What could make morality objective?

[Belinda]

Okay. Is "It is wrong to kill people" morally objective?

That's the issue here. And I think not, because 'objective' means 'factual' or 'based on facts' - and there are no moral facts, but only moral opinions. So the expressions 'moral fact' and 'moral objectivity' are incoherent. For example, it can't be a fact that X - say, abortion - is morally wrong or not morally wrong.

Objective: impartial
unbiased
unprejudiced
non-partisan
disinterested


Nobody in the history of mankind has ever be completely impartial regarding any fact, therefore in the context here 'objective ' means that the ethic in question would exist even when nobody existed to be partial to it.

[CIN]

So is "do not kill people" not morally objective?

I would say that killing a human, other things being equal, is objectively bad. The argument runs like this:
1. To say that X is good is to show a pro-attitude to X and also to imply that that pro-attitude is appropriate to X.
2. A pro-attitude is appropriate to pleasure.
3. Therefore pleasure is (intrinsically) good.
4. Therefore it is (instrumentally) good to cause a being to have pleasure, and bad to prevent the having of pleasure by a being.
5. If a being would have more net pleasure (i.e. more pleasure than pain) if it was not killed, killing that being prevents the having of net pleasure by that being.
6. Therefore, if a being would have net pleasure if it was not killed, then other things being equal, killing that being is bad.

Notes:
1. Humans obviously qualify as beings in this context.
2. Re step 1: see A.C.Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 152: 'We may therefore define "good" as "fitting object of a pro attitude".'
3. Re step 2: there's a vast amount of empirical evidence for this from both human and animal behaviour. See also Irwin Goldstein's excellent paper, Why people prefer pleasure to pain (on JSTOR).

To show that killing is objectively wrong, as opposed to objectively bad, is trickier, because it gets us into the issue of moral standing, but I'll have a go if you wish (though it may not be today).

1. To say that X is good is to show a pro-attitude to X and also to imply that that pro-attitude is appropriate to X.

It appear there is nothing in the above to stop 'genocides' [or whatever evil to us] as X being good [relative to their definition] and showing a pro-attitude to 'genocide'*.
* those who believe genocide is good for their cause will not label it as 'genocide' but some positive terms [e.g. cleansing] relative to their ideology or beliefs.

I don't understand your objection. Are you saying that a definition of 'good' should make it impossible for people to say that something is good if in fact it is evil? Language doesn't work like that, it evolves to serve people's need to say what they want to say, so if there are people who want to say that something is good when it's actually evil, then language has to provide them with that ability.

It's my argument as a whole that shows that killing (and therefore genocide) is bad, not just the first premise.

I believe it would be more effective to define "morality" as 'the management to eliminate and prevent evil to enable its related good to manifest spontaneously'.

Possibly, but I wasn't defining 'morality', I was defining 'good', so your comment isn't relevant to my argument.

To effect the above, we need an effective moral framework and system [a moral model].

If genocide is identified as evil, then the task of morality is to eliminate or prevent genocide.
In this case, we need to have an exhaustive list of 'what is evil'.
We need not have to focus on 'what is good' because the related good will naturally emerge when the related evil is got rid off, prevented or reduced to most possible minimum.

But you haven't said what you think the word 'good' actually means. If you don't first establish what the words used in ethics mean, you can't be sure what people are saying when they use them, and therefore you won't know whether their statements (including your own statements) are true or false. Defining 'good', 'bad' and so on is an essential first step in moral philosophy.

[CIN]

it can't be a fact that *X... is morally wrong or not morally wrong

Heaven help us if you're right. I, for one, have no interest in livin' thru a repeat of humanity's spicer periods. As I say elsewhere: even if natural rights are just a clever construct, a fiction, I can see no downside to livin' as though every person has them.

*an abuse or violation of another's life, liberty, or property

I wouldn't worry, Henry. Peter frequently claims that there are no moral facts, but to the best of my knowledge he has never produced a single argument or piece of evidence to support his claim. I think he thinks that because no-one has shown to his personal satisfaction that there are moral facts, this somehow proves that there aren't any. This is a fallacy, because 'X has never seen a proof that there are moral facts that X accepts as a proof' does not entail 'there are no moral facts,' whether X means Peter Holmes, David Hume, or all the philosophers who ever lived. He owes us an argument or evidence to show that there are no moral facts, but I think you will have to wait a long time before you see one.

