compatibilism

[henry quirk]

Free-willers talk about determinism in terms of particles in order to make it sound stupid.

Necessitarianism is stupid when applied to persons. And: it's not my, or any other free will proponent's, description. If you object: take your complaint to the necessitarians.

So stop reducing it to particles.

When I speak of necessitarianism, what it is and what it sez about us, I will speak of particles.

So compassion and affection has nothing to do with whether the animal has free-will or not.

Can't see why it should.

It's only a fiction if the word "choice" (and its variations ) is completely redefined.

I haven't redefined anything. Have you?

A chess playing computer still chooses moves although it doesn't have free-will. If it's not 'choosing', then what is it doing?

It is running a program. It can't choose becuz there's nuthin' inside to make a choice.

Valuable in what way?

The necessitarian, like any of us, wants to be understood. The value is in communication. But, ask a necessitarian if you wanna be sure.

Yes.

If you say so.

Where else would it come from?

You.

[phyllo]

Does it truly seem to you that everything you think, say, do, feel, conclude is purely the result of what came before?

Yes.

Where else would it come from?

I also recall that last time I talked to him about free will, he pretty much explicitly said that what comes before guarantees a particular choice - he literally used that word, guarantee.

I remember those discussions.

He would agree to the reasoning but at the end, when the inevitable conclusion presented itself, he would revert to his starting position ... he's a free-will.

[henry quirk]

Does it truly seem to you that everything you think, say, do, feel, conclude is purely the result of what came before?

Yes.

Where else would it come from?

I also recall that last time I talked to him about free will, he pretty much explicitly said that what comes before guarantees a particular choice - he literally used that word, guarantee.

Me? I don't recall that. Can you offer a quote, in context?

[Flannel Jesus]

I remember those discussions.

He would agree to the reasoning but at the end, when the inevitable conclusion presented itself, he would revert to his starting position ... he's a free-will.

Yeah, I was asking pretty straight forward questions and getting very much not straight forward answers. The choice is guaranteed, but still there's libertarian free will... Hmmm... It definitely felt like he had never really deeply thought about what he was saying prior to that conversation.

[henry quirk]

You could choose to do something that isn't what you want to do most/this is best in the situation. You would be free to not have you actions caused by your desires and sense of what's best.

Yes, exactly. I can choose to do wrong, choose to do what goes against my grain. Most folks, me included, won't...but we can.

As to the use of such a capacity: being a free will is its own reward.

[phyllo]

Necessitarianism is stupid when applied to persons. And: it's not my, or any other free will proponent's, description. If you object: take your complaint to the necessitarians.

You're the one writing here.

The determinists that I have read, heard and communicated with, don't usually reduce things down to particles.

When I speak of necessitarianism, what it is and what it sez about us, I will speak of particles.

So the discussion nears the end because I think that talking in terms of particles is a waste of everybody's time.

So compassion and affection has nothing to do with whether the animal has free-will or not.

Can't see why it should.

Well, you seemed to suggest that if the animal doesn't have free-will, then its suffering doesn't matter or it's not suffering at all. An idea that iambiguous has stated several times in this thread.

It's only a fiction if the word "choice" (and its variations ) is completely redefined.

I haven't redefined anything. Have you?

A chess playing computer still chooses moves although it doesn't have free-will. If it's not 'choosing', then what is it doing?

It is running a program. It can't choose becuz there's nuthin' inside to make a choice.

It has several legal moves available in the position. It selects one and plays it.

If you don't call that "choosing" the move, then I don't know what it is.

Valuable in what way?

The necessitarian, like any of us, wants to be understood. The value is in communication. But, ask a necessitarian if you wanna be sure.

???
I have no idea what this means.

Where else would it come from?

You.

But I don't exist in isolation. I exist within a physical reality, within a context. This has shaped me physically and intellectually. There is a connection to what is and what came before which cannot be broken.

[henry quirk]

The determinists that I have read, heard and communicated with, don't usually reduce things down to particles.

Okay.

So the discussion nears the end because I think that talking in terms of particles is a waste of everybody's time.

Okay.

Well, you seemed to suggest that if the animal doesn't have free-will, then its suffering doesn't matter or it's not suffering at all.

It matters to me. It may not to another.

It has several legal moves available in the position. It selects one and plays it.

It does what its programmed to do, yes. This is not choice: it's automation.

I have no idea what this means.

If you say so.

But I don't exist in isolation.

No, you don't.

I exist within a physical reality, within a context.

Yes, you do,

This has shaped me physically and intellectually.

It's had, it has, an effect, yes.

There is a connection to what is and what came before which cannot be broken.

Without exception?

[phyllo]

Well, you seemed to suggest that if the animal doesn't have free-will, then its suffering doesn't matter or it's not suffering at all.

It matters to me. It may not to another.

It's not a question of whether it matters to you or me or some random person in the street. It's a question of whether animals without free-will suffer or don't suffer. And if they do suffer, whether the suffering matters or does not matter, in some sense. What's the reasonable philosophical analysis of this?

