Free Will

[Harbal]

Oh, we all are. Question is: are we just meat or are we meat plus?

We are biological organisms, henry.

Yeah, sure, but is that all we are?

No, we are all sorts of things: Doctors, bus drivers, fathers, mothers, mammals, human beings. I could make quite a long list of the things we could be.

[Dubious]

Only if you're edible.

Oh, we all are. Question is: are we just meat or are we meat plus?

I would go for the plus but that depends on how far you're willing to take the plus.

We are by nature, greedy creatures in which life of short duration demands an afterlife of eternity...above or below!

[Harbal]

Then "you" are not there. "You" is not a description of anything that can do anything. It can't "believe" or "disbelieve."

What the "you" that cannot exist "believes," then, is that some prior condition (plausibly of matter) has made it impossible for the "you" that cannot really exist to seem to "disbelieve" in free will. "You" never had a choice, and there's no "you" who did it. Matter lined up in the way it did, and the pseudo-experience of "belief" or "disbelief" magically lept out of that particular arrangement of matter. No more, no less, and no other.

So your statement reads (if there were anybody to read it), "A nobody didn't-believe in a nothing."

That is an argument against one possible definition of the term, "free will". What the OP exactly means by it, and what you have assumed he means by it, could be completely different things. Wouldn't it always be wiser to first establish what, exactly, is being stated or claimed before mounting an objection to it? Not just in this instance, but as a general principle.

Well, it seems to me there really is only one "reasonable" definition of free will. We can't possibly think it means, "The ability to do anything one can ever imagine," or something equally absurd, can we? Philosophically, it doesn't even involve the denial that SOME things are caused strictly by physical causes -- how could one ever deny that? Sufficient for any reasonable definition of free will is that under SOME conditions, SOMETIMES people make choices that are not strictly caused by physical preconditions, but rather by something like volition.

Well I can think of several ways of interpreting the term, and I don't even know much about the subject, other than what occurs to me. And there is the matter of the degree of free will we might have; I think it simplistic to see it as an all or nothing situation.

But if his definition is actually something absurd or totally unanticipated, then you're right; we should probably check. Though I was assuming he was being at least marginally reasonable.

He hasn't said enough to be able to tell if he's being reasonable. What he has said doesn't particularly suggest he's some kind of crank, but neither does it lead me to expect a flash of blinding insight is imminent.



The site seems to be acting up again.

[Immanuel Can]

Sufficient for any reasonable definition of free will is that under SOME conditions, SOMETIMES people make choices that are not strictly caused by physical preconditions, but rather by something like volition.

Most philosophers are compatibilists,

I'm afraid I'm going to have to call 'bluff' on that. I'll need you to show me that "most philosophers" are really, really gullible.

[Flannel Jesus]

Sufficient for any reasonable definition of free will is that under SOME conditions, SOMETIMES people make choices that are not strictly caused by physical preconditions, but rather by something like volition.

Most philosophers are compatibilists,

I'm afraid I'm going to have to call 'bluff' on that. I'll need you to show me that "most philosophers" are really, really gullible.

I'll ignore the 'gullible' bit, as I'm quite happy to not throw in little jabs at you for the sake of this conversation, and I'll charitably ignore one or two jabs from you in good faith. I would appreciate it if you don't throw in additional jabs if that's within your capacity.

https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4838

Philpapers 2020 survey, Free will: no free will, libertarianism, or compatibilism?

Accept or lean towards:
compatibilism
59.16% (57.68%)

Accept or lean towards:
libertarianism
18.83% (18.20%)

Accept or lean towards:
no free will
11.21% (10.58%)

The Survey's target population includes 7685 philosophers drawn from two groups: (1) From Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the US (6112 philosophers): all regular faculty members (tenure-track or permanent) in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more members (according to the PhilPeople database). (2). From all other countries (1573 philosophers): English-publishing philosophers in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more English-publishing faculty members. An English-publishing philosopher is defined as someone with one or more publications in the PhilPapers database in a wide range of English-language venues, including English-language journals and book publishers.

[Immanuel Can]

Sufficient for any reasonable definition of free will is that under SOME conditions, SOMETIMES people make choices that are not strictly caused by physical preconditions, but rather by something like volition.

Most philosophers are compatibilists...

I doubt that. I would say that's a bluff. I'll need you to prove to me that "most philosophers" are that gullible.

Compatibilism isn't even superficially plausible. It's just a form of Determinism with a sugar-coating, and there's no authentic "compatibility" involved.

But let's see what Osric says he understands by "free will," and then we'll know.

[Impenitent]

if the brain controls the body, what controls the brain?

who writes the program that the brain follows?

why isn't every brain programmed the same?

-Imp

Who is asking these brain questions?

a will that believes it is free

-Imp

[Flannel Jesus]

Sufficient for any reasonable definition of free will is that under SOME conditions, SOMETIMES people make choices that are not strictly caused by physical preconditions, but rather by something like volition.

Most philosophers are compatibilists...

I doubt that. I would say that's a bluff. I'll need you to prove to me that "most philosophers" are that gullible.

Compatibilism isn't even superficially plausible. It's just a form of Determinism with a sugar-coating, and there's no authentic "compatibility" involved.

But let's see what Osric says he understands by "free will," and then we'll know.

I answered above, I think you double-posted because of the forum software troubles.

