Wokeism of Analytic Philosophy

[Atla]

Interesting! Could he have been an exoteric writer? Or do you just mean that no one quite knows what (and whether!) anyone else is thinking?

I mean he couldn't write very clearly, so we have all kinds of interpretations about what his philosophy was. Not sure he ever even had a coherent philosophy.

I don't see what's twisted about any of that. Can you explain?

Well that tells me that you could be a solipsist, if you don't see a difference between interacting with people who are actually real and interacting with people who only exist in our "minds".

No. He specifically responded to Hume. He replaced Hume's fundamental distinction between 1) relations of ideas, and 2) matters of fact, by that between 1) analytic judgments a priori, 2) synthetic judgments a posteriori, and 3) synthetic judgments a priori:

Professor Lawrence Cahoone, "Kant's Copernican Revolution" (YouTube)

(I'm linking here to the heart of the matter, but I recommend watching the whole lecture, if not the whole series.)

Yes and it's an abomination. He misses the twofold nature of indirect realism which is the realistic approach. There is this phenomenal world in here, and there is probably a partially knowable worlds out there, and the two are connected.

Is it, though? See above.

Due to it's solipsistic nature yes.

It's not necessarily true, no, and I'd agree that it's probably not true, but is it really what Kant was saying? Wasn't belief in a God for him an imperative of practical reason, not of pure reason? Like belief in other human beings?

Nor do our human minds have 100% uniform mental faculties.
Oh and yes.. WHY should we employ any practical reason when THERE ARE NO OTHER PEOPLE?

Why?

It's derived from external experience, yet always works.

How?

It makes sense to use three categories: phenomena, partially knowable noumena "out there" and 100% unknowable noumena "out there". But he just uses two categories which is kinda the point of his whole philosophy. Everything we know is consistent with the three categories view.

I disagree.

"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." (Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Architecture of Theories".)

All forms of idealism are probably wrong, as they are based on a made-up dualism.

[Atla]

¹ "Socrates and Nietzsche share the basic features of philosophy itself: an inquiry into being that comes to recognize the need to inquire first into the inquirer and his fitness to know—epistemology—and only then a properly prepared inquiry into being as far as it is knowable—ontology. Guided by Parmenides, Socrates arrived at a fundamental skepticism about the possibility of direct human knowledge of the world, just as Nietzsche’s early study of Kant and Schopenhauer led him to an epistemological skepticism comparable in scope and radicality. That insight led Socrates, as it led Nietzsche, to a study of the human soul not only in its capacity to know but also in its fundamental passions—'Know thyself' in each case. Study of the human soul led each of them to the study of humans in groups, the 'city' [pólis] or culture in the broadest sense. Such study led both thinkers to a genealogy of morality, knowledge of good and evil in their rootedness in the passions. Ultimately, knowledge of the self and the human pointed each of them to an ontology that could never be more than inferential, the result of moving from the truth about human being to a posited truth about all beings, a sovereignty of becoming more exacting than mere process, an active, generative power at work in every event in nature. Call it eros, call it will to power; the names matter, but no name is completely adequate for what Leo Strauss called, in connection with Nietzsche's view, 'the most fundamental fact'." (Laurence Lampert, How Socrates Became Socrates, page 223.)

This doesn't look like any fundamental fact, just a deep psychological drive in some people. Imo most people lack it.

[Self-Lightening]

Interesting! Could he have been an exoteric writer? Or do you just mean that no one quite knows what (and whether!) anyone else is thinking?

I mean he couldn't write very clearly, so we have all kinds of interpretations about what his philosophy was. Not sure he ever even had a coherent philosophy.

He did, and you may well be wrong in putting the onus on him, because philosophers usually can write very clearly, but just won't—clear to non-(potential) philosophers, that is. In other words, they usually do write clearly, but only for their intended audience. This is an important aspect of exoteric writing.

I don't see what's twisted about any of that. Can you explain?

Well that tells me that you could be a solipsist, if you don't see a difference between interacting with people who are actually real and interacting with people who only exist in our "minds".

Would that be a bad thing? (I'm literally no solipsist, though, but rather a solosomniist.)

No. He specifically responded to Hume. He replaced Hume's fundamental distinction between 1) relations of ideas, and 2) matters of fact, by that between 1) analytic judgments a priori, 2) synthetic judgments a posteriori, and 3) synthetic judgments a priori:

Professor Lawrence Cahoone, "Kant's Copernican Revolution" (YouTube)

(I'm linking here to the heart of the matter, but I recommend watching the whole lecture, if not the whole series.)

Yes and it's an abomination. He misses the twofold nature of indirect realism which is the realistic approach. there is this phenomenal world in here, and there is a partially knowable worlds out there, and the two are connected.

Interesting! For this seems to contradict your previous post. I'll discuss that below.

Is it, though? See above.

Due to it's solipsistic nature yes.

Is there only a life of others, then? No life of oneself?

It's not necessarily true, no, and I'd agree that it's probably not true, but is it really what Kant was saying? Wasn't belief in a God for him an imperative of practical reason, not of pure reason? Like belief in other human beings?

Nor do our human minds have 100% uniform mental faculties.

I agree, though I can't really see why you're saying that here.

Oh and yes.. WHY should we employ any practical reason when THERE ARE NO OTHER PEOPLE?

First off, there may be other (living) things in themselves. And foremost, we have to do so for our own sake.

Why?

It's derived from external experience, yet always works.

Interesting! Could it be analytic knowledge a posteriori, then?

It may also just be begging the question, though. Why does it always work?

How?

It makes sense to use three categories: phenomena, partially knowable noumen "out there" and 100% unknowable noumena "out there". But he just two categories which is kinda the point of his whole philosophy. Everything we know is consistent with the three categories view.

By "partially knowable noumen 'out there'," do you mean (Einsteinian) space and time, for example?

I disagree.

"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." (Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Architecture of Theories".)

All forms of idealism are probably wrong, as they are based on a made-up dualism.

At this point I shall address your previous post, of which I couldn't make much sense before. Let's see if I can make some sense of it now!

At this point, at least, I wasn't thinking of a single mind (a universal mind), but a great many particular minds. And I'm not claiming that anyone could actually demonstrate that it is.¹ But take this image again:



If you postulate a universal existence that does not consist of mind(s), of (a) subject(s), you postulate one that consists of "matter", of (an) object(s)... But, as I put it recently,

'A subject is a being about which the question "what's it like to be that being" makes sense and has an answer; an object is a being about which the question makes no sense and has no answer.
(I suppose we could distinguish between real and unreal subjects, with an unreal subject being a being about whom the question makes sense but doesn't have an answer, but that would really just be another object: an object of imagination. And in fact, all objects are imaginary like that, being mental constructs on the part of subjects. They may consist of subjects or a subject may consist of them, but they themselves don’t really exist, e.g. in Heidegger’s sense: "Dasein existiert"!)'