[Veritas Aequitas]

I would say that killing a human, other things being equal, is objectively bad. The argument runs like this:
1. To say that X is good is to show a pro-attitude to X and also to imply that that pro-attitude is appropriate to X.
2. A pro-attitude is appropriate to pleasure.
3. Therefore pleasure is (intrinsically) good.
4. Therefore it is (instrumentally) good to cause a being to have pleasure, and bad to prevent the having of pleasure by a being.
5. If a being would have more net pleasure (i.e. more pleasure than pain) if it was not killed, killing that being prevents the having of net pleasure by that being.
6. Therefore, if a being would have net pleasure if it was not killed, then other things being equal, killing that being is bad.

Notes:
1. Humans obviously qualify as beings in this context.
2. Re step 1: see A.C.Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 152: 'We may therefore define "good" as "fitting object of a pro attitude".'
3. Re step 2: there's a vast amount of empirical evidence for this from both human and animal behaviour. See also Irwin Goldstein's excellent paper, Why people prefer pleasure to pain (on JSTOR).

To show that killing is objectively wrong, as opposed to objectively bad, is trickier, because it gets us into the issue of moral standing, but I'll have a go if you wish (though it may not be today).

1. To say that X is good is to show a pro-attitude to X and also to imply that that pro-attitude is appropriate to X.

It appear there is nothing in the above to stop 'genocides' [or whatever evil to us] as X being good [relative to their definition] and showing a pro-attitude to 'genocide'*.
* those who believe genocide is good for their cause will not label it as 'genocide' but some positive terms [e.g. cleansing] relative to their ideology or beliefs.

I don't understand your objection. Are you saying that a definition of 'good' should make it impossible for people to say that something is good if in fact it is evil?
Language doesn't work like that, it evolves to serve people's need to say what they want to say, so if there are people who want to say that something is good when it's actually evil, then language has to provide them with that ability.

What I am saying the term 'good' is too loose a word for use within morality, i.e. "one man's meat and another man's poison."
When Hitler stated the genocide of the Jews is good relative to Nazism, how do we counter that and justify our views genocide is not good?
We need justified objective moral facts to counter that.

The term "good" had and is still a "battered punching bag" within moral philosophy.
See: "Good" within Moral Philosophy
viewtopic.php?t=42955

I believe for the purpose of morality and ethics, it is not necessary to focus on the definition 'good' with details rather.
If one need to define 'good' with reference to morality & Ethics, then 'good' is the opposite of evil.
If we strive to get rid of genocide [an evil], and achieve zero genocide [or a reduction], that consequence will be good, i.e. it is good there is no genocide.
If we can bring chattel slavery to ZERO as moral target, then, it is good that slavery is ZERO.
Whatever defined as good for anyone is secondary.

When we have an exhaustive list of what is evil [=list of not good] as defined, there is no room for evil to be good at all.

It's my argument as a whole that shows that killing (and therefore genocide) is bad, not just the first premise.

You'll need to justify that "humans killing of humans" is objective, i.e. an objective moral fact, i.e. universal. Otherwise, moral relativists will argue your argument is subjective and your personal opinion, belief or judgment.

I believe it would be more effective to define "morality" as 'the management to eliminate and prevent evil to enable its related good to manifest spontaneously'.

Possibly, but I wasn't defining 'morality', I was defining 'good', so your comment isn't relevant to my argument.

The main subject is morality, so it is imperative that we define morality and ethics from the start.

To effect the above, we need an effective moral framework and system [a moral model].

If genocide is identified as evil, then the task of morality is to eliminate or prevent genocide.
In this case, we need to have an exhaustive list of 'what is evil'.
We need not have to focus on 'what is good' because the related good will naturally emerge when the related evil is got rid off, prevented or reduced to most possible minimum.

But you haven't said what you think the word 'good' actually means. If you don't first establish what the words used in ethics mean, you can't be sure what people are saying when they use them, and therefore you won't know whether their statements (including your own statements) are true or false. Defining 'good', 'bad' and so on is an essential first step in moral philosophy.

