compatibilism

[phyllo]

You understand agency and libertarian free will are two different things, yes? You understand agent causation is not synonymous with agency, right?

No, I don't understand.

Perhaps you could explain for it for us.

I agree, but I'm a libertarian free will, not a necessitarian. Not my job to defend the necessitarian position that man is creatively & causally impotent.

Well you wrote something about determinism and I responded that it's wrong.

It's "your job" to defend your statements if you think that you are right and I am wrong in my response.

[henry quirk]

IWP is giving reasons why he thinks what he thinks. You're just restating your position without reasons.

Okay.

Why do I believe myself to be a free will?

First, my own experience of myself in the world. I do not seem to be just a link in a causal chain. It seems to me I begin, end, and bend causal chains. It seems to me my thinking is mine and not necessitated by sumthin' that proceeds me. Intuitively I understand that when I drive to get that slice of pizza, instead of makin' a pb&j sandwich at home I do this not becuz I had to or even becuz I wanted pizza. I understand the appetite is mine to satisfy or deny.

Second, Neuroscience hasn't disproven free will. Quite the contrary.

Third, my moral intuition, which is quite natural, supports the idea I am responsible . This ties in well with the idea I choose.

There, a start.

As for IWP's reasons: they seem to be about recasting my own position in a way that favors compatibilism (his desire vs my desiring, for example). I mean no offense, IWP, I'm just tellin' it like it seems to me.

[Flannel Jesus]

I don't think he's ever gonna engage with the actual issues you're raising my guy.

Well, that's not very generous.

We -- he and I -- talk past one another, neither of seeming to get the other, both at fault (if there's fault to be assigned), but I'm the one failing to engage.

No, not generous at all.

It just doesn't seem like you're attempting to answer his questions honestly with an intention of helping him understand what you actually think about these things. It seems like your answers are specially designed with the explicit aim of not moving his understanding forward.

Of course reading intentions is hard, maybe you're just accidentally completely stalling the conversation. But even if that were the case, my above post would be correct

[phyllo]

It's hard to communicate intuition.

[Flannel Jesus]

It's hard to communicate intuition.

And we're on a philosophy forum, so we try.

[phyllo]

His reasons are his intuitions.

How would he get someone to get the same intuitions as he has?

[Flannel Jesus]

His reasons are his intuitions.

How would he get someone to get the same intuitions as he has?

Get good at using language to communicate about your intuitions. It's not always easy, but it's gotta be part of the reason why any of us are interested in a forum like this.

[phyllo]

So how would this ...

Intuitively I understand that when I drive to get that slice of pizza, instead of makin' a pb&j sandwich at home I do this not becuz I had to or even becuz I wanted pizza.

... be converted into philosophical reasoning?

Or this ...

Third, my moral intuition, which is quite natural, supports the idea I am responsible .

[Flannel Jesus]

So how would this ...

Intuitively I understand that when I drive to get that slice of pizza, instead of makin' a pb&j sandwich at home I do this not becuz I had to or even becuz I wanted pizza.

... be converted into philosophical reasoning?

Or this ...

Third, my moral intuition, which is quite natural, supports the idea I am responsible .

That's not my intuition, so I'm not in a great position to say. The person whose intuition it is can decide if they'd like to put in the work to bring you to understand their thought process.

[henry quirk]

* https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... onomy.html

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... inism.html

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... ality.html

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... ilism.html

https://www.informationphilosopher.com/ ... to_us.html

*The first link has all the links that follow, and many more.

[henry quirk]

It just doesn't seem like you're attempting to answer his questions honestly with an intention of helping him understand what you actually think about these things. It seems like your answers are specially designed with the explicit aim of not moving his understanding forward.

And, to me, as I say, it appears IWP is only recasting my own position in a way that favors compatibilism. He doesn't seem in the dark about my position at all.

[henry quirk]

That's not my intuition

What are your intuitions?

[Flannel Jesus]

That's not my intuition

What is your intuition?

My intuition is, the question of determinism is a question about how the future evolves from the past. Take a moment in time, and take note (hypothetically) of *Everything* in the universe - that includes everything physical, and everything maybe that's non-physical that you think also exists, souls, spirits, minds, agents, whatever - take note of *Everything* that might go into what decides what happens next.

Either:

A) The list of everything you've just taken note of uniquely decides what happens next
or
B) That list of everything doesn't uniquely decide what happens next, multiple things could happen next given *Everything* that's true that that moment

If A is the case, that's determinism, libertarian free will is impossible in that case.

If B is the case, that actually doesn't leave any more room for libertarian free will. If B is the case, that means what happens next has a little bit of randomness to it. But if something random happens in the universe, something truly random, no agent chose that. It doesn't come from anywhere. If it did come from somewhere, if it did happen for some reason, then you must have missed something from "the list of everything", so you haven't properly done made the list of everything that might go into what decides what happens next. So let's assume you didn't fuck up in making that list, you've actually accounted for everything - then if the list doesn't uniquely decide what happens next, there's randomness, and randomness isn't freedom.

My root intuition for all of this starts with a rejection of libertarian free will for the above reasons.

[henry quirk]

Thanks for the explanation, but that wasn't the kind of intuitions I meant (your explanation seemed less about intuition and more about reasoning).

What I mean, what I'm asking...

When you do sumthin' well, is it your intuition, your understanding, that you did it? That you're responsible?

When you do wrong, does it seem to you you're to blame? That you're responsible?

Or does it seem in either case you aren't responsible? Or that you didn't actually do the good job or commit the wrong?

[Flannel Jesus]

Thanks for the explanation, but that wasn't the kind of intuitions I meant (your explanation seemed less about intuition and more about reasoning).

What I mean, what I'm asking...

When you do sumthin' well, is it your intuition, your understanding, that you did it? That you're responsible?

When you do wrong, does it seem to you you're to blame? That you're responsible?

Or does it seem in either case you aren't responsible? Or that you didn't actually do the good job or commit the wrong?

Yeah sure, which is why I say the words "I believe in free will".