As a mind, you only have actual experience of being a mind and having ideas. So why posit some third thing which is neither a mind nor an idea? That's just irrational!

No sorry, not only do I disagree with Kant but also the entire school of Western thought since Plato, or rather especially with the latter. My "Eastern" nondual take is just outside all of that.

There is no mental-material dualism, that's just something people made up without evidence. Instead mental and material refer to the same thing.

That may well be true. The entire school of Western thought you (seem to/think you) disagree with already started with Homer, by the way, and even he didn't make up the dualism, but actually already sublated it:

"Her [i.e., Circe's] enchantment consists of transforming a man into a pig, with its head, voice, bristles, and build, but the mind (noos) remains as it was before. [Odysseus's] knowledge, then, is the knowledge that the mind of man belongs together with his build. They are together as much as the [black] root and [white] flower of the moly. There cannot be a change in one without a corresponding change in the other. Menelaus's encounter with constant becoming, in which there are no natures, must have been an illusion." (Seth Benardete, The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the Odyssey, page 86.)

The mental-material dualism is part of the prescientific, common-sense view of the world:

"The scientific positing or taking for granted of nature is preceded by and based upon the prescientific one, and the latter is as much in need of radical clarification as the first. Hence an adequate theory of knowledge cannot be based on the naive acceptance of nature in any sense of nature. The adequate theory of knowledge must be based on scientific knowledge of the consciousness as such, […which] can be the task only of a phenomenology of the consciousness in contradistinction to the naturalistic [or positivistic] science of psychic phenomena. […The lack of such a clarification] makes so-called exact psychology radically unscientific, for the latter constantly makes use of concepts which stem from every-day experience without having examined them as to their adequacy.
According to Husserl it is absurd to ascribe to phenomena a nature: phenomena appear in an 'absolute flux,' an 'eternal flux,' while 'nature is eternal.' Yet precisely because phenomena have no natures, they have essences [eidótes].Phenomenology is essentially the study of essences and in no way of existence." (Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, pages 35-36.)

And with this, we come back to Kant—and Nietzsche—:

"'In order that there might be any degree of consciousness in the world, an unreal world of error had to—emerge: beings¹ with the belief in persisting things, in individuals etc.' (V 2, 11 [162]). What is called the unreal world of error here? Nietzsche’s answer reads: 'beings with the belief in persisting things, in individuals etc.' On a cursory reading, one might think that what is unreal about this world of error be only the belief of the beings that populate it. But the beings are actually themselves that in which they believe, namely individuals, more precisely put: that which they call their Being² organizes itself through their will to be individuals. Life means self-assertion; life rests on the delusion that there were a self-identical self, which can persevere through time, which can hold its own. Greek ontology calls that which perseveres as something identical through the changes of an organic being its εἶδος [eidos], its form. This form is never purely realized. It never comes into full presence. But all the phases in the development of a living being may be designated as becoming or perishing, that is to say as degrees of approximating or moving away from the realization of the form. Therefore the form has the character of the τέλος [telos]—the goal immanent in each living being. Greek ontology designates the self-identical τέλος as the true Being of each thing that moves. The designation of the τέλος as the Being of entities³ suggests itself strongly when one considers that becoming, that is, the transition into Being, is a process of approximating the immanent τέλος, and that perishing, conversely, is a process of moving away from the immanent τέλος. But with the decline and eventual fall of metaphysics, the possibility of designating a non-sensual, never given being as the true Being of the temporal vanishes as well. If the τέλος has no Being, then the only remaining alternative is to interpret it as a non-Being that presents itself as a Being, that is, to interpret it as show⁴. Now it remains true, however, that all life is only made possible by the fact that a being organizes itself in the striving after such a unity. One cannot say that the τέλος were a man-made fiction. Every living being is in actual fact oriented towards an organizing unity. Thus the show of the τέλος is a show brought forth by nature itself. Show, or, as Nietzsche also puts it: error, is the condition of the possibility of life. The unreal world of error is thus no man-made fiction but the real world of living beings. All living beings whatsoever exist only through the belief in persisting things, that is to say through their striving after the organizing unity of the τέλος. But that after which they strive never has a Being. Thus they exist only by virtue of error. The ultimate truth is the flux of things with the contradiction that it contains within itself.⁵ Torn into its opposites and formless, this ultimate truth is not world, either. There is only an unreal world; the real is nothing but pure negativity, time, or, as Nietzsche also calls it: suffering. But pure negativity has, by itself and out of itself, no subsistence⁶: it is only as it produces show out of itself, which however, because it stands in opposition to it, is itself not real either but only a show. […W]ithout show, the eternal flux has no subsistence. It must produce show out of itself. Show therefore belongs to its truth. […] In Nietzsche as in all philosophy that is to be taken seriously soever, consciousness is not a phenomenon of psychology. Nietzsche rather employs the concept 'consciousness' here as Kant does, who designates as 'consciousness soever' the horizon in which the truth shows up. Nietzsche thus means to say that through the opposition between the flux of time, which in itself cannot be, and the sphere of show, which however is just only show, the horizon is opened up in the first place in which the truth can get to show up, in which consciousness can emerge." (Georg Picht, Nietzsche, pages 250-53, my translation.)

¹ The nominalized infinite verb Wesen.
² The nominalized infinite verb Sein.
³ Seiende, the singular nominalized participle of sein.
⁴ The noun Schein.
⁵ The contradiction between past and future.
⁶ The noun Bestand.

Materialism and idealism make no sense.

Yes and no: a subject is probably not a being about which the question "what's it like to be that being" makes sense and has an answer, because this take conflates two things: phenomenal consciousness which is probably universal, and the particular mind - what it's like to be that particular mind.

I didn't say that the answer could be known to another particular mind/subject/being. It makes sense for another to ask the question, but only the one in question can fully answer it (more precisely, its experience is the answer).

There are no "beings", "subjects", "objects" anyway.

Feel free to say "minds" instead of "subjects", and "phenomena" instead of "objects".

Objects are probably also part of phenomneal consciousness.

Dasein doesn't mean anything beyond what's it like to be that particular mind.

As a 'mind' you also don't have the experience of being a 'mind', that's just another theorethical distinction, so why posit this distinction in the first place?

That's right: you are a mind, and a mind is the experience of having ideas. But that means it's not just the experience of ideas, but also of having them. The ideas are immanent to the mind, the mind is transcendent to the ideas. Without this distinction, there could be no distinction between ideas, either. The mind is the space in which the particular ideas show up.

[Atla]

He did, and you may well be wrong in putting the onus on him, because philosophers usually can write very clearly, but just won't—clear to non-(potential) philosophers, that is. In other words, they usually do write clearly, but only for their intended audience. This is an important aspect of exoteric writing.

