Strong emergence is impossible

[bahman]

To show this consider a system with many parts each part has a set of properties. Now let’s assume that the system has a specific property that parts do not have, like consciousness. This property should not be a function of properties of parts if it is a strongly emergent property. There must however be a reason that the system has this specific property rather than any other arbitrary property. This means that there is a function that describes the property of the system. The only available variables are however the properties of parts. This means that the property of the system must be a function of the properties of parts. Therefore, there is no strong emergence.

[Peter Kropotkin]

To show this consider a system with many parts each part has a set of properties. Now let’s assume that the system has a specific property that parts do not have, like consciousness. This property should not be a function of properties of parts if it is a strongly emergent property. There must however be a reason that the system has this specific property rather than any other arbitrary property. This means that there is a function that describes the property of the system. The only available variables are however the properties of parts. This means that the property of the system must be a function of the properties of parts. Therefore, there is no strong emergence.

K: You know, I'm going to wait for the English translation before I address this....

Kropotkin

[bahman]

To show this consider a system with many parts each part has a set of properties. Now let’s assume that the system has a specific property that parts do not have, like consciousness. This property should not be a function of properties of parts if it is a strongly emergent property. There must however be a reason that the system has this specific property rather than any other arbitrary property. This means that there is a function that describes the property of the system. The only available variables are however the properties of parts. This means that the property of the system must be a function of the properties of parts. Therefore, there is no strong emergence.

K: You know, I'm going to wait for the English translation before I address this....

Kropotkin

Could you please tell me which part you cannot understand so I can elaborate?

[mickthinks]

... a specific property ... like consciousness.

But consciousness isn't a property. It's more a capacity, an activity, a behaviour.

This property should not be a function of properties of parts

Quite. Capacities, activities, behaviours, etc. aren't functions of properties at all.

There must however be a reason that the system has this specific [capacity/activity] rather than any other arbitrary [capacity/activity].

Why must there?

This means that there is a function that describes the property of the system.

I don't see why, nor do I see how.

[bahman]

... a specific property ... like consciousness.

But consciousness isn't a property.

It is within materialism.

It's more a capacity, an activity, a behaviour.

No. These are features of our experiences.

There must however be a reason that the system has this specific property rather than any other arbitrary property.

Why must there?

Please do not change my words. The question is why a system has a specific property rather than any other property.

This means that there is a function that describes the property of the system.

I don't see why, nor do I see how.

That follows from the definition of function. When a thing is a function of something else, let's call this a variable, then the change in the variable is the reason for the change in the thing.

[Age]

... a specific property ... like consciousness.

But consciousness isn't a property.

It is within materialism.

Who and/or what claims that 'materialism' is, literally, all there is?

Could there be other things, which 'consciousness', itself, is 'within'?

It's more a capacity, an activity, a behaviour.

No. These are features of our experiences.

So, 'now' 'we' have a;

System.
Parts.
Properties.
Functions (of properties). And now,
Features (of 'our' experiences).

There must however be a reason that the system has this specific property rather than any other arbitrary property.

Why must there?

Please do not change my words.

How, exactly, is "mickthinks", supposedly, changing your words here?

you, exact, words are; 'There must, however, be ...'.

The question is why a system has a specific property rather than any other property.

your, previous, question does not matter one iota here. you said, 'There must be a reason ...'. And, "mickthinks", and 'I', are curios as to 'why' there, supposedly, 'must be'?

And, if 'your question' is, and you are still wondering, 'Why a system has a specific property rather than any other property?' then this is, solely, because 'you' said to 'us', 'Now let 'us' assume that the system has a specific property that [the] parts [of the system] do not have'.

So, now do you know why a system has a specific property rather than any other property?

This means that there is a function that describes the property of the system.

I don't see why, nor do I see how.

That follows from the definition of function. When a thing is a function of something else, let's call this a variable, then the change in the variable is the reason for the change in the thing.

[Flannel Jesus]

This might be the first post by bahman I've ever agreed with. I'm not entirely on board with the exact phrasing of the reasoning ("function of the properties of the parts" for example), but I think the reasoning is at least close.

I personally don't think strong emergence is logically impossible (it seems op thinks it's impossible), but I don't think it's logically necessary either and I don't believe there's strong evidence we live in a world where it happens.

[mickthinks]

But consciousness isn't a property.

It is within materialism.

That’s argument from authority. Can materialism offer a better one?

It's more a capacity, an activity, a behaviour.

No. These are features of our experiences.

The capacity to have an experience isn’t a feature of the experience. The having of an experience isn’t a feature of the experience.

[Veritas Aequitas]

Therefore, there is no strong emergence.

Yeah, because there is a consciousness or mind [God] that exists absolutely independent of the human conditions, which sort of infuses itself in mind-independent matter to make it conscious.

The above is an impossibility because,
whatever is reality, fact, truth, knowledge and objectivity is contingent upon a human-based framework and system of emergence, realization of reality and its subsequent cognition and description. [FSERC]
Therefore, an absolutely mind-independent consciousness, mind or God is an impossibility to be real and objective.

