10k Philosophy challenge

[Daniel McKay]

I for one have neve heard of 'freedom consequentialism' before, so I went to have a look for some.
Currently the only literature on the subject appears to be Daniel's PhD thesis, available here

For a bit of what it's about, here's a para from near the top of that...

My goal in constructing my normative theory is to determine how free, rational agents ought to be or act,
where “ought” is understood in an objective and universal sense, assuming that this question has an
answer. Because this is my goal, I put free, rational agency, or “personhood” at the heart of my theory.
The measure of value I use is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, as being
able to do these two things in conjunction is the defining characteristic of free, rational agency. In this
way, my theory shares the advantage deontology has of closely connecting moral value with moral agency.
Because my theory is also consequentialist, it shares the advantages utilitarianism has of not having to
draw a strong distinction between action and inaction, and of being able to make clear recommendations
in most circumstances by analysing the consequences of the various courses of action available. So, to the
extent that one thinks that morality should describe the way all persons ought to be or act, or that one
finds both consequentialism and a close connection between moral value and moral agency appealing,
one has a reason to be interested in my theory

Thanks for identifying this explanation, Flash. I haven't kept up with the whole discussion so far, so apologies if my response has been covered already.

The problem is: 'how to weigh freedom over different things within the normative theory of freedom consequentialism'.

1 Surely, any theory that asserts 'oughts' is normative: 'establishing, relating to, or deriving from a standard or norm, especially of behaviour'. So what work is 'normative' doing in 'the normative theory of freedom consequentialism'? Not sure about this - I just don't know.

2 If we begin with deontology and consequentialism - which is just the deontological can kicked down the road - then surely we're already committed to moral realism or objectivism. Whether the moral rightness or wrongness of either an action or its consequences is inherent or intrinsic is the issue. If it isn't, then that's the end of deontology and consequentialism. And good riddance, as far as I'm concerned.

3 Non-moral premises can't entail moral conclusions. And the falsifiability of the premise is irrelevant. ''The highest good is X (eg freedom or free rational agency)', or 'The purpose of life/human life/my life is Y' - and so on - can never entail an ought, such as: 'therefore, the highest good ought to be the free exercise of rational agency'.

And it's because morality can't be objective that normative ethical and moral theories fail. What constitutes 'the good life' and 'good behaviour' can only ever be a matter of opinion.

1: "Normative theory" is what theories of normative ethics are called. Normative ethics is the project of determining how we ought to live our lives, as opposed to meta ethics which considers what it means for something to be moral or applied ethics which looks at specific cases or disciplines and how ethical principles apply to them.
2: Yes, committed to both I'd say.
3: Weeeeeeell, not entirely true. They can't entail them by themselves. But, for example, if we assume that ought implies can, then we can determine some moral facts from non-moral facts. There's a normative premise there bridging the is-ought gap.
4: Nothing you have said suggests that morality can't be objective. I'd say rather than morality can only be objective. That our options are universal, objective morality, or moral error theory. If you don't think that is what is meant by the term "morality", then I disagree, but I'll accept the asterix next to the word and we can move on from linguistic concerns to ones of whether objective moral truths exist or not.

[Daniel McKay]

Immanuel - appreciate the attempted proofing against examiners, but I conquered them some years ago now.

So, I completely agree that determinism would render morality non-existent, I was simply pointing out that a) I'm in the minority with that view and b) physicalism doesn't imply determinism. I am a physicalist, but not a determinist. I think we live in a physical universe, just not a deterministic one. Those aren't the same thing.

I made the case by essentially arguing for the most fitting candidate using criteria based on assumptions such as morality being applicable to all moral agents. Inference to the best measure of value if you will.

[Daniel McKay]

Peter Holmes - To the point that seems addressed to me, a free rational agent doesn't necessarily know how to act with regard to abortion, but my theory helpfully answers that for them. Persons (free, rational agents) are the only things that are morally valuable, but we ought to use consciousness as the basis for quantitative personal identity and treat a conscious entity that will one day be a person as identical to the perosn it will be and grant them moral status on the basis of that. What that means is that you can abort feotuses to your heart's content until they become conscious, but not afterwards (except in cases such as the mother's life being directly threatened by the continuation of the pregnancy, but that's a case-by-case basis type of deal). Roughly speaking, abortions all you like before about 26 weeks (though in practice, it may be better to err on the side of caution and say 24 or 25 weeks, just to be safe), abortions only in very extreme circumstances (like, the mother will die) after that.