Answer here: viewtopic.php?p=725985#p725985

[Immanuel Can]

Most philosophers are compatibilists,

I'm afraid I'm going to have to call 'bluff' on that. I'll need you to show me that "most philosophers" are really, really gullible.

I'll ignore the 'gullible' bit, as I'm quite happy to not throw in little jabs at you for the sake of this conversation, and I'll charitably ignore one or two jabs from you in good faith. I would appreciate it if you don't throw in additional jabs if that's within your capacity.

If it's a jab, it's not on you. It's a problem for them, if they believe it. But I'll accept your palm branch, of course, and not "jab" where unnecessary.

https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/4838

Philpapers 2020 survey, Free will: no free will, libertarianism, or compatibilism?

Accept or lean towards:
compatibilism
59.16% (57.68%)

Accept or lean towards:
libertarianism
18.83% (18.20%)

Accept or lean towards:
no free will
11.21% (10.58%)

If that's right, then, it would seem to be a significant slam against what "philosophers" think. Compatibilism is awfully easy to correct. Essentially, it's just Determinism. The claim that people don't know that Determinism is how things are working doesn't, of course, restore any vestige of free will at all -- it would just imply that Compatiblists are deluded about how reality works, which would hardly be a badge of honour for any "philosopher," would it?

[Flannel Jesus]

If that's right, then, it would seem to be a significant slam against what "philosophers" think. Compatibilism is awfully easy to correct. Essentially, it's just Determinism. The claim that people don't know that Determinism is how things are working doesn't, of course, restore any vestige of free will at all -- it would just imply that Compatiblists are deluded about how reality works, which would hardly be a badge of honour for any "philosopher," would it?

It's extremely common for many philosophers to react the way you react to compatibilism, and maybe you're correct, but at least now you know that most academic philosophers do in fact accept a view of free will very much unlike your own. Maybe they're all unreasonable, maybe, but I don't think so.

So the 'any reasonable definition' part of your previous post has an asterisk of "any reasonable definition, where 'reasonable' is determined by IC" rather than "where 'reasonable' is determined by the academic philosophy establishment". That doesn't mean you're wrong, of course, just an asterisk some people might find relevant.

[Immanuel Can]

I answered above, I think you double-posted because of the forum software troubles.

Yes, sorry...exactly so. I had to rewrite my answer several times, because the PN server, it would seem, was messing up again.

[Immanuel Can]

If that's right, then, it would seem to be a significant slam against what "philosophers" think. Compatibilism is awfully easy to correct. Essentially, it's just Determinism. The claim that people don't know that Determinism is how things are working doesn't, of course, restore any vestige of free will at all -- it would just imply that Compatiblists are deluded about how reality works, which would hardly be a badge of honour for any "philosopher," would it?

It's extremely common for many philosophers to react the way you react to compatibilism, and maybe you're correct,

I would say I am. I've thought this through. And unless there's some strange new argument that has arisen recently, Compabilitism is still an easily debunkable issue.

...but at least now you know that most academic philosophers...

Well, that's an argumentum ad populum anyway, so not legit. It may be that that it's just not an issue these "philosophers" have been willing to devote any serious attention to, or which, for some other reason, they're not prepared to be rigorous about. I guess the survey, if it was more nuanced, could have said something more about that. We can't say why: but we can say they're wrong.

[Immanuel Can]

That is an argument against one possible definition of the term, "free will". What the OP exactly means by it, and what you have assumed he means by it, could be completely different things. Wouldn't it always be wiser to first establish what, exactly, is being stated or claimed before mounting an objection to it? Not just in this instance, but as a general principle.

Well, it seems to me there really is only one "reasonable" definition of free will. We can't possibly think it means, "The ability to do anything one can ever imagine," or something equally absurd, can we? Philosophically, it doesn't even involve the denial that SOME things are caused strictly by physical causes -- how could one ever deny that? Sufficient for any reasonable definition of free will is that under SOME conditions, SOMETIMES people make choices that are not strictly caused by physical preconditions, but rather by something like volition.

Well I can think of several ways of interpreting the term, and I don't even know much about the subject, other than what occurs to me. And there is the matter of the degree of free will we might have; I think it simplistic to see it as an all or nothing situation.

And yet it is. Because although conceptions of free will can allow for physical causality, the same is not at all true of Determinisms. They absolutely require NO element of free will be actually involved AT ALL. Even one admitted countercase would defeat Determinisms.

The site seems to be acting up again.

Yes, we're all seeing that. It's not personal. Seems to be straightening out now, though.

[Flannel Jesus]

Well, that's an argumentum ad populum anyway

It's not an argument that compatibilism is correct, it's merely an argument that your use of "reasonable" should be understood by readers as localised to you in particular, rather than any kind of philosophical consensus of what constitutes reasonable. When you say "any reasonable definition" there, it becomes indistinguishable from just saying "any definition that stands a chance of me, IC, personally agreeing with it".

[Immanuel Can]

Well, that's an argumentum ad populum anyway

It's not an argument that compatibilism is correct, it's merely an argument that your use of "reasonable" should be understood by readers as localised to you in particular,...

That's a bad argument. "Reasonable" means, "amenable to reason." It does not, in this case, mean "conforming to some particular reasons I happen to like," but rather "vulnerable to the impartial requirements of logic or sound argumentation." As such, it's universal.

Compatibilism does not make any reasonable sense, regardless of who one is.