10k Philosophy challenge

[FlashDangerpants]

I think there are necessary moral truths, that are true across all possible worlds. I hope that gives you an accurate picture of my view.

When you consider the many possible worlds, how absurd do things have to get before the modality is too silly to contemplate? As an example: we might for instance imagine an alternative Earth in which the ecological niche of brainy animal with the ability to deliberately alter the local environment to its own benefit according to a mental design was not ultimately filled by the descendents of social apes, but rather a branch of the shark family that evolved into land dwelling, opposable thumb owning, trouser wearing shark-men.

It's probably fairly easy to construct a picture of morality as experienced by these shark-men who favour enterprise, daring and might, but have little use for any notions of empathy, which was not a feature of the cold-blooded marine killers from which they evolved. If our own imagination lets us down we should be able to plunder from one of the alien races in Star Trek or something like that, because these shows are full of such creatures and cultures. The gist of my epic thrust is that on a possible worlds basis, a majority of what we normally consider to be key features of all moral systems might actually be contingent. Morality, at its core, rather than being a way of thinking and rationalising about how to be nice and how not to be nasty, could just be the ways of life that permit selfish agents to live together in large societies that don't descend into the war of all against all.

So we can imagine a possible world in which a morality exists, but where kindness, sympathy and empathy are not especially virtuous, but we cannot imagine one where agency and autonomy are similarly contingent. Or does that sort of thing constitute an abuse of the notion of possible worlds?

[Daniel McKay]

So long as the world is possible, then I'd say it's not too silly to contemplate. For a normative theory to be true, I am saying it needs to be true in our world, and on the world with the sharks in trousers. That world isn't even particularly weird, as possible worlds go.

I would say that morality is neither about being nice and not nasty nor is it about allowing selfish agents to coexist, but rather is about how all persons ought to live, regardless of what they think matters. Whether those persons are shark-like, or ape-like, or weird non-physical ghosts. If it's a free, rational agent, then morality should apply to it.

I think I would agree with the core point that there is no world in which there is morality that isn't deeply connected to free, rational agency. That is, in fact, why I have used the exercise of that free, rational agency (at least over those choices that belong to the agent), as the measure of value for FC. Because every free, rational agent, every moral agent, has such a capacity, including the sharks in the trousers.

[Peter Holmes]

I for one have neve heard of 'freedom consequentialism' before, so I went to have a look for some.
Currently the only literature on the subject appears to be Daniel's PhD thesis, available here

For a bit of what it's about, here's a para from near the top of that...

Thanks for identifying this explanation, Flash. I haven't kept up with the whole discussion so far, so apologies if my response has been covered already.

The problem is: 'how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism'.

1 Surely, any theory that asserts 'oughts' is normative: 'establishing, relating to, or deriving from a standard or norm, especially of behaviour'. So what work is 'normative' doing in 'the normative theory of freedom consequentialism'? Not sure about this - I just don't know.

2 If we begin with deontology and consequentialism - which is just the deontological can kicked down the road - then surely we're already committed to moral realism or objectivism. Whether the moral rightness or wrongness of either an action or its consequences is inherent or intrinsic is the issue. If it isn't, then that's the end of deontology and consequentialism. And good riddance, as far as I'm concerned.

3 Non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions. And the falsifiability of the premise is irrelevant. ''The highest good is X (eg freedom or free rational agency)', or 'The purpose of life/human life/my life is Y' - and so on - can never entail an ought, such as: 'therefore, the highest good ought to be the free exercise of rational agency'.

And it's because morality can't be objective that normative ethical and moral theories fail. What constitutes 'the good life' and 'good behaviour' can only ever be a matter of opinion.

1: "Normative theory" is what theories of normative ethics are called. Normative ethics is the project of determining how we ought to live our lives, as opposed to meta ethics which considers what it means for something to be moral or applied ethics which looks at specific cases or disciplines and how ethical principles apply to them.

Thanks. This is a distinction without much of a difference. Here are a couple of definitions:

Normative ethics is a branch of moral philosophy concerned with criteria of what is right and wrong. It includes the formulation of moral rules that have implications for what human actions, institutions, and ways of life should be like.'

'Metaethics is a branch of ethics that explores the nature and meaning of ethical terms, judgments, and arguments. It does not focus on what is moral, but on what morality itself is. Metaethics seeks to understand the status, foundations, and scope of moral values, properties, and words. It is also known as analytic ethics.'

