compatibilism

[Atla]

I can't say it doesn't make sense, but the laws of physics is a kind of third person perspective. Let's come from a first person perspective: I am free to choose to do anything. What leads me to whatever choice I make within mass of options? Is it causeless? In what sense is it a choice? or my choice? If I decide, hey, I go out dancing, didn't my desire lead to that choice? If I decide not to do what I desired, isn't that also a desire?
Forget atoms and chemical reactions. Let's pretend were' pre-Democritus. What leads to the choice?

I guess in this view, the choice simply comes from a will that exists outside the causality of the physical universe.

Part of the reason I moved away from physics is that I was trying to see what would motivate the choices of this will. Does it have no motivations (desires, goals, information.....)? If it ihas these things, aren't they causing the choice? If they aren't causing the choice, then it seems to me the will isn't reallly choosing. It's like a gap in causation and anything can happen. It happens. I am not sure that's a kind of freedom. I don't know how the term 'free will' applies. If desires, goals, information lead to the choice, then the choice is determined - doesn't matter what laws are or aren't involved.

The above could be taken as an argument against libertarian free will, but here I mean it as saying that I can't conceive of it (it can't be conceived of). Of course someone might say, simply saying that the will chooses outside the the causality of the physical universe is conceiving of it. So, I suppose we could mull over what conceving means. But in that conception I have no idea what 'will' means, and then also as long as it is caused, determined, to me I still don't have a conception of libertarian free will, since it still seems like any will making a choice is part of an inevitable chains of causes, if internal and motivation from within.

Naturally, free will entails a kind of causation/determination/determinism of its own, but here we are writing the rules of it. The point is not to confuse it with the other kind of determinism, "the" determinism, where we aren't writing the rules.

[Iwannaplato]

I guess in this view, the choice simply comes from a will that exists outside the causality of the physical universe.

Part of the reason I moved away from physics is that I was trying to see what would motivate the choices of this will. Does it have no motivations (desires, goals, information.....)? If it ihas these things, aren't they causing the choice? If they aren't causing the choice, then it seems to me the will isn't reallly choosing. It's like a gap in causation and anything can happen. It happens. I am not sure that's a kind of freedom. I don't know how the term 'free will' applies. If desires, goals, information lead to the choice, then the choice is determined - doesn't matter what laws are or aren't involved.

The above could be taken as an argument against libertarian free will, but here I mean it as saying that I can't conceive of it (it can't be conceived of). Of course someone might say, simply saying that the will chooses outside the the causality of the physical universe is conceiving of it. So, I suppose we could mull over what conceving means. But in that conception I have no idea what 'will' means, and then also as long as it is caused, determined, to me I still don't have a conception of libertarian free will, since it still seems like any will making a choice is part of an inevitable chains of causes, if internal and motivation from within.

Naturally, free will entails a kind of causation/determination/determinism of its own, but here we are writing the rules of it. The point is not to confuse it with the other kind of determinism, "the" determinism, where we aren't writing the rules.

To me determinism, is not taking a stand on substance - like say physicalism does - it is just saying that state A had to lead to state B. Generally determinists, think that state A includes causes that are both internal to people and external, however they conceive of causation and substance. But regardless they think that whatever happened after A had to be B.

To me once the word will is involved, we are talking about someone being able to choose more or less as their own force. Most conceptions of free will, it seems to me, don't assume one can do anything. I can't eat the sun or walk through walls, but the libertarian free will person thinks that from the range of physically possible options, I can choose any one of them.

I don't know what that 'I' is, either in the usual libertarian free will I usually encounter or in yours.

I can conceive of a gap in causation, where anything can happen in the next moment. I can concieve of that. I just can't see where the will is. To me will includes the idea of me going for what I want, and thus what came before in me, led to my choice to jump to France, or order take out food or take a nap or walk through a wall. That there is an internal causation. Doesn't matter if this is within an idealism, physicalism, dualism. Doesn't matter if the rules of physical matter or the realm of ideas or anything else can be ignored, there are no restraints. If my will or a will can choose then it is choose from its or my desires, goals, knowledge. If we say that I can do anything at all imaginable or merely that I am free within the range of options of physical matter or the rules of maya or whatever, doesn't matter. If a will is choosing then it is choosing from that state that we usually think of as internal (in physicalist models) but it doesn't really matter where they are. If state A, including them, leads to state B, then state B is determined as are all coming states.