Seems to me that it's also the philosophers who are divided on what he said?

Would that be a bad thing? (I'm literally no solipsist, though, but rather a solosomniist.)

This is the only thing I found, your old comment maybe?

Thus Nietzsche corrects Descartes with cogito, ergo est: there is this phenomenon, so there must be a Being underlying it. The ‘I’ may be as imaginary as the ‘thinking’. This is basically a correction to solipsism which I’ve coined ‘solosomniism’: even the ‘self’ (ipse) of solipsism may be part of the ‘dream’ (somnium).

There is probably nothing underlying phenomena, again a dualistic mistake.
Imo if it's 'solosomniism' which seems to be even less than solipsism, or even if it's just ordinary solipsism, I don't exist to you and you don't exist to me so everything is irrelevant.

First off, there may be other (living) things in themselves. And foremost, we have to do so for our own sake.

If you're all alone or just the illusion of even that, then there is no 'sake' to most people, even if you and Kant see it otherwise.

It may also just be begging the question, though. Why does it always work?

Imo the answer could probably be the Anthropic principle: humans necessarily observe a world compatible with humans. So for example with stable spacetime.

That may well be true. The entire school of Western thought you (seem to/think you) disagree with already started with Homer, by the way, and even he didn't make up the dualism, but actually already sublated it:

"Her [i.e., Circe's] enchantment consists of transforming a man into a pig, with its head, voice, bristles, and build, but the mind (noos) remains as it was before. [Odysseus's] knowledge, then, is the knowledge that the mind of man belongs together with his build. They are together as much as the [black] root and [white] flower of the moly. There cannot be a change in one without a corresponding change in the other. Menelaus's encounter with constant becoming, in which there are no natures, must have been an illusion." (Seth Benardete, The Bow and the Lyre: A Platonic Reading of the Odyssey, page 86.)

The mental-material dualism is part of the prescientific, common-sense view of the world:

"The scientific positing or taking for granted of nature is preceded by and based upon the prescientific one, and the latter is as much in need of radical clarification as the first. Hence an adequate theory of knowledge cannot be based on the naive acceptance of nature in any sense of nature. The adequate theory of knowledge must be based on scientific knowledge of the consciousness as such, […which] can be the task only of a phenomenology of the consciousness in contradistinction to the naturalistic [or positivistic] science of psychic phenomena. […The lack of such a clarification] makes so-called exact psychology radically unscientific, for the latter constantly makes use of concepts which stem from every-day experience without having examined them as to their adequacy.
According to Husserl it is absurd to ascribe to phenomena a nature: phenomena appear in an 'absolute flux,' an 'eternal flux,' while 'nature is eternal.' Yet precisely because phenomena have no natures, they have essences [eidótes].Phenomenology is essentially the study of essences and in no way of existence." (Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, pages 35-36.)

And with this, we come back to Kant—and Nietzsche—:

"'In order that there might be any degree of consciousness in the world, an unreal world of error had to—emerge: beings¹ with the belief in persisting things, in individuals etc.' (V 2, 11 [162]). What is called the unreal world of error here? Nietzsche’s answer reads: 'beings with the belief in persisting things, in individuals etc.' On a cursory reading, one might think that what is unreal about this world of error be only the belief of the beings that populate it. But the beings are actually themselves that in which they believe, namely individuals, more precisely put: that which they call their Being² organizes itself through their will to be individuals. Life means self-assertion; life rests on the delusion that there were a self-identical self, which can persevere through time, which can hold its own. Greek ontology calls that which perseveres as something identical through the changes of an organic being its εἶδος [eidos], its form. This form is never purely realized. It never comes into full presence. But all the phases in the development of a living being may be designated as becoming or perishing, that is to say as degrees of approximating or moving away from the realization of the form. Therefore the form has the character of the τέλος [telos]—the goal immanent in each living being. Greek ontology designates the self-identical τέλος as the true Being of each thing that moves. The designation of the τέλος as the Being of entities³ suggests itself strongly when one considers that becoming, that is, the transition into Being, is a process of approximating the immanent τέλος, and that perishing, conversely, is a process of moving away from the immanent τέλος. But with the decline and eventual fall of metaphysics, the possibility of designating a non-sensual, never given being as the true Being of the temporal vanishes as well. If the τέλος has no Being, then the only remaining alternative is to interpret it as a non-Being that presents itself as a Being, that is, to interpret it as show⁴. Now it remains true, however, that all life is only made possible by the fact that a being organizes itself in the striving after such a unity. One cannot say that the τέλος were a man-made fiction. Every living being is in actual fact oriented towards an organizing unity. Thus the show of the τέλος is a show brought forth by nature itself. Show, or, as Nietzsche also puts it: error, is the condition of the possibility of life. The unreal world of error is thus no man-made fiction but the real world of living beings. All living beings whatsoever exist only through the belief in persisting things, that is to say through their striving after the organizing unity of the τέλος. But that after which they strive never has a Being. Thus they exist only by virtue of error. The ultimate truth is the flux of things with the contradiction that it contains within itself.¹ Torn into its opposites and formless, this ultimate truth is not world, either. There is only an unreal world; the real is nothing but pure negativity, time, or, as Nietzsche also calls it: suffering. But pure negativity has, by itself and out of itself, no subsistence:² it is only as it produces show³ out of itself, which however, because it stands in opposition to it, is itself not real either but only a show. […W]ithout show, the eternal flux has no subsistence. It must produce show out of itself. Show therefore belongs to its truth. […] In Nietzsche as in all philosophy that is to be taken seriously soever, consciousness is not a phenomenon of psychology. Nietzsche rather employs the concept 'consciousness' here as Kant does, who designates as 'consciousness soever' the horizon in which the truth shows up. Nietzsche thus means to say that through the opposition between the flux of time, which in itself cannot be, and the sphere of show, which however is just only show, the horizon is opened up in the first place in which the truth can get to show up, in which consciousness can emerge." (Georg Picht, Nietzsche, pages 250-53, my translation.)

¹ The nominalized infinite verb Wesen.
² The nominalized infinite verb Sein.
³ Seiende, the singular nominalized participle of sein.
⁴ The noun Schein.
⁵ The contradiction between past and future.
⁶ The noun Bestand.

My point is that there is no actual known evidence throughout the entire history of the West for the mental/material dualism. Unless you can present some.

That's right: you are a mind, and a mind is the experience of having ideas. But that means it's not just the experience of ideas, but also of having them. The ideas are immanent to the mind, the mind is transcendent to the ideas. Without this distinction, there could be no distinction between ideas, either. The mind is the space in which the particular ideas show up.

