Kant is not a Solipsist

[Veritas Aequitas]

It very common for those [especially philosophical realists] who are not philosophical competent [unable to grasp nor understand {not necessary}] are most likely to charge Kant with Solipsism in reading his Transcendental Idealism. [the external world is contingent upon the human conditions]
This was the case after the 1st Edition of the CPR was published.
In the 2nd Edition, Kant added a large section i.e. Refutation of Idealism to absolve his TI from solipsism.

Here from AI [wR]:

Kant's Refutation Against Idealism and Solipsism
Kant's Refutation Against Idealism is a key component of his response to the charge of solipsism.
Solipsism, the philosophical position that only one's own mind and experiences exist, is a potential consequence of idealism, the view that reality is mentally constructed.

Kant's Argument
Kant argues against idealism by asserting the transcendental reality of objects. This means that while our perception of objects is subjective, the objects themselves exist independently of our perception. He supports this claim by pointing out that our experience is structured by a priori categories of understanding, such as causality and substance. These categories, which are innate to our minds, allow us to distinguish between our subjective perceptions and the objective world.

Key points of Kant's argument:
• Transcendental idealism: Our experience is subjective, but the objects of experience are real.
• A priori categories: Innate mental structures allow us to distinguish between subjective perception and objective reality.
• Refutation of idealism: The objective world exists independently of our perception.

Addressing Solipsism
By establishing the objective reality of objects, Kant directly addresses the solipsistic concern that only the mind exists. His argument suggests that while our experience is subjective, the objects of experience are real and independent of our minds. This counters the solipsistic claim that the external world is merely a mental construct.

Additional points to consider:
• Inter-subjectivity: Kant emphasizes the shared nature of our experiences. We can communicate and agree on the existence of objects, suggesting a common reality beyond individual minds.
• Practical reason: Kant's moral philosophy posits that we have duties to others, which implies the existence of other minds. This practical perspective strengthens his argument against solipsism.

In conclusion, Kant's Refutation Against Idealism effectively addresses the charge of solipsism by establishing the objective reality of objects and emphasizing the shared nature of our experiences.
His argument provides a philosophical framework for understanding the relationship between our subjective minds and the external world.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[Iwannaplato]

Kant's Argument
Kant argues against idealism by asserting the transcendental reality of objects. This means that while our perception of objects is subjective, the objects themselves exist independently of our perception.

Another lazy ass. AI dependent post and it's unclear he even read it.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Kant's Argument
Kant argues against idealism by asserting the transcendental reality of objects. This means that while our perception of objects is subjective, the objects themselves exist independently of our perception.

Another lazy ass. AI dependent post and it's unclear he even read it.

You are the incompetent bastard [tit for tat] who is ignorant.

Kant's empirical realism provides that objects themselves exist independent of our perception but this is merely relative and not absolutely independent.

[Iwannaplato]

And just to add that the AI was correct

1-

"Die Dinge an sich selbst müssen also von uns und unserer Sinnlichkeit unabhängig existieren."

"Things in themselves must therefore exist independently of us and of our sensibility." CPR B306

2-

"Es ist außer allem Zweifel, daß alle unsere Vorstellung in uns ist; aber, ob ihr auch noch etwas entspricht, was außer uns ist, und ob also zu der subjektiven Realität der Vorstellungen noch eine objektive hinzukomme, darüber kann niemals aus der Erfahrung entschieden werden."

"It is beyond doubt that all our representation is in us; but whether besides this subjective mode of representation of objects, there is also something else outside us which corresponds to it, is a question which can never be decided by means of any experience." (CPR A371)

3-

"Man muß zugeben, daß die Existenz äußerer Dinge zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung notwendig sei."

"We must admit that the existence of external things is required for the possibility of experience." (PAFM, §49)

Now can one find other quotes in Kant that shift how these might, with a stretch, be interpreted, or how Kant should be viewed in general? Yes. However, it is quite clear that Kant did not deny, in the way VA does, the independent existence of Ding an Sich and noumena. And he makes this clear in his defense against the charge of solipsism. Kant did not want his position to be conflated with Berkeley's. Yes, Kant clearly thought phenomena were mind dependent and argued that what is true about Ding an sich is unknowable, but his schema assumes they are there or we can't know if they are there or not. One might be able to argue that he remains agnostic on the issue: some quotes support that, others contradict it. It's better supported to say he thinks something is out there beyond our ken.

But then let's look at all this in the broader context.
VA wants objective moral facts.
To support this he needs to change the definition of objective.
He does this by arguing that ALL objectivity is intersubjective.
Fine. I happen to be with him so far.
But part of what his whole enterprise does is to use both Kant and AIs in appeals to authority - when their quotes seem to support his positions or do support his positions.
So, the entire enterprise has added unnecessary layers.
It is as if Kant said X, then it is true.
It is as if AIs say X about Kant or something else, then it is true.