Defining morality and ethics is the first step in moral philosophy, i.e.
"morality" [& ethics] is the getting rid of evil to enable its related goods to manifest.
In the case of morality, what is 'good' is not evil.

When we get rid of evil to ZERO, there is no need to be bothered with its related good, rather we just accept whatever goods manifest therefrom.

The majority do not simply go about killing humans, i.e. which is effective morality; they do not focus on its related "good" with much attention.

If there are killings of humans by humans [evil as defined], people will want to get rid or prevent such killings [evil] which is morality as defined, i.e. getting rid or prevention of evil [killings of humans by humans].

[Peter Holmes]

1. To say that X is good is to show a pro-attitude to X and also to imply that that pro-attitude is appropriate to X.

It appear there is nothing in the above to stop 'genocides' [or whatever evil to us] as X being good [relative to their definition] and showing a pro-attitude to 'genocide'*.
* those who believe genocide is good for their cause will not label it as 'genocide' but some positive terms [e.g. cleansing] relative to their ideology or beliefs.

I don't understand your objection. Are you saying that a definition of 'good' should make it impossible for people to say that something is good if in fact it is evil?
Language doesn't work like that, it evolves to serve people's need to say what they want to say, so if there are people who want to say that something is good when it's actually evil, then language has to provide them with that ability.

What I am saying the term 'good' is too loose a word for use within morality, i.e. "one man's meat and another man's poison."
When Hitler stated the genocide of the Jews is good relative to Nazism, how do we counter that and justify our views genocide is not good?
We need justified objective moral facts to counter that.

The term "good" had and is still a "battered punching bag" within moral philosophy.
See: "Good" within Moral Philosophy
viewtopic.php?t=42955

I believe for the purpose of morality and ethics, it is not necessary to focus on the definition 'good' with details rather.
If one need to define 'good' with reference to morality & Ethics, then 'good' is the opposite of evil.
If we strive to get rid of genocide [an evil], and achieve zero genocide [or a reduction], that consequence will be good, i.e. it is good there is no genocide.
If we can bring chattel slavery to ZERO as moral target, then, it is good that slavery is ZERO.
Whatever defined as good for anyone is secondary.

When we have an exhaustive list of what is evil [=list of not good] as defined, there is no room for evil to be good at all.

It's my argument as a whole that shows that killing (and therefore genocide) is bad, not just the first premise.

You'll need to justify that "humans killing of humans" is objective, i.e. an objective moral fact, i.e. universal. Otherwise, moral relativists will argue your argument is subjective and your personal opinion, belief or judgment.

I believe it would be more effective to define "morality" as 'the management to eliminate and prevent evil to enable its related good to manifest spontaneously'.

Possibly, but I wasn't defining 'morality', I was defining 'good', so your comment isn't relevant to my argument.

The main subject is morality, so it is imperative that we define morality and ethics from the start.

To effect the above, we need an effective moral framework and system [a moral model].

If genocide is identified as evil, then the task of morality is to eliminate or prevent genocide.
In this case, we need to have an exhaustive list of 'what is evil'.
We need not have to focus on 'what is good' because the related good will naturally emerge when the related evil is got rid off, prevented or reduced to most possible minimum.

But you haven't said what you think the word 'good' actually means. If you don't first establish what the words used in ethics mean, you can't be sure what people are saying when they use them, and therefore you won't know whether their statements (including your own statements) are true or false. Defining 'good', 'bad' and so on is an essential first step in moral philosophy.

Defining morality and ethics is the first step in moral philosophy, i.e.
"morality" [& ethics] is the getting rid of evil to enable its related goods to manifest.
In the case of morality, what is 'good' is not evil.

When we get rid of evil to ZERO, there is no need to be bothered with its related good, rather we just accept whatever goods manifest therefrom.

The majority do not simply go about killing humans, i.e. which is effective morality; they do not focus on its related "good" with much attention.

If there are killings of humans by humans [evil as defined], people will want to get rid or prevent such killings [evil] which is morality as defined, i.e. getting rid or prevention of evil [killings of humans by humans].

Premise: Most humans don't go about killing humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, humans killing humans is evil - iow, not good.

Premise: Most humans go about killing humans.
Conclusion: Therefore, humans killing humans is not evil - iow, is good.

Erm. Sauce for the goose.

