have to wade through some rubbish, probably said by many transcendental idealists (who think they are so deep), that ChatGPT was programmed with.

If the established science of perception aligns more closely with indirect realism than with transcendental idealism, then why is transcendental idealism more rational? Summary only.

...
The rationality of transcendental idealism lies in its explanation of how perception is fundamentally shaped by cognitive faculties, addressing why we consistently experience reality in certain ways. It emphasizes that even if indirect realism aligns with scientific findings, it does not account for the mind's role in shaping the nature of experience itself. Thus, transcendental idealism is considered more comprehensive in explaining the conditions for the possibility of perception and knowledge.

That is factually incorrect, indirect realism claims that we perceive the world through mental representations based on external objects, and that these representations are shaped by cognitive faculties.

You’re correct. Indirect realism does acknowledge that our perception is mediated through mental representations shaped by cognitive faculties. The distinction lies in how the two philosophies address the nature of perception and reality:

...

The rationale for transcendental idealism being considered more rational by some is its deeper emphasis on the mind’s active role in constituting the nature of experience itself, not just shaping mental representations. It explains why our experiences consistently follow certain structures (e.g., spatial-temporal frameworks), suggesting that these structures are conditions imposed by the mind rather than properties of external objects.

That is also factually incorrect, indirect realism also claims that humans quite consistently share the same mental faculties, and therefore more or less experience the same kind of representations.

You're right again. Indirect realism does indeed account for the consistency in human experience by recognizing that people share similar cognitive faculties, which lead to largely consistent mental representations of the external world. Both indirect realism and transcendental idealism acknowledge that the mind plays a role in shaping how we perceive the world, and both explain why there is a shared consistency in our experiences.

...

The reason transcendental idealism might be considered more rational by some is because it questions the assumption that there is a direct correspondence between mental representations and an independent external world. It emphasizes that the shared structures of experience are not just shaped by cognitive faculties but are actually conditions set by the mind for experiencing anything at all. This deeper level of explanation is seen by some as more comprehensive in addressing why our experiences are consistently structured in specific ways.

And does the established science of perception align with indirect realism here? Summary only.

Yes, the established science of perception aligns more closely with indirect realism. It supports the idea that our experiences are based on mental representations shaped by sensory input from an external world, processed by shared cognitive faculties. This aligns with indirect realism's claim that we perceive the world indirectly through representations formed by our brain, rather than experiencing the world directly as it is. While perception science acknowledges that our cognitive faculties shape these representations, it generally maintains the existence of an external reality that these representations correspond to, even if imperfectly.

So based on this, is indirect realism more rational?

...
Thus, the "rationality" of each view depends on whether one prioritizes empirical alignment (favoring indirect realism) or a more fundamental philosophical inquiry into the nature of experience (favoring transcendental idealism).

I argue that since transcendental idealism simply avoids the veil of perception problem, it avoids uncertainty, indirect realism is actually the more fundamental philosophical consideration.

...
From this perspective, indirect realism could be considered a more fundamental philosophical position because it directly addresses the epistemological challenge of the veil of perception rather than bypassing it. By grappling with the uncertainty and trying to bridge the gap between perception and reality, indirect realism delves deeper into the problem of how we come to know the world. This approach can be seen as a more rigorous attempt to tackle the complexities of perception and knowledge head-on.

[Iwannaplato]

Well, as long as we are playing with AIs we can choose a more concise one:

Physics
In physics, Indirect Realism is more commonly favored. This is because physics relies on the assumption that there is an objective reality that can be understood through observation and experimentation, even if our perceptions are mediated by our sensory apparatus and instruments.

Philosophy
Philosophy is more diverse in its views. According to the 2020 PhilPapers Survey, there isn't a single dominant position1
. However, many philosophers lean towards Metaphysical Antirealism or at least acknowledge the significant role of perception and conceptual frameworks in shaping our understanding of reality1

Science in General
In general science, the preference tends to align more with Indirect Realism. Scientific methods are built on the idea that there is an external reality that can be studied and understood, even if our tools and senses provide a mediated view of it.

