Wokeism of Analytic Philosophy

[Veritas Aequitas]

AP argued its case and thought other positions were false.
Exactly as you do.
And the professional philosophers who did this did not call their opponents primitive, violent, philosophical gnats chasing an illusion.

Seriously, you've fallen off the deep end.

You are very ignorant of the history of Philosophy re the emergence and domination of AP.
Suggest you read wider on this subject.
The professional AP philosophers [then even now some cases] were mocking, insulting and calling those who are not their kind, names, etc.

The 'philosophical gnat' term arose from a tit-for-tat where I would not have started if my interlocutors were amiable in their counters.
The typical APs are driven by desperate psychology thus they tend to go 'berserk' when their views are countered, opposed and rejected.

You're re-defining wokism and sticking it's square peg in the AP hole.
This entire post is an ad hom, insult - though, of course, you have always asserted that you don't start with insults and ad hom, but you are, [like the hero in a film] not going to put up with that treatment and will respond in kind.

Only here, and in many other threads, you insult all people in philosophical categories you disagree with.

And you can't even notice that actually you are doing precisely what you are saying the analytical philosophers did and do.

If only you could manage to be embarrassed by this.

[/quote]
The idea of 'wokeism' is a very fluid thing in the first place, thus not a problem if I defined the context. You are claiming to be a rigid semantic God?
Critiquing a belief [ideology in this case] in general and its active dogmatic believers is not ad hom.
It is just the same as critiquing or condemning an ideological evil religion and its active evil followers.

[Atla]

AP argued its case and thought other positions were false.
Exactly as you do.
And the professional philosophers who did this did not call their opponents primitive, violent, philosophical gnats chasing an illusion.

Seriously, you've fallen off the deep end.

You are very ignorant of the history of Philosophy re the emergence and domination of AP.
Suggest you read wider on this subject.
The professional AP philosophers [then even now some cases] were mocking, insulting and calling those who are not their kind, names, etc.

The 'philosophical gnat' term arose from a tit-for-tat where I would not have started if my interlocutors were amiable in their counters.
The typical APs are driven by desperate psychology thus they tend to go 'berserk' when their views are countered, opposed and rejected.

You're re-defining wokism and sticking it's square peg in the AP hole.
This entire post is an ad hom, insult - though, of course, you have always asserted that you don't start with insults and ad hom, but you are, [like the hero in a film] not going to put up with that treatment and will respond in kind.

Only here, and in many other threads, you insult all people in philosophical categories you disagree with.

And you can't even notice that actually you are doing precisely what you are saying the analytical philosophers did and do.

If only you could manage to be embarrassed by this.

The idea of 'wokeism' is a very fluid thing in the first place, thus not a problem if I defined the context. You are claiming to be a rigid semantic God?
Critiquing a belief [ideology in this case] in general and its active dogmatic believers is not ad hom.
It is just the same as critiquing or condemning an ideological evil religion and its active evil followers.

I've never seen anyone so dogmatic about "relative mind-independence" as VA, even though he can't prove it. Obviously he is driven by desperate psychology and projects this desperation onto others, and is the one who starts the ad homs as we could disagree without them like civilized adults. VA keeps bringing shame upon himself.

[Iwannaplato]

You are very ignorant of the history of Philosophy re the emergence and domination of AP.

You are very ignorant of what you are doing, such a basic cognitive weakness that you can't even see that you are doing precisely what you are complaining about to the best of your ability. Of course you have no power, but within the format and range of action, you have access to, you do exactly what they did. Often, instead of arguing, you try to find, as you did in this thread, ways to ad hom and insult those who disagree with you, to claim that they are more primitive, more violent, stupider, hallucinating and so on. Then of course you do this at the individual level also, aiming these types of insults and ad homs at individual posters.

You have claimed that you only go to the insult ad hom type attack in response to others doing this to you. This is a lie. You often start threads with OPs attacking categories of people who disagree with you in precisely these ways.

