As I understand it, there are many varieties of "determinism", and only one of them is "causal determinism". My point was that other forms (predestination) do not conflict with free will.Immanuel Can wrote: ↑Mon Oct 07, 2024 4:21 amThat accounts for free will. It doesn't account for Determinism. So it doesn't account for Compatiblism. It doesn't show the two are in any way "compatible."
Now let's posit an omniscient God who can see the future as well as we can see the past. He would know whether we will make a trip to the store tomorrow. But he won't force us to do so, any more than the man who went yesterday was forced to make the trip.
That won't do. To "know" is not the same verb as to "make." Determinism would require that this God had to "make" one go to the store, not merely "know" he would choose to go.
If I "know" (and it turns out, rightly) that you will respond to this message, that doesn't even remotely suggest I'm "making" you respond.
This is precisely the problem with your example. "Knowledge" does not "make" things happen. So it's not Deterministic.The 'freedom" of the act is not constrained by the knowledges.
When was the last time you "made" a cake simply by "knowing" how to make one?![]()
IN addition, as discussed elsewhere, "cause' is such a tricky word and concept that the distinction between "causation" and "predetermination" is a dubious one. What "causes" the ace of spades to be dealt off the top of the deck (if it's dealt off the bottom, we have a different "cause")? Is it the shuffle? The cut? The deal? Or the confluence of events that has continued ever since the big bang, has given rise to life, to humankind, and has been determined from the beginning of time?