So, while physics and general science lean towards Indirect Realism, philosophy encompasses a broader spectrum of views, with a notable presence of Metaphysical Antirealism.

So, we could all fanatically choose one to live utterly by tomorrow: professionally, interpersonally, in our leisure actitivies, etc.
Then compare notes. Call it a coin toss and we can then explore all the incredibly different experiences and insights we have when we live through these different models.

[Iwannaplato]

And while we're at it: what is an illusion to a metaphysical antirealist?
We just have another perception/experience/perspective, it would seem? We can never be misinterpreting objective reality, so the term 'illusion' doesn't really work here.

It seems like between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism there is 1) a difference in degree: illusions are in a sense endemic in indirect realism,while they are more exceptional in direct realism. 2) there would be some spectrum in indirect realism from merely mediated, to mediated in a very misleading way (illusion).

If we go with Kant, the only possible illusion is when we think we are experiencing objective reality or a noumenon directly. But that's not really perception; it's more like how we think about our experience. Or?

So if we take a cliche
Perceptual Illusions: A simple illusion, like a stick appearing bent in water, would be an example of our mind organizing sensory input in a way that doesn’t match the object as it appears under different conditions (air vs. water). While the stick isn’t “bent” in the noumenal sense, our senses interpret it as such due to the way our perceptual apparatus works.

Kant cannot say that the bent image of the stick is any more an illusion than the image of the straight stick in one medium (for ex. air) Because that would imply we really know what the stick ding an sich is. For all we know it is bendy and straight in some inconceivable way for us.

The indirect realist and the direct realist decide that the two medium image is misleading about the object itself.

[Atla]

By the way, VA hasn't even noticed that the ChatGPT quotes he brought, totally assume a form of transcendental idealism where an objective, mind-independent reality IS assumed, noumenal objects ARE assumed, other people ARE assumed, and it IS also assumed that we all have the same mental faculties. But VA rejects all this, this kind of transcendental idealism is almost like a deliberately dumb version of indirect realism at this point.

[Iwannaplato]

By the way, VA hasn't even noticed that the ChatGPT quotes he brought, totally assume a form of transcendental idealism where an objective, mind-independent reality IS assumed, noumenal objects ARE assumed, other people ARE assumed, and it IS also assumed that we all have the same mental faculties. But VA rejects all this, this kind of transcendental idealism is almost like a deliberately dumb version of indirect realism at this point.

There's 'seeing what X entails': fairly direct, deductive conclusions about what it would mean if X is true. These may be different from the restricted focus someone has on the intellectual consequences of believing X is true. Anyone doing this will be told they are using a strawman. Which ends up being a ban on noticing what is entailed, or an attempt at a ban. It certainly stops any discussion with VA. Utter compartmentalization.
It would be nice to not only seems or is entails, but even to get into some extrapolation.

[Veritas Aequitas]

By the way, VA hasn't even noticed that the ChatGPT quotes he brought, totally assume a form of transcendental idealism where an objective, mind-independent reality IS assumed, noumenal objects ARE assumed, other people ARE assumed, and it IS also assumed that we all have the same mental faculties. But VA rejects all this, this kind of transcendental idealism is almost like a deliberately dumb version of indirect realism at this point.

Strawman.

ChatGpt refers to Transcendental_Idealism-Empirical Realism [TI-ER] in complementary not just TI alone.

In the ChatGpt quotes,
the charge is that IR [& philosophical] merely assume an absolutely mind-independent reality and noumenal objects.
Thus in claiming such assumptions as real is chasing illusions.

Transcendental_Idealism - Empirical Realism claims what-is-real is what is experienced, seen, observed empirically. There is no assumptions regarding what is real.

[Veritas Aequitas]

And while we're at it: what is an illusion to a metaphysical antirealist?
We just have another perception/experience/perspective, it would seem? We can never be misinterpreting objective reality, so the term 'illusion' doesn't really work here.