Abiogenesis, morality, consciousness and others are clear evidence of strong emergences as conditioned upon the FSERC.

Relative to strong emergence, the weakness of your argument, i.e. an absolutely mind-independent conscious is as follows re AP [wR]:

there are several weaknesses to consider:

Interaction Problem:
The argument faces the classic interaction problem: How does an immaterial consciousness interact with the physical world?
If consciousness exists independently of the brain, how does it influence neural processes or vice versa? This challenge remains unresolved.

Epistemic Limits:
Our knowledge of consciousness is inherently limited by our subjective experiences and the tools we use (e.g., language, introspection).
Claiming an external, mind-independent consciousness exists requires evidence beyond our current epistemic reach.

Circular Reasoning:
The argument often relies on conceivability (the ability to imagine something) as evidence.
However, conceivability doesn’t necessarily imply metaphysical possibility. It can be circular: “I can conceive of X, so X must be possible.”

Physical Basis of Consciousness:
Neuroscientific evidence links consciousness to specific brain processes (e.g., neural firing patterns, synaptic connections).
If consciousness were entirely mind-independent, we’d need an alternative explanation for these correlations.

Occam’s Razor:
The principle of parsimony suggests that simpler explanations are preferable.
Mind-independent consciousness adds complexity—why not explain consciousness solely through physical processes?

Abiogenesis vs. Consciousness:
Comparing abiogenesis (life emerging from non-life) to consciousness isn’t a direct counter.
Abiogenesis involves complex chemical interactions, while consciousness relates to subjective experience

[Flannel Jesus]

Boooo

[bahman]

But consciousness isn't a property.

It is within materialism.

Who and/or what claims that 'materialism' is, literally, all there is?

I didn't say so. A big chunk of philosophers and scientists are materialist though.

Could there be other things, which 'consciousness', itself, is 'within'?

Consciousness is not a thing in itself, mind or self is.

There must however be a reason that the system has this specific property rather than any other arbitrary property.

Why must there?

Please do not change my words.

How, exactly, is "mickthinks", supposedly, changing your words here?

you, exact, words are; 'There must, however, be ...'.

Read more from his post to see...

[bahman]

But consciousness isn't a property.

It is within materialism.

That’s argument from authority. Can materialism offer a better one?

No, they cannot offer better and they are wrong.

[bahman]

This might be the first post by bahman I've ever agreed with. I'm not entirely on board with the exact phrasing of the reasoning ("function of the properties of the parts" for example), but I think the reasoning is at least close.

I personally don't think strong emergence is logically impossible (it seems op thinks it's impossible), but I don't think it's logically necessary either and I don't believe there's strong evidence we live in a world where it happens.

I am glad that you agree!

[bahman]

Therefore, there is no strong emergence.

Yeah, because there is a consciousness or mind [God] that exists absolutely independent of the human conditions, which sort of infuses itself in mind-independent matter to make it conscious.

The above is an impossibility because,
whatever is reality, fact, truth, knowledge and objectivity is contingent upon a human-based framework and system of emergence, realization of reality and its subsequent cognition and description. [FSERC]
Therefore, an absolutely mind-independent consciousness, mind or God is an impossibility to be real and objective.

Abiogenesis, morality, consciousness and others are clear evidence of strong emergences as conditioned upon the FSERC.

Relative to strong emergence, the weakness of your argument, i.e. an absolutely mind-independent conscious is as follows re AP [wR]:

there are several weaknesses to consider:

Interaction Problem:
The argument faces the classic interaction problem: How does an immaterial consciousness interact with the physical world?
If consciousness exists independently of the brain, how does it influence neural processes or vice versa? This challenge remains unresolved.

Epistemic Limits:
Our knowledge of consciousness is inherently limited by our subjective experiences and the tools we use (e.g., language, introspection).
Claiming an external, mind-independent consciousness exists requires evidence beyond our current epistemic reach.

Circular Reasoning:
The argument often relies on conceivability (the ability to imagine something) as evidence.
However, conceivability doesn’t necessarily imply metaphysical possibility. It can be circular: “I can conceive of X, so X must be possible.”

Physical Basis of Consciousness:
Neuroscientific evidence links consciousness to specific brain processes (e.g., neural firing patterns, synaptic connections).
If consciousness were entirely mind-independent, we’d need an alternative explanation for these correlations.

Occam’s Razor:
The principle of parsimony suggests that simpler explanations are preferable.
Mind-independent consciousness adds complexity—why not explain consciousness solely through physical processes?

Abiogenesis vs. Consciousness:
Comparing abiogenesis (life emerging from non-life) to consciousness isn’t a direct counter.
Abiogenesis involves complex chemical interactions, while consciousness relates to subjective experience

I cannot follow how what you said is related to the discussion.

[promethean75]

^^^ That is a bucket of six pieces of chicken that, considered together, compose a KFC FSK that pretty much defeats any immaterialism tryna find its way into neuroscience with all this Chalmersian cartesianism talk of panpsychic AI ghost zombies. Or maybe that's another guy. Searle's chicken is good too regarding this emergent property stuff.