[Immanuel Can]

Immanuel - appreciate the attempted proofing against examiners, but I conquered them some years ago now.

Ah, very good. So you are officially "Dr. McKay"? Nice work.

I think we live in a physical universe, just not a deterministic one. Those aren't the same thing.

They would be, if it's strictly a physical universe. If physical laws, for example, were taking to be the comprehensive accounting for all possible real entities and phenomena, then determinism would surely be entailed.

But I don't think that belief would be easy to sustain, and you believe in things like "freedom" and "personhood," you say, so I assume you don't mean that. There probably has to be some place in your universe for non-physical realities, I would guess.

Am I right?

I made the case by essentially arguing for the most fitting candidate using criteria based on assumptions such as morality being applicable to all moral agents. Inference to the best measure of value if you will.

I don't question that a genuinely moral fundamental would have to govern all relevantly-similar agents and situations. That seems obvious. Murder of a particular kind couldn't be wrong one day, then, under exactly the same circumstances, be moral tomorrow. But what most people here seem to believe is that no such moral fundamentals exist or can exist. I wouldn't be one of them: but it's a cynical postulate one would have to defeat rationally, for a project such as yours, as it would surely appear.

[Daniel McKay]

One wouldn't necessarily need to defeat moral scepticism if you could show that it were all-things-considered a worse option than believing in moral realism. Certainly, there are potential moral benefits if I'm right, heh.

I mean, I would certainly say that there are things and facts that a non-physical (eg economic facts), but those things arise due to physical things, such that if you copied all physical facts about the universe, you would get all the non-physical facts with them. You seem to be asserting that physical things must follow a chain of cause and effect, but that just isn't so. Just because something is physical (or, in the case of a mind, perhaps something that a physical thing, the brain, does) doesn't mean it must be deterministic. It seems entirely plausible to me that we can have free will without any spooky non-physical entities. If we are willing to say that non-physical entities can be exempt from cause and effect, then why not just say that at least some physical entities can be? Is there a reason why it can be true for one and not the other?

[Age]

Sorry, I thought from your questions that perhaps you hadn't read it yet. Let me answer them one by one:

what you are asking them to find a solution 'to'? - I am asking for a solution to the problem of how to weigh freedom over different things that allows for freedom consequentialism to be action guiding, and is in line with all of the other restrictions detailed in the primer and the post.

I think if you just elaborated on and thus cleared up, exactly, what you are actually meaning, and thus are actually asking, then you will 'the answer, and solution', "yourself".

For example what do you mean by 'weigh freedom', and how does one, actually, 'weigh' 'freedom', itself,exactly?

What are the 'different things', exactly, which you are wondering how to 'weigh freedom' over?

What is 'freedom consequentialism', exactly? And, why do you even want, or why does, so-called 'freedom consequentilism' even have to be 'action guiding'. In fact, what even is 'action guiding' anyway?

Are all, or any, of the so-called 'other restrictions', detailed in the primer and/or the post, also as non specific as the things that you wrote about here?

If yes, then, again, once you "yourself" obtain an absolute clear and Accurate 'picture' of what it is that you are asking here, then you find and uncover the 'actual answer and solution', "yourself". Obviously, saving "yourself" $10,000 of some specific currency.

Is it a problem that is empirically provable? - No, almost certainly not.

If not, then how are you going to judge whether or not it is a 'solution'? - The same way we judge whether anything is a solution in philosophy, through reasoned analysis.

But, going by the last few thousand or so years, hitherto when this is being written, you adult human beings are not necessarily the best ones of 'reasoned analysis', nor of 'judging' neither.

What purpose does it serve? - The purpose of developing the correct normative theory and solving the project of ethics... or at least getting a step closer.

What is the development of a so-called 'the correct normative theory' based upon, exactly?

And, what so-called 'project of ethics' is there that, supposedly is in 'need' of a solution, anyway.