According to Kant there are three types of illusions;
-empirical illusions of the senses
-logical illusions - fallacies
-transcendental illusion - hypostatizations

It seems like between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism there is 1) a difference in degree: illusions are in a sense endemic in indirect realism,while they are more exceptional in direct realism. 2) there would be some spectrum in indirect realism from merely mediated, to mediated in a very misleading way (illusion).

There is no difference in terms of the transcendental illusion between direct and indirect realism.
Both claim there is an absolutely mind-independent reality out there which exists regardless of whether there are human or not.
The difference is whether the "illusions" are mediated [IR] or not [DR].

If we go with Kant, the only possible illusion is when we think we are experiencing objective reality or a noumenon directly. But that's not really perception; it's more like how we think about our experience. Or?

According to Kant, transcendental illusions arise due to hypostatization and subreption where it is assumed there is a mind-independent reality beyond experience and the empirical.

So if we take a cliche
Perceptual Illusions: A simple illusion, like a stick appearing bent in water, would be an example of our mind organizing sensory input in a way that doesn’t match the object as it appears under different conditions (air vs. water). While the stick isn’t “bent” in the noumenal sense, our senses interpret it as such due to the way our perceptual apparatus works.

Kant cannot say that the bent image of the stick is any more an illusion than the image of the straight stick in one medium (for ex. air) Because that would imply we really know what the stick ding an sich is. For all we know it is bendy and straight in some inconceivable way for us.

The indirect realist and the direct realist decide that the two medium image is misleading about the object itself.

Kant recognizes the "bent stick" as an empirical illusion which can be easily exposed upon detail examinations to determine the empirical actual stick.

The transcendental illusion arise when the philosophical realists [IR and DR] claim besides the empirical actual stick, there is still a mind-independent actual stick that exists regardless of whether there are humans or not.

Here is where Kant described the difference between a logical and transcendent illusion, the obvious empirical illusion is explained elsewhere.

Logical Illusion, which consists in the mere imitation of the Form of Reason (the Illusion of Formal fallacies), arises entirely from lack of attention to the Logical Rule.
As soon as attention is brought to bear on the case that is before us, the Illusion completely disappears.
Transcendental Illusion, on the other hand, does not cease even after it has been detected and its invalidity clearly revealed by Transcendental Criticism (e.g. the Illusion in the Proposition: the World must have a beginning in Time). A297 B353

Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them {the illusions}.
After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. B397

These are the illusions chased by philosophical realists [DR, IR and others] when driven by an evolutionary default arising from an existential crisis.
The above imply the problem of such illusions is due to psychology rather than epistemology.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Re this OP, in summary Atla countered 5 points raised by AI, and AI explained in detailed with the final conclusion:

"These arguments show why TI-ER is more rational and practical than IR, not only from within Kant’s own framework but from a broader general perspective of how we engage with and understand the world."

From the following discussions:
Points 1-3
viewtopic.php?p=734605#p734605

Points 4-5
viewtopic.php?p=734609#p734609
detailed as below

Here is my interlocutor's response to point 4 and 5.
[ChatGpt] 4. TI-ER is More Aligned with Scientific Practice
Modern science operates within a framework similar to TI-ER: we construct theoretical models of reality based on empirical data, acknowledging that we may never know the world in itself but that our models are sufficiently accurate for practical purposes. This scientific mindset aligns more with Kant’s empirical realism than with IR, which posits a reality beyond our perception that science cannot directly engage with.

From a general rational perspective, TI-ER is more compatible with how we actually engage with reality in everyday life and in science. It provides a workable framework for knowledge without introducing speculative, inaccessible entities like the IR’s noumenon.

[Interlocutor Responded]This a blatant lie, IR and not TI-ER is the default in science exactly because it's consistent with IR.

[ChatGpt]5. Reality-Gap vs. No Reality-Gap
IR is often described as more honest because it “accepts uncertainty.” However, the reality-gap it creates by insisting on a mind-independent noumenon leads to more epistemic uncertainty than is necessary. It leaves us with the problem of never knowing whether we have accurate knowledge of the external world.