Given how you relate to people who disagree with you, given the lack of power you have, it seems extremely likely that you would behave in precisely the ways you complain about here if you had more power. You have the same attitudes and tactice, within the limited range of power you have.

You know that you are attacking AP because of individuals here. You know what you are doing and it is, as Atla has pointed out, gotten worse of late.

To put it simply: you are a hypocrite.

[Self-Lightening]

I've never seen anyone so dogmatic about "relative mind-independence" as VA, even though he can't prove it. Obviously he is driven by desperate psychology and projects this desperation onto others,

Does it matter? The topic is AP's "wokeism", not VA's. Do you think he's wrong, about AP in general, or the users he mentioned in his OP, or you in particular? Would you consider yourself an analytic philosopher or, more to the point, a philosophical realist? When you say "the world is probably real and not just the figment of [one's] imagination" (emphasis mine), is that because you've sublated the distinction between real and imaginary, fact and fiction?

"[…] the fundamental distinction between the world which is of any concern to us and the world in itself, or between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text)." (Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, page 178, emphasis mine.)

[Atla]

Does it matter? The topic is AP's "wokeism", not VA's. Do you think he's wrong, about AP in general, or the users he mentioned in his OP, or you in particular? Would you consider yourself an analytic philosopher or, more to the point, a philosophical realist? When you say "the world is probably real and not just the figment of [one's] imagination" (emphasis mine), is that because you've sublated the distinction between real and imaginary, fact and fiction?

"[…] the fundamental distinction between the world which is of any concern to us and the world in itself, or between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text)." (Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, page 178, emphasis mine.)

I don't subscribe to analytic philosophy. Philosophical realism isn't like wokeism. Most fundamentally I'm rather a realist, but it's combined with some anti-realist views.

When you say "the world is probably real and not just the figment of [one's] imagination" (emphasis mine), is that because you've sublated the distinction between real and imaginary, fact and fiction?

"[…] the fundamental distinction between the world which is of any concern to us and the world in itself, or between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text)." (Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, page 178, emphasis mine.)

No I meant that VA thinks the world is mind-dependent, he's a certain kind of anti-realist (which is imo ultimately solipsistic).

Strauss seems to be talking about the difference between our everyday perception of the world and the world as it truly is. That's realism, so he is an unsophisticated, primitive philosophical gnat driven by existential terrors and forever chasing an illusion, and is more likely to kill people, according to VA.

Umm how does "sublated the distinction between real and imaginary, fact and fiction" connect to what Staruss said?

[Self-Lightening]

When you say "the world is probably real and not just the figment of [one's] imagination" (emphasis mine), is that because you've sublated the distinction between real and imaginary, fact and fiction?

"[…] the fundamental distinction between the world which is of any concern to us and the world in itself, or between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text)." (Leo Strauss, Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy, page 178, emphasis mine.)

No I meant that VA thinks the world is mind-dependent, he's a certain kind of anti-realist (which is imo ultimately solipsistic).

He does seem to be a moral realist though, doesn't he? Although the connection may be that, for a metaphysical idealist, there is no indifferent world.

As for this being solipsistic, I don't think that's true, at least not literally. For the solipsist, at least something is real, namely the self... It's rather 'solosomniism': as Harry Neumann puts it, all there is is "a dream whose dreamer is himself a dream" or "dreams whose dreamers are themselves dreams" (and there is then no real difference between these two phrases).

Strauss seems to be talking about the difference between our everyday perception of the world and the world as it truly is. That's realism, so he is an unsophisticated, primitive philosophical gnat driven by existential terrors and forever chasing an illusion, and is more likely to kill people, according to VA.

Umm how does "sublated the distinction between real and imaginary, fact and fiction" connect to what Staruss said?

If the world in itself is of no concern to us, it might as well not exist for us. The sublation consists in hypothesizing that the world in itself be nothing besides "interested interpreting", so to say...