If it is not determined, I don't know what the word will means nor the free part. I, it seems to me, don't 'have free will'. In the next moment anything can happen and my desires, motivations, goals and knoweldge don't cause that. So I don't see where will comes it. Something random happens and state b is uncaused. Then there is a freedom involved, by the universe. Freedom in the sense that anything can happen. But it's not a freedom that any self has. The next moment can be anything. States happen, they are not chosen.

[Atla]

Part of the reason I moved away from physics is that I was trying to see what would motivate the choices of this will. Does it have no motivations (desires, goals, information.....)? If it ihas these things, aren't they causing the choice? If they aren't causing the choice, then it seems to me the will isn't reallly choosing. It's like a gap in causation and anything can happen. It happens. I am not sure that's a kind of freedom. I don't know how the term 'free will' applies. If desires, goals, information lead to the choice, then the choice is determined - doesn't matter what laws are or aren't involved.

The above could be taken as an argument against libertarian free will, but here I mean it as saying that I can't conceive of it (it can't be conceived of). Of course someone might say, simply saying that the will chooses outside the the causality of the physical universe is conceiving of it. So, I suppose we could mull over what conceving means. But in that conception I have no idea what 'will' means, and then also as long as it is caused, determined, to me I still don't have a conception of libertarian free will, since it still seems like any will making a choice is part of an inevitable chains of causes, if internal and motivation from within.

Naturally, free will entails a kind of causation/determination/determinism of its own, but here we are writing the rules of it. The point is not to confuse it with the other kind of determinism, "the" determinism, where we aren't writing the rules.

To me determinism, is not taking a stand on substance - like say physicalism does - it is just saying that state A had to lead to state B. Generally determinists, think that state A includes causes that are both internal to people and external, however they conceive of causation and substance. But regardless they think that whatever happened after A had to be B.

To me once the word will is involved, we are talking about someone being able to choose more or less as their own force. Most conceptions of free will, it seems to me, don't assume one can do anything. I can't eat the sun or walk through walls, but the libertarian free will person thinks that from the range of physically possible options, I can choose any one of them.

I don't know what that 'I' is, either in the usual libertarian free will I usually encounter or in yours.

I can conceive of a gap in causation, where anything can happen in the next moment. I can concieve of that. I just can't see where the will is. To me will includes the idea of me going for what I want, and thus what came before in me, led to my choice to jump to France, or order take out food or take a nap or walk through a wall. That there is an internal causation. Doesn't matter if this is within an idealism, physicalism, dualism. Doesn't matter if the rules of physical matter or the realm of ideas or anything else can be ignored, there are no restraints. If my will or a will can choose then it is choose from its or my desires, goals, knowledge. If we say that I can do anything at all imaginable or merely that I am free within the range of options of physical matter or the rules of maya or whatever, doesn't matter. If a will is choosing then it is choosing from that state that we usually think of as internal (in physicalist models) but it doesn't really matter where they are. If state A, including them, leads to state B, then state B is determined as are all coming states.

If it is not determined, I don't know what the word will means nor the free part. I, it seems to me, don't 'have free will'. In the next moment anything can happen and my desires, motivations, goals and knoweldge don't cause that. So I don't see where will comes it. Something random happens and state b is uncaused. Then there is a freedom involved, by the universe. Freedom in the sense that anything can happen. But it's not a freedom that any self has. The next moment can be anything. States happen, they are not chosen.

Sorry I just don't understand what you guys are saying. Let's forget this "range of physically possible options", I've no idea what that's supposed to mean. Either we have free will so we aren't constrained by a range in the physical universe, or we don't have free will and there is only one option.

You're saying in determinism state A had to lead to state B. But with free will you can continue with any state after state A, that's the will part.

