compatibilism

[Flannel Jesus]

Whether the concept itself can be made sense of? Yes I'd say so

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all.

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

Well I'd like to clarify first that I don't think libertarians would all say that. "I can break the laws of physics". I don't think they'd frame it that way. And that's not the thing I'm talking about when I say it doesn't make sense (although there might be some way where it works out to that, but I don't think so).

For me, the difference between determinism and indeterminism is what happens in the rewind test - in determinism, you watch an event unfold, you rewind time, put back in place every possible relevant variable as it was before the event, press play again and it must play out the same way. In contrast with indeterminism, you do the same thing, press play, and something different might happen.

This, as the basis for free will, is what I don't think makes sense. I'll try to express why succinctly, but chances are it'll need more elucidation: if you watch someone choose something and then rewound every variable relevant and something different happened anyway, it didn't happen differently *because of him* - how could it? You rewound him too. He was the same both times, so how can he be the real source of the difference?

If random stuff happens in the universe, that's not a source of free will because we don't control the randomness, if anything the randomness controls us.

[Atla]

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all.

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

I can't say it doesn't make sense, but the laws of physics is a kind of third person perspective. Let's come from a first person perspective: I am free to choose to do anything. What leads me to whatever choice I make within mass of options? Is it causeless? In what sense is it a choice? or my choice? If I decide, hey, I go out dancing, didn't my desire lead to that choice? If I decide not to do what I desired, isn't that also a desire?
Forget atoms and chemical reactions. Let's pretend were' pre-Democritus. What leads to the choice?

I guess in this view, the choice simply comes from a will that exists outside the causality of the physical universe.

[Atla]

This.

This is where I get off the libertarian free will train. I don't think that makes sense at all.

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

Well I'd like to clarify first that I don't think libertarians would all say that. "I can break the laws of physics". I don't think they'd frame it that way. And that's not the thing I'm talking about when I say it doesn't make sense (although there might be some way where it works out to that, but I don't think so).

For me, the difference between determinism and indeterminism is what happens in the rewind test - in determinism, you watch an event unfold, you rewind time, put back in place every possible relevant variable as it was before the event, press play again and it must play out the same way. In contrast with indeterminism, you do the same thing, press play, and something different might happen.

This, as the basis for free will, is what I don't think makes sense. I'll try to express why succinctly, but chances are it'll need more elucidation: if you watch someone choose something and then rewound every variable relevant and something different happened anyway, it didn't happen differently *because of him* - how could it? You rewound him too. He was the same both times, so how can he be the real source of the difference?

If random stuff happens in the universe, that's not a source of free will because we don't control the randomness, if anything the randomness controls us.

You mean if we have the free will to make different free choices in the same situation, then that is actually random? Whether or not it is random is irrelevant imo, because what matters is that we can make any choice we want.

[Flannel Jesus]

Whether or not it is random is irrelevant imo, because what matters is that we can make any choice we want.

That's a compatibilist definition of free will.

[Atla]

Whether or not it is random is irrelevant imo, because what matters is that we can make any choice we want.

That's a compatibilist definition of free will.

No it's not, it's a free will definition. Either compatibilism is just determinism, or compatibilism doesn't exist because it's a self-contradiction.

[Flannel Jesus]

Whether or not it is random is irrelevant imo, because what matters is that we can make any choice we want.

That's a compatibilist definition of free will.

No it's not, it's a free will definition. Either compatibilism is just determinism, or compatibilism doesn't exist because it's a self-contradiction.

Well I'm a compatibilist and I definitely say "random is irrelevant, what matters is we can make the choices we want". There's nothing apparently contradictory with determinism in that, that I can see

[Atla]

That's a compatibilist definition of free will.

No it's not, it's a free will definition. Either compatibilism is just determinism, or compatibilism doesn't exist because it's a self-contradiction.

Well I'm a compatibilist and I definitely say "random if irrelevant, what matters is we can make the choices we want". There's nothing apparently contradictory with determinism in that, that I can see

If you can make any choice you want, why can't you choose to break the known deterministic laws of physics?