"[T]he world as will to power is both the world of concern to us and the world in itself. Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e.[!] acts of the will to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction to all other interpretations, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of the possibility of any 'categories.'
[…T]he most spiritual will to power consists in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be ([Beyond Good and Evil] aph. 9). It is in this way that Nietzsche abolishes the difference between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text)." (ibid. and page 189.)

[Atla]

He does seem to be a moral realist though, doesn't he? Although the connection may be that, for a metaphysical idealist, there is no indifferent world.

As for this being solipsistic, I don't think that's true, at least not literally. For the solipsist, at least something is real, namely the self... It's rather 'solosomniism': as Harry Neumann puts it, all there is is "a dream whose dreamer is himself a dream" or "dreams whose dreamers are themselves dreams" (and there is then no real difference between these two phrases).
He does seem to be a moral realist though, doesn't he? Although the connection may be that, for a metaphysical idealist, there is no indifferent world.

As for this being solipsistic, I don't think that's true, at least not literally. For the solipsist, at least something is real, namely the self... It's rather 'solosomniism': as Harry Neumann puts it, all there is is "a dream whose dreamer is himself a dream" or "dreams whose dreamers are themselves dreams" (and there is then no real difference between these two phrases).

By solipsistic I meant that VA uses the Kantian transcendental idealism, which is imo ultimately solipsistic, because you only have access to your own mental content, and your own mental content is 100% unrelated to the potential noumenal realm (anything outside your mind).

Plus VA merged this Kantian philosophy with Buddhist (mind-)dependent arising and Buddhist emptiness, or something like that.

If the world in itself is of no concern to us, it might as well not exist for us. The sublation consists in hypothesizing that the world in itself be nothing besides "interested interpreting", so to say...

"[T]he world as will to power is both the world of concern to us and the world in itself. Precisely if all views of the world are interpretations, i.e. acts of the will to power, the doctrine of the will to power is at the same time an interpretation and the most fundamental fact, for, in contradistinction to all other interpretations, it is the necessary and sufficient condition of the possibility of any 'categories.'
[…T]he most spiritual will to power consists in prescribing to nature what or how it ought to be ([Beyond Good and Evil] aph. 9). It is in this way that Nietzsche abolishes the difference between the world of appearance or fiction (the interpretations) and the true world (the text)." (ibid. and page 189.)

I'm an indirect realist (representationalist) and fundamentally disagree with the Kantian line of thinking as a whole, including Nietzsche's Kantian-based view I guess, though I didn't read Nietzsche.

I guess there is nothing to abolish in my indirect realism because it is understood by default that the human mind is a continuous part of the natural world.

[Self-Lightening]

I'm an indirect realist (representationalist) and fundamentally disagree with the entire Kantian line of thinking, including Nietzsche's Kantian-based view I guess, though I didn't read Nietzsche.

I guess there is nothing to abolish in my indirect realism because it is understood by default that the human mind is a continuous part of the natural world.

What's there to abolish in this representation is the distinction between mind (subject) and object: what in our idea is an "object" is really a mind, or a group of minds, just like us (in that regard...). But maybe your indirect realism is already a monist version?

By solipsistic I meant that VA uses the Kantian transcendental idealism, which is imo ultimately solipsistic, because you only have access to your own mental content, and your own mental content is 100% unrelated to the potential noumenal realm (anything outside your mind).

Plus VA merged this Kantian philosophy with Buddhist (mind-)dependent arising and Buddhist emptiness, or something like that.

I think that, in transcendental idealism, the mind transcends its content (its ideas)... Buddhist emptiness can be understood in a way to be that-in-which dependent arising occurs, the mind itself:

"In Vajrayāna Buddhism the subtlest state of consciousness is known as clear light. In terms of categories of consciousness, there is one type of consciousness that consists of a permanent stream or an unending continuity and there are other forms of consciousness whose continuum comes to an end. Both these levels of consciousness—one consisting of an endless continuum and the other of a finite continuum—have a momentary nature. That is to say, they arise from moment to moment, and they are constantly in a state of flux. So the permanence of the first kind is only in terms of its continuum. The subtlest consciousness consists of such an eternal continuum, while the streams of the grosser states of consciousness do end."
https://religion.fandom.com/wiki/Mindstream#cite_note-21