We can't determine how we ought to live our lives, unless we have criteria for moral rightness and wrongness in place. And those come from meta-ethical conclusions, such as they are. How can 'what is moral [ly right or wrong]' be distinguished from 'what morality itself is'?

2: Yes, committed to both I'd say.

Fair enough. Do you have a valid and sound argument for the intrinsic moral rightness or wrongness of an action? For the existence of moral facts? Or a moral fact? An example will do.

3: Weeeeeeell, not entirely true. They can't entail them by themselves. But, for example, if we assume that ought implies can, then we can determine some moral facts from non-moral facts. There's a normative premise there bridging the is-ought gap.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'ought implies can'. And there are obviously situations in which we ought to do something but can't. And the 'normative premise bridging the is-ought gap' - without begging the question - is precisely the issue. But again, could you set out a syllogism to show what you mean? That would clear it up for me.

4: Nothing you have said suggests that morality can't be objective. I'd say rather than morality can only be objective. That our options are universal, objective morality, or moral error theory. If you don't think that is what is meant by the term "morality", then I disagree, but I'll accept the asterix next to the word and we can move on from linguistic concerns to ones of whether objective moral truths exist or not.

I disagree. I maintain there are no moral facts, so morality cant be objective. But again, if you can show an example of a moral fact - which, of course, will have to be a factually true moral assertion - and why it's a fact, that will make your case. I assume you agree a moral assertion is one that says X is morally right or wrong, or that we should or shouldn't do X, because it's morally right or wrong.

[Immanuel Can]

How can a non-physical cause have a physical effect? Or how can a physical effect be evidence for a non-physical cause? What is the supposed causal mechanism? Magic?

No, Pete; but your own wording shows you're already pre-determining what the only answer you'd accept would be: a "mechanism." But "mechanics" are for physical entities, so you've already asked us to assume that the only possible answer will be a physical one.

I didn't ask what the physical causal mechanism is - just what the causal mechanism is.

It's still a physical entity, a "mechanism." Calling it a "method" won't change that, unless one is already prepared to entertain the possibility of non-physical causes. Likewise, if one is not, then one will not accept evidence of any such -- which I have given, in the form of reference to such phenomena as "mind," "reason," "volition," "personhood," "values," and such, all of which are things universally conceded to exist (because nobody can live without assuming them), but which are not going to be unpackable in terms of "method" or "mechanics."

This is called the "emergence" problem, Pete. And I can't explain all of it here, because it's a big and complex field: but basically, the problem is how something like "mind" could possibly "emerge" from non-sentient matter...which we know had to be all there was in the universe at some point, if progressivism is at all true. There had to be a state of the universe in which there were only chemicals and electricity, for example. So how does something like "mind" ever appear? The guess (and it's a pure guess) is that it has to "emerge" more or less 'ready to go' at some point in the development of the brain -- but nobody even pretends to know how this could come about: so no "mechanism" for it can be offered.

What if things like "mind" or "choice" or "freedom" are actually explanations of original causes of events? What if "Pete decided to go to the store" does not have a prior determinative explanation in the secondary fact of Peter's physical hunger, or Peter's physical desire to move, but in something like Peter's acquisitive intentions of the moment?

What we call the mind, choice and freedom aren't explanations at all, causal or otherwise.

This is exactly what I was saying that Physicalism amounts to. But it's 100% assumptive, and without scientific or empirical basis. It's just a story people choose to believe for other reasons. For to foreclose on the question of whether or not things like "mind" and "choice" can be legitimate causal explanations, even before all possible investigation, is simply to choose one's conclusion before any inquiry can even begin.

You claim that, at some point, a non-physical cause can have a physical effect.

So do you, if I judge by your actions, rather than your claims. Even by typing, you're doing that very thing. The state of your mind is causing your fingers to move in certain patterns that express ideas you have in your consciousness; and you're aiming to have a conversation with another mind or minds to achieve a change in it or them, too.

A causal explanation which explains nothing isn't an explanation at all.

You'll recall that that is my critique of Physicalism. It simply arbitrarily precludes certain kinds of explanation from the field, prejudicially damning them as "not explanations," and then claims victory. It hasn't proved a thing: it just tilted the table so far in its own favour that no opposition is able to get uphill anymore.