[Belinda]

1. To say that X is good is to show a pro-attitude to X and also to imply that that pro-attitude is appropriate to X.

It appear there is nothing in the above to stop 'genocides' [or whatever evil to us] as X being good [relative to their definition] and showing a pro-attitude to 'genocide'*.
* those who believe genocide is good for their cause will not label it as 'genocide' but some positive terms [e.g. cleansing] relative to their ideology or beliefs.

I don't understand your objection. Are you saying that a definition of 'good' should make it impossible for people to say that something is good if in fact it is evil?
Language doesn't work like that, it evolves to serve people's need to say what they want to say, so if there are people who want to say that something is good when it's actually evil, then language has to provide them with that ability.

What I am saying the term 'good' is too loose a word for use within morality, i.e. "one man's meat and another man's poison."
When Hitler stated the genocide of the Jews is good relative to Nazism, how do we counter that and justify our views genocide is not good?
We need justified objective moral facts to counter that.

The term "good" had and is still a "battered punching bag" within moral philosophy.
See: "Good" within Moral Philosophy
viewtopic.php?t=42955

I believe for the purpose of morality and ethics, it is not necessary to focus on the definition 'good' with details rather.
If one need to define 'good' with reference to morality & Ethics, then 'good' is the opposite of evil.
If we strive to get rid of genocide [an evil], and achieve zero genocide [or a reduction], that consequence will be good, i.e. it is good there is no genocide.
If we can bring chattel slavery to ZERO as moral target, then, it is good that slavery is ZERO.
Whatever defined as good for anyone is secondary.

When we have an exhaustive list of what is evil [=list of not good] as defined, there is no room for evil to be good at all.

It's my argument as a whole that shows that killing (and therefore genocide) is bad, not just the first premise.

You'll need to justify that "humans killing of humans" is objective, i.e. an objective moral fact, i.e. universal. Otherwise, moral relativists will argue your argument is subjective and your personal opinion, belief or judgment.

I believe it would be more effective to define "morality" as 'the management to eliminate and prevent evil to enable its related good to manifest spontaneously'.

Possibly, but I wasn't defining 'morality', I was defining 'good', so your comment isn't relevant to my argument.

The main subject is morality, so it is imperative that we define morality and ethics from the start.

To effect the above, we need an effective moral framework and system [a moral model].

If genocide is identified as evil, then the task of morality is to eliminate or prevent genocide.
In this case, we need to have an exhaustive list of 'what is evil'.
We need not have to focus on 'what is good' because the related good will naturally emerge when the related evil is got rid off, prevented or reduced to most possible minimum.

But you haven't said what you think the word 'good' actually means. If you don't first establish what the words used in ethics mean, you can't be sure what people are saying when they use them, and therefore you won't know whether their statements (including your own statements) are true or false. Defining 'good', 'bad' and so on is an essential first step in moral philosophy.

Defining morality and ethics is the first step in moral philosophy, i.e.
"morality" [& ethics] is the getting rid of evil to enable its related goods to manifest.
In the case of morality, what is 'good' is not evil.

When we get rid of evil to ZERO, there is no need to be bothered with its related good, rather we just accept whatever goods manifest therefrom.

The majority do not simply go about killing humans, i.e. which is effective morality; they do not focus on its related "good" with much attention.

If there are killings of humans by humans [evil as defined], people will want to get rid or prevent such killings [evil] which is morality as defined, i.e. getting rid or prevention of evil [killings of humans by humans].

The good is about neither killing nor not killing. The good is about thinking and feeling about the matter of good and evil. What is good in some circumstances is bad in other circumstances.

What is bad is to not think about the question at all. Not -thinking is what stones and machines do. It's always good to think and think again and again; except when you are required by circumstances to swim for your life in a hurricane surge. A properly civilised society will have provided for its citizens protected institutions where people are taught to think and where thinking is the aim.

[FlashDangerpants]

My thinking has moved on a little since that discussion.