"The average temperature of the universe is determined by the afterglow left over from the Big Bang, the cosmic microwave background radiation. It evenly pervades space at an effective temperature of 2.73° above absolute zero. This is utterly frigid, hundreds of degrees colder than any temperature terrestrial organisms can survive. But the fact that the temperature is non-zero implies a corresponding tiny amount of heat in deep space. This of course implies a corresponding tiny amount of experience."
https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/is-consciousness-everywhere

[Atla]

What is there to abolish in this representation is the distinction between mind (subject) and object: what in our idea is an "object" is really a mind, or a group of minds, just like us (in that regard...). But maybe your indirect realism is already a monist version?

Don't really understand the above, imo there are two objects: the object "out there" and the representational mental object "in the mind".

Yes my indirect realism is monist (actually Eastern nondualist). Indirect realism doesn't need a fundamental metaphysical dualism, the two different objects only need to be located elsewhere in spacetime.

I think that, in transcendental idealism, the mind transcends its mental content (its ideas)... Buddhist emptiness can be understood in a way to be that-in-which dependent arising occurs, the mind itself:

"In Vajrayāna Buddhism the subtlest state of consciousness is known as clear light. In terms of categories of consciousness, there is one type of consciousness that consists of a permanent stream or an unending continuity and there are other forms of consciousness whose continuum comes to an end. Both these levels of consciousness—one consisting of an endless continuum and the other of a finite continuum—have a momentary nature. That is to say, they arise from moment to moment, and they are constantly in a state of flux. So the permanence of the first kind is only in terms of its continuum. The subtlest consciousness consists of such an eternal continuum, while the streams of the grosser states of consciousness do end."
https://religion.fandom.com/wiki/Mindst ... te_note-21

"The average temperature of the universe is determined by the afterglow left over from the Big Bang, the cosmic microwave background radiation. It evenly pervades space at an effective temperature of 2.73° above absolute zero. This is utterly frigid, hundreds of degrees colder than any temperature terrestrial organisms can survive. But the fact that the temperature is non-zero implies a corresponding tiny amount of heat in deep space. This of course implies a corresponding tiny amount of experience."
https://thereader.mitpress.mit.edu/is-c ... everywhere

Even if there is a universal mind with mental categories (imo which idea may have been Kant's selfish attempt to bring back God, and then collect the fame for it), aren't we still limited to our little solipsistic streams with content 100% unrelated to other little solipsistic streams?

[Self-Lightening]

What is there to abolish in this representation is the distinction between mind (subject) and object: what in our idea is an "object" is really a mind, or a group of minds, just like us (in that regard...). But maybe your indirect realism is already a monist version?

Don't really understand the above, imo there are two objects: the object "out there" and the representational mental object "in the mind".

Yes my indirect realism is monist (actually Eastern nondualist). Indirect realism doesn't need a fundamental metaphysical dualism, the two different objects only need to be located elsewhere in spacetime.

In Eastern nondualism, the object "out there" is itself a representational mental object "in the [universal] mind" (in Brahman in Hinduism, in the mindstream, the storehouse consciousness or the ground in Buddhism, in the Tao in Taoism, etc.).

Even if there is a universal mind with mental categories (imo which idea may have been Kant's selfish attempt to bring back God, and then collect the fame for it), aren't we still limited to our little solipsistic streams with content 100% unrelated to other little solipsistic streams?

You think Kant was driven by fame? I think it may well have been a genuine concern for society (if it wasn't just for his own sanity or peace of mind, etc.). "[T]he starry sky above me and the moral law within me" (emphasis mine)!

Anyway, yes and no. No, because this "100% unrelated" is not the same as the "100% unrelated" you mentioned earlier:

"[Y]ou only have access to your own mental content, and your own mental content is 100% unrelated to the potential noumenal realm".