A mind doesn't literally 'have' ideas and 'experiences having ideas'. Ideas are just more phenomena that are parts of the mind.
The mind is not transcendent to the ideas, we just say such things for practical purposes.

[Self-Lightening]

¹ "Socrates and Nietzsche share the basic features of philosophy itself: an inquiry into being that comes to recognize the need to inquire first into the inquirer and his fitness to know—epistemology—and only then a properly prepared inquiry into being as far as it is knowable—ontology. Guided by Parmenides, Socrates arrived at a fundamental skepticism about the possibility of direct human knowledge of the world, just as Nietzsche’s early study of Kant and Schopenhauer led him to an epistemological skepticism comparable in scope and radicality. That insight led Socrates, as it led Nietzsche, to a study of the human soul not only in its capacity to know but also in its fundamental passions—'Know thyself' in each case. Study of the human soul led each of them to the study of humans in groups, the 'city' [pólis] or culture in the broadest sense. Such study led both thinkers to a genealogy of morality, knowledge of good and evil in their rootedness in the passions. Ultimately, knowledge of the self and the human pointed each of them to an ontology that could never be more than inferential, the result of moving from the truth about human being to a posited truth about all beings, a sovereignty of becoming more exacting than mere process, an active, generative power at work in every event in nature. Call it eros, call it will to power; the names matter, but no name is completely adequate for what Leo Strauss called, in connection with Nietzsche's view, 'the most fundamental fact'." (Laurence Lampert, How Socrates Became Socrates, page 223.)

This doesn't look like any fundamental fact, just a deep psychological drive in some people. Imo most people lack it.

Surely you just mean will to power, not eros.

"The word which Nietzsche used is 'the will to power.' Nietzsche meant it in a very subtle and noble manner". (Strauss, "Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization".)

Because people usually understand it in a "crude and ignoble way" (ibid.), they wishfully think they themselves and others lack it.

In any case, if you were to grant that it's a deep psychological drive in all people, or (at least) in yourself, you'd still have to infer from that that it's a fundamental fact, posit that it be a fundamental fact. But then, the question is whether you must not do so:

https://forum.philosophynow.org/viewtopic.php?t=42727

[Atla]

¹ "Socrates and Nietzsche share the basic features of philosophy itself: an inquiry into being that comes to recognize the need to inquire first into the inquirer and his fitness to know—epistemology—and only then a properly prepared inquiry into being as far as it is knowable—ontology. Guided by Parmenides, Socrates arrived at a fundamental skepticism about the possibility of direct human knowledge of the world, just as Nietzsche’s early study of Kant and Schopenhauer led him to an epistemological skepticism comparable in scope and radicality. That insight led Socrates, as it led Nietzsche, to a study of the human soul not only in its capacity to know but also in its fundamental passions—'Know thyself' in each case. Study of the human soul led each of them to the study of humans in groups, the 'city' [pólis] or culture in the broadest sense. Such study led both thinkers to a genealogy of morality, knowledge of good and evil in their rootedness in the passions. Ultimately, knowledge of the self and the human pointed each of them to an ontology that could never be more than inferential, the result of moving from the truth about human being to a posited truth about all beings, a sovereignty of becoming more exacting than mere process, an active, generative power at work in every event in nature. Call it eros, call it will to power; the names matter, but no name is completely adequate for what Leo Strauss called, in connection with Nietzsche's view, 'the most fundamental fact'." (Laurence Lampert, How Socrates Became Socrates, page 223.)

This doesn't look like any fundamental fact, just a deep psychological drive in some people. Imo most people lack it.

Surely you just mean will to power, not eros.

"The word which Nietzsche used is 'the will to power.' Nietzsche meant it in a very subtle and noble manner". (Strauss, "Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization".)

Because people usually understand it in a "crude and ignoble way" (ibid.), they wishfully think they themselves and others lack it.

In any case, if you were to grant that it's a deep psychological drive in all people, or (at least) in yourself, you'd still have to infer from that that it's a fundamental fact, posit that it be a fundamental fact. But then, the question is whether you must not do so:

https://forum.philosophynow.org/viewtopic.php?t=42727

Yes I meant the will to power. I think it's about as much a 'fundamental fact' as pedophilia is. A few people are driven by it, but the majority never will be.

[Impenitent]

are some brain constructions better than others?

aggravated pineal glands aside...

-Imp

[Self-Lightening]

He did, and you may well be wrong in putting the onus on him, because philosophers usually can write very clearly, but just won't—clear to non-(potential) philosophers, that is. In other words, they usually do write clearly, but only for their intended audience. This is an important aspect of exoteric writing.

Seems to me that it's also the philosophers who are divided on what he said?

Well, that could have several reasons. One would be that those "philosophers" aren't really philosophers, but only professors of philosophy, say; or only philosophers 1.0 (natural philosophers) and not philosophers 2.0 (political philosophers). If, however, political philosophers seem divided on what he said, that may well be an exoteric front on their part. Also, there's this:

"[F]or a variety of reasons, we live in an age of extreme hermeneutical pessimism. We despair of the possibility of reaching the 'true interpretation' of even the simplest of texts. In such an environment, the idea that earlier thinkers wrote esoterically is a most unwelcome suggestion, threatening to burden the practice of scholarship with all kinds of new and intractable demands. Exactly how is one to read 'between the lines,' and how is one ever to know that one has reached the author’s true, esoteric teaching? Every such difficulty, real as it may be, grows in our eyes into a sheer impossibility. In our hermeneutical malaise, this theory feels to us altogether unmanageable, unbearable, unacceptable." (Arthur Melzer, Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing, pages 106-07.)

Would that be a bad thing? (I'm literally no solipsist, though, but rather a solosomniist.)

This is the only thing I found, your old comment maybe?

Thus Nietzsche corrects Descartes with cogito, ergo est: there is this phenomenon, so there must be a Being underlying it. The ‘I’ may be as imaginary as the ‘thinking’. This is basically a correction to solipsism which I’ve coined ‘solosomniism’: even the ‘self’ (ipse) of solipsism may be part of the ‘dream’ (somnium).

There is probably nothing underlying phenomena, again a dualistic mistake.
Imo if it's 'solosomniism' which seems to be even less than solipsism, or even if it's just ordinary solipsism, I don't exist to you and you don't exist to me so everything is irrelevant.

Well, that comment is almost 15 years old. I also used the term on page 2 of this very thread. And, I deliberately wrote 'rather a solosomniist', not 'instead a solosomniist'. I will agree that there's probably nothing underlying phenomena. But this would seem to contradict what you said before:

"It makes sense to use three categories: phenomena, partially knowable noumen 'out there' and 100% unknowable noumena 'out there'."

If there's nothing underlying phenomena, there are no noumena...

First off, there may be other (living) things in themselves. And foremost, we have to do so for our own sake.