TI-ER, by focusing on what we can know (phenomena) and rejecting the idea of a constitutive noumenon, avoids this reality-gap entirely. What is real for us is what appears through the structures of our cognition. This is a more rational and practical view of reality, as it doesn’t lead to the skepticism that arises from the gap introduced by IR.

[Interlocutor's Responded ]Yes, but at the cost of becoming a solipsist, and this also can't explain things like hallucinations and illusions. There is no problem with the external world because there is no external world at all. If this is more rational to you then there is probably something very wrong with you.

[ME] I believe Indirect Realism assumes an absolutely mind-independent external world that is mediated via the sense data to the subject.

What is your respond to the above beside the charge of solipsism, hallucination and illusions which you have responded earlier.

Here's ChatGpt's Response:

Your interlocutor's responses seem to involve two main arguments beyond the already addressed charges of solipsism, hallucinations, and illusions:

Claim that IR is the default in science and not TI-ER.
Misrepresentation of TI-ER as denying the external world, resulting in an accusation of solipsism.

Let’s address these points one by one.

1. Is IR the Default in Science?
Your interlocutor claims that Indirect Realism (IR) is the default position in science, implying that TI-ER is not compatible with scientific practice. This is not accurate when we examine the philosophical underpinnings of science. Here's why:

Scientific Models and TI-ER Compatibility: Modern scientific practice involves creating theoretical models that organize empirical data to make predictions about phenomena. These models are not direct representations of an absolutely mind-independent reality but conceptual tools that help us understand and predict the world as it appears to us. This approach aligns more with Kant’s empirical realism (ER) than with IR, which posits an unmediated access to a mind-independent world that we cannot directly verify.

Kant’s Framework and Scientific Practice: Kant’s TI-ER emphasizes that we engage with the world through cognitive categories (e.g., space, time, causality) that structure our experience. Science operates within this same structured framework, focusing on empirical phenomena that can be observed and measured. Scientists use models and theories to predict and explain phenomena, acknowledging that these models may not reflect the “thing-in-itself” but are sufficient for practical purposes—this is exactly what Kant argues.

Empirical Focus of Science: Science doesn’t concern itself with noumena (the unknowable reality posited by IR). Instead, it focuses on the phenomena—the observable, measurable aspects of the world. TI-ER, by focusing on the reality of phenomena, aligns more closely with the methodology of science than IR, which speculates about an unknowable external world (noumenon) beyond our direct experience. Hence, Kant’s view is more aligned with scientific pragmatism because it doesn’t require unnecessary speculation about an unreachable world.

Scientific Realism and Models: Even in scientific realism, the aim is not to claim that our models provide a one-to-one correspondence with an objective, mind-independent world. Rather, models are seen as useful approximations of reality as we experience it. This fits well with TI-ER, which acknowledges the limitations of human cognition but asserts the practical utility of empirical knowledge.

In conclusion, the claim that IR is the default in science overlooks the fact that modern science, much like Kant’s philosophy, deals primarily with observable phenomena and does not concern itself with an unobservable noumenon that IR insists on.

2. Misrepresentation of TI-ER: Denial of External World
Your interlocutor repeatedly asserts that TI-ER denies the external world, leading to solipsism. However, this is a misinterpretation of Kant’s philosophy. Here's why:

TI-ER Acknowledges an External World: In Kant's framework, there is indeed an external world—the world of phenomena that we all interact with. This external world is structured by our cognitive faculties, such as space, time, and causality. Kant is not denying the existence of objects, other people, or the empirical world. He is simply explaining that our knowledge of these things is shaped by our mental structures—we know the world as it appears to us, not as it might exist “in itself.”