That seems intuitively true: we all think and act as if we "make up our minds" about things, and then enact them on the physical world (with varying degrees of success, of course). But that's how we all think and feel that we live. So if that's not how things really are, then I think the Physicalist is the one who needs the explanation: why do we all have this conviction that we make choices and enact our wills, when choice and will are actually not final explantions of anything? And why are they not? The answer must surely be something better than, "because I'm only prepared to consider physical cause-and-effect relations."

So, you appeal to intuition and 'how we all think and feel', and what we're inclined to say.

Yes -- but only to settle the question of burden of proof. I suggest that any theory as thoroughly counterintuitive and as thoroughly impossible to live out consistently as Physicalism owes an explanation that is better than the intuitive one. Until it can provide one, we have no intuitive reason to believe it at all, and no scientific evidence for it: so what's the point of believing it?

Plausibly, the only reason, if we're honest, is that we're coming to it with preformed assumptions, perhaps based on a desire for certain metaphysical conclusions we can't otherwise justify to ourselves. That's possible.

Why assume that what we call "mind," "personhood," "freedom" and "values," and "reasoning." are non-physical realities?

Two reasons: we all, for some reason Physicalists never try to explain, do just that. And secondly, because pre-imposing the rule that only physical things are allowed to exist is not a genuine way to investigate the question.

1 The explanation for human belief in non-physical things and causes is easy. Ignorance and fear are part of it.

That's merely ad hominem, and has nothing to do with whether or not the non-physical theory is the truth. You can't defeat the truth value of a theory by slandering the people who believe it, you know. You have to provide something to disprove the theory they're holding.

But let's play anyway, because it makes a further point: if it's "ignorance," and "fear," then let's justify that. Let's prove that any belief in non-physical causes can only be caused by "fear" and can only involved "ignorance" of something. What is that "something" of which these people are allegedly "ignorant"? It can't be of the truth of Physicalism itself, because Physicalism is merely a hypothetical postulate taken in advance. So of what scientific or empirical verities are they "ignorant"?

2 I've never come across a physicalist who claims there can be no other than physical things and causes.

Also merely ad hominem. If are logically Physicalists are inconsistent with regard to their theory, and even if all are, that may be because Physicalism itself contains a problem that convinces everybody else to abandon it, unless they are prepared to buy into the irrational claim that the world can be totally physical and yet have genuine explanations how non-physical things can remain causal.

That being the case, it would mean that Physicalists are essentially behaving as irrational people in this one way, in order to save their Physicalism, and all of them would be doing that or else leaving Physicalism. So their consistency with each other would be utterly unsurprising.

Whether that's how it is, we could debate: but it's certainly not the case that tacit agreement among Physicalists you've met would constitute an argument in favour of the coherence of Physicalism itself.

Because we talk about them, but can have no physical evidence for their existence?

We do have physical evidence of them, and plenty of it. If Peter chooses to go to the store to satisfy his acquisitive desires, that's as comprehensive an explanation as maybe we need for why Peter's at the store. And the fact that Peter is now at the store is a physical fact: so we are certainly seeing the outcome on a physical level, the results being evident to us; we're perhaps just not able to limit the cause to physical preconditions. Peter's will is a genuine explanation for why he's ultimately at the store.

So, choosing to do X is physical evidence for the existence of a non-physical thing or cause: choice or freedom or the will - and so on.

Prima facie, at least. That's the theory we should go with, until proved otherwise, that means. The burden's not on the non-physicalist, who is behaving in a way that makes sense of our universal intuitions and behaviours; the Physicalist is currently asking us to believe, instead, something for which we have neither intuitive plausibility nor any scientific evidence. Clearly, we should side with what seems intuitively right, in this case...until Physicalists can actually do something about that, by way of providing proof.

[FlashDangerpants]

4: Nothing you have said suggests that morality can't be objective. I'd say rather than morality can only be objective. That our options are universal, objective morality, or moral error theory.

I disagree. I maintain there are no moral facts, so morality cant be objective.

I think you may have accidentally agreed with Daniel there. What he set up looks a lot like he's saying our moral assertions aim at facts, and if there are no such facts then they are all in error. And you then effectively replied that indeed they are erroneous. In effect, you currently both agree that there is a particular bifurcated dichotomy in play, and you happen to be simply choosing different outcomes.