The whole focus gets shifted from an argument VA can make on his own to arguments about what a philosopher meant who wrote in a language I don't think VA or most people here know. And this all gets run through AIs by VA, and he cherry picks quotes and frames issues, such that it seems like his interpretation of Kant is correct. Atla, for example, has shown again and again that how the issue is framed for the AI affects their responses. The only effect this has had is that it led to VA writing [with reservations] before his appeals to AI authority and in this case on the way to the appeals to authority to Kant.

What's ironic about all this is that we have to deal with a kind of kids' telephone game (or 'whisper down the lane game') instead of directly dealing with VA's argument for the objectivity of morals (and in particular his moral priorities and interpretations.

That this mirrors the telephone game that some theists play, where we have interpreters of scriptures with are interpretations about God, seems to be utterly missed.

Obviously Kant could be completely wrong and the AIs could be wrong about him.

But the convenience of using appeals to authority and now AIs in this process are too strong and convenient.

One must play some chasing down the actual argument through all these middle-men.

Of course, it's perfectly legitimate to have a thread on the topic of is Kant a Solipsist. But this thread is just another tangent in the giant double appeal to authority VA has been making for years.

Add in that he frequently ad hom and insults all members of the set he calls philosophical realists, and the whole thing leaves a bad taste in the mouth. Is this a person one wants determining what objective morality is, with his us/them, paint philosophical opponents as stupid and violent approach? For a person with anti-theist stances, he echos some of the uglier theist propaganda down through the ages, both in his hermeneutics and his Manichean rhetoric.

[Atla]

Also, Kant entirely fails to refute the solipsist claim. Even if he assumes the objective reality of the noumenal objects, they are still 100% unknowable. So for 100% of all practical purposes, Kant's world still exists only in his head and he is all alone in that world, he is a solipsist.

It's the philosophy the Kantians wanted.. they should accept the consequences.

-----------

Some Kantians like VA have this idea that Kant can shoot a man dead in front of a large crowd, and when they shout "Kant you shot him, you are a murderer", Kant just has to say "nah", and then everyone is like "oh okay sorry, you didn't do it". Imo just because Kant says something, there's no guarantee that it's correct, but I'm weird like that.

[Iwannaplato]

Also, Kant entirely fails to refute the solipsist claim. Even if he assumes the objective reality of the noumenal objects, they are still 100% unknowable. So for 100% of all practical purposes, Kant's world still exists only in his head and he is all alone in that world, he is a solipsist.

I think this is a fair critique. He definitely considers other humans both pheneomena and noumena, and the mind/experiencing subjective self would be the noumenal. Given that we can have no knowledge of what other minds are like and what is going on in them.

He opts to infer that they are similar, because this is necessary to understand the world in any coherent way. But it is inference.

One this this rules out is the kind of mind reading ad hom VA uses. If other minds are noumena, he has no idea what is making the physical body do and say things.

He not a solipsist because he considers it necessary to assume the existence of other minds and further that they are similar. But he does see this as inference, not knowledge.

He is a solipsist in the sense that all he experiences is phenomena and there are no minds in phenomena. There may be other minds, out there, but he has no experience of them.

Which makes him a kind of anti-animist since animist experience other minds direatly, often, and all over the place.

[Atla]

He not a solipsist because he considers it necessary to assume the existence of other minds and further that they are similar. But he does see this as inference, not knowledge.

Yeah but necessary for what? I don't understand why Kant (and by extension VA) developed a moral system at all, when Kant/VA is the only person in existence.

[Iwannaplato]

He not a solipsist because he considers it necessary to assume the existence of other minds and further that they are similar. But he does see this as inference, not knowledge.

Yeah but necessary for what? I don't understand why Kant (and by extension VA) developed a moral system at all, when Kant/VA is the only person in existence.

Self-love.

[Atla]

He not a solipsist because he considers it necessary to assume the existence of other minds and further that they are similar. But he does see this as inference, not knowledge.

Yeah but necessary for what? I don't understand why Kant (and by extension VA) developed a moral system at all, when Kant/VA is the only person in existence.

Self-love.

Why self-love? What's self-love (I don't know what it is)?

[Iwannaplato]

Yeah but necessary for what? I don't understand why Kant (and by extension VA) developed a moral system at all, when Kant/VA is the only person in existence.

Self-love.

Why self-love? What's self-love (I don't know what it is)?

It's the Kantian imperative when there's only one creature in existence.

[Skepdick]

And just to add that the AI was correct

1-

"Die Dinge an sich selbst müssen also von uns und unserer Sinnlichkeit unabhängig existieren."

"Things in themselves must therefore exist independently of us and of our sensibility." CPR B306

2-

"Es ist außer allem Zweifel, daß alle unsere Vorstellung in uns ist; aber, ob ihr auch noch etwas entspricht, was außer uns ist, und ob also zu der subjektiven Realität der Vorstellungen noch eine objektive hinzukomme, darüber kann niemals aus der Erfahrung entschieden werden."