[Flannel Jesus]

No it's not, it's a free will definition. Either compatibilism is just determinism, or compatibilism doesn't exist because it's a self-contradiction.

Well I'm a compatibilist and I definitely say "random if irrelevant, what matters is we can make the choices we want". There's nothing apparently contradictory with determinism in that, that I can see

If you can make any choice you want, why can't you choose to break the known deterministic laws of physics?

I'm glad I clarified before that I do not believe most libertarians believe that, nor is that what I mean.

[Atla]

Well I'm a compatibilist and I definitely say "random if irrelevant, what matters is we can make the choices we want". There's nothing apparently contradictory with determinism in that, that I can see

If you can make any choice you want, why can't you choose to break the known deterministic laws of physics?

I'm glad I clarified before that I do not believe most libertarians believe that, nor is that what I mean.

Then, as I said, you're a determinist. There is no such thing as compatibilism.

[Flannel Jesus]

If you can make any choice you want, why can't you choose to break the known deterministic laws of physics?

I'm glad I clarified before that I do not believe most libertarians believe that, nor is that what I mean.

Then, as I said, you're a determinist. There is no such thing as compatibilism.

And libertarians who also aren't talking about defying gravity - they're all determinists too?

[Atla]

I'm glad I clarified before that I do not believe most libertarians believe that, nor is that what I mean.

Then, as I said, you're a determinist. There is no such thing as compatibilism.

And libertarians who also aren't talking about defying gravity - they're all determinists too?

Of course. You can't be a libertarian if you can't defy gravity.

[Flannel Jesus]

Of course. You can't be a libertarian if you can't defy gravity.

Okay

[Atla]

Of course. You can't be a libertarian if you can't defy gravity.

Okay

They want to have their cake and eat it too, or are just not very bright. It's wishful thinking.

But even if we just insert a "little" free will into the human, we are already bypassing some of the deterministic brain/mind mechanisms that technically have a small but non-zero gravitational field.

[Atla]

It's telling btw that 60% of professional philosophers subscribe to compatibilism, even though we can see at a glance that it's breaking the basic laws of thought, so it's a position that doesn't even exist. It says that P and not-P can be true at the same time.

And that's why even philosophy forums are better than professional philosophy.

[Iwannaplato]

The concept is that you can choose to do anything, including breaking the known laws of physics. Why doesn't the concept itself make sense?

I can't say it doesn't make sense, but the laws of physics is a kind of third person perspective. Let's come from a first person perspective: I am free to choose to do anything. What leads me to whatever choice I make within mass of options? Is it causeless? In what sense is it a choice? or my choice? If I decide, hey, I go out dancing, didn't my desire lead to that choice? If I decide not to do what I desired, isn't that also a desire?
Forget atoms and chemical reactions. Let's pretend were' pre-Democritus. What leads to the choice?

I guess in this view, the choice simply comes from a will that exists outside the causality of the physical universe.

Part of the reason I moved away from physics is that I was trying to see what would motivate the choices of this will. Does it have no motivations (desires, goals, information.....)? If it ihas these things, aren't they causing the choice? If they aren't causing the choice, then it seems to me the will isn't reallly choosing. It's like a gap in causation and anything can happen. It happens. I am not sure that's a kind of freedom. I don't know how the term 'free will' applies. If desires, goals, information lead to the choice, then the choice is determined - doesn't matter what laws are or aren't involved.

The above could be taken as an argument against libertarian free will, but here I mean it as saying that I can't conceive of it (it can't be conceived of). Of course someone might say, simply saying that the will chooses outside the the causality of the physical universe is conceiving of it. So, I suppose we could mull over what conceving means. But in that conception I have no idea what 'will' means, and then also as long as it is caused, determined, to me I still don't have a conception of libertarian free will, since it still seems like any will making a choice is part of an inevitable chains of causes, if internal and motivation from within.

If motivations, desires, goals and knowledge do not lead to my choosing amongst every option, I don't see it as either freedom or something to do with will. Just a gap in causation and randomness.