If you're all alone or just the illusion of even that, then there is no 'sake' to most people, even if you and Kant see it otherwise.

Well, yes and no. No, there is for me no reason whatsoever to extend my existence. However, an eternity of non-existence most probably awaits me, so why rush toward that?

'Is there then no non-arbitrary distinction between life and death? In fact, there is: the distinction between consciousness and unconsciousness.'
https://forum.philosophynow.org/viewtopic.php?p=691778#p691778

'[L]iving beings cannot do nothing'.
https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/t/esoteric-buddhism/80256

My point is that there is no actual known evidence throughout the entire history of the West for the mental/material dualism. Unless you can present some.

No, I agree that "matter" is itself mental and there's nothing underlying it.

That's right: you are a mind, and a mind is the experience of having ideas. But that means it's not just the experience of ideas, but also of having them. The ideas are immanent to the mind, the mind is transcendent to the ideas. Without this distinction, there could be no distinction between ideas, either. The mind is the space in which the particular ideas show up.

A mind doesn't literally 'have' ideas and 'experiences having ideas'. Ideas are just more phenomena that are parts of the mind.
The mind is not transcendent to the ideas, we just say such things for practical purposes.

And maybe it even seems that way for practical purposes... But yeah, particles are just kinked space.

[Self-Lightening]

This doesn't look like any fundamental fact, just a deep psychological drive in some people. Imo most people lack it.

Surely you just mean will to power, not eros.

"The word which Nietzsche used is 'the will to power.' Nietzsche meant it in a very subtle and noble manner". (Strauss, "Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization".)

Because people usually understand it in a "crude and ignoble way" (ibid.), they wishfully think they themselves and others lack it.

In any case, if you were to grant that it's a deep psychological drive in all people, or (at least) in yourself, you'd still have to infer from that that it's a fundamental fact, posit that it be a fundamental fact. But then, the question is whether you must not do so:

https://forum.philosophynow.org/viewtopic.php?t=42727

Yes I meant the will to power. I think it's about as much a 'fundamental fact' as pedophilia is. A few people are driven by it, but the majority never will be.

Are you sure you've understood the "very subtle and noble manner" in which Nietzsche meant it, though? The pedophilia remark suggests that you understand it in a crude and ignoble way.

And why only address the will to power, and not eros? Could it be because you can't level your criticism of the will to power against eros?—I hereby offer a little essay I wrote two years ago.

::

The Three Gooods: Eros, Will-to-Power, Self-Lightening

Perhaps the most significant philosophical, as distinct from politico-philosophical, statement in Lampert's latest book is this:

"[T]he nature of nature is universal process, a becoming that is an internal drive to fulfill itself whose product is an internal drive to fulfill itself." (How Socrates Became Socrates, page 190.)

In order to fully appreciate it, however, at least when taken out of context like this, we must compare it to the corresponding statements in his forelast book:

"[F]orce is the drive to discharge itself within a field of forces enacting the same necessity. […W]ill to power has no aim but discharge of the total quanta of its force at every moment; such discharge is always an event within a relatively unstable field of such impulses to discharge, the relation among them being simply that of greater or lesser; all beings are ultimately more or less stable collections of such impulses and themselves express the fundamental quality of impulse, will to power." (Becoming Nietzsche, pp. 264 and 266n29.)

By "force", we should here understand repellent force: will to power is the internal drive (the "inner world", which Kaufmann wrongly renders as "inner will") that explains force as repellent (WP 619; cf. 618). The former statement, then, may be taken to describe eros as the internal drive that explains force as attractive: attractive force is the drive to fulfill itself in bringing forth (pro-ducing) another such force. The irony, however, is that such a drive "fulfills" itself precisely in discharging itself, lightening itself from a part of itself, which manifests as a new whole which in turn seeks to "fulfill" itself like that, too. And all this happens "within a field of forces enacting the same necessity". When a quantum of force lightens itself of a part of itself, what happens to that part, then? It adds itself to another quantum of force, which thereby becomes greater, i.e., a heavier cloud, so to say, more pressed to discharge itself.—Eros and will to power, then, can both be described as self-lightening (self-discharging)—not in the sense of the lightening of some "self", but of the lightening of that very lightening. Now as I wrote in an email to Lampert four and a half years ago (to which he never responded, but I must admit it was quite tumultuous):

'The first of the Three Evils [from Zarathustra's eponymous speech], Wollust [lit. "well-lust", in the sense of goodly pleasure or desire], corresponds to Platonic eros. The second, which I now call Herrsch-Lust [lit. "lust to rule", as distinct from Herrschsucht, lit. "ruling-sickness, addiction to ruling"], corresponds to the will to power. And the third, which even Zarathustra calls Selbst-Lust [Lampert had said that Zarathustra left it nameless], corresponds to self-valuing. The fact that I call the latter two evils "Lust" may serve to confirm that eros is basic to them. (Consider WP 55: "good, valuable--with pleasure [Lust]." I have identified this Lust, as the feeling of power, as the feeling of freedom, as the feeling of--free--will. The feeling of power (might) is the feeling of will-power (will-force).)
The third Evil I see as the synthesis of the first two: Wollust is what Blake calls the Devouring portion of being; Herrsch-Lust, the Prolific. For more on this, see [https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/t/the-prolific-and-the-devouring/39835]'

Now note that in this passage I speak, not of self-lightening, but of self-valuing. By this, I do mean the valuing of that very valuing—and, again, not of some "self"—, but not directly, only indirectly: self-valuing through other-valuing, i.e., by valuing other self-valuings which in turn other-value "you"… What this means, however, is that "you", the (more or less stable collection of) self-lightening(s) that you are, lighten yourself on another self-lightening (collection) which "in turn"—i.e., before, during, or after—lightens itself on you. Thus "valuing" does not mean "considering valuable", not "attaching value" in the mind (only), but physically, by bestowing value, "values", in the literal sense of "things of value"—and the sole ultimate value is valuation itself, i.e., self-lightening.—As for the "field of forces enacting the same necessity", however, I don't think self-lightening is always an event within such a field. That is, I think "matter" radiates space-light… For the form, though not the content, of this latter term, compare the term "wave-particle": particles are collapsed waveforms which can again "uncollapse" into waves of vacuum-radiation; quantum excitations of a field which may become less excited and more field, less particular and more wavelike. In fact, at the most basic—quantum—level, all "beings" are getting lighter all the time, less all the time, meaning more and more space emerges. This is the infinite universe-equivalent of the "expansion" of the universe. (Logically, it makes no difference whether the universe is expanding or everything in it is contracting.) The Big Bang itself is the absolute maximum accumulation of force discharging itself into space (the heat death of the universe is when the universe almost entirely consists of space). Self-lightening into light-space is not so much discharge into the void as it is discharge into void: the self-lightening becomes light-space, never completely but more and more (approximating an asymptote). The discharge creates more void, or more precisely it is a creating of more void (empty space, vacuum). Self-lightening in light-space is not even a particle('s) becoming a quantum of space, but the relative un-kinking of a wave of space. [Note: I now think self-lightening in light-space is a particle's uncollapsing into one or more quanta of a wave of space as well as the relative unkinking of that wave.] The whole is infinite, but its "parts" can never be infinitesimal. The elementary charge becomes ever smaller—not relatively to others, but to its former self and the former selves of all others alike. The Big Chill is the ending that never ends, just as the Big Bang is the beginning that never began. Yet eternal return wouldn't make a difference, for that means there's absolutely no difference between the "current" cosmic cycle and the "next". This includes this life of yours, which in turn includes any déjà vu experiences that may occur in it.