To me, the word 'ethics' is just in relation to what one does in regards to what is Right, or Wrong, in Life.

And, what to do in relation to what is Right, and Wrong, in Life, is, already, a very simple and easy thing to know, and do.

Is finding a 'solution' going to be useful to anyone? If so, then how? - It will be useful in that it would provide correct answers to moral questions (or at least, closer to correct answers than we have now).

But these answers have already been uncovered, and thus are already known.

Although this well may not be the case of any or all of you here, in this forum.

[Age]

Putting aside possible worlds, I'm not sure where this human-based framework and system of reality comes in. The aim of ethics should be to get at the truth of morality, and there are almost certainly other moral agents somewhere in the world (where "world" is understood as a complete spacio-temporal manifold, rather than a planet).

What has caused issues, or troubles, with 'morality', itself, is that you human beings think making up 'laws', and rules, which 'must be' followed and abide by is the 'right thing' to do, otherwise punishment, judgment, humiliation, and/or ridicule will ensure, which in and of itself is Wrong, and bad, anyway.

In regards to 'morality' there are no 'laws'. There is only one 'lore', which applies to absolutely every thing equally, throughout the whole Universe, Itself. And, when this 'lore' is learned, understood, and taught how to just do voluntary, and is being followed voluntary, then this is only when living in a Truly 'just world' is happening and occurring.

Human weakness, or any other weakness for that matter, might be a problem with getting from the world we live in to the world we ought to live in, but that is a seperate issue from trying to figure out what that world should look like. If we can't do the latter, then it will be very hard to get any real work done on the former, weakness or not.

How to get from 'this world', in the days when this being written, to 'the world' that some people in the days when this is being written call, ' the world' we ought to live ', is, and was, an extremely easy and simply process. And, considering what 'that world', (which by the way will be found out to be the 'Real world', or 'Reality', Itself, but which is another issue), happens and occurs within just a generation, or two.

Now, what 'that world' so-called 'should look like', can be very 'clearly seen' from 'within' as it is 'the world' that absolutely every one dreams of, or just wants and desires, once anyway.

So, so-called 'figuring out' what 'that world' 'should', and does, actually 'look like' can be done and reached through, again, Truly open and honest discussions. And then 'we' can proceed in making 'that world' a 'Reality', for every one.

By the way, absolutely all of this is far, far simpler, easier, and quicker than all of you posters here first imagine.

[Age]

I would say that I am trying to tackle the overall problem at its roots, but that humanity is far too small a lens. Morality must apply to all moral agents, actual and possible, in all possible worlds.

You've got a real problem, Daniel. I don't think it's solvable.

So, in "immanuel can's" very 'small and little world' if "'mmanuel can" thinks some thing is not solvable, then the other has a so-called 'real problem'. Which would be opposed to just 'a problem', exactly, "immanuel can"?

Consequentialisms (you will know there are various versions of it) are all dogged by several concerns. One is the ultimately-arbitrary nature of the implied ranking of values, as I'm sure you know.

So, it would obviously be better if you just stopped 'ranking values'. For example, if you stopped putting, or ranking, the values of 'yours or another' "immanuel can" before ours', then you would cease with the 'arbitration' that you have.

Another is the arbitrary nature of the choosing of any particular "consequence" as the priority: that move needs justification, of course; and you're asking that it be universal and applicable to all agents in all possible worlds.

So, if "daniel mckay" is asking that 'consequence' be 'universal', and thus obviously applicable to all agents, then why continue with your obviously 'arbitrary' here "immanuel can"?

That's no small thing.

But it is. That is; when you, also, learn and understand just how Truly simple and easy it was to find 'the lore' that is universal, and thus applicable to absolutely every one.

Another such problem is the difficulty of weighing in things like motives or intentions, or habits, character and virtues, for that matter: things by which all moral practice routinely operates assumptively, and which it seems most moral agents do seem to intuit as not irrelevant to any moral calculation, but which consequentialisms all tend to avoid or obscure on the way to...consequences.

Here is another prime example one absolutely over 'complicating' what is, essentially, one of the most basic and 'simple' things there is.