I no longer think that all beings capable of experiencing pleasure and/or pain have the same moral standing. Nor do I think moral standing is related to current net pleasure. I am now inclined to think that a being's moral standing is proportional to that being's potential lifetime net pleasure, rather than the net pleasure they are experiencing at the moment. Suppose a child and an old lady are trapped in a burning building, and you can only rescue one of them. The child is terrified and unhappy, and has a broken leg which is very painful but mendable; the old lady is calm and not in any pain. If we decide who to rescue on the basis of their current net pleasure, we will rescue the old lady and leave the child to die. I think this would be irrational: more lifetime net pleasure can be created for the child than for the old lady, so the child has the greater moral standing. We should rescue the child and let the old lady die (sorry gran).

I think I get the idea. The old plan had an issue (in my view at the time anyway) that it followed two masters in the form of pleasure and fairness. This switch to a total factor style lifetime net pleasure blends them in a way that maintains the primary status of pleasure without discarding the broad need for equitable distribution.

Prima facie I think the change works, and probably retains everything you wanted to keep while closing down the arguments I could see that targeted your position rather than just all consequentialist positions equally.

Whether your great aunt and the foetus have moral standing, then, depends on whether they have potential positive lifetime net pleasure. If they do, then they have positive moral standing. To abort the foetus or withdraw life support from your great aunt would be to treat them as if they had no moral standing at all. If they have potential positive moral standing, this is a moral error. If something is a moral error, then I think it can be regarded as morally wrong.

Do you intend to drift into Singer territory here, or have you got a preferred way to avoid it if not? Is every unfertilized ovum that ends up going to waste (be it human, rabbit, or toad) not equally capable of a potential positive lifetime net pleasure? Do we need to investigate methods to keep as many females of all species pregnant at once as is physiologically possible?

I also note the oblique reference to utilitarian calculus, but I assume you wouldn't go so far as to endorse actually creating a measurement system to assign units of pleasurability and pain-ness to the mouse and the man's situations, assuming them to be scientific data now, because that would be giberring insanity?

I think we do recognise that some pleasures and pains are more intense than others, and I can't see how this could be the case unless it is also the case that pleasures and pains are quantified. But I would agree that quantified does not necessarily imply measurable.

Point taken. Although I think I might want to argue later that metaphors of scale are purely metaphorical. I think perhaps we take urgency, or focus and convert that into a matter of size for purposes of making some thing describable rather than because it reflects the nature of the thing that is being described.

I am not sure up front how you can use fairness that way. The thing that makes utilitarianism tempting is that it massively simplifies the situation and provides a principle allows assignation of internally uncontroversial statuses of right and wrong. By which I mean that all who agree to the pleasure/pain thing can agree on which is the rigth or wrong course of action in any hypothetical or factual scenario where the outcome is known. but fairness breaks that unless you deal with the rthings that might make any outcome fair or unfair. That would at the very least include dessert, unless we are simplifying "fairness" into equality of outcome or something?

My current view is that goodness does not imply rightness, and that it is possible for an action to be morally good but also morally wrong. (Good and right are different concepts, so 'X is good' does not contradict 'X is wrong'.) An example is our old friend, the surgeon who kills a healthy patient and uses his organs to extend the lives of five unhealthy patients. His action is morally good, because (we assume) it creates more net pleasure than would otherwise be created; but it involves treating the healthy patient as if he was an object with no moral standing (in Kantian language, treating him as a mere means rather than an end), and since he does have moral standing, this is morally wrong.

Should the surgeon choose what is morally good (killing the healthy patient), or what is morally right (not killing him)? I don't think there is an objective answer to this question. We probably give a relative weighting to goodness and rightness in such cases, but I can't see how there could be a single objective scale against which goodness and rightness can both be weighted, so the choice must be subjective.

All comments on the above (from you, not necessarily from anyone else) welcome, but my ethical theory is a work in progress and could still change, so if you don't want to waste time on it, don't.

This bit I still need to think about. I'm partly inclined to pick it up and run with it and see if I can throw more stuff into the cart. It looks like you are open an argument from incommensurability, or indeed that you are tempted to make such an argument yourself. If we can end up with competing answers to the question of what outcome we ought to prefer versus what ought we to do, then I am not at all sure we haven't fundamentally grasped the nettle with regard to mortal antirealism?

[FlashDangerpants]

it can't be a fact that *X... is morally wrong or not morally wrong

Heaven help us if you're right. I, for one, have no interest in livin' thru a repeat of humanity's spicer periods. As I say elsewhere: even if natural rights are just a clever construct, a fiction, I can see no downside to livin' as though every person has them.