"[T]he shattering recognition that the autonomous will is an illusion […] does not really come from the eternal recurrence. It is dictated by determinism. […] The doctrine of eternal recurrence is not required to generate the abysmal thought. It is the thought from the abyss concerning the deterministic universe and its consequent nihilism." (Seung, Nietzsche's Epic of the Soul, page 179.)

[Atla]

Well, that could have several reasons. One would be that those "philosophers" aren't really philosophers, but only professors of philosophy, say; or only philosophers 1.0 (natural philosophers) and not philosophers 2.0 (political philosophers). If, however, political philosophers seem divided on what he said, that may well be an exoteric front on their part. Also, there's this:

"[F]or a variety of reasons, we live in an age of extreme hermeneutical pessimism. We despair of the possibility of reaching the 'true interpretation' of even the simplest of texts. In such an environment, the idea that earlier thinkers wrote esoterically is a most unwelcome suggestion, threatening to burden the practice of scholarship with all kinds of new and intractable demands. Exactly how is one to read 'between the lines,' and how is one ever to know that one has reached the author’s true, esoteric teaching? Every such difficulty, real as it may be, grows in our eyes into a sheer impossibility. In our hermeneutical malaise, this theory feels to us altogether unmanageable, unbearable, unacceptable." (Arthur Melzer, Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing, pages 106-07.)

Even Kant scholars can spend half their careers disagreeing with each other on what Kant meant, for example the Allison vs Guyer debate (the two-aspect vs two-world interpretations).

Well, that comment is almost 15 years old. I also used the term on page 2 of this very thread. And, I deliberately wrote 'rather a solosomniist', not 'instead a solosomniist'. I will agree that there's probably nothing underlying phenomena. But this would seem to contradict what you said before:

"It makes sense to use three categories: phenomena, partially knowable noumen 'out there' and 100% unknowable noumena 'out there'."

If there's nothing underlying phenomena, there are no noumena...

See, how do you know that that's what Kant meant? Saying that noumena are "underlying" phenomena is a knowledge claim about how noumena are related to phenomena, but shouldn't such a knowledge claim be impossible according to Kant?

Anyway, whatever Kant meant, in my indirect realism noumena are probably not "underlying" phenomena as there are no levels, noumena just means "beyond phenomena".

Well, yes and no. No, there is for me no reason whatsoever to extend my existence. However, an eternity of non-existence most probably awaits me, so why rush toward that?

I meant that solipsists are asocial, but most people couldn't bear to be asocial, they can't exist like that (also, humanity wouldn't function if people were solipsists).

And maybe it even seems that way for practical purposes...

Anything is possible but is it likely, when the evidence we do have is to the contrary?

[Atla]

Surely you just mean will to power, not eros.

"The word which Nietzsche used is 'the will to power.' Nietzsche meant it in a very subtle and noble manner". (Strauss, "Progress or Return? The Contemporary Crisis in Western Civilization".)

Because people usually understand it in a "crude and ignoble way" (ibid.), they wishfully think they themselves and others lack it.

In any case, if you were to grant that it's a deep psychological drive in all people, or (at least) in yourself, you'd still have to infer from that that it's a fundamental fact, posit that it be a fundamental fact. But then, the question is whether you must not do so:

https://forum.philosophynow.org/viewtopic.php?t=42727

Yes I meant the will to power. I think it's about as much a 'fundamental fact' as pedophilia is. A few people are driven by it, but the majority never will be.

Are you sure you've understood the "very subtle and noble manner" in which Nietzsche meant it, though? The pedophilia remark suggests that you understand it in a crude and ignoble way.

And why only address the will to power, and not eros? Could it be because you can't level your criticism of the will to power against eros?—I hereby offer a little essay I wrote two years ago.

::

The Three Gooods: Eros, Will-to-Power, Self-Lightening

Perhaps the most significant philosophical, as distinct from politico-philosophical, statement in Lampert's latest book is this:

"[T]he nature of nature is universal process, a becoming that is an internal drive to fulfill itself whose product is an internal drive to fulfill itself." (How Socrates Became Socrates, page 190.)

In order to fully appreciate it, however, at least when taken out of context like this, we must compare it to the corresponding statements in his forelast book:

"[F]orce is the drive to discharge itself within a field of forces enacting the same necessity. […W]ill to power has no aim but discharge of the total quanta of its force at every moment; such discharge is always an event within a relatively unstable field of such impulses to discharge, the relation among them being simply that of greater or lesser; all beings are ultimately more or less stable collections of such impulses and themselves express the fundamental quality of impulse, will to power." (Becoming Nietzsche, pp. 264 and 266n29.)

By "force", we should here understand repellent force: will to power is the internal drive (the "inner world", which Kaufmann wrongly renders as "inner will") that explains force as repellent (WP 619; cf. 618). The former statement, then, may be taken to describe eros as the internal drive that explains force as attractive: attractive force is the drive to fulfill itself in bringing forth (pro-ducing) another such force. The irony, however, is that such a drive "fulfills" itself precisely in discharging itself, lightening itself from a part of itself, which manifests as a new whole which in turn seeks to "fulfill" itself like that, too. And all this happens "within a field of forces enacting the same necessity". When a quantum of force lightens itself of a part of itself, what happens to that part, then? It adds itself to another quantum of force, which thereby becomes greater, i.e., a heavier cloud, so to say, more pressed to discharge itself.—Eros and will to power, then, can both be described as self-lightening (self-discharging)—not in the sense of the lightening of some "self", but of the lightening of that very lightening. Now as I wrote in an email to Lampert four and a half years ago (to which he never responded, but I must admit it was quite tumultuous):

