Sober: Refutation of Hume No Ought From Is

[Veritas Aequitas]

Here is refutation of Hume's NOFI by Elliot Sober:

The proposition I'll call Hume’s thesis says you can't deduce an ought from an is.
Hume's thesis, I believe, is correct. 3
Hume's thesis, by itself, does not entail subjectivism.
However, it plays a role in the following argument for subjectivism:

• Ought-statements cannot be deduced validly from exclusively is premisses.
  If ought-statements cannot be deduced validly from exclusively is-premisses, then no ought-statements are true.
  No ought-statements are true.

"The first premiss is Hume's thesis.
The second premiss, which is needed to reach the subjectivist conclusion, is a reductionist assumption.
It says that for an ought-statement to be true, it must reduce to (be deducible from) exclusively is-premisses.

My doubts about this argument center on the second premiss.
Why should the fact that Ethics cannot be deduced from purely is propositions show that no ethical statements are true?
Why can't ethical statements be true, though irreducible?
It is important to remember that Hume's thesis concerns deductive arguments.

Consider an analogy:
Scientific theories about unobservable entities cannot be deduced from premisses that are strictly about observables,
but this provides no reason to think that theories about unobservables are always untrue."

Here's AI [wR] comments:

Sober's argument provides a strong challenge to Hume's Is-Ought problem.

Here's a breakdown of his key points:
• Hume's Thesis: Sober acknowledges Hume's claim that "ought" cannot be derived logically from "is."
• Reductionist Assumption: Sober challenges the assumption that for an "ought" statement to be true, it must be reducible to "is" statements.
• Irreducibility of Ethical Statements: Sober proposes that ethical statements can be true even if they cannot be deduced from factual statements.
• Analogy with Scientific Theories: He draws a parallel between ethical statements and scientific theories about unobservable entities, arguing that neither can be fully reduced to observable facts.

Sober's core argument is that the inability to deduce "ought" from "is" does not automatically invalidate the truth of ethical statements. This is a significant departure from the traditional interpretation of Hume's problem.
This opens up possibilities for other forms of justification for ethical claims, such as inductive reasoning, intuition, or other non-deductive methods.

By introducing the concept of irreducibility, Sober opens up the possibility of ethical truths existing independently of factual truths.
This challenges the strict dichotomy between descriptive and normative statements, offering a more nuanced perspective on the relationship between is and ought.

Discuss??
Views??

[Veritas Aequitas]

Notes:

[FlashDangerpants]

The second premise goes beyond what hume writes about the copulation of dissimilar propositions requiring extraordinary justification. You could pin that premiss on Pete, but I would say you shouoldn't pin it on Hume. The reducability bit is supect at best, I'm minded to just deny that move out of hand unless there's a lot of argument to justify it. The question "Why should the fact that Ethics cannot be deduced from purely is propositions show that no ethical statements are true?" must be intentionally disingenuous or else there is serious out of context quoting going on here. Overall, there are strange gaps in this argument and odd assumptions that imply VA has meddled with it, or just presented it very badly.

But the thing doesn't refute Hume anyway. If you don't use ISes to derive your oughts, then you aren't refuting Hume, this should be beyond obvious. Elliot Sober seems to be a serious enough philosopher that if he addressed this topic as a discrete work he would probably offer something much better than the cack that VA is throwing up here. Something is fishy in this thread.

My guess is that the OP comes from sort of off hand aside in a work about philosophy of science where the strange second premiss and the treatment of reduction would make a lot more sense. I strongly suspect Sober does not actually endorse this argument, and probably considers it some sort of footnote for future consideration at best.

Alternatively, he's pretty old, this argument would be grounds to send somebody round for a wellness check. Like when Flew suddenly became a Christian.

[Peter Holmes]

Just musing. (Btw, it's no ought from is.)

If what we call the dog didn't what call sit on what we call the log, then the factual assertion 'the dog sat on the log', in context, would be false. (Note: this is not to espouse a correspondence theory.)

Point is: can the free-standing moral assertion 'we ought not to abort zygotes' be true or false? What would have to be the case in reality to make it true, the absence of which would make it false?

Genuine question.

