Theories of Consciousness

[Flannel Jesus]

But would you consider the difference between unexperiencing matter to experiencing matter to be a strong emergence?

As in, not the direct consequence of other stuff doing what other stuff does? No, I don't think strong emergence is likely to exist in this universe.

[Iwannaplato]

But would you consider the difference between unexperiencing matter to experiencing matter to be a strong emergence?

As in, not the direct consequence of other stuff doing what other stuff does? No, I don't think strong emergence is likely to exist in this universe.

Where do you think the consciousness is?

I ask thinking of the main current model: some matter ended up in specific configurations of complexity (perhaps dependent on certain types of atoms being invovled) where consciousness was present. I

If we go below that level of complexity, matter is not conscious.

Over the threshold, matter is conscious.

It seems to me that at this point we have no explanation for consciousness being caused by anything we understand about matter. (this doesn't prove strong emergence of course). Further it doesn't seem similar in any way all at to what we know of phenomena below it. Often weak emergent properties/phenomena are unexpected, but this seems to go beyond that. Also I am think not some much of an emergent form of causation, but an emergent feature of matter (or real things, since I don't think the term matter has a clear definition or limit or has been consistant over time).

IN any case I'm not focused on downward causation - echoing possible free will discussions.

Though as I say this, the hypothesis I call the main one above is giving an explanation for the appearance of concsiousness, it just seems to have nothing to do with what we know about matter.

I'm not sure how we reduce consciousness to mass, volume, density, position, spin, etc. It seems wholly other.

[Flannel Jesus]

It seems to me that at this point we have no explanation for consciousness being caused by anything we understand about matter

I would cut that sentence a little bit shorter than you have.

It seems to me that at this point we have no explanation for consciousness

If we had some satisfying non material explanation of consciousness, then singling out material hypotheses would make sense. But because we don't have that, singling out the material hypothesis feels similar to saying "No Philippino has figured out the cure for cancer." Like... yeah that's strictly true, but why single out those people? Nobody else has either.

Unless of course you have a higher expectation on those people than other people. If you expected Philippinos to be especially capable of curing cancer, then it kinda makes sense. Do you expect materialists to be especially capable of figuring out consciousness?

I can't see using this as a point against material ideas of consciousness, unless some alternative did have a more complete explanation. And as far as I know that doesn't exist.

[anonymous66]

Emergence of mind is very difficult to explain, you're right. There's no way around it, it's difficult.

Humanity has solved a lot of difficult problems.

I don't know exactly how mind emerges, but I think it's more likely that it does than that it doesn't.

But the thing is... whenever you describe an example of emergence, both the first thing, and the thing that emerges are in the same category

I don't know what you mean by that but it doesn't seem true to me. Is chat gpt in the same category as the matter that's used to store the data and code of chat gpt and run it?

Any analysis of just how consciousness came to be is difficult. I don't see any clear winners among the choices I presented.

Another problem of emergence is this - how exactly is it that, if emergence is the case, presumably non-experiencing matter is transformed into experiencing matter as a human embryo develops? And to complicate matters, when comparing the development of human embryos and octopus embryos, what is the common element? It's a problem because the human nervous system and the nervous system of an octopus are decidedly different. Assuming that both embryos start out as non-experiencing matter and at some point transform into experiencing matter - what is the common element that both share?

Regarding chapter gpt- I guess I don't get it. Is chat cpt doing something different from any other program that is doing what it was programmed to do?

[Flannel Jesus]

I guess I don't get it. Is chat cpt doing something different from any other program that is doing what it was programmed to do?

You said "both the first thing, and the thing that emerges are in the same category" - as in, "the thing that emerges is in the same category as the thing it emerges from", that's what I understand you to be saying here.

I do think chat gpt is doing something different from most programs, yes, but even if it weren't, are "computer programs" in the same category as "electrical circuits"? I don't think so.

(for an example of why I think chat gpt is doing something different from most other software, check this out: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yzGDwpR ... esentation )

[anonymous66]

I guess I don't get it. Is chat cpt doing something different from any other program that is doing what it was programmed to do?