The content of two "little solipsistic" mindstreams is at least not most fundamentally different, because it has the same basic structure (at the very least the characteristic of being content, being "contained" in a mindstream).

[Atla]

In Eastern nondualism, the object "out there" is itself a representational mental object "in the [universal] mind" (in Brahman in Hinduism, in the mindstream, the storehouse consciousness or the ground in Buddhism, in the Tao in Taoism, etc.).

By Eastern nondualism I just mean nondual thinking (which is simply missing from Western philosophy). Nondual thinking even without the metaphysical baggage of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. Nondualism doesn't have to assume that the universal existence is a mind, mind-like, in fact that's quite delusional.

You think Kant was driven by fame? I think it may well have been a genuine concern for society (if it wasn't just for his own sanity or peace of mind, etc.). "[T]he starry sky above me and the moral law within me" (emphasis mine)!

Anyway, yes and no. No, because this "100% unrelated" is not the same as the "100% unrelated" you mentioned earlier:

"[Y]ou only have access to your own mental content, and your own mental content is 100% unrelated to the potential noumenal realm".

The content of two "little solipsistic" mindstreams is at least not most fundamentally different, because it has the same basic structure (at the very least the characteristic of being content, being "contained" in a mindstream).

Yes I think he was driven by fame first and foremost. Someone who is genuinely concerned about others, doesn't come up with an evil solipsistic philosophy that makes others disappear. Having the structure of the content being the same is quite irrelevant when all the other people you encounter in your life never actually existed.

I've found that some autistic people like Kant can be quite vain actually. They aren't really malicious or anything, they just care about themselves more than about others.

[Self-Lightening]

In Eastern nondualism, the object "out there" is itself a representational mental object "in the [universal] mind" (in Brahman in Hinduism, in the mindstream, the storehouse consciousness or the ground in Buddhism, in the Tao in Taoism, etc.).

By Eastern nondualism I just mean nondual thinking (which is simply missing from Western philosophy). Nondual thinking even without the metaphysical baggage of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism. Nondualism doesn't have to assume that the universal existence is a mind, mind-like, in fact that's quite delusional.

It doesn't have to be an assumption, it can be a postulation... You seem to at least postulate some universal existence. Isn't that, too, delusional then?

You think Kant was driven by fame? I think it may well have been a genuine concern for society (if it wasn't just for his own sanity or peace of mind, etc.). "[T]he starry sky above me and the moral law within me" (emphasis mine)!

Anyway, yes and no. No, because this "100% unrelated" is not the same as the "100% unrelated" you mentioned earlier:

"[Y]ou only have access to your own mental content, and your own mental content is 100% unrelated to the potential noumenal realm".

The content of two "little solipsistic" mindstreams is at least not most fundamentally different, because it has the same basic structure (at the very least the characteristic of being content, being "contained" in a mindstream).

Yes I think he was driven by fame first and foremost. Someone who is genuinely concerned about others, doesn't come up with an evil solipsistic philosophy that makes others disappear. Having the structure of the content being the same is quite irrelevant when all the other people you encounter in your life never actually existed.

Why must it just be all the other people you encounter in your life that never actually exist?

"In a river mist, if another boat knocks against yours, you might yell at the other fellow to stay clear. But if you notice then, that it's an empty boat, adrift with nobody aboard, you stop yelling. When you discover that all the others are drifting boats, there's no one to yell at. And when you find out you are an empty boat, there's no one to yell."
—Zhuangzi

To be sure, though, Nietzsche taught that Kant was no genuine philosopher, but 'merely' a "philosophical labourer and m[a]n of science", a "scholar". And then it makes perfect sense to think he was driven by fame first and foremost. However, that would mean he arguably cared more about other people than a genuine philosopher needs to... After all, fame requires other people. The philosopher needs only the appearance of (other) people.

I've found that some autistic people like Kant can be quite vain actually. They aren't really malicious or anything, they just care about themselves more than about others.