I believe that to properly disagree with him you would need to be working one of the angles that disputes whether we are actually attempting to state facts which are describing a state of the world. So things such as one of the brands of fictionalism (when I say "stealing is wrong", I actually mean "it as if stealing is wrong" and that's what the person I speak to is understanding by my words), or one of the non-cognitive alternatives ("boo to stealing" etc). That would mean the options would be universal, objective morality, or moral error theory, or boo/hurrah emotivism etc.

[Peter Holmes]

No, Pete; but your own wording shows you're already pre-determining what the only answer you'd accept would be: a "mechanism." But "mechanics" are for physical entities, so you've already asked us to assume that the only possible answer will be a physical one.

I didn't ask what the physical causal mechanism is - just what the causal mechanism is.

It's still a physical entity, a "mechanism." Calling it a "method" won't change that, unless one is already prepared to entertain the possibility of non-physical causes. Likewise, if one is not, then one will not accept evidence of any such -- which I have given, in the form of reference to such phenomena as "mind," "reason," "volition," "personhood," "values," and such, all of which are things universally conceded to exist (because nobody can live without assuming them), but which are not going to be unpackable in terms of "method" or "mechanics."

1 Still dodging. Yours is the burden of proving the existence of non-physical causes - or at least one. Do so, and my preparedness to accept them or it will be irrelevant. You will have made your case.

2 Mind, reason, volition, personhood and values are terms, not causal explanations. I assume you know the difference.

This is called the "emergence" problem, Pete. And I can't explain all of it here, because it's a big and complex field: but basically, the problem is how something like "mind" could possibly "emerge" from non-sentient matter...which we know had to be all there was in the universe at some point, if progressivism is at all true. There had to be a state of the universe in which there were only chemicals and electricity, for example. So how does something like "mind" ever appear? The guess (and it's a pure guess) is that it has to "emerge" more or less 'ready to go' at some point in the development of the brain -- but nobody even pretends to know how this could come about: so no "mechanism" for it can be offered.

But this begs the question, by assuming that what we call mind or consciousness is a non-physical thing. You've got your Trojan horse inside the gate, and taken the city already.

What if things like "mind" or "choice" or "freedom" are actually explanations of original causes of events? What if "Pete decided to go to the store" does not have a prior determinative explanation in the secondary fact of Peter's physical hunger, or Peter's physical desire to move, but in something like Peter's acquisitive intentions of the moment?

What we call the mind, choice and freedom aren't explanations at all, causal or otherwise.

This is exactly what I was saying that Physicalism amounts to. But it's 100% assumptive, and without scientific or empirical basis. It's just a story people choose to believe for other reasons. For to foreclose on the question of whether or not things like "mind" and "choice" can be legitimate causal explanations, even before all possible investigation, is simply to choose one's conclusion before any inquiry can even begin.

1 We can set aside the question as to whether physicalism has any scientific or empirical basis - because you claim that a non-physical cause can have a physical effect, which I assume you think is coherent.

2 Again, you're dodging the question. Q 'What causes me to have a thought?' A 'Mind'. Q 'What caused me to make that choice?' A 'Choice'. These aren't explanations at all.

You claim that, at some point, a non-physical cause can have a physical effect.

So do you, if I judge by your actions, rather than your claims. Even by typing, you're doing that very thing. The state of your mind is causing your fingers to move in certain patterns that express ideas you have in your consciousness; and you're aiming to have a conversation with another mind or minds to achieve a change in it or them, too.

Begging the question. I assume you know what that means.

A causal explanation which explains nothing isn't an explanation at all.

You'll recall that that is my critique of Physicalism. It simply arbitrarily precludes certain kinds of explanation from the field, prejudicially damning them as "not explanations," and then claims victory. It hasn't proved a thing: it just tilted the table so far in its own favour that no opposition is able to get uphill anymore.

No, it doesn't. And I don't. I'm asking for an explanation of how a non-physical cause can have a physical effect. I'm not pre-judging the answer - and nor do physicalists, in my experience. I wonder why it's so hard for you actually to address that question. Perhaps you find 'I don't know, and nobody does' an uncomfortable answer.

That seems intuitively true: we all think and act as if we "make up our minds" about things, and then enact them on the physical world (with varying degrees of success, of course). But that's how we all think and feel that we live. So if that's not how things really are, then I think the Physicalist is the one who needs the explanation: why do we all have this conviction that we make choices and enact our wills, when choice and will are actually not final explantions of anything? And why are they not? The answer must surely be something better than, "because I'm only prepared to consider physical cause-and-effect relations."