You said "both the first thing, and the thing that emerges are in the same category" - as in, "the thing that emerges is in the same category as the thing it emerges from", that's what I understand you to be saying here.

I do think chat gpt is doing something different from most programs, yes, but even if it weren't, are "computer programs" in the same category as "electrical circuits"? I don't think so.

(for an example of why I think chat gpt is doing something different from most other software, check this out: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yzGDwpR ... esentation )

Just to be clear - we're talking about emergence - here is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."

How are computer programs an example of emergence? (what gradually reaches complexity? and what emerges?) and considering that we are talking about

You said "both the first thing, and the thing that emerges are in the same category" - as in, "the thing that emerges is in the same category as the thing it emerges from", that's what I understand you to be saying here.

How do computer programs "fit the bill"? What exactly is the composition of the thing before emergence, and what emerges?

[Flannel Jesus]

How do computer programs "fit the bill"? What exactly is the composition of the thing before emergence, and what emerges?

Well computer programs are made of arrangements of matter and operate by running electricity through circuits and stuff, right?

But a computer program can do something like analyze a chess board position and rank the available next moves. That's not something any piece of the matter on its own can do. It seems categorically different to me.

If you had ever written a program, you would have experienced moments where someone might ask "why did it do this at this time?" and you would answer "for this reason and for that reason". But of course, you would know that those reasons don't actually exist in any individual piece of the hardware that the computer program is stored on or runs on. For example, I could write a program that outputs 1 when it receives a letter that's a vowel, and outputs 0 otherwise. If at some time someone asks me "why did it say 1 at this time?" I could say "because it was fed a vowel". But you can't look at any individual circuit of the computer and find the vowel, or any reasoning about vowels.

[Flannel Jesus]

here is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."

What do you think of this?

Consider, for example, a tornado. At any moment, a tornado depends for its existence on dust and debris, and ultimately on whatever micro-entities compose it; and its properties and behaviors likewise depend, one way or another, on the properties and interacting behaviors of its fundamental components. Yet the tornado’s identity does not depend on any specific composing micro-entity or configuration, and its features and behaviors appear to differ in kind from those of its most basic constituents, as is reflected in the fact that one can have a rather good understanding of how tornadoes work while being entirely ignorant of particle physics. The point generalizes to more complex and longer-lived entities, including plants and animals, economies and ecologies, and myriad other individuals and systems studied in the special sciences: such entities appear to depend in various important respects on their components, while nonetheless belonging to distinctive taxonomies

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/

[Iwannaplato]

It seems to me that at this point we have no explanation for consciousness being caused by anything we understand about matter

I would cut that sentence a little bit shorter than you have.

It seems to me that at this point we have no explanation for consciousness

Fair enough.

I wonder if we could say we don't have an explanation for mass. We can describe it, but do we have an explanation for it?

If we had some satisfying non material explanation of consciousness, then singling out material hypotheses would make sense. But because we don't have that, singling out the material hypothesis feels similar to saying "No Philippino has figured out the cure for cancer." Like... yeah that's strictly true, but why single out those people? Nobody else has either.

I'm not sure what group I'm picking on in the analogous consciousness situation. Who are the Philipinoes on that issue? [ah, I get my answer below]

Unless of course you have a higher expectation on those people than other people. If you expected Philippinos to be especially capable of curing cancer, then it kinda makes sense. Do you expect materialists to be especially capable of figuring out consciousness?

Ah, no. I am not picking on materialists. I don't think anyone has an explanation for consciousness. I suppose idealists and some other positions are more parsimonious with substance. But my mentioning my questions about matter was more or less a tangent. I kind presumed materialist and felt like I was betraying myself a bit by consistantly using that language. But, I do not think they bear any extra burden, nor would I call myself an idealist or dualist. I'm not arguing for those positions or attacking materialists. For the sake of focus, I am actually pressing toward, if anything, considering consciousness a facet of matter, not unlike those facets I mentioned earlier of matter.

[to continue the aside, I more or less consider 'matter' and 'the physical' to be placeholders for 'real' 'verified'. I feel no great urge to bring down materialism, though sometimes I want to point out that it looks like a substance claim, but I don't think it is, and the problem that comes from that is often materialists rule out phenomena based on substance, which I think is problematic. _______________are not physical so they can't exist.]