Empirical Realism vs. Noumenon: Kant’s empirical realism (ER) insists that the external world is real for us, but we only know it through the lens of our cognitive structures. This doesn’t imply the world doesn’t exist or that we’re trapped in a subjective bubble (solipsism). It only means that we experience the world as it is mediated by our minds. The noumenon (thing-in-itself) is a regulative idea that helps us recognize the limits of our knowledge, not something we are “missing out on.”

Regulative Idea, Not Constitutive Reality: Kant treats the noumenon as a regulative concept that reminds us we cannot have unmediated access to a completely mind-independent world. This is very different from IR’s constitutive noumenon, which assumes the real existence of a world that we can never know directly. Kant’s approach avoids the speculative nature of IR and doesn’t claim that there’s “nothing” beyond phenomena—it simply refrains from claiming direct knowledge of it.

Conclusion:
Your interlocutor's criticisms misrepresent TI-ER by incorrectly claiming it denies the external world and that science defaults to IR, when in fact TI-ER is more compatible with scientific practice due to its pragmatic focus on phenomena and empirical knowledge.
Far from solipsism, Kant’s empirical realism acknowledges the shared, external world we all experience, while avoiding the epistemic uncertainty and reality-gap created by IR's assumption of an unknowable, mind-independent reality.

These arguments show why TI-ER is more rational and practical than IR, not only from within Kant’s own framework but from a broader general perspective of how we engage with and understand the world.

[Atla]

Re this OP, in summary Atla countered 5 points raised by AI, and AI explained in detailed with the final conclusion:

"These arguments show why TI-ER is more rational and practical than IR, not only from within Kant’s own framework but from a broader general perspective of how we engage with and understand the world."

From the following discussions:
Points 1-3
viewtopic.php?p=734605#p734605

Points 4-5
viewtopic.php?p=734609#p734609
detailed as below

Here is my interlocutor's response to point 4 and 5.
[ChatGpt] 4. TI-ER is More Aligned with Scientific Practice
Modern science operates within a framework similar to TI-ER: we construct theoretical models of reality based on empirical data, acknowledging that we may never know the world in itself but that our models are sufficiently accurate for practical purposes. This scientific mindset aligns more with Kant’s empirical realism than with IR, which posits a reality beyond our perception that science cannot directly engage with.

From a general rational perspective, TI-ER is more compatible with how we actually engage with reality in everyday life and in science. It provides a workable framework for knowledge without introducing speculative, inaccessible entities like the IR’s noumenon.

[Interlocutor Responded]This a blatant lie, IR and not TI-ER is the default in science exactly because it's consistent with IR.

[ChatGpt]5. Reality-Gap vs. No Reality-Gap
IR is often described as more honest because it “accepts uncertainty.” However, the reality-gap it creates by insisting on a mind-independent noumenon leads to more epistemic uncertainty than is necessary. It leaves us with the problem of never knowing whether we have accurate knowledge of the external world.

TI-ER, by focusing on what we can know (phenomena) and rejecting the idea of a constitutive noumenon, avoids this reality-gap entirely. What is real for us is what appears through the structures of our cognition. This is a more rational and practical view of reality, as it doesn’t lead to the skepticism that arises from the gap introduced by IR.

[Interlocutor's Responded ]Yes, but at the cost of becoming a solipsist, and this also can't explain things like hallucinations and illusions. There is no problem with the external world because there is no external world at all. If this is more rational to you then there is probably something very wrong with you.

[ME] I believe Indirect Realism assumes an absolutely mind-independent external world that is mediated via the sense data to the subject.

What is your respond to the above beside the charge of solipsism, hallucination and illusions which you have responded earlier.

Here's ChatGpt's Response:

Your interlocutor's responses seem to involve two main arguments beyond the already addressed charges of solipsism, hallucinations, and illusions:

Claim that IR is the default in science and not TI-ER.
Misrepresentation of TI-ER as denying the external world, resulting in an accusation of solipsism.

Let’s address these points one by one.