So, you appeal to intuition and 'how we all think and feel', and what we're inclined to say.

Yes -- but only to settle the question of burden of proof.

It doesn't, because the truth is all that matters, as you well know. So 'how we all think and feel' doesn't meet the burden. Or, of course, if it does, then 'we all think and act as though physical reality exists', does too. You seem oblivious to your cognitive dissonance.

I suggest that any theory as thoroughly counterintuitive and as thoroughly impossible to live out consistently as Physicalism owes an explanation that is better than the intuitive one. Until it can provide one, we have no intuitive reason to believe it at all, and no scientific evidence for it: so what's the point of believing it?

See above.

Plausibly, the only reason, if we're honest, is that we're coming to it with preformed assumptions, perhaps based on a desire for certain metaphysical conclusions we can't otherwise justify to ourselves. That's possible.

Two reasons: we all, for some reason Physicalists never try to explain, do just that. And secondly, because pre-imposing the rule that only physical things are allowed to exist is not a genuine way to investigate the question.

1 The explanation for human belief in non-physical things and causes is easy. Ignorance and fear are part of it.

That's merely ad hominem, and has nothing to do with whether or not the non-physical theory is the truth. You can't defeat the truth value of a theory by slandering the people who believe it, you know. You have to provide something to disprove the theory they're holding.

This is not a slanderous ad hominem. Humans didn't know what causes lightning, which they feared, and invented supernatural things and causes, such as spirits and gods, to explain it and try to control the fear by inventing propitiatory rites, and so on. Our discovery of the actual physical explanation for lightning is what 'disproved' the supernaturalist 'theory'. A physical effect has a physical cause.

But let's play anyway, because it makes a further point: if it's "ignorance," and "fear," then let's justify that. Let's prove that any belief in non-physical causes can only be caused by "fear" and can only involved "ignorance" of something. What is that "something" of which these people are allegedly "ignorant"? It can't be of the truth of Physicalism itself, because Physicalism is merely a hypothetical postulate taken in advance. So of what scientific or empirical verities are they "ignorant"?

This is being silly. And dodging again. I impute nothing by asking you to provide an explanation for how a non-physical cause can have a physical effect, which is what you claim.

2 I've never come across a physicalist who claims there can be no other than physical things and causes.

Also merely ad hominem.

Please look up the ad hominem fallacy, because you don't seem to understand it.

If are logically Physicalists are inconsistent with regard to their theory, and even if all are, that may be because Physicalism itself contains a problem that convinces everybody else to abandon it, unless they are prepared to buy into the irrational claim that the world can be totally physical and yet have genuine explanations how non-physical things can remain causal.

Sorry, but I don't understand this.

That being the case, it would mean that Physicalists are essentially behaving as irrational people in this one way, in order to save their Physicalism, and all of them would be doing that or else leaving Physicalism. So their consistency with each other would be utterly unsurprising.

Whether that's how it is, we could debate: but it's certainly not the case that tacit agreement among Physicalists you've met would constitute an argument in favour of the coherence of Physicalism itself.

I don't know where you got this from. I was only countering your claim that physicalists must think there can be no non-natural causes - because that's false. And obviously, agreement - tacit or otherwise - can't establish the truth of any assertion - such as that there are non-physical causes 'because we all intuitively think there are'.

We do have physical evidence of them, and plenty of it. If Peter chooses to go to the store to satisfy his acquisitive desires, that's as comprehensive an explanation as maybe we need for why Peter's at the store. And the fact that Peter is now at the store is a physical fact: so we are certainly seeing the outcome on a physical level, the results being evident to us; we're perhaps just not able to limit the cause to physical preconditions. Peter's will is a genuine explanation for why he's ultimately at the store.

So, choosing to do X is physical evidence for the existence of a non-physical thing or cause: choice or freedom or the will - and so on.

Prima facie, at least. That's the theory we should go with, until proved otherwise, that means. The burden's not on the non-physicalist, who is behaving in a way that makes sense of our universal intuitions and behaviours; the Physicalist is currently asking us to believe, instead, something for which we have neither intuitive plausibility nor any scientific evidence. Clearly, we should side with what seems intuitively right, in this case...until Physicalists can actually do something about that, by way of providing proof.