[Flannel Jesus]

More AI slop? booooo

[Iwannaplato]

the posited unobservables in science are posited due to effects that are empirical. positing inobservable objective morals adds nothing to an explanation. He did that because it was moral. Parsimony would take away that added something and just deal with molecules and neurons and what was sensed that led to....etc. If we decide that someone being nice is eveidence of objective morals, then someone being a monster is evidence of, well, a different objective moral. 2)

[Flannel Jesus]

the posited unobservables in science are posited due to effects that are empirical. positing inobservable objective morals adds nothing to an explanation. He did that because it was moral. Parsimony would take away that added something and just deal with molecules and neurons and what was sensed that led to....etc. If we decide that someone being nice is eveidence of objective morals, then someone being a monster is evidence of, well, a different objective moral. 2)

All very good points, but get back to me when you can make an ai say it.

[Iwannaplato]

the posited unobservables in science are posited due to effects that are empirical. positing inobservable objective morals adds nothing to an explanation. He did that because it was moral. Parsimony would take away that added something and just deal with molecules and neurons and what was sensed that led to....etc. If we decide that someone being nice is eveidence of objective morals, then someone being a monster is evidence of, well, a different objective moral. 2)

All very good points, but get back to me when you can make an ai say it.

OK, I presented the AI with that conclusion from VA's quote: "Scientific theories about unobservable entities cannot be deduced from premisses that are strictly about observables, but th is provides no reason to think that theories about unobservables are always untrue." I said this was a weak conclusion/analogy and made a slightly longer version of my post above.

Here's what the AI said:

Your argument highlights a key distinction between the scientific practice of positing unobservable entities and the philosophical practice of positing objective morals. Here’s a refined version of your argument:

### Argument

The claim that "scientific theories about unobservable entities cannot be deduced from premises that are strictly about observables, but this provides no reason to think that theories about unobservables are always untrue" is weak because it overlooks the empirical basis for positing unobservables in science. The unobservables posited by science are necessitated by empirical effects that require explanation. In contrast, positing objective morals as unobservables adds nothing substantive to explanations of human behavior. Parsimony would favor explanations that rely solely on observable phenomena, such as molecular and neurological interactions, and the sensory inputs leading to specific behaviors.

### Key Points

1. **Empirical Basis in Science**:
- Scientific theories posit unobservable entities like electrons, quarks, or dark matter because there are observable empirical phenomena that cannot be adequately explained without inferring these entities.
- For instance, the behavior of particles in a cloud chamber, gravitational effects, and the spectrum of electromagnetic radiation all require the positing of unobservables to be comprehensively explained.

2. **Lack of Explanatory Necessity for Objective Morals**:
- Positing objective morals does not provide additional explanatory power when understanding human behavior.
- Human actions, whether moral or immoral, can be explained through physiological, neurological, and behavioral frameworks without invoking objective moral truths.

3. **Parsimony and Explanation**:
- Parsimony, or Occam’s Razor, suggests that we should not multiply entities beyond necessity. In explaining human behavior, there is no empirical necessity to posit objective morals.
- Behavioral and neurological sciences can explain why people act in certain ways based on stimuli, brain states, and environmental factors.

4. **Consistency in Evidence**:
- If we take an act of kindness as evidence for objective morals, consistency demands that we also take acts of cruelty as evidence for a different set of objective morals, leading to a contradictory and unmanageable set of moral truths.
- This inconsistency suggests that objective morals are not the best explanation for human behavior.

### Conclusion

Therefore, while scientific theories posit unobservable entities out of empirical necessity, positing objective morals lacks such a necessity and does not enhance our understanding of human behavior. Parsimony dictates that we should rely on observable phenomena and their interactions to explain behavior, making the concept of objective morals superfluous in this context.

[Flannel Jesus]

the posited unobservables in science are posited due to effects that are empirical. positing inobservable objective morals adds nothing to an explanation. He did that because it was moral. Parsimony would take away that added something and just deal with molecules and neurons and what was sensed that led to....etc. If we decide that someone being nice is eveidence of objective morals, then someone being a monster is evidence of, well, a different objective moral. 2)

All very good points, but get back to me when you can make an ai say it.

OK, I presented the AI with that conclusion from VA's quote: "Scientific theories about unobservable entities cannot be deduced from premisses that are strictly about observables, but th is provides no reason to think that theories about unobservables are always untrue." I said this was a weak conclusion/analogy and made a slightly longer version of my post above.