You're saying that they themselves aren't really malicious or anything, but can come up with a philosophy that's evil, right? But even if that philosophy is realist, is it evil if it's concerned more with its author than with others? People aren't necessarily equal. As Heraclitus said, one was myriads for him, if he be best (áristos).

[Atla]

It doesn't have to be an assumption, it can be a postulation... You seem to at least postulate some universal existence. Isn't that, too, delusional then?

I don't think so, the world seems to exist, but it doesn't seem mind-like to me, nor have I seen anyone actually show that it is.

Why must it just be all the other people you encounter in your life that never actually exist?

"In a river mist, if another boat knocks against yours, you might yell at the other fellow to stay clear. But if you notice then, that it's an empty boat, adrift with nobody aboard, you stop yelling. When you discover that all the others are drifting boats, there's no one to yell at. And when you find out you are an empty boat, there's no one to yell."
—Zhuangzi

To be sure, though, Nietzsche taught that Kant was no genuine philosopher, but 'merely' a "philosophical labourer and m[a]n of science", a "scholar". And then it makes perfect sense to think he was driven by fame first and foremost. However, that would mean he arguably cared more about other people than a genuine philosopher needs to... After all, fame requires other people. The philosopher needs only the appearance of (other) people.

My current understanding, which can easily be wrong as no one quite knows what Kant was thinking, is that in Kant's transcendental idealism other people (with their identically structured personal streams) can only be speculated to exist, but are all located in the unknowable noumenon if they exist. So the content of my experience is 100% unrelated to them (minus the structure). The people I do encounter in life aren't actually the real other people, they are just parts of a coherent solipsistic experience-stream I'm having. However Kant also denies solipsism, he says we should always totally act like we weren't solipsists and treat our stream with the apparent other people in it as real.

That's some next level twisted shit that Kant came up with imo. He "cared" for other people within the above mindset. I see no parallel to the Zhuangzi quote, I don't think Kant was talking about a no-self philosophy at all.

Kant was no man of science either imo. He unified 18th century rationalism and empiricism in a horrific way, created an abomination, just because why not, he could get away with it. And since he was a super-high IQ autistic in the 18th century, people thought that he was some kind of superhuman with some next level insight.

You're saying that they themselves aren't really malicious or anything, but can come up with a philosophy that's evil, right? But even if that philosophy is realist, is it evil if it's concerned more with its author than with others? People aren't necessarily equal. As Heraclitus said, one was myriads for him, if he be best (áristos).

I think Kant knew somewhere that his philosophy is rather anti-life, he just didn't want to go there, didn't really care. Luckily his philosophy was sufficiently refuted since then, it's just not true that mental categories come from a universal mind, and (Einsteinian) space and time are almost certainly not mental categories at all (nor is causality), and his phenomena-noumena distinction is also dead wrong. The correct philosophy is probably indirect realism.

[Self-Lightening]

It doesn't have to be an assumption, it can be a postulation... You seem to at least postulate some universal existence. Isn't that, too, delusional then?

I don't think so, the world seems to exist, but it doesn't seem mind-like to me, nor have I seen anyone actually show that it is.

At this point, at least, I wasn't thinking of a single mind (a universal mind), but a great many particular minds. And I'm not claiming that anyone could actually demonstrate that it is.¹ But take this image again:



If you postulate a universal existence that does not consist of mind(s), of (a) subject(s), you postulate one that consists of "matter", of (an) object(s)... But, as I put it recently,

'A subject is a being about which the question "what's it like to be that being" makes sense and has an answer; an object is a being about which the question makes no sense and has no answer.
(I suppose we could distinguish between real and unreal subjects, with an unreal subject being a being about whom the question makes sense but doesn't have an answer, but that would really just be another object: an object of imagination. And in fact, all objects are imaginary like that, being mental constructs on the part of subjects. They may consist of subjects or a subject may consist of them, but they themselves don’t really exist, e.g. in Heidegger’s sense: "Dasein existiert"!)'