All false, and deflective. The truth is what matters, not what seems to be the case to us. And your failure to meet the burden of proof for your claim about non-physical things and causes is unsurprising. And, tell you what, I'll leave this where it is until you do meet the burden of proof.

[Immanuel Can]

Yours is the burden of proving the existence of non-physical causes - or at least one.

It's not, actually. It's the default. It's Physicalism that has to prove a) that it's true, and b) that it's liveable. For right now, it has neither going for it.

2 Mind, reason, volition, personhood and values are terms, not causal explanations. I assume you know the difference.

This is called the "emergence" problem, Pete. And I can't explain all of it here, because it's a big and complex field: but basically, the problem is how something like "mind" could possibly "emerge" from non-sentient matter...which we know had to be all there was in the universe at some point, if progressivism is at all true. There had to be a state of the universe in which there were only chemicals and electricity, for example. So how does something like "mind" ever appear? The guess (and it's a pure guess) is that it has to "emerge" more or less 'ready to go' at some point in the development of the brain -- but nobody even pretends to know how this could come about: so no "mechanism" for it can be offered.

But this begs the question, by assuming that what we call mind or consciousness is a non-physical thing.

No, I'm not asking you for an assumption, Pete. I'm asking you to explain how you know this thing we all use...and you're using right now...is non-physical. Clearly, we both think it has causal efficacy; but you say it's merely physical, and I want to know what evidence supports that assumption.

What we call the mind, choice and freedom aren't explanations at all, causal or otherwise.

This is exactly what I was saying that Physicalism amounts to. But it's 100% assumptive, and without scientific or empirical basis. It's just a story people choose to believe for other reasons. For to foreclose on the question of whether or not things like "mind" and "choice" can be legitimate causal explanations, even before all possible investigation, is simply to choose one's conclusion before any inquiry can even begin.

1 We can set aside the question as to whether physicalism has any scientific or empirical basis...

Not so long as Physicalism is a live option: because it insists that's how things can be known. And yet it, itself, has none of the things it demands of non-physicalism. Why then would we let Physicalism off the "hook" it wants to put non-physicalism on? That would be biased.

Q 'What causes me to have a thought?' A 'Mind'. Q 'What caused me to make that choice?' A 'Choice'. These aren't explanations at all.

They aren't physical explanations. But only Physicalism asserts they ought to be (and then cannot meet its own standard). The question is whether "mind" as the start of a causal chain IS a correct explanation of an event; and you simply assert it's not, and I assert that it is, and is far better than the explanation, "matter/physical stuff did it," particularly when the event is evidently the result of cognition, or when it's evidently against all the obvious physical inducements -- as when a triathlete persists against the pain in his lungs and the sweat on his brow, for something as totally abstract as "the glory" of "a win." That decision and action are not easy to explain in terms of physical preconditions, because the preconditions all seem opposed. But it's easy to explain in terms of the desires and goals of the triathlete.

I think you should opt for the more obvious explanation. Clearly, Physicalism is so inobvious it's without evidence.

You claim that, at some point, a non-physical cause can have a physical effect.

So do you, if I judge by your actions, rather than your claims. Even by typing, you're doing that very thing. The state of your mind is causing your fingers to move in certain patterns that express ideas you have in your consciousness; and you're aiming to have a conversation with another mind or minds to achieve a change in it or them, too.

Begging the question. I assume you know what that means.

I'm not "begging" it. I'm pointing to the evidence. When is the Physicalist going to start pointing to some?

I'm asking for an explanation of how a non-physical cause can have a physical effect.

And when it's given, even using your own current activity, you simply reject it. I don't know what the next step would be when a man refuses the obvious evidence of what he, himself is doing.

So, you appeal to intuition and 'how we all think and feel', and what we're inclined to say.

Yes -- but only to settle the question of burden of proof.

It doesn't, because the truth is all that matters, as you well know.

We should always prefer the better explanation. Non-physicalism can account for things like cognition, reasoning, science, logic, volition, choice, argumentation, and so on, and Physicalism simply cannot. That makes non-physicalism, until further notice, the preferable hypothesis.

However, if Physicalism is finally ready to cough up some evidence, I'm ready to hear it.