Based on that analysis, you reach some conclusions which are used in situations that arise ... the ethical treatment of animals, for example.

It has several legal moves available in the position. It selects one and plays it.

It does what its programmed to do, yes. This is not choice: it's automation.

See, you're "choosing" but the computer is "automation". But the result on the chessboard is exactly the same. So you have defined move selection in two different ways, depending on 'who' is doing the selection.

There is a connection to what is and what came before which cannot be broken.

Without exception?

In which situation would the exception arise? And why in that situation? What's special about it?

[henry quirk]

It's a question of whether animals without free-will suffer or don't suffer.

Good question. What do you think?

What's the reasonable philosophical analysis of this?

Your analysis?

See, you're "choosing" but the computer is "automation". But the result on the chessboard is exactly the same. So you have defined move selection in two different ways, depending on 'who' is doing the selection.

We're not talkin' about the result but rather how the result is arrived at.

I can choose: to play fair, to cheat, to quit in the middle of the game, to not play. And I can change my choice: was gonna cheat but now I'll be good (or vice versa); was gonna quit but I'll carry on (or vice versa); was not gonna play but instead I will.

Can the computer choose to play fair, to quit, to not play? Can it change its choice? Or can it only follow its programming?

And: should the computer quit the game, might it feel regret for not continuing? Of course not. I might, though. I might quit the game but later regret quitting.

In which situation would the exception arise?

No situation in particular. I just wanted to know if there was an exception, for you, to There is a connection to what is and what came before which cannot be broken.

I can see, for you, there isn't.

[Iwannaplato]

You could choose to do something that isn't what you want to do most/this is best in the situation. You would be free to not have you actions caused by your desires and sense of what's best.

Yes, exactly. I can choose to do wrong,

That's different: you might want to do wrong. I certainly do sometimes.

choose to do what goes against my grain.

So, someone could do something they liked less than something else they could have done.

Most folks, me included, won't...but we can.

I wonder what motivates those who do what they dont' want to do or think is best.

As to the use of such a capacity: being a free will is its own reward.

OK

[henry quirk]

you might want to do wrong

Sure, but that's not what I said. I said: I can choose to do wrong.

So, someone could do something they liked less than something else they could have done.

Yes, of course, but that's not what I said. I said: (I can) choose to do what goes against my grain.

I wonder what motivates those who do what they dont' want to do or think is best

A good question. Depends entirely on the individual.

[phyllo]

It's a question of whether animals without free-will suffer or don't suffer.

Good question. What do you think?

What's the reasonable philosophical analysis of this?

Your analysis?

A straight observation of animals shows that they suffer and that suffering matters to them.

See, you're "choosing" but the computer is "automation". But the result on the chessboard is exactly the same. So you have defined move selection in two different ways, depending on 'who' is doing the selection.

We're not talkin' about the result but rather how the result is arrived at.

I can choose: to play fair, to cheat, to quit in the middle of the game, to not play. And I can change my choice: was gonna cheat but now I'll be good (or vice versa); was gonna quit but I'll carry on (or vice versa); was not gonna play but instead I will.

Can the computer choose to play fair, to quit, to not play? Can it change its choice? Or can it only follow its programming?

You think that you have a wider range of options than the computer. And that's true.

But that doesn't change the fact that a computer chooses a move given how we define and use the word "choose".

The same applies to a determinist ... he/she chooses between options. There is no illusion of choice.

In which situation would the exception arise?

No situation in particular. I just wanted to know if there was an exception, for you, to There is a connection to what is and what came before which cannot be broken.

I can see, for you, there isn't.

You "free-wills" claim that these exceptions occur for you. Yet when I ask about them, nobody seems to be able to identify any.

[Iwannaplato]

I wonder what motivates those who do what they dont' want to do or think is best

A good question. Depends entirely on the individual.

Well, whatever it is that motivates them, it's a cause. And since they do it, an utterly effective cause.

[henry quirk]

A straight observation of animals shows that they suffer and that suffering matters to them.

We can be certain animals feel. How can we know it matters to them?

You "free-wills" claim that these exceptions occur for you. Yet when I ask about them, nobody seems to be able to identify any.

I have.

Up-thread I said you.

You're the exception (well, mebbe not you cuz you insist you're not a free will).

Anyway, the exception to that connection to what is and what came before which cannot be broken is the free will himself as he stops, even if only for a moment, to *consider, to *deliberate, to *conclude, to *choose. Choice then, in response to the snipped out bit about computers and determinists, is not about an automated selection by a machine lacking even the rudiments of awareness, nor is it about the necessary reaction of a meat machine, poor fiction-plagued thing he is. Choice is reserved for free wills.

*for reasons, or by way of criteria, particular to him

[henry quirk]

Well, whatever it is that motivates them, it's a cause.

Yes. Where we differ is: I say that cause is the free will himself.