What is actually Right, and Wrong, in Life, is already known, deep down within, just not yet consciously, for most of you human beings, in the days when this is being written.

There are others, but you'll probably already know them.

These kinds of statements come across as so arrogant.

They've been abundantly rehearsed.

So, whatever 'it' is, which you have alluded to only, have, supposedly, been 'abundantly rehearsed'.

Which, really, is not saying absolutely any thing at all.

But I think your biggest problem is going to be this: that ontological beliefs are logically prior to moral ones, and either make moral judgments rationally possible or impossible to rationalize fully.

This one just keeps proving, absolutely, that it, still, is not even sure what an 'actual problem' even is, exactly, yet.

"Freedom" is indeed felt by many to be a value; but it's very hard to say why it ought to be, especially if some sort of Materialism, Physicalism, or some simliar kind of belief that logically inevitably implies something like Determinism, Subjectivism or Amoralism is weighed as the foundational ontological belief in play.

you have, although unconsciously to you, just explained, more or less and in one way, what 'freedom' actually is, exactly.

And, once again, for those who are curios, and interested, then let 'us' have a discussion.

"Freedom" then becomes an imaginary, emotive, solipsistic or entirely personal kind of preference, and is not assertable as an "ought" or a universal basis of anything, I think. We may all like it: but we can never say why we are owed it.

Here is another prime example of how the previous over complication of things has led to a complete loss and confusion of what is actually True and Right, in Life.

But if you can beat this problem, the problem of ontology inevitably already imposing limits on what is thinkable as a universal value, I'd be very interested in knowing how you would hope to pull that off.

It has already been done "immanuel can". But, because you an absolute closed being, it will take you far longer, if ever, to find out, and learn.

And I think you'll find that the person who can do it deserves more than 10K. They'd have solved what has been called "the major problem in modern moral philosophy." A Rosetta Stone for universal ethical legitimation is (to mix a metaphor) the Holy Grail of current moral theory...and really, that's what you'd need.

Sorry to sound like a "wet blanket," but I think that's where this goes.

And, obviously what 'this one' 'thinks' is not necessarily even being close to the actual Truth of things, let alone being the actual Truth of things.

Where this one 'thinks' where 'this' goes, could not be in any further of a Wrong direction.

In other words, what this one thinks cannot be done has, already, been done.

[Age]

Seems a bit like offering a 10K prize for the answer to 'what is the meaning of life?'

Which is just another question that has already been answered. And, irrefutably so as well.

And, how I know that I have the irrefutable answer is because 'that answer' fits in perfectly with all of the 'other answers, solutions, and definitions' for all of the other issues, or problems, which, in turn, 'paints' a crystal clear picture of all-there-is. Or, in other words, knowing what is in a GUTOE, which will be verified, means that the already known 'answer' to, 'What is the meaning of life?' is the True, Right, Accurate, and Correct, and thus irrefutable, answer.

[Age]

Prove it.

I mean, I cover the meaning of life in first and second year courses when my lectures run short. But, since I imagine you don't want to look at a powerpoint, I might quote from a book if you don't mind. It's written a little bit cheekily, but it saves me having to write out a whole explanation. Spoiler warning for anyone planning on reading The Black Swan Killer (though who am I kidding, nobody was planning on reading that). Also, be warned, I can give you the right answer to the question "What is the meaning of life", but that doesn't mean you'll find it satisfying.

"Before we go any further, I think we need to address the meaning of life. It’s come up a few times so far, and I just used it to save myself and Maria from a bunch of nihilists, so it’s possible that a few of you are wondering what exactly the meaning of life is. If you already know, feel free to skip ahead just this once and rejoin us when we get to the diner for pancakes.
Right, so, the meaning of life. The way I explained it to the nihilists might not be the most helpful to you because they were moronic nihilists and you, I assume, aren’t. So, for your benefit let’s imagine a little scenario.
Let’s imagine the great philosopher Plato is out for a stroll one day, and up comes another ancient Greek; let’s call him “Bob.” Bob, as well as having a rather strange name for an ancient Greek, has a problem. He doesn’t know the meaning of life. So, he asks Plato.
“Plato,” he says. “What is the meaning of life?”
Now, what’s wrong with Bob’s question here? Well, the first is the use of the word “meaning.” It’s ambiguous, and ambiguity is the enemy of good philosophy. Bob might be asking what the word “life” means. So first, let’s help Bob clarify his language here. It seems what he really means is this:
“Plato, what is the purpose of life?”[/quote]

But, and obviously, what 'seems', to you, is not necessarily what is True at all.