[Iwannaplato]

Sorry I just don't understand what you guys are saying. Let's forget this "range of physically possible options", I've no idea what that's supposed to mean. Either we have free will so we aren't constrained by a range in the physical universe, or we don't have free will and there is only one option.

You're saying in determinism state A had to lead to state B. But with free will you can continue with any state after state A, that's the will part.

OK, so Atla, you have free will. You are not constrained by the laws of the universe.
What leads to your next choice. And be specific. Like if this was the case, what would you do next and why?

You choose to create money in your hands or fly or order a pizza. What leads to the next choice you make from all the possible choices?

is it random? If not, what leads to the option Atla chooses in the free will universe?

[Atla]

Sorry I just don't understand what you guys are saying. Let's forget this "range of physically possible options", I've no idea what that's supposed to mean. Either we have free will so we aren't constrained by a range in the physical universe, or we don't have free will and there is only one option.

You're saying in determinism state A had to lead to state B. But with free will you can continue with any state after state A, that's the will part.

OK, so Atla, you have free will. You are not constrained by the laws of the universe.
What leads to your next choice. And be specific. Like if this was the case, what would you do next and why?

You choose to create money in your hands or fly or order a pizza. What leads to the next choice you make from all the possible choices?

Umm.. it would be an idea stemming from my current self.

[Atla]

Part of the reason I moved away from physics is that I was trying to see what would motivate the choices of this will. Does it have no motivations (desires, goals, information.....)? If it ihas these things, aren't they causing the choice? If they aren't causing the choice, then it seems to me the will isn't reallly choosing. It's like a gap in causation and anything can happen. It happens. I am not sure that's a kind of freedom. I don't know how the term 'free will' applies. If desires, goals, information lead to the choice, then the choice is determined - doesn't matter what laws are or aren't involved.

The above could be taken as an argument against libertarian free will, but here I mean it as saying that I can't conceive of it (it can't be conceived of). Of course someone might say, simply saying that the will chooses outside the the causality of the physical universe is conceiving of it. So, I suppose we could mull over what conceving means. But in that conception I have no idea what 'will' means, and then also as long as it is caused, determined, to me I still don't have a conception of libertarian free will, since it still seems like any will making a choice is part of an inevitable chains of causes, if internal and motivation from within.

Naturally, free will entails a kind of causation/determination/determinism of its own, but here we are writing the rules of it. The point is not to confuse it with the other kind of determinism, "the" determinism, where we aren't writing the rules.

To me determinism, is not taking a stand on substance - like say physicalism does - it is just saying that state A had to lead to state B. Generally determinists, think that state A includes causes that are both internal to people and external, however they conceive of causation and substance. But regardless they think that whatever happened after A had to be B.

To me once the word will is involved, we are talking about someone being able to choose more or less as their own force. Most conceptions of free will, it seems to me, don't assume one can do anything. I can't eat the sun or walk through walls, but the libertarian free will person thinks that from the range of physically possible options, I can choose any one of them.

I don't know what that 'I' is, either in the usual libertarian free will I usually encounter or in yours.

I can conceive of a gap in causation, where anything can happen in the next moment. I can concieve of that. I just can't see where the will is. To me will includes the idea of me going for what I want, and thus what came before in me, led to my choice to jump to France, or order take out food or take a nap or walk through a wall. That there is an internal causation. Doesn't matter if this is within an idealism, physicalism, dualism. Doesn't matter if the rules of physical matter or the realm of ideas or anything else can be ignored, there are no restraints. If my will or a will can choose then it is choose from its or my desires, goals, knowledge. If we say that I can do anything at all imaginable or merely that I am free within the range of options of physical matter or the rules of maya or whatever, doesn't matter. If a will is choosing then it is choosing from that state that we usually think of as internal (in physicalist models) but it doesn't really matter where they are. If state A, including them, leads to state B, then state B is determined as are all coming states.

If it is not determined, I don't know what the word will means nor the free part. I, it seems to me, don't 'have free will'. In the next moment anything can happen and my desires, motivations, goals and knoweldge don't cause that. So I don't see where will comes it. Something random happens and state b is uncaused. Then there is a freedom involved, by the universe. Freedom in the sense that anything can happen. But it's not a freedom that any self has. The next moment can be anything. States happen, they are not chosen.

