Abortion is Not Permissible, Period!

[henry quirk]

The philosophical principle is that any piece of information can be interpreted in different ways.

But not all interpretations are equal, this is common sense. Philosophical neutrality, about everything, is madness.

[Will Bouwman]

Data does make a difference. Theories that have none are not as good as theories that have some.

Can you have two competing theories to explain the same data?

[Immanuel Can]

The philosophical principle is that any piece of information can be interpreted in different ways.

But not all interpretations are equal, this is common sense. Philosophical neutrality, about everything, is madness.

All is anti-intellectual, in fact. For if all interpretations of phenomena are indistinguishable as to quality, then there's no such thing as a better or worse theory or "explanation." So there's no such thing as learning, or science, or reasoning, or logic, or truth, or evidences, or data, or demonstrations...

It's all too silly. And despite Will's lame attempts at pedantry, it's just about the dumbest theory one can possibly hold. It means one can't learn anything at all.

In fact, epistemologists all agree that all explanations are not equal. That's why, recently, many refer to things like what they call "the epistemic virtues," which are the criteria by which we are able to judge one theory or another as better or worse. If Will knew half as much as he wants us to think he knows, he'd already know that, and wouldn't be saying what he's saying.

So here is a quotation from The Embassy of Good Science:

All European Academies (ALLEA) published a revised and updated European Code of Conduct for Research Integrity (ECoC), in which it emphasized the importance of addressing ethics and research integrity. The ECoC defines principles and practices of good research, and includes the virtues of reliability, honesty, respect and accountability. Usually philosophers consider honesty and the following characteristics to be epistemic virtues: attentiveness, benevolence (principle of charity), creativity, curiosity, discernment, humility, objectivity, parsimony, studiousness, understanding, warranty, and wisdom.

In short, those theories that prove reliable are better than those that prove unreliable. Those that are objective are better than those that are not. Those that account for phenomena parsimoniously are better than those that are unnecessarily elaborate. Those that are warranted are better than those that are not...and so on...all probabilistic and combinative, of course. But all fully aware that all "explanations of phenomena" are not equal.

However, Will's still very late behind the train in understanding this, by his own testimony.

P.S. -- You were mentioning the word "idiot," in another context. Not to call Will an "idiot," but it's an interesting word...the "id," you will recognize from things like Freud, meaning "self." The "-iot" bit, you will recognize from words like "patriot," means "believer." So an "idiot," literally, would be somebody who believes he's always right...and thus, cannot learn, cannot be instructed, has no epistemic standards...

[Immanuel Can]

Data does make a difference. Theories that have none are not as good as theories that have some.

Can you have two competing theories to explain the same data?

Not two EQUAL theories. And not two CORRECT theories, if they are mutually contradictory, as many are. But you can have as many "competing" theories as you wish.

[Will Bouwman]

Can you have two competing theories to explain the same data?

Not two EQUAL theories.

If two scientific theories explain the same data with equal accuracy, on what grounds are they not equal?

[bahman]

Can you have two competing theories to explain the same data?

Not two EQUAL theories.

If two scientific theories explain the same data with equal accuracy, on what grounds are they not equal?

There are error bars in any data. Two scientific theories therefore can explain the same data if their predictions fall within the range of error bars.

[Immanuel Can]

Can you have two competing theories to explain the same data?

Not two EQUAL theories.

If two scientific theories explain the same data with equal accuracy, on what grounds are they not equal?

Give me the two that do this.

[henry quirk]

I posted this...

In this unequal contest betwixt Common Sense and Philosophy, the latter will always come off both with dishonour and loss; nor can she ever thrive till this rivalship is dropt, these encroachments given up, and a cordial friendship restored: for, in reality, Common Sense holds nothing of Philosophy, nor needs her aid. But on the other hand, Philosophy, (if I may be permitted to change the metaphor) has no other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them: severed from this root, its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots.

...up thread. It applies.

So an "idiot," literally, would be somebody who believes he's always right...and thus, cannot learn, cannot be instructed, has no epistemic standards...

By Crom: I might be an idiot!

[Immanuel Can]

So an "idiot," literally, would be somebody who believes he's always right...and thus, cannot learn, cannot be instructed, has no epistemic standards...

By Crom: I might be an idiot!

Or...you might be accustomed to forming your opinions carefully, and so not easily dissuaded by a facile critique.

Or you could be stubborn and unpersuadable, in which case...sure.

[henry quirk]

you might be accustomed to forming your opinions carefully, and so not easily dissuaded by a facile critique.

Or you could be stubborn and unpersuadable, in which case...sure.

I like the first better, so I'm gonna go with that one.

[Will Bouwman]

If two scientific theories explain the same data with equal accuracy, on what grounds are they not equal?

Give me the two that do this.