As a mind, you only have actual experience of being a mind and having ideas. So why posit some third thing which is neither a mind nor an idea? That's just irrational!

Why must it just be all the other people you encounter in your life that never actually exist?

"In a river mist, if another boat knocks against yours, you might yell at the other fellow to stay clear. But if you notice then, that it's an empty boat, adrift with nobody aboard, you stop yelling. When you discover that all the others are drifting boats, there's no one to yell at. And when you find out you are an empty boat, there's no one to yell."
—Zhuangzi

To be sure, though, Nietzsche taught that Kant was no genuine philosopher, but 'merely' a "philosophical labourer and m[a]n of science", a "scholar". And then it makes perfect sense to think he was driven by fame first and foremost. However, that would mean he arguably cared more about other people than a genuine philosopher needs to... After all, fame requires other people. The philosopher needs only the appearance of (other) people.

My current understanding, which can easily be wrong as no one quite knows what Kant was thinking,

Interesting! Could he have been an exoteric writer? Or do you just mean that no one quite knows what (and whether!) anyone else is thinking?

is that in Kant's transcendental idealism other people (with their identically structured personal streams) can only be speculated to exist, but are all located in the unknowable noumenon if they exist. So the content of my experience is 100% unrelated to them (minus the structure). The people I do encounter in life aren't actually the real other people, they are just parts of a coherent solipsistic experience-stream I'm having. However Kant also denies solipsism, he says we should always totally act like we weren't solipsists and treat our stream with the apparent other people in it as real.

That's some next level twisted shit that Kant came up with imo. He "cared" for other people within the above mindset.

I don't see what's twisted about any of that. Can you explain?

I see no parallel to the Zhuangzi quote, I don't think Kant was talking about a no-self philosophy at all.

I wasn't so much thinking of Kant there, as of myself and others (no pun intended):

"Nihilism means that nothing -- and only nothing! -- has an identity or nature, a being not subject to radical, random change or obliteration at any moment. No divine or natural support exists for the common-sense faith that anything is more than nothing. Nothing is more than what it experiences or what is experienced about it. There is nothing in, behind or above things to make them more than empty experiences (thoughts, perceptions, moods, feelings, etc.), impressions as Hume called them. Nihilism is not solipsist nor does it make man the measure of all things. The nihilist 'self' or 'man' which experiences its 'world' is itself no more than empty impressions. It too is nothing." (Harry Neumann, Liberalism, page 27; cf. 44.)

Note the mention of Hume:

Kant was no man of science either imo. He unified 18th century rationalism and empiricism in a horrific way, created an abomination, just because why not, he could get away with it.

No. He specifically responded to Hume. He replaced Hume's fundamental distinction between 1) relations of ideas, and 2) matters of fact, by that between 1) analytic judgments a priori, 2) synthetic judgments a posteriori, and 3) synthetic judgments a priori:

Professor Lawrence Cahoone, "Kant's Copernican Revolution" (YouTube)

(I'm linking here to the heart of the matter, but I recommend watching the whole lecture, if not the whole series.)

And since he was a super-high IQ autistic in the 18th century, people thought that he was some kind of superhuman with some next level insight.

And he was—if only next level insight into systems, not individuals; next level insight into individuals may require a super-high EQ allistic, i.e., not a neurotypical either but a neurodivergent in the opposite direction...

How autism drives human invention with Simon Baron-Cohen (YouTube)

You're saying that they themselves aren't really malicious or anything, but can come up with a philosophy that's evil, right? But even if that philosophy is realist, is it evil if it's concerned more with its author than with others? People aren't necessarily equal. As Heraclitus said, one was myriads for him, if he be best (áristos).

I think Kant knew somewhere that his philosophy is rather anti-life,

Is it, though? See above.

he just didn't want to go there, didn't really care. Luckily his philosophy was sufficiently refuted since then,

Was it, though? See below.

it's just not true that mental categories come from a universal mind,

It's not necessarily true, no, and I'd agree that it's probably not true, but is it really what Kant was saying? Wasn't belief in a God for him an imperative of practical reason, not of pure reason? Like belief in other human beings?

and (Einsteinian) space and time are almost certainly not mental categories at all,

Why?

and his phenomena-noumena distinction is also dead wrong.