1 The explanation for human belief in non-physical things and causes is easy. Ignorance and fear are part of it.

That's merely ad hominem, and has nothing to do with whether or not the non-physical theory is the truth. You can't defeat the truth value of a theory by slandering the people who believe it, you know. You have to provide something to disprove the theory they're holding.

This is not a slanderous ad hominem. Humans didn't know what causes lightning, which they feared, and invented supernatural things and causes, such as spirits and gods, to explain it and try to control the fear by inventing propitiatory rites, and so on.

It's irrelevant to establishing Physicalism.

Even supposing it were true (and, of course, it's only an imaginary, anthropological just-so story, not any kind of history or even close analysis of present data here, so it's highly unlikely to be true at all: but let that be) even supposing that, it would not prove Physicalism. So I can't see why the argument's even being made.

But let's play anyway, because it makes a further point: if it's "ignorance," and "fear," then let's justify that. Let's prove that any belief in non-physical causes can only be caused by "fear" and can only involved "ignorance" of something. What is that "something" of which these people are allegedly "ignorant"? It can't be of the truth of Physicalism itself, because Physicalism is merely a hypothetical postulate taken in advance. So of what scientific or empirical verities are they "ignorant"?

This is being silly.

To ask somebody who has made a claim to substantiate it? Hardly. It's basic critical thinking.

That being the case, it would mean that Physicalists are essentially behaving as irrational people in this one way, in order to save their Physicalism, and all of them would be doing that or else leaving Physicalism. So their consistency with each other would be utterly unsurprising.

Whether that's how it is, we could debate: but it's certainly not the case that tacit agreement among Physicalists you've met would constitute an argument in favour of the coherence of Physicalism itself.

I don't know where you got this from.

Reasoning the case.

The truth is what matters, not what seems to be the case to us.

I wish Physicalists would play by that rule. They seem to want us to believe something for which they have neither evidence nor proof, and which, if true, would destroy science itself. I'm disinclined to give them that for free.

[Peter Holmes]

P1 If some physical effects (events) have physical causes, then physical causation exists.
P2 Some physical effects (events) have physical causes.
C Therefore, physical causation exists.

This is valid, so the question is its soundness. And it's possible to deny the main premise: some physical effects (events) have physical causes. That would be to assert: it's not the case that some physical effects (events) have physical causes. And that would imply: no physical effects (events) have physical causes - entailing the conclusion: therefore, physical causation does not exist.

Something to ponder. If you step out into fast-moving traffic, your injury or death will not have a physical cause.

[Daniel McKay]

Peter -
So, I tend to agree that normative ethics and metaethics are deeply connected, but I'm in the minority there. Many people would say that one's metaethical view on what it means for something to be right or wrong isn't really relevant to what actually is right or wrong. I think they're wrong, so I'm not really disagreeing with you here.

No, I don't have any such argument. What I have is an abductive argument for what morality may look like if it indeed exists. It is possible that it doesn't exist, that moral error theory is true and that all our considerations of what is moral is in error. There are arguments for moral realism, but what I will offer you is a pragmatic argument: if moral error theory isn't true, then there are moral costs to believing that it is, such as not doing things which are right and/or doing things which are wrong. Because of this, there is at least some potential gain to be had by assuming moral realism over moral error theory. Of course, if an argument came to light proving that moral error theory is true, then that may diminish the expected moral value to such a degree that it would not longer be a good reason to believe in moral facts. But, until and unless such an argument or reason comes to light, then moral realism has at least some pragmatic benefits inasmuch as not believing may cause you to do something you shouldn't in the event that it is true.

Ought implies can is a reasonably accepted principle that morality can't demand things of people they can't do. I don't think there are obviously situations where someone ought to do something but can't. An example of this bridging the is-ought gap might look something like this:
P1 Bob can not save Bill from the fire (we can imagine that he has no way of knowing about it and is too far away to act if he had)
P2: Ought implies can
C: It is not that case that Bob ought to save Bill from the fire.

This is an example of non-normative premises being part of an argument leading to a normative conclusion. The key is that there needs to be normative premises to bridge the gap.

Morality can be objective whether or not there are moral facts. If there are none, then it is objectively incorrect. I think I have mentioned a lot of moral facts, both in this forum discussion and in the primer I intially mentioned. But, given our fundamental disagreement about metaethics, I'm not sure what fact I could present that you would agree with. Similarly to if I was arguing with some kind of Cartesian sceptic, it would be very difficult for me to present them with facts about the external world that they would accept.