'The first of the Three Evils [from Zarathustra's eponymous speech], Wollust [lit. "well-lust", in the sense of goodly pleasure or desire], corresponds to Platonic eros. The second, which I now call Herrsch-Lust [lit. "lust to rule", as distinct from Herrschsucht, lit. "ruling-sickness, addiction to ruling"], corresponds to the will to power. And the third, which even Zarathustra calls Selbst-Lust [Lampert had said that Zarathustra left it nameless], corresponds to self-valuing. The fact that I call the latter two evils "Lust" may serve to confirm that eros is basic to them. (Consider WP 55: "good, valuable--with pleasure [Lust]." I have identified this Lust, as the feeling of power, as the feeling of freedom, as the feeling of--free--will. The feeling of power (might) is the feeling of will-power (will-force).)
The third Evil I see as the synthesis of the first two: Wollust is what Blake calls the Devouring portion of being; Herrsch-Lust, the Prolific. For more on this, see [https://www.ilovephilosophy.com/t/the-prolific-and-the-devouring/39835]'

Now note that in this passage I speak, not of self-lightening, but of self-valuing. By this, I do mean the valuing of that very valuing—and, again, not of some "self"—, but not directly, only indirectly: self-valuing through other-valuing, i.e., by valuing other self-valuings which in turn other-value "you"… What this means, however, is that "you", the (more or less stable collection of) self-lightening(s) that you are, lighten yourself on another self-lightening (collection) which "in turn"—i.e., before, during, or after—lightens itself on you. Thus "valuing" does not mean "considering valuable", not "attaching value" in the mind (only), but physically, by bestowing value, "values", in the literal sense of "things of value"—and the sole ultimate value is valuation itself, i.e., self-lightening.—As for the "field of forces enacting the same necessity", however, I don't think self-lightening is always an event within such a field. That is, I think "matter" radiates space-light… For the form, though not the content, of this latter term, compare the term "wave-particle": particles are collapsed waveforms which can again "uncollapse" into waves of vacuum-radiation; quantum excitations of a field which may become less excited and more field, less particular and more wavelike. In fact, at the most basic—quantum—level, all "beings" are getting lighter all the time, less all the time, meaning more and more space emerges. This is the infinite universe-equivalent of the "expansion" of the universe. (Logically, it makes no difference whether the universe is expanding or everything in it is contracting.) The Big Bang itself is the absolute maximum accumulation of force discharging itself into space (the heat death of the universe is when the universe almost entirely consists of space). Self-lightening into light-space is not so much discharge into the void as it is discharge into void: the self-lightening becomes light-space, never completely but more and more (approximating an asymptote). The discharge creates more void, or more precisely it is a creating of more void (empty space, vacuum). Self-lightening in light-space is not even a particle('s) becoming a quantum of space, but the relative un-kinking of a wave of space. [Note: I now think self-lightening in light-space is a particle's uncollapsing into one or more quanta of a wave of space as well as the relative unkinking of that wave.] The whole is infinite, but its "parts" can never be infinitesimal. The elementary charge becomes ever smaller—not relatively to others, but to its former self and the former selves of all others alike. The Big Chill is the ending that never ends, just as the Big Bang is the beginning that never began. Yet eternal return wouldn't make a difference, for that means there's absolutely no difference between the "current" cosmic cycle and the "next". This includes this life of yours, which in turn includes any déjà vu experiences that may occur in it.

"[T]he shattering recognition that the autonomous will is an illusion […] does not really come from the eternal recurrence. It is dictated by determinism. […] The doctrine of eternal recurrence is not required to generate the abysmal thought. It is the thought from the abyss concerning the deterministic universe and its consequent nihilism." (Seung, Nietzsche's Epic of the Soul, page 179.)

Well if you really want to hear my disillusioned take, I think that middle-aged, male, high-IQ philosophers ("real" philosophers with a genuine and profound curiosity about existence) like Kant and Nietzsche, have a tendency to analyze the psychological forces of their owns minds, and theorize that these psychological forces are somehow connected to cosmic forces.

But they are missing the extremely disappointing thing that almost all the average and below-average humans seem to be almost or entirely devoid of such forces. Most people are more retarded than these high-IQ philosophers can comprehend, without excessive training.

I never really looked into Nietzsche because I had the impression that he pushed Western philosophy as far as it can go into the "psychic", but ultimately it just looks like wishful thinking.

But again, if we have some kind of "evidence" for the existence and interaction of such forces, I'll change my mind.

[Veritas Aequitas]

To be sure, though, Nietzsche taught that Kant was no genuine philosopher, but 'merely' a "philosophical labourer and m[a]n of science", a "scholar". And then it makes perfect sense to think he was driven by fame first and foremost. However, that would mean he arguably cared more about other people than a genuine philosopher needs to... After all, fame requires other people. The philosopher needs only the appearance of (other) people.

Nietzsche was very critical of Kant's Critical Philosophy following his mentor Schopenhauer [has great respect for Kant] who critiqued Kant thing-in-itself in contrast to S' ultimate Will.

Nietzsche's Perspectivism and Kant's Transcendental Idealism [Copernican Revolution] both opposed philosophical realism's absolute mind-independence.

However I believe Nietzsche misinterpreted Kant overall philosophy at the fringe whilst they share the same fundamentals.

Here's from AI:

Here are some key points that Kantians often highlight that Nietzsche may have missed:
1. The Importance of Practical Reason: Kantians emphasize that Kant's philosophy is not solely about theoretical reason but also about practical reason. Kant believed that moral principles are not merely subjective preferences but objective laws that can be discovered through reason. Nietzsche, on the other hand, tended to emphasize the subjective and irrational aspects of human nature.

2. The Role of Freedom: Kantians argue that Kant's philosophy is deeply committed to the idea of human freedom. While Nietzsche also valued freedom, his understanding of it was often more radical and individualistic than Kant's. Kant believed that freedom was essential for moral agency and that it could be reconciled with the idea of a universal moral law.

3. The Limits of Reason: Kant was aware of the limitations of reason, particularly when it comes to metaphysical questions. He argued that while we cannot know the ultimate nature of reality, we can still use reason to guide our actions and make moral judgments. Nietzsche, on the other hand, was more skeptical of the power of reason and often emphasized the role of intuition and passion.

Another:

1. Misunderstanding of the Noumenon: Nietzsche often portrayed Kant's noumenon as a mystical or supernatural entity. Kantians argue that the noumenon was merely a conceptual device used to highlight the limits of human knowledge. It was not a metaphysical claim about the existence of a hidden reality.

2. Oversimplification of Kant's Ethics: Nietzsche often presented Kant's ethics as overly rigid and formalistic. Kantians argue that Kant's categorical imperative was intended to be a practical guide for moral action, not a rigid set of rules.

3. Ignoring Kant's Pragmatism: Nietzsche often portrayed Kant as a purely theoretical philosopher. Kantians argue that Kant was deeply concerned with practical matters, such as politics and education. His philosophy was intended to be a guide for action, not just a theoretical exercise.