Oh wait wait wait.. "I", "I", "I", "my", "my will", is this about the "I", the Eastern ego? I'm a nondualist, so this non-issue doesn't even register with me anymore. I no longer have/"am" the kind of "I" that you guys have/"are".

[Atla]

The issue with free will isn't really the "I", it's memory. Maybe we do have free will, but simply never remember using it because our will doesn't come with its own memory, or just with a miniscule amount. Our will always finds itself in some new "body" that remembers its own deterministic world, but we don't remember our millions of chosen prior jumps between the different worlds/different versions of ourselves.

[Age]

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all.

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

I can't say it doesn't make sense, but the laws of physics is a kind of third person perspective. Let's come from a first person perspective: I am free to choose to do anything. What leads me to whatever choice I make within mass of options? Is it causeless? In what sense is it a choice? or my choice? If I decide, hey, I'll go out dancing, didn't my desire lead to that choice? Is not the choice affected by what I know is available nearby, my budget? If I decide not to do what I desired, isn't that also a desire? a perverse or curious one, but also a desire?
Forget atoms and chemical reactions. Let's pretend were' pre-Democritus. What leads to the choice?

Past experiences.

[Age]

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all.

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

Well I'd like to clarify first that I don't think libertarians would all say that. "I can break the laws of physics". I don't think they'd frame it that way. And that's not the thing I'm talking about when I say it doesn't make sense (although there might be some way where it works out to that, but I don't think so).

For me, the difference between determinism and indeterminism is what happens in the rewind test - in determinism, you watch an event unfold, you rewind time, put back in place every possible relevant variable as it was before the event, press play again and it must play out the same way. In contrast with indeterminism, you do the same thing, press play, and something different might happen.

How could it?

If one just 'rewinds', and 'presses play', then obviously the exact same thing/s will happen, and occur, or 'play out'.

However, 'free will' will always remain there, within you human beings.

This, as the basis for free will, is what I don't think makes sense.

But, that is not the basis of 'free will'. And, this is why you human beings have been squabbling for, and quarreling over, for so many years hitherto when this is being written.

I'll try to express why succinctly, but chances are it'll need more elucidation: if you watch someone choose something and then rewound every variable relevant and something different happened anyway, it didn't happen differently *because of him* - how could it? You rewound him too. He was the same both times, so how can he be the real source of the difference?

Who and what is 'he', exactly?

And, why only 'he' and why not 'she', here?

If random stuff happens in the universe, that's not a source of free will because we don't control the randomness, if anything the randomness controls us.

But, who and/or what is 'us', exactly?

When, and if, you work this out, properly and Correctly, then you will most likely also come to fully understand 'free will' and 'determinism', as well.

Until then just be rest assured that both 'free will' is within and available, and works absolutely compatible with 'determinism', itself.

[Age]

I can't say it doesn't make sense, but the laws of physics is a kind of third person perspective. Let's come from a first person perspective: I am free to choose to do anything.

Also known as 'free will'.

What leads me to whatever choice I make within mass of options?

Past experiences.

Is it causeless?

Yes.

In what sense is it a choice? or my choice?

In what sense is 'what' 'a choice' or 'your choice', exactly?

If you are asking, in what sense is 'the choice' made 'a choice', then in each and every sense, (of the word).

If I decide, hey, I go out dancing, didn't my desire lead to that choice?

Maybe more correctly, 'a desire' 'within you' led to 'that choice'. But, now you are just detracting away from 'choice', itself, and how 'choice', itself, is what the 'free will' term and phrase is in relation to, exactly.

See, this here is a prime example of why you human beings have been so lost and confused over this Truly very simple and easy issue or subject here.

For thousands of years, hitherto when this is being written, you have been mistakenly talking about 'the choice/s' made, instead of just focusing on 'choice', itself.

you all have 'the ability to choose', which, when 'free will' is 'looked at' and 'seen' from this perspective only, then obviously you human beings have 'free will'. Full stop.

If I decide not to do what I desired, isn't that also a desire?

Yes, obviously, you would not have 'decided' 'that'.