"It is beyond doubt that all our representation is in us; but whether besides this subjective mode of representation of objects, there is also something else outside us which corresponds to it, is a question which can never be decided by means of any experience." (CPR A371)

3-

"Man muß zugeben, daß die Existenz äußerer Dinge zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung notwendig sei."

"We must admit that the existence of external things is required for the possibility of experience." (PAFM, §49)

Now can one find other quotes in Kant that shift how these might, with a stretch, be interpreted, or how Kant should be viewed in general? Yes.

<blah blah blah>

Of all the interpretations you can come up with, can you find one that is NOT self-contradictory?

The claim of undecidability in 2 contardicts the claims he makes in 1 and 3. Here's a better (more literal) translation of 2.

It is beyond all doubt that all our representations are within us; but whether there is also something corresponding to them outside of us, and whether an objective reality is thus added to the subjective reality of the representations, can never be decided from experience.

In quote 2 he acknowledges the undecidability of his situation. And yet... he goes and adds that exact something that cannot be decided from experience. So he decided it anyway, just not from experience? Yep... he made it up! Now, wouldn't that be evidence for solipsism?

By (un)decidability it is not possible to decide whether Kant is; or isn't a solipsist. Because he himself doesn't know what he is.Like every philosopher he would've had a better chance of saying somethign worth-while if his head was up his ass.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decidability_(logic)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Undecidable_problem

[Skepdick]

It very common for those [especially philosophical realists] who are not philosophical competent [unable to grasp nor understand {not necessary}] are most likely to charge Kant with Solipsism in reading his Transcendental Idealism. [the external world is contingent upon the human conditions]
This was the case after the 1st Edition of the CPR was published.
In the 2nd Edition, Kant added a large section i.e. Refutation of Idealism to absolve his TI from solipsism.

<blah blah blah>

Kant was a solipsist in action.

If he actually believed his own words then he would've come to recognize that all of his works are the product of his mind.

It is beyond doubt that all our representation is in us; but whether besides this subjective mode of representation of objects, there is also something else outside us which corresponds to it, is a question which can never be decided by means of any experience.

[Veritas Aequitas]

And just to add that the AI was correct

1-

"Die Dinge an sich selbst müssen also von uns und unserer Sinnlichkeit unabhängig existieren."

"Things in themselves must therefore exist independently of us and of our sensibility." CPR B306

2-

"Es ist außer allem Zweifel, daß alle unsere Vorstellung in uns ist; aber, ob ihr auch noch etwas entspricht, was außer uns ist, und ob also zu der subjektiven Realität der Vorstellungen noch eine objektive hinzukomme, darüber kann niemals aus der Erfahrung entschieden werden."

"It is beyond doubt that all our representation is in us; but whether besides this subjective mode of representation of objects, there is also something else outside us which corresponds to it, is a question which can never be decided by means of any experience." (CPR A371)

3-

"Man muß zugeben, daß die Existenz äußerer Dinge zur Möglichkeit der Erfahrung notwendig sei."

"We must admit that the existence of external things is required for the possibility of experience." (PAFM, §49)

Now can one find other quotes in Kant that shift how these might, with a stretch, be interpreted, or how Kant should be viewed in general? Yes. However, it is quite clear that Kant did not deny, in the way VA does, the independent existence of Ding an Sich and noumena.

I cannot find where the above in the CPR in either the Smith or Guyer's translation.
As such, further reference need to be made as to which translation, or it is AI translation direct from the original.
In any case, the full context is necessary to make sense of the above.

Regardless, there is no where that Kant assert things-in-themselves, noumenon or thing-in-itself exist as real [empirical wise] at all.

Within his Empirical Realism, Kant did acknowledge the existence of external things that is necessary for experience, but that is only relative and not absolutely mind independent.

"It is beyond doubt that all our representation is in us; but whether besides this subjective mode of representation of objects, there is also something else outside us which corresponds to it, is a question which can never be decided by means of any experience." (CPR A371)

I cannot find the above.
That "can never be decided by means of any experience" can only mean it can be thought but there is no way it can be really real and possible to be experienced.

It is like a square-circle [Santa Claus and the like] that cannot be really real but nevertheless can be thought of as a merely a thought.

You must understand [not necessary agree] Kant's CPR thoroughly before you can have some credibility to discuss issues related to Kant's CPR.

[Iwannaplato]

Here are the options: Kant was a solipsist or noumena are real, period, unless you think other people die when you die. There's no clump consciousness in Kant. All our minds together. So, if you can only know something as phenomenon, then you cannot know something as noumena. So, other minds are assumed but not known.

"The human being, whom I cognize through my outer perceptions as a phenomenon, I cognize in myself through pure apperception, yet also as a noumenon."
— Critique of Practical Reason, 5:105

Thus statements like this

You must understand [not necessary agree] Kant's CPR thoroughly before you can have some credibility to discuss issues related to Kant's CPR.

are idiotic in a Kantian perspective. You cannot know ANYTHING about noumena. Nothing, nada, zilch.