Here's what the AI said:

Your argument highlights a key distinction between the scientific practice of positing unobservable entities and the philosophical practice of positing objective morals. Here’s a refined version of your argument:

### Argument

The claim that "scientific theories about unobservable entities cannot be deduced from premises that are strictly about observables, but this provides no reason to think that theories about unobservables are always untrue" is weak because it overlooks the empirical basis for positing unobservables in science. The unobservables posited by science are necessitated by empirical effects that require explanation. In contrast, positing objective morals as unobservables adds nothing substantive to explanations of human behavior. Parsimony would favor explanations that rely solely on observable phenomena, such as molecular and neurological interactions, and the sensory inputs leading to specific behaviors.

### Key Points

1. **Empirical Basis in Science**:
- Scientific theories posit unobservable entities like electrons, quarks, or dark matter because there are observable empirical phenomena that cannot be adequately explained without inferring these entities.
- For instance, the behavior of particles in a cloud chamber, gravitational effects, and the spectrum of electromagnetic radiation all require the positing of unobservables to be comprehensively explained.

2. **Lack of Explanatory Necessity for Objective Morals**:
- Positing objective morals does not provide additional explanatory power when understanding human behavior.
- Human actions, whether moral or immoral, can be explained through physiological, neurological, and behavioral frameworks without invoking objective moral truths.

3. **Parsimony and Explanation**:
- Parsimony, or Occam’s Razor, suggests that we should not multiply entities beyond necessity. In explaining human behavior, there is no empirical necessity to posit objective morals.
- Behavioral and neurological sciences can explain why people act in certain ways based on stimuli, brain states, and environmental factors.

4. **Consistency in Evidence**:
- If we take an act of kindness as evidence for objective morals, consistency demands that we also take acts of cruelty as evidence for a different set of objective morals, leading to a contradictory and unmanageable set of moral truths.
- This inconsistency suggests that objective morals are not the best explanation for human behavior.

### Conclusion

Therefore, while scientific theories posit unobservable entities out of empirical necessity, positing objective morals lacks such a necessity and does not enhance our understanding of human behavior. Parsimony dictates that we should rely on observable phenomena and their interactions to explain behavior, making the concept of objective morals superfluous in this context.

I guess that means you win, since this AI is answering more broadly than the narrow OP. Congratulations on your victory, anybody who disagrees is childish and immature.

[Iwannaplato]

I guess that means you win, since this AI is answering more broadly than the narrow OP. Congratulations on your victory, anybody who disagrees is childish and immature.

Oh, thank God. I thought I was going to have to read the CPR twice before sleep tonight.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Consider an analogy:
Scientific theories about unobservable entities cannot be deduced from premisses that are strictly about observables,
but this provides no reason to think that theories about unobservables are always untrue."

In this case "unobservables" are true because the specific human-based Science FSERC said so.
My principle;
Whatever is true [fact, reality, knowledge, objectivity] is contingent upon a specific human-based [collective of subjects] FSERC of which the scientific FSERC is the gold standard of credibility, truth and objectivity.

So, theories of unobservables are true as conditioned upon the credible and objective scientific FSERC.

Sober's core argument is that the inability to deduce "ought" from "is" does not automatically invalidate the truth of ethical statements. This is a significant departure from the traditional interpretation of Hume's problem.
This opens up possibilities for other forms of justification for ethical claims, such as inductive reasoning, intuition, or other non-deductive methods.

Where a moral FSERC is established with credibility and objectivity to as near as possible [say 85] to the scientific FSERC [@100], then, the moral claims are true with [85/100] credbility and objectivity.

Within a moral FSERC, any deliberate action to end life [including unborn] of humans by humans is immoral.
A fetus as an unborn life.
Therefore "abortion is immoral" [the oughtnotness of abortion] is a moral fact conditioned upon a moral FSERC.
However, within a moral FSERC, "abortion is immoral" is merely a moral ideal & standard imperative to guide moral progress within humanity.

The moral FSERC is merely a model with moral ideals as guide to moral progress.
In the present psychological states of humans, anyone can have as many abortions as they need to; but there is need to be mindful to strive towards the ideals.

