You literally just said that transcendental realism isn't realism-in-general, but transcendental realism is realism-in-general.Veritas Aequitas wrote: ↑Mon Aug 26, 2024 8:29 amWe have gone through this before with a taxanomy of 'realism'.
Yes, transcendental realism cannot be classed as realism-in-general, so a detailed analysis is necessary to find out how Kant's transcendental realism is the same with philosophical and scientific realism.
Classes of Realism
viewtopic.php?t=42601
Thus:AI wrote:Key Points
Absolute Mind-Independence: Realities in this category exist entirely independently of human perception or cognition. This includes traditional philosophical realism, indirect realism, and Kant's transcendental realism as critiqued by Kant.
Relative Mind-Independence: Realities in this category exist independently of individual perceptions but are structured by the human mind's conditions of experience. This aligns with Kant's empirical realism and his Copernican Revolution.
Kant's transcendental realism is classed with whatever realism that claims Absolutely Mind-Independence, i.e.
If I go back to ChatGpt with the above, it will surely confirm my claims as it had done before.Classification Summary
Class 1: Absolutely Mind-Independent Realism:
-Philosophical Realism
-Indirect Realism
-Direct Realism
-Kant's Transcendental Realism (as critiqued by Kant)
-scientific realism
-moral realism [naturalism, non-naturalism]
Class 2: Relative Mind-Independent Realism:
-Kant's Empirical Realism
-Anti-Philosophical Realism
-moral empirical realism
-scientific anti-realism
How many more times do you want to be shamed for ignorance?
"same with philosophical and scientific realism"
And the guy says "surely". The above lists show that they are not the same, just share a certain feature that's not about the noumenon.
Atla the KG wrote:Do all realist philosophies (where reality has a mind-independent existence) fall under Kant's transcendental realism?
God wrote:Not all realist philosophies fall under Kant's transcendental realism. While both realism and transcendental realism posit that reality has a mind-independent existence, Kant's transcendental realism is a specific philosophical position with distinctive features that do not align with all forms of realism.
1. Realism (Broadly Defined):
Core Idea: Realism is the belief that objects and the world exist independently of our perception or understanding of them.
Varieties: There are different types of realism, such as naïve realism, scientific realism, and critical realism, each differing in how they interpret the relationship between perception, knowledge, and reality.
Common Feature: All forms of realism generally assert that the external world exists independently of our minds.
2. Kant’s Transcendental Realism:
Definition: Transcendental realism, in Kant's terminology, is the belief that objects exist as they are independently of our perceptions and that we can have knowledge of things as they are "in themselves" (noumena).
Kant's Critique: Kant criticizes transcendental realism because he believes it mistakenly assumes that the way things appear to us (phenomena) is the same as the way they are in themselves (noumena). For Kant, while the external world exists independently, our knowledge is limited to how things appear to us through the structures of our mind (space, time, and categories of understanding). This leads to Kant's own position of transcendental idealism—the idea that we can only know phenomena, not noumena.
3. Realist Philosophies vs. Kant's Transcendental Realism:
Realist Philosophies: Some forms of realism, such as naïve realism, do not share Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena. These philosophies hold that the world we perceive is the world as it truly is, without any distinction between appearances and the things themselves.
Transcendental Realism: This is a specific form of realism that Kant critiques. It holds that we can know the world as it is in itself. However, not all realist philosophies make this claim. Some realist positions, like scientific realism, might assert that we can get closer to understanding the world as it is, but they may not fully commit to the idea that our knowledge can be complete or identical to the world itself.
Conclusion:
While all realist philosophies share the belief in a mind-independent reality, they do not all fall under Kant's transcendental realism. Kant's transcendental realism is a particular position that makes specific claims about our knowledge of reality, which he ultimately critiques and opposes through his transcendental idealism. Other forms of realism may either avoid these claims or adopt different stances on the relationship between perception and reality.
Atla the KG wrote:Is it a serious mistake to classify indirect realism as transcendental realism?
Instead of speed-reading while drunk, you could actually read stuff every now and then?God wrote:Yes, it would be a serious mistake to classify indirect realism as transcendental realism. Although both indirect realism and transcendental realism deal with the relationship between perception and reality, they differ significantly in their philosophical approaches, assumptions, and implications.
1. Indirect Realism:
Core Idea: Indirect realism (also known as representationalism) holds that we do not perceive the external world directly. Instead, we perceive it through mental representations or sense data. These representations are caused by and correspond to objects in the external world, but they are not the objects themselves.
Mind-Independent Reality: Indirect realists still believe in a mind-independent reality, but they argue that our access to it is mediated by our perceptions, which may not always accurately reflect the world as it is.
Philosophers: Notable indirect realists include John Locke and René Descartes, who emphasized that our ideas or sense data represent the external world, but they are distinct from the actual objects.
2. Kant's Transcendental Realism:
Core Idea: In Kantian terms, transcendental realism is the belief that we can know the world as it is in itself (the noumenal world), independent of our perception and cognitive structures.
Kant's Critique: Kant critiques transcendental realism for assuming that we can have direct knowledge of the noumenal world. Instead, he argues that we can only know the world as it appears to us (phenomena), through the lens of our cognitive structures (space, time, categories of understanding).
Relation to Transcendental Idealism: Kant contrasts transcendental realism with his own transcendental idealism, which posits that while the external world exists, we can only know it through the conditions of our perception and cognition.
3. Why It’s a Serious Mistake to Conflate Indirect Realism with Transcendental Realism:
Different Epistemological Claims: Indirect realism does not claim that we can know the world as it is in itself (as transcendental realism does). Instead, it posits that we can know the world only through representations or sense data, which may not fully or accurately represent the external world.
Different Focus on the Noumenal World: Transcendental realism, in Kant's critique, assumes direct knowledge of the noumenal world, which Kant rejects. Indirect realism, however, generally focuses on the phenomenal world—what we can perceive and represent in our minds, rather than making claims about the noumenal world.
Philosophical Context: Indirect realism is often discussed in the context of epistemology and the philosophy of perception, whereas transcendental realism (and its critique) is situated within Kant's broader metaphysical and epistemological project. Indirect realism does not necessarily engage with the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena.
Conclusion:
Conflating indirect realism with transcendental realism overlooks crucial differences in their philosophical commitments. Indirect realism, with its focus on mediated perception and representational knowledge, does not make the same metaphysical or epistemological claims as transcendental realism. As a result, classifying indirect realism as transcendental realism would misrepresent both positions and lead to confusion about their respective philosophical implications.