Free will, freedom from what?

[Flannel Jesus]

Likewise.

Do you have an answer to the question of why you are a Compatibilist -- in terms of evidence, logic or demonstration of the truth of that theory?

I have a train of thought. If you're prepared to stop demanding proofs like you did before, I could try to talk you through it.

Go ahead. We've dropped the word "proof," and we're now working with evidence, demonstration of truth, logical explanation...take your pick.

I said I could offer you an insight into my train of thought, so that's what I pick. Train of thought.

My train of thought starts not with compatibilism itself, which I actually didn't even come to until the last couple years, it starts with the standard debate that frames it as Determinism vs Free Will.

I remember thinking about this intensely for a long long time when I was first met with the question. I ended up boiling it down to something quite simple: the rewind test. Take a moment in time, press "play" on the universe and see what happens. Then rewind everything casually relevant (and I mean EVERYTHING - if you think immaterial things like souls are causally relevant, we rewind those too) to the exact same way it was in that initial moment and press play. Do that over and over again. There are 2 possibilities:

Either the events always play out exactly the same way every time, or they sometimes play out differently.

The first scenario is what I call Determinism - if the starting state is the same, the following chain of events must necessarily also be the same. The second scenario, in contrast, can only be explained by randomness.

Not fake randomness or apparent randomness, of course - fake randomness can't affect the outcome of the rewind test. Real, genuine randomness.

Do you understand all that? (I'm not asking if you agree with it, mind, just understand)

[Immanuel Can]

But is one of those causes volition? If not, how can you speak of "one reacting," when the "one" is no causal agent, and the "reaction" is only a material-chain-reaction? No "one" did it at all, then.

Everyone is an agent.

Then you are neither a Determinist nor a Compatiblist. You just don't know it.

If there's a "one," a person, who is an agent of change, then you believe in free will. You just don't know you do.

Which is standard. A true Determinist could never argue for his position. Why would he argue with something he assumes is a dumb terminal? Dumb terminals cannot change their minds. Their minds will always be whatever they were predetermined to be, regardless of truth, argumentation, or will.

But you argue. So you're not a Determinist, nor are you a Compatiblist...at least, in theory, maybe; but not in practice.

[Flannel Jesus]

But is one of those causes volition? If not, how can you speak of "one reacting," when the "one" is no causal agent, and the "reaction" is only a material-chain-reaction? No "one" did it at all, then.

Everyone is an agent.

Then you are neither a Determinist nor a Compatiblist. You just don't know it.

If there's a "one," a person, who is an agent of change, then you believe in free will. You just don't know you do.

That doesn't really make sense. At all. I was going to try to explain why, talking about how someone could currently think that an agent was implemented in a deterministic way, but I don't even think it needs that many words - it just straight up doesn't make sense to say what you're saying here.

[Immanuel Can]

I have a train of thought. If you're prepared to stop demanding proofs like you did before, I could try to talk you through it.

Go ahead. We've dropped the word "proof," and we're now working with evidence, demonstration of truth, logical explanation...take your pick.

I said I could offer you an insight into my train of thought, so that's what I pick. Train of thought.

My train of thought starts not with compatibilism itself, which I actually didn't even come to until the last couple years, it starts with the standard debate that frames it as Determinism vs Free Will.

I remember thinking about this intensely for a long long time when I was first met with the question. I ended up boiling it down to something quite simple: the rewind test. Take a moment in time, press "play" on the universe and see what happens. Then rewind everything casually relevant (and I mean EVERYTHING - if you think immaterial things like souls are causally relevant, we rewind those too) to the exact same way it was in that initial moment and press play. Do that over and over again. There are 2 possibilities:

Either the events always play out exactly the same way every time, or they sometimes play out differently.

The first scenario is what I call Determinism - if the starting state is the same, the following chain of events must necessarily also be the same. The second scenario, in contrast, can only be explained by randomness.

Not fake randomness or apparent randomness, of course - fake randomness can't affect the outcome of the rewind test. Real, genuine randomness.

Do you understand all that? (I'm not asking if you agree with it, mind, just understand)

Hmmm...