[FlashDangerpants]

Consider an analogy:
Scientific theories about unobservable entities cannot be deduced from premisses that are strictly about observables,
but this provides no reason to think that theories about unobservables are always untrue."

In this case "unobservables" are true because the specific human-based Science FSERC said so.

That's a tragic misreading.

[Iwannaplato]

In this case "unobservables" are true because the specific human-based Science FSERC said so.

1) why put 'unobservables' in quotes? 2) I think you must mean 'real' not 'true'. It would be weird to say an electron is true. Statements on other hand.....

My principle;
Whatever is true [fact, reality, knowledge, objectivity] is contingent upon a specific human-based [collective of subjects] FSERC of which the scientific FSERC is the gold standard of credibility, truth and objectivity.

So, theories of unobservables are true as conditioned upon the credible and objective scientific FSERC.

Great, so statements asserting the existence of mind-independent object as conditioned on realist science's FSERC can be true or false. This FSERC has confirmed within its methods and framework that many of these objects exist and that we can evaluate statements within the FSERC.

The statements that the realist science FSERC determines are true or false, those are mind-dependent. The objects posited are not mind dependent and we can see this in all the models that posit the persistence of objects when not viewed. Anything from orbits of planets, the Big Bang Theory, to models of the gradual decrease in radioactivity over time as the isotopes decay in nuclear waste. All these models, down to images, presume the mind independence of the objects in question. There are other examples from evolutionary theory, physiology, chemistry and so no down the line.

Facts are mind dependent. Facts in the sense of statements conditioned on the science realist FSERC. The objects, obviously considered, mind independent in models and research, are, well mind-independent. And this realist science has been the gold standard for a long time.

And, as always, remember: if you are saying there are not mind independent objects you are making a claim about what phenomena when no on is around.

[Veritas Aequitas]

In this case "unobservables" are true because the specific human-based Science FSERC said so.

1) why put 'unobservables' in quotes? 2) I think you must mean 'real' not 'true'. It would be weird to say an electron is true. Statements on other hand.....

"unobservables" means that confined to science not the supernaturals or God and the like.
It is 'quarks exists as real' it true as conditioned upon the science-physics FSERC.

My principle;
Whatever is true [fact, reality, knowledge, objectivity] is contingent upon a specific human-based [collective of subjects] FSERC of which the scientific FSERC is the gold standard of credibility, truth and objectivity.

So, theories of unobservables are true as conditioned upon the credible and objective scientific FSERC.

Great, so statements asserting the existence of mind-independent object as conditioned on realist science's FSERC can be true or false. This FSERC has confirmed within its methods and framework that many of these objects exist and that we can evaluate statements within the FSERC.

The statements that the realist science FSERC determines are true or false, those are mind-dependent. The objects posited are not mind dependent and we can see this in all the models that posit the persistence of objects when not viewed. Anything from orbits of planets, the Big Bang Theory, to models of the gradual decrease in radioactivity over time as the isotopes decay in nuclear waste. All these models, down to images, presume the mind independence of the objects in question. There are other examples from evolutionary theory, physiology, chemistry and so no down the line.

Facts are mind dependent. Facts in the sense of statements conditioned on the science realist FSERC. The objects, obviously considered, mind independent in models and research, are, well mind-independent. And this realist science has been the gold standard for a long time.

And, as always, remember: if you are saying there are not mind independent objects you are making a claim about what phenomena when no on is around.

I have stated;
There are Two Senses of Reality
viewtopic.php?t=40265
as such, two senses of scientific reality, i.e.

1. Scientific realism based FSERC
2. Scientific antirealism based FSERC.


Included within the scientific realism FSERC, there is an ASSUMPTION there are absolutely mind-independent thing-in-itself existing out there awaiting discovery where science is getting nearer to discover its finality.

Realists [p] tend to believe that whatever we believe now is only an approximation of reality but that the accuracy and fullness of understanding can be improved.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_realism

Note it is only a belief, i.e. an assumption.
Do you have a counter for this?

There is no such assumption within the scientific antirealism FSERC which is merely a conjecture-polishing-machine based on empirical evidences.
Science in reality and practice is not serious about what could be out there existing as absolutely mind-independent, but the focus is the predictability of its optimal polished conjectures.

[Veritas Aequitas]

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