Forget atoms and chemical reactions. Let's pretend were' pre-Democritus. What leads to the choice?

Past experiences, fundamentally.

[Iwannaplato]

Sorry I just don't understand what you guys are saying. Let's forget this "range of physically possible options", I've no idea what that's supposed to mean. Either we have free will so we aren't constrained by a range in the physical universe, or we don't have free will and there is only one option.

You're saying in determinism state A had to lead to state B. But with free will you can continue with any state after state A, that's the will part.

OK, so Atla, you have free will. You are not constrained by the laws of the universe.
What leads to your next choice. And be specific. Like if this was the case, what would you do next and why?

You choose to create money in your hands or fly or order a pizza. What leads to the next choice you make from all the possible choices?

Umm.. it would be an idea stemming from my current self.

And wouldn't that idea have to do with your desires and motivations?

[Age]

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all.

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

Well I'd like to clarify first that I don't think libertarians would all say that.

This here is another prime example of why these human beings were so quarrelsome, and so lost and confused.

Talking as though "libertarians" were an actual thing, that actually existed, was just a Truly very distorted False, Wrong, Inaccurate, and Incorrect way to 'look at', 'see', and 'discuss' things. And, speaking as though these human beings grouped together and so-called presumed things known as "libertarians" would all agree on one, let alone every thing is one reason why you human beings remained so lost and confused for so long.

"I can break the laws of physics". I don't think they'd frame it that way. And that's not the thing I'm talking about when I say it doesn't make sense (although there might be some way where it works out to that, but I don't think so).

For me, the difference between determinism and indeterminism is what happens in the rewind test - in determinism, you watch an event unfold, you rewind time, put back in place every possible relevant variable as it was before the event, press play again and it must play out the same way. In contrast with indeterminism, you do the same thing, press play, and something different might happen.

This, as the basis for free will, is what I don't think makes sense. I'll try to express why succinctly, but chances are it'll need more elucidation: if you watch someone choose something and then rewound every variable relevant and something different happened anyway, it didn't happen differently *because of him* - how could it? You rewound him too. He was the same both times, so how can he be the real source of the difference?

If random stuff happens in the universe, that's not a source of free will because we don't control the randomness, if anything the randomness controls us.

[iambiguous]

He's got a fixed idea of what is required to have moral responsibility ... the ability to choose otherwise.

And he alters compatibilism to fit into that idea.

No amount of talking can make him change his idea of moral responsibility.

Maybe moral responsibility is something else? He doesn't even consider it.

And thinking that only with freedom can we have responsibility is a postion that he could argue for. This would entail making an argument, rather than expressing incredulity and merely asserting his position, and I'm not sure why he doesn't make that argument.

Other people have explained why they think determinism is compatible with holding people responsible. Instead of a making his case for the necessity of freedom or countering their arguments - which would mean specifically pointing out the flaws in the argument, for example - he simply repeats his assertions

Absolutely shameless!

For example, if I do say so myself.

[Iwannaplato]

Oh wait wait wait.. "I", "I", "I", "my", "my will", is this about the "I", the Eastern ego? I'm a nondualist, so this non-issue doesn't even register with me anymore. I no longer have/"am" the kind of "I" that you guys have/"are".

I can come at this from a non-dualist perspective also. Whether it's something like a Buddhist aggregate, or just the presents of 'willing' without an I that's willing. We still have forces, intentions present before the choice that affect the choice.

Further, you have now described a free will that has little to do with most free will positions out there. There's no 'I', and there is no limitation by the physical laws of the universe.

I mean, for example, nearly every version of free will will talk about 'agents'.

Could you define will in your conceived version of 'free will'.

[Atla]

OK, so Atla, you have free will. You are not constrained by the laws of the universe.
What leads to your next choice. And be specific. Like if this was the case, what would you do next and why?

You choose to create money in your hands or fly or order a pizza. What leads to the next choice you make from all the possible choices?

Umm.. it would be an idea stemming from my current self.

And wouldn't that idea have to do with your desires and motivations?

Not necessarily, I'd be free to choose things that go against my current desires and motivations, or are unrelated to them.