Do you want questions, or was your point just to "put it out there"? If you want questions, you're going to have to accept that I'm not attacking you, but interrogating your idea, maybe so you can make it better. And if having your idea well-formed is what you would want, you should welcome the challenge...but I know not everybody has the nerve to sit still for that.

I'll wait to see what you say.

[Immanuel Can]

Everyone is an agent.

Then you are neither a Determinist nor a Compatiblist. You just don't know it.

If there's a "one," a person, who is an agent of change, then you believe in free will. You just don't know you do.

That doesn't really make sense. At all. I was going to try to explain why, talking about how someone could currently think that an agent was implemented in a deterministic way, but I don't even think it needs that many words - it just straight up doesn't make sense to say what you're saying here.

Sure it does. (But I was talking to Phyllo, not to you explicitly, of course; though you're welcome to chime in.)

Either a "person" is capable of initiating a causal chain, or he/she is not. If you say "not," then you're a Determinist or Compatibilist. If you think that a person can even occasionally, or even once, initiate a causal chain, then you're not either of those things. That's definitional, because all forms of Determinism are absolute: they insist that ALL actions are products of NOTHING OTHER THAN a strict, material chain of cause-and-effect, and that human volition has absolutely no role to play in initiating or even altering what happens.

Arguing presupposes a hearer who can "choose" to "change" his mind. If you don't believe it's possible, you would never argue.

[henry quirk]

I don't know what you mean

Oh, I had the silly idea becuz you feel I was just making new facts up about animals and you doubted I got that from anybody who specializes in animal behaviour or cognition, that you might know some of those facts yourself.

My mistake.

https://academic.oup.com/bioscience/art ... 861/233998

It's obvious you didn't actually read the piece. Not a fact is presented. Hell, the author even makes appeals to a kind of anthropomorphism.

Clearly you sent me on a snipe hunt.

Thanks for that.

[Flannel Jesus]

Then you are neither a Determinist nor a Compatiblist. You just don't know it.

If there's a "one," a person, who is an agent of change, then you believe in free will. You just don't know you do.

That doesn't really make sense. At all. I was going to try to explain why, talking about how someone could currently think that an agent was implemented in a deterministic way, but I don't even think it needs that many words - it just straight up doesn't make sense to say what you're saying here.

Sure it does. (But I was talking to Phyllo, not to you explicitly, of course; though you're welcome to chime in.)

Either a "person" is capable of initiating a causal chain

But what words from Phyllo make you so sure he meant "initiating a causal chain" when he said the word "agent"? In fact I can assure you right now, plenty of compatibilists have used the word "agent" coherently and not meant the thing you mean.

[Flannel Jesus]

Go ahead. We've dropped the word "proof," and we're now working with evidence, demonstration of truth, logical explanation...take your pick.

I said I could offer you an insight into my train of thought, so that's what I pick. Train of thought.

My train of thought starts not with compatibilism itself, which I actually didn't even come to until the last couple years, it starts with the standard debate that frames it as Determinism vs Free Will.

I remember thinking about this intensely for a long long time when I was first met with the question. I ended up boiling it down to something quite simple: the rewind test. Take a moment in time, press "play" on the universe and see what happens. Then rewind everything casually relevant (and I mean EVERYTHING - if you think immaterial things like souls are causally relevant, we rewind those too) to the exact same way it was in that initial moment and press play. Do that over and over again. There are 2 possibilities:

Either the events always play out exactly the same way every time, or they sometimes play out differently.

The first scenario is what I call Determinism - if the starting state is the same, the following chain of events must necessarily also be the same. The second scenario, in contrast, can only be explained by randomness.

Not fake randomness or apparent randomness, of course - fake randomness can't affect the outcome of the rewind test. Real, genuine randomness.

Do you understand all that? (I'm not asking if you agree with it, mind, just understand)

Hmmm...

Do you want questions, or was your point just to "put it out there"? If you want questions, you're going to have to accept that I'm not attacking you, but interrogating your idea, maybe so you can make it better. And if having your idea well-formed is what you would want, you should welcome the challenge...but I know not everybody has the nerve to sit still for that.

I'll wait to see what you say.