4. Misinterpreting Kant's Critique of Reason: Nietzsche often interpreted Kant's critique of pure reason as a complete rejection of reason. Kantians argue that Kant was not against reason per se, but against the misuse of reason, particularly when it is divorced from experience.

While Nietzsche's criticisms of Kant were influential, Kantians argue that they were often based on misunderstandings or oversimplifications of Kant's philosophy. By carefully examining Kant's texts and considering the context of his thought, it is possible to appreciate the nuances and complexities of his ideas.

I believe Kant overall philosophy has a marginal edge over Nietzsche.
Nietzsche's Will-to-Power drives continuous improvements and progress but it can be a double edged sword.

On the other hand Kant's vision and mission of perpetual peace [whilst idealistic] drive and steer continuous improvements toward the ideal only in a positive direction; it nip evil at source and wherever it creep up from any cranny.

Your views?

[Self-Lightening]

Well, that could have several reasons. One would be that those "philosophers" aren't really philosophers, but only professors of philosophy, say; or only philosophers 1.0 (natural philosophers) and not philosophers 2.0 (political philosophers). If, however, political philosophers seem divided on what he said, that may well be an exoteric front on their part. Also, there's this:

"[F]or a variety of reasons, we live in an age of extreme hermeneutical pessimism. We despair of the possibility of reaching the 'true interpretation' of even the simplest of texts. In such an environment, the idea that earlier thinkers wrote esoterically is a most unwelcome suggestion, threatening to burden the practice of scholarship with all kinds of new and intractable demands. Exactly how is one to read 'between the lines,' and how is one ever to know that one has reached the author’s true, esoteric teaching? Every such difficulty, real as it may be, grows in our eyes into a sheer impossibility. In our hermeneutical malaise, this theory feels to us altogether unmanageable, unbearable, unacceptable." (Arthur Melzer, Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing, pages 106-07.)

Even Kant scholars can spend half their careers disagreeing with each other on what Kant meant, for example the Allison vs Guyer debate (the two-aspect vs two-world interpretations).

Scholars can be subsumed under 'professors of philosophy' in my order of rank above.

Well, that comment is almost 15 years old. I also used the term on page 2 of this very thread. And, I deliberately wrote 'rather a solosomniist', not 'instead a solosomniist'. I will agree that there's probably nothing underlying phenomena. But this would seem to contradict what you said before:

"It makes sense to use three categories: phenomena, partially knowable noumen 'out there' and 100% unknowable noumena 'out there'."

If there's nothing underlying phenomena, there are no noumena...

See, how do you know that that's what Kant meant? Saying that noumena are "underlying" phenomena is a knowledge claim about how noumena are related to phenomena, but shouldn't such a knowledge claim be impossible according to Kant?

No, since there would then be no (non-practical) reason to posit any noumena at all.

Anyway, whatever Kant meant, in my indirect realism noumena are probably not "underlying" phenomena as there are no levels, noumena just means "beyond phenomena".

That's not nondual, though. If it was really nondual, all that's beyond phenomena would be other phenomena. And that's basically what Nietzsche (with Peirce, Plato, and others) suggests: see my "A study in Nietzschean religious philosophy", section 2—Nietzsche's philosophy as objective subjectivism; in other words, noumenal phenomenalism, or real idealism, etc.

Well, yes and no. No, there is for me no reason whatsoever to extend my existence. However, an eternity of non-existence most probably awaits me, so why rush toward that?

I meant that solipsists are asocial, but most people couldn't bear to be asocial, they can't exist like that (also, humanity wouldn't function if people were solipsists).

Those are just practical reasons to believe in objective existence, though...

And maybe it even seems that way for practical purposes...

Anything is possible but is it likely, when the evidence we do have is to the contrary?

We have evidence that the mind does not seem to be transcendent to the ideas for practical purposes?

[Veritas Aequitas]

Anyway, whatever Kant meant, in my indirect realism noumena are probably not "underlying" phenomena as there are no levels, noumena just means "beyond phenomena".

That's not nondual, though. If it was really nondual, all that's beyond phenomena would be other phenomena.

It is not likely that your Nietzsche's position will see eye to eye with Atla's Indirect Realism grounded on philosophical realism.

Philosophical realism – is the view that a certain kind of thing (ranging widely from abstract objects like numbers to moral statements to the physical world itself) has mind-independent existence, i.e. that it exists even in the absence of any mind perceiving it or that its existence is not just a mere appearance in the eye of the beholder.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

And that's basically what Nietzsche (with Peirce, Plato, and others) suggests: see my "A study in Nietzschean religious philosophy", section 2—Nietzsche's philosophy as objective subjectivism; in other words, noumenal phenomenalism, or real idealism, etc.

Could Nietzsche's philosophy be:
-Objective Meta-Subjectivism [i.e. collective not plain subjectivity]
-Perspectivism
-Power Perspective -This term highlights the role of power in shaping our understanding of the world. Nietzsche believed that those who hold power are able to impose their perspectives as dominant narratives.

The other perspective where subjectivity is transmuted to objectivity is intersubjectivity based on intersubjective consensus as in scientific objectivity qualified to a collective-of-subjects [scientists].

[Atla]

No, since there would then be no (non-practical) reason to posit any noumena at all.

Kant 'needs' noumena for his philosophy, but Kant's philosophy is about not positing any (non-practical) noumena. So imo you may not know either what he meant. He ended up using noumena as a limiting concept, and was against positing them.

Kant needs noumena to underlie phenomena in some sense, but Kant says it's impossible to know that noumena underlie phenomena.
Kant needs noumena to 'cause' phenomena in some sense, but Kant says causation only applies within phenomena, so noumena can't 'cause' phenomena.

No wonder people can't figure out what Kant actually meant. He didn't even know it himself.

That's not nondual, though. If it was really nondual, all that's beyond phenomena would be other phenomena. And that's basically what Nietzsche (with Peirce, Plato, and others) suggests: see my "A study in Nietzschean religious philosophy", section 2—Nietzsche's philosophy as objective subjectivism; in other words, noumenal phenomenalism, or real idealism, etc.

Again why do you claim that's what Kant meant? If the noumenon is just a limiting concept, then we can't claim that (in the metaphysical sense) the noumena aren't just more phenomena, because we can't know what they are and what they aren't.

Yes naturally as a nondualist I see the noumena as more phenomena (in the metaphysical sense).

Those are just practical reasons to believe in objective existence, though...

In a more serious philosophy than Kant's anything can be reduced to practical reasons, but why would we?

We have evidence that the mind does not seem to be transcendent to the ideas for practical purposes?

Of course we have evidence duh, no metaphysical duality was ever uncovered by science in the human head, nor was a universal mind ever shown to exist. Nor has anyone successfully demonstrated such things "philosophically".