Part of the reason I started focusing on the emergences issue is not to take a run at materialism, but rather to see if in fact, at this point, it seems more elegant and parsimonius to consider consciousness a property/feature of matter, rather than something that emerges.

This is in contrast with what I would categorize as cognitive functions, which I think can be seen as medium emergences in matter. Following your sense of medium emergence.

That does not mean I am arguing that consciousness is strong emergence. In fact, I am saying it might not even be an emergent property but rather a fundamental one. From there the complexity of what is experienced follows the complexity of the intra-interacting clump of matter. Certain more complicated self-relating systems of matter have more complicated cognitive functions.

[Flannel Jesus]

_______________are not physical so they can't exist.

That's the sort of shit people say when emergence isn't taken seriously.

[Iwannaplato]

_______________are not physical so they can't exist.

That's the sort of shit people say when emergence isn't taken seriously.

I'm not sure that's the kind of argument I am thinking of. I am thinking more along the lines of Ghosts aren't physical, therefore they don't exist.

Can you give me an example of when people don't take emergence seriously, an example that fits what you were thinking of?

[anonymous66]

here is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."

What do you think of this?

Consider, for example, a tornado. At any moment, a tornado depends for its existence on dust and debris, and ultimately on whatever micro-entities compose it; and its properties and behaviors likewise depend, one way or another, on the properties and interacting behaviors of its fundamental components. Yet the tornado’s identity does not depend on any specific composing micro-entity or configuration, and its features and behaviors appear to differ in kind from those of its most basic constituents, as is reflected in the fact that one can have a rather good understanding of how tornadoes work while being entirely ignorant of particle physics. The point generalizes to more complex and longer-lived entities, including plants and animals, economies and ecologies, and myriad other individuals and systems studied in the special sciences: such entities appear to depend in various important respects on their components, while nonetheless belonging to distinctive taxonomies

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/

[Flannel Jesus]

_______________are not physical so they can't exist.

That's the sort of shit people say when emergence isn't taken seriously.

I'm not sure that's the kind of argument I am thinking of. I am thinking more along the lines of Ghosts aren't physical, therefore they don't exist.

Can you give me an example of when people don't take emergence seriously, an example that fits what you were thinking of?

People who are illusionists about the mind, or illustionists about anything non-fundamental, which is not incredibly common but you see it from time to time among physicalists.

[anonymous66]

here is a description from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - "a property is emergent if it is a novel property of a system or an entity that arises when that system or entity has reached a certain level of complexity and that, even though it exists only insofar as the system or entity exists, it is distinct from the properties of the parts of the system from which it emerges."

What do you think of this?

Consider, for example, a tornado. At any moment, a tornado depends for its existence on dust and debris, and ultimately on whatever micro-entities compose it; and its properties and behaviors likewise depend, one way or another, on the properties and interacting behaviors of its fundamental components. Yet the tornado’s identity does not depend on any specific composing micro-entity or configuration, and its features and behaviors appear to differ in kind from those of its most basic constituents, as is reflected in the fact that one can have a rather good understanding of how tornadoes work while being entirely ignorant of particle physics. The point generalizes to more complex and longer-lived entities, including plants and animals, economies and ecologies, and myriad other individuals and systems studied in the special sciences: such entities appear to depend in various important respects on their components, while nonetheless belonging to distinctive taxonomies

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/

The basic problem is this: emergence seems, at first glance, to be a reasonable enough idea, but when pressed for details it comes up sorely lacking. In fact, emergence of mind is very difficult to sensibly explain. Mind is not like five-fingered-ness, or warm-bloodedness. These things, which clearly did emerge, are ontologically unlike mind. They are simply reconfigurations of existing physical matter, whereas mind is of a different ontological order. It is too fundamental an aspect of existence to be comparable to ordinary biological structural features.

This is just another example in which the 2 things (wind and tornadoes) are both in the same ontological category.

[Flannel Jesus]

This is just another example in which the 2 things (wind and tornadoes) are both in the same ontological category.

What about a video game? Is a video game the same ontological category as the metal it runs on?