1. Is IR the Default in Science?
Your interlocutor claims that Indirect Realism (IR) is the default position in science, implying that TI-ER is not compatible with scientific practice. This is not accurate when we examine the philosophical underpinnings of science. Here's why:

Scientific Models and TI-ER Compatibility: Modern scientific practice involves creating theoretical models that organize empirical data to make predictions about phenomena. These models are not direct representations of an absolutely mind-independent reality but conceptual tools that help us understand and predict the world as it appears to us. This approach aligns more with Kant’s empirical realism (ER) than with IR, which posits an unmediated access to a mind-independent world that we cannot directly verify.

Kant’s Framework and Scientific Practice: Kant’s TI-ER emphasizes that we engage with the world through cognitive categories (e.g., space, time, causality) that structure our experience. Science operates within this same structured framework, focusing on empirical phenomena that can be observed and measured. Scientists use models and theories to predict and explain phenomena, acknowledging that these models may not reflect the “thing-in-itself” but are sufficient for practical purposes—this is exactly what Kant argues.

Empirical Focus of Science: Science doesn’t concern itself with noumena (the unknowable reality posited by IR). Instead, it focuses on the phenomena—the observable, measurable aspects of the world. TI-ER, by focusing on the reality of phenomena, aligns more closely with the methodology of science than IR, which speculates about an unknowable external world (noumenon) beyond our direct experience. Hence, Kant’s view is more aligned with scientific pragmatism because it doesn’t require unnecessary speculation about an unreachable world.

Scientific Realism and Models: Even in scientific realism, the aim is not to claim that our models provide a one-to-one correspondence with an objective, mind-independent world. Rather, models are seen as useful approximations of reality as we experience it. This fits well with TI-ER, which acknowledges the limitations of human cognition but asserts the practical utility of empirical knowledge.

In conclusion, the claim that IR is the default in science overlooks the fact that modern science, much like Kant’s philosophy, deals primarily with observable phenomena and does not concern itself with an unobservable noumenon that IR insists on.

2. Misrepresentation of TI-ER: Denial of External World
Your interlocutor repeatedly asserts that TI-ER denies the external world, leading to solipsism. However, this is a misinterpretation of Kant’s philosophy. Here's why:

TI-ER Acknowledges an External World: In Kant's framework, there is indeed an external world—the world of phenomena that we all interact with. This external world is structured by our cognitive faculties, such as space, time, and causality. Kant is not denying the existence of objects, other people, or the empirical world. He is simply explaining that our knowledge of these things is shaped by our mental structures—we know the world as it appears to us, not as it might exist “in itself.”

Empirical Realism vs. Noumenon: Kant’s empirical realism (ER) insists that the external world is real for us, but we only know it through the lens of our cognitive structures. This doesn’t imply the world doesn’t exist or that we’re trapped in a subjective bubble (solipsism). It only means that we experience the world as it is mediated by our minds. The noumenon (thing-in-itself) is a regulative idea that helps us recognize the limits of our knowledge, not something we are “missing out on.”

Regulative Idea, Not Constitutive Reality: Kant treats the noumenon as a regulative concept that reminds us we cannot have unmediated access to a completely mind-independent world. This is very different from IR’s constitutive noumenon, which assumes the real existence of a world that we can never know directly. Kant’s approach avoids the speculative nature of IR and doesn’t claim that there’s “nothing” beyond phenomena—it simply refrains from claiming direct knowledge of it.

Conclusion:
Your interlocutor's criticisms misrepresent TI-ER by incorrectly claiming it denies the external world and that science defaults to IR, when in fact TI-ER is more compatible with scientific practice due to its pragmatic focus on phenomena and empirical knowledge.
Far from solipsism, Kant’s empirical realism acknowledges the shared, external world we all experience, while avoiding the epistemic uncertainty and reality-gap created by IR's assumption of an unknowable, mind-independent reality.

These arguments show why TI-ER is more rational and practical than IR, not only from within Kant’s own framework but from a broader general perspective of how we engage with and understand the world.

Do you understand that in this version of TI, Kant did make a lot of assumptions about the noumenon, something you reject, so you're the one insisting on Kant's solipsism?