[Atla]

Again these considerations about "moral realism" and "error theory" etc., decades after it was solved in psychology what morality actually is heh

[Veritas Aequitas]

So, I tend to agree that normative ethics and metaethics are deeply connected, but I'm in the minority there.

I agree that normative ethics and metaethics are essential elements as complementary and independent parts of a whole framework and system [FS] of morality & ethics with its input, feedback that generate continual optimal moral progress within humanity.
Like the scientific framework and system, the moral FS has to be credible and objective [from as assessment of weighted criteria].

[Peter Holmes]

Peter -
So, I tend to agree that normative ethics and metaethics are deeply connected, but I'm in the minority there. Many people would say that one's metaethical view on what it means for something to be right or wrong isn't really relevant to what actually is right or wrong. I think they're wrong, so I'm not really disagreeing with you here.

No, I don't have any such argument. What I have is an abductive argument for what morality may look like if it indeed exists. It is possible that it doesn't exist, that moral error theory is true and that all our considerations of what is moral is in error. There are arguments for moral realism, but what I will offer you is a pragmatic argument: if moral error theory isn't true, then there are moral costs to believing that it is, such as not doing things which are right and/or doing things which are wrong. Because of this, there is at least some potential gain to be had by assuming moral realism over moral error theory. Of course, if an argument came to light proving that moral error theory is true, then that may diminish the expected moral value to such a degree that it would not longer be a good reason to believe in moral facts. But, until and unless such an argument or reason comes to light, then moral realism has at least some pragmatic benefits inasmuch as not believing may cause you to do something you shouldn't in the event that it is true.

Ought implies can is a reasonably accepted principle that morality can't demand things of people they can't do. I don't think there are obviously situations where someone ought to do something but can't. An example of this bridging the is-ought gap might look something like this:
P1 Bob can not save Bill from the fire (we can imagine that he has no way of knowing about it and is too far away to act if he had)
P2: Ought implies can
C: It is not that case that Bob ought to save Bill from the fire.

This is an example of non-normative premises being part of an argument leading to a normative conclusion. The key is that there needs to be normative premises to bridge the gap.

Morality can be objective whether or not there are moral facts. If there are none, then it is objectively incorrect. I think I have mentioned a lot of moral facts, both in this forum discussion and in the primer I intially mentioned. But, given our fundamental disagreement about metaethics, I'm not sure what fact I could present that you would agree with. Similarly to if I was arguing with some kind of Cartesian sceptic, it would be very difficult for me to present them with facts about the external world that they would accept.

Thanks, Daniel. There's a lot here I'd like to address properly, when I have time. And thanks for your clarity. It's a pleasure to read what you write.

[Daniel McKay]

- Atla: What morality is is not a psychological question. Unless by "morality" you mean something quite different to what we are discussing here.

[Atla]

- Atla: What morality is is not a psychological question. Unless by "morality" you mean something quite different to what we are discussing here.

I admit, as someone who had more than enough dealings with people who partially or entirely lacked the human moral sense, which made me fully realize what the basis of morality is, and made me realize that most normal, healthy people spend their lives under sort of an imperceptible illusion of all-permeating morality, I'm always perplexed what these philosophy forum discussions (and the philosophical literature on morality) are about. I can't put my finger on it. What does it mean to (try to) divorce morality from the human moral sense? Anyway I'm probably going off-topic.

[Age]

Okay, that's a lot of posts. I think there are two main things I want to pull you up on first of all.

First, you make numerous references to morality being solved or right and wrong already being known. If you know what they are, can you share with the rest of the class, as well as the source of this information?

I have already.

And, which no one has responded to.

Because I am fairly sure that we don't all know "deep down" any such thing,

Just because you are 'fairly sure' of some thing in no way means that 'that thing' is true, nor correct.

Also, 'deep down' 'that thing' is already known by all.

and the things that we think we know "deep down" are not just inconsistent with one another,

Well if you only 'think' you know, then obviously you are 'not sure'.

See, I do not 'think' I know here. I 'know', 'for sure'.

they are also often internally inconsistent and inconsistent with external reality.

So, why then do you keep 'thinking' those things?

Second, you refer to us human beings a lot. As opposed to what exactly? If you are an octopus that has learned to type, I'd like to know about it.

Okay.