How?

The correct philosophy is probably indirect realism.

I disagree.

"The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws." (Charles Sanders Peirce, "The Architecture of Theories".)

"Peirce's objective idealism is the paradoxical doctrine that what is most intimate and private, not observable but only introspectable [namely, feeling], in fact exists objectively: it composes the universe and all the things in it that we objectively observe. The 'law of mind' must be known by introspection but applies objectively, so that, by looking within our own minds, we grasp the fundamental law of the universe.” (Thomas L. Short, “What was Peirce’s Objective Idealism?”)

¹ "Socrates and Nietzsche share the basic features of philosophy itself: an inquiry into being that comes to recognize the need to inquire first into the inquirer and his fitness to know—epistemology—and only then a properly prepared inquiry into being as far as it is knowable—ontology. Guided by Parmenides, Socrates arrived at a fundamental skepticism about the possibility of direct human knowledge of the world, just as Nietzsche’s early study of Kant and Schopenhauer led him to an epistemological skepticism comparable in scope and radicality. That insight led Socrates, as it led Nietzsche, to a study of the human soul not only in its capacity to know but also in its fundamental passions—'Know thyself' in each case. Study of the human soul led each of them to the study of humans in groups, the 'city' [pólis] or culture in the broadest sense. Such study led both thinkers to a genealogy of morality, knowledge of good and evil in their rootedness in the passions. Ultimately, knowledge of the self and the human pointed each of them to an ontology that could never be more than inferential, the result of moving from the truth about human being to a posited truth about all beings, a sovereignty of becoming more exacting than mere process, an active, generative power at work in every event in nature. Call it eros, call it will to power; the names matter, but no name is completely adequate for what Leo Strauss called, in connection with Nietzsche's view, 'the most fundamental fact'." (Laurence Lampert, How Socrates Became Socrates, page 223.)

[Atla]

That's too much to address all at once. Let's look at this one.

At this point, at least, I wasn't thinking of a single mind (a universal mind), but a great many particular minds. And I'm not claiming that anyone could actually demonstrate that it is.¹ But take this image again:



If you postulate a universal existence that does not consist of mind(s), of (a) subject(s), you postulate one that consists of "matter", of (an) object(s)... But, as I put it recently,

'A subject is a being about which the question "what's it like to be that being" makes sense and has an answer; an object is a being about which the question makes no sense and has no answer.
(I suppose we could distinguish between real and unreal subjects, with an unreal subject being a being about whom the question makes sense but doesn't have an answer, but that would really just be another object: an object of imagination. And in fact, all objects are imaginary like that, being mental constructs on the part of subjects. They may consist of subjects or a subject may consist of them, but they themselves don’t really exist, e.g. in Heidegger’s sense: "Dasein existiert"!)'

As a mind, you only have actual experience of being a mind and having ideas. So why posit some third thing which is neither a mind nor an idea? That's just irrational!

No sorry, not only do I disagree with Kant but also the entire school of Western thought since Plato, or rather especially with the latter. My "Eastern" nondual take is just outside all of that.

There is no mental-material dualism, that's just something people made up without evidence. Instead mental and material refer to the same thing.

Materialism and idealism make no sense.

Yes and no: a subject is probably not a being about which the question "what's it like to be that being" makes sense and has an answer, because this take conflates two things: phenomenal consciousness which is probably universal, and the particular mind - what it's like to be that particular mind. There are no "beings", "subjects", "objects" anyway.

Objects are probably also part of phenomneal consciousness.

Dasein doesn't mean anything beyond what's it like to be that particular mind.

As a 'mind' you also don't have the experience of being a 'mind', that's just another theorethical distinction, so why posit this distinction in the first place?