That's pretty much exactly what the moral fictionalists say.

[Atla]

According to Kant,
the individual[s] and the-collective need to strive to be morally competent, relative to his current moral competency abilities. If indexed at 100 then progress to 101, 102 .. and so on, or try to achieve a quantum jump say, 101, 102, 110, 111, 115 .. and so on.

Damn I underestimated Kant, the guy already knew about quantum jumps.

[henry quirk]

I wouldn't worry, Henry.

About Pete? Meh, he doesn't bother me. We mutually dismissed one another a long time back.

What does bother, or worry, me: in the amoralist's world there is no right or wrong beyond personal or collective opinion. Well, of course I think, as a matter of opinion, rape is wrong but it's not a fact rape is wrong he'll say. In other words, he sez I understand why my friend is butt hurt (mebbe literally) about being used as a cum depository, and I sympathize with her, but her being raped isn't wrong. This is a hop, skip, and jump from excusing atrocity. Well, of course, I think, as a matter of opinion, slavery is wrong, but it's not a fact slavery is wrong the amoralist can say.

It's timid, *fence-sittin'.

The amoralist, of course, counters with all the atrocities foisted up by the moralists. Those objectivists are responsible for so much discrimination and slavery and bad crap, that's all moral objectivism is good for! he sez. I counter: a morality that allows for murder, rape, slavery, theft, and fraud is no morality at all. It's nuthin' but amorality in a poor disguise. Also, there's nuthin' about a true morality stoppin' liars and hypocrites from sheltering under it.

As I say, over and over: a person, any person, anywhere or when, has an absolute moral claim -- a natural right -- to his, and no one else's, life, liberty, and property. I believe this. Moreover, I think it's fact. In itself, though, this declaration cannot stop someone from murdering, slaving, raping, stealing, or defrauding. Any wolf can wear sheep's clothing, sayin' I recognize and respect your natural rights as he steals from you.

So, no: moral realism has never, and simply cannot be, a source of or a justification for, atrocity. Atrocity always comes from amorality, amorality in disguise, or amoralists who lie.

Looping back: even if natural rights is just another subjective construct. So what? I can't see how recognizing and respecting another's claim to his own life, liberty, and property, even if the claim is fiction, is a bad thing. Moral subjectivism, on the other hand, can only lead to atrocity.

Teach a person his fellows, all his fellows, have the same right to their lives, liberties, and properties as he does and he can only go wrong by rejecting the teaching. Teach him we're all just meat, morality is a fiction, and he isn't a free will, then he can only go right by rejecting that teaching.




*and this fence-sittin' on morality is part & parcel to a wider denial. Man is nuthin' special, he's meat, just material, he has no, or is not a, free will often is part of the amoralist's view. And God, as Creator and ultimate measure? Well, He's passe', to say the least.

[FlashDangerpants]

amoralist

You don't have any grounds to use that word to describe a single person at this site.

[henry quirk]

amoralist

You don't have any grounds to use that word to describe a single person at this site.

I use amoralist as I would moral subjectivist. You know this (and now, anyone with an interest knows this too).

'nuff said.

[FlashDangerpants]

amoralist

You don't have any grounds to use that word to describe a single person at this site.

I use amoralist as I would moral subjectivist. You know this (and now, anyone with an interest knows this too).

'nuff said.

With compete ignorance for what the word means, or with no care for accurate communication?

[henry quirk]

When I end with 'nuff said I'm sayin' I'm not talkin' to you, on this subject, anymore.

You know this (and now, anyone with an interest knows this too).

'nuff said.

[FlashDangerpants]

When I end with 'nuff said I'm sayin' I'm not talkin' to you, on this subject, anymore.

You know this (and now, anyone with an interest knows this too).

'nuff said.

Well then you must intend for me to have the last word on the matter.

And the last word is this; that there is a world of difference between disagreeing with you over the logical status of moral propositions (statements of external fact versus statments of internal belief) and not being subject to any moral feelings at all. If you are ofthe opinon that you are morally superior by virtue of your position on the first matter, then you really ought to have a regard for honesty that would preclude bad faith argument based on confusion over the latter.

Now there's 'nuff said