You could start by answering my question. If there's something you didn't understand and would like to ask a question about, of course you should do that.

[phyllo]

Which is standard. A true Determinist could never argue for his position. Why would he argue with something he assumes is a dumb terminal? Dumb terminals cannot change their minds. Their minds will always be whatever they were predetermined to be, regardless of truth, argumentation, or will.

This is an idea that you repeat often and it shows that you don't understand determinism.

If determinists can't change their minds, it means that they are not responding to the current state. It means that cause and effect is not playing out. It's the opposite of determinism.

I will give you a simple example :

Your mother come up to you and tells you to take out the garbage.

The state of the world has now changed from what it was before. Previously you did not know that she wanted you to take out the garbage. Now you know and she knows that you know and you react to the new state.

You might react by taking out the garbage to please your mother. Or you might not do it because you hate her and you want to annoy her. Or do it later after you finish some other task. It depends on the overall situation.

What happens when a determinist makes an argument? He is altering the state of the world for the target of his argument.

The target of the argument may think " I never knew what I just learned from you. This changes my beliefs on the subject." Or he may think "That doesn't sound convincing."

[Immanuel Can]

That doesn't really make sense. At all. I was going to try to explain why, talking about how someone could currently think that an agent was implemented in a deterministic way, but I don't even think it needs that many words - it just straight up doesn't make sense to say what you're saying here.

Sure it does. (But I was talking to Phyllo, not to you explicitly, of course; though you're welcome to chime in.)

Either a "person" is capable of initiating a causal chain

But what words from Phyllo make you so sure he meant "initiating a causal chain" when he said the word "agent"?

Because that's what "agent" means. By definition, if something has no causal influence, then it's not an "agent" of that change.

[henry quirk]

Free-willers..imagine determinists as dumb.

No, I think they're wrong.

They toss aside the entirety of their own self-experience and adopt a notion that ultimately describes them as mechanisms. They live as free wills but deny themselves as free wills.

[Immanuel Can]

Which is standard. A true Determinist could never argue for his position. Why would he argue with something he assumes is a dumb terminal? Dumb terminals cannot change their minds. Their minds will always be whatever they were predetermined to be, regardless of truth, argumentation, or will.

This is an idea that you repeat often and it shows that you don't understand determinism.

No. Just that you don't.

If determinists can't change their minds, it means that they are not responding to the current state.

That is exactly what Determinism requires: that they are not "responding," which would suggest they could have a causal impact, but that rather they are dumb terminals in a chain that precedes them, continues after them, and on which their cognitions, choices and beliefs have zero impact.

What happens when a determinist makes an argument? He is altering the state of the world for the target of his argument.

The the person you're calling a "determinist" is volitionally altering the causal chain. He's changing things as a result of his own decision. And that's what Determinism holds is impossible for him to do.

And if his hearer has any choice at all about whether to take out the garbage or not, then again, Determinism is defeated.

[Flannel Jesus]

Sure it does. (But I was talking to Phyllo, not to you explicitly, of course; though you're welcome to chime in.)

Either a "person" is capable of initiating a causal chain

But what words from Phyllo make you so sure he meant "initiating a causal chain" when he said the word "agent"?

Because that's what "agent" means. By definition, if something has no causal influence, then it's not an "agent" of that change.

"causal influence" and "initiating a causal chain" aren't necessarily synonymous. You should probably check in with phyllo before you assume what he means when he says 'agent' because I don't think it's as trivially obvious as you think it is.

[phyllo]

That is exactly what Determinism requires: that they are not "responding," which would suggest they could have a causal impact, but that rather they are dumb terminals in a chain that precedes them, continues after them, and on which their cognitions, choices and beliefs have zero impact.

I don't how you think cause and effect could work if determinists ignore causes.

Responding is fundamental to cause and effect.

The the person you're calling a "determinist" is volitionally altering the causal chain. He's changing things as a result of his own decision. And that's what Determinism holds is impossible for him to do.

His decision is based on previous causes.

The argument is caused.

And the argument becomes a cause for the person who hears it.

[henry quirk]

He left out the third possibility: the free will can change his mind, do differently, in any rewind, but: given that his circumstances in each run thru are the same, why would he?