Well, my go to example is gravity for which there are several alternatives to general relativity, but if it's two you're after, how about GR and Brans-Dicke?

[Immanuel Can]

If two scientific theories explain the same data with equal accuracy, on what grounds are they not equal?

Give me the two that do this.

Well, my go to example is gravity for which there are several alternatives to general relativity, but if it's two you're after, how about GR and Brans-Dicke?

I'm unfamiliar with them. You'd have to choose a different example. I mean, I know a bit about General Relativity, but not enough to qualify as an expert in theoretical physics. I do have some idea of what the limits of its application to epistemology would be, however. But I'm not going to go out of court on this.

The point is actually simple: there are no such things as "equal" theories. Rather, there are different theories that attempt to account for different aspects of a phenomenon. What we know, by way of the Law of Non-Contradiction, however, is that there are only three possibilities: one, that neither theory is correct; two, that one theory is correct; three, that the other theory is correct. But we know for sure and for certain that the fourth possibility can never be true: namely, that both mutually-contradicting theories can be correct, covering exactly the same phenomena by exactly the same data, and meant in exactly the same way.

So "equal" theories are a myth. There are no such things.

[Will Bouwman]

The point is actually simple: there are no such things as "equal" theories. Rather, there are different theories that attempt to account for different aspects of a phenomenon.

General relativity, Brans-Dicke, loop quantum gravity, string theory, modified Newtonian dynamics and others, all attempt to account for the same aspects of the same phenomena. There are different research groups across the world looking for ways to generate data that would make them unequal in their explanatory power.

What we know, by way of the Law of Non-Contradiction, however, is that there are only three possibilities: one, that neither theory is correct; two, that one theory is correct; three, that the other theory is correct.

What you don't appreciate is that until new data becomes available that can separate the different theories, they remain equal in the explanatory and predictive powers. For practical purposes, it makes no difference which, if any is correct.

But we know for sure and for certain that the fourth possibility can never be true: namely, that both mutually-contradicting theories can be correct...

Well, yes, at the end of the day a maximum of one of the theories will be true. The problem is without data to rule one or other out, there is no way of telling which it is. Even if all current competing theories are resolved so that only one remains tenable, you cannot predict the future and be certain that new theories will arrive.

So "equal" theories are a myth. There are no such things.

In terms of explanation and prediction, yes there are.

[Immanuel Can]

The point is actually simple: there are no such things as "equal" theories. Rather, there are different theories that attempt to account for different aspects of a phenomenon.

General relativity, Brans-Dicke, loop quantum gravity, string theory, modified Newtonian dynamics and others, all attempt to account for the same aspects of the same phenomena. There are different research groups across the world looking for ways to generate data that would make them unequal in their explanatory power.

I'll take your word for it. But even by your own description, they aren't "equal" theories: they describe what you call "different aspects," and they draw on "data that would make them unequal."

So again, there are no "equal" theories.

What we know, by way of the Law of Non-Contradiction, however, is that there are only three possibilities: one, that neither theory is correct; two, that one theory is correct; three, that the other theory is correct.

What you don't appreciate is that until new data becomes available that can separate the different theories, they remain equal in the explanatory and predictive powers.

What you're ignoring is that the data's not equal, nor are the different "aspects" as you call them, equal. And no, there's no such thing as being "equal in explanatory and predictive powers." There are only theories that are differently-preferable and based on different data, and in no sense are we equipped to pronounce them unilaterally and in advance all as good or as true as each other. That would simply be nonsense.

But we know for sure and for certain that the fourth possibility can never be true: namely, that both mutually-contradicting theories can be correct...

Well, yes, at the end of the day a maximum of one of the theories will be true.

So some theory is "more equal than others"?

The problem is without data to rule one or other out, there is no way of telling which it is.

"There is no way..."? What's the point of acquiring data, then? C'mon, Will. There's no way that's true. Even superficially, no two theories are "equal," no two data sets are "equal," and the problem of us knowing which to prefer is at most a temporary epistemological one, not an justification for permanent, anti-intellectual ontological relativism.

Even if all current competing theories are resolved so that only one remains tenable, you cannot predict the future and be certain that new theories will arrive.

That's of no consequence at all. Science is supposed to remain permanently open to new data and to falsification of old theories. If it's not, then it's not science. It's dogma.

[henry quirk]

General relativity, Brans-Dicke, loop quantum gravity, string theory, modified Newtonian dynamics and others, all attempt to account for the same aspects of the same phenomena. There are different research groups across the world looking for ways to generate data that would make them unequal in their explanatory power.

Do these groups each investigate all the theories or does group A do GR while group B does string theory, etc.?

If each group is tackling a different theory, did they pick out of a hat or did each group choose to investigate the theory that seems most likely true to them?