'What is the 'purpose' of some thing?' can be, and is, very different to, 'What is the 'meaning' of some thing?' And, if the actual Truth be known, so-called "bob" is the only one who 'knows' what was actually meant, in what was actually asked.

Also, even if you have found out, or learnt, and 'now' understand what the 'purpose' of life is, exactly, if you do not also express, and make clear, what even is the 'meaning' of life, then you are not actually helping anyone nor any thing here.

That’s better, though still not quite right. After all, it would be very strange were all life, from a sea anemone to an elephant to a kudzu to you and me, to be possessed of the same purpose.

But not necessarily so at all. And, this also goes somewhat against any idea of a 'universal morality'.

Plato’s pupil Aristotle would certainly have a lot to say about that. He thought that plants, other animals, and humans all had fundamentally different souls. In any event, Bob is likely not that concerned with the meaning of a sea anemone’s life. In fact, he’s probably not that concerned with the meaning of yours. What Bob really wants to ask, it seems, is this:
“Plato, what is the purpose of my life?”

But,

1. 'We' can only go on what "bob" actually asked.

2. "bob" did not actually ask about any 'one's' life.

3. "bob" asked in regards to 'life', itself.

Now we’re getting somewhere.

Only in regards to what 'it' is that 'you' want to 'get to'. Also, let 'us' not forget that 'this' is all of 'your own made up hypothetical' situation. Which obviously 'you' can take to absolutely anywhere that 'you want'.

When people talk about the “meaning of life,” this is what they’re really getting at.

Not from what I have observed, and clarified.

Are you here suggesting that when you say the words, 'What is the meaning of life?' then what you are, 'really getting at' is; 'What is the purpose of life?'

If yes, then why do you do this?

But, if no, then are you not a 'person' when 'you' talk about the 'meaning of life'?

However, there’s still something wrong with this question, and to get at what that is, we need to consider what we mean by “purpose.”

But, there is actually nothing 'wrong' with 'the question'. you appear to have not yet considered what is actually meant by the 'purpose' word, previously sometime.

So, let’s think about purpose.

Talk about going off on another tangent.

What is the purpose of a chair? Anyone? It’s not a trick question. The purpose of a chair is to be sat on. But, a more interesting question is why is that the purpose of a chair? The obvious answer is that is what they are made for, but that isn’t the whole truth of it. When a person buys a chair, they buy it so they have something to sit on, or for others to sit on. If a person were to buy a chair with some other purpose in mind, say they wanted to put their television on it, or they planned to turn it into a piece of modern art, or they wanted to use it to make part of a blanket fort, then is the chair’s purpose still to be sat on? It gets a bit murky. Who decides the purpose of a chair, the one who makes it or the one who puts it to use? Suffice to say, whoever is making the decision, it is someone with a mind.

Here is another one who states and claims that there are 'those' with "their" own 'mind/s'.

Not that this was unusual at all, back in the 'olden days', when this was being written.

The chair doesn’t have a purpose beyond that which people decide it has. Purpose is imbued into things by people. Or, more accurately, by persons, but that’s a distinction for another time.

Okay. So, the 'purpose' of life, to you, depends on 'the one' who answers, right?

So, purpose is imbued by people, and Bob is already a person. In the case of the chair, there is perhaps some disagreement to be had about who is most suited to decide what purpose a chair has. But Bob is in a unique position to both know himself and set himself toward goals. Unlike the chair, Bob is most definitely the person best suited to decide what purpose Bob has.

But, "bob" never ever talked about nor mentioned "bob's" life at all. "bob" spoke and asked about 'life', itself. Which, again, is a whole other thing.

All of which means, Bob is doing something wrong when he asks his question.
When Bob asks Plato what the purpose of his own life is, he is asking the wrong person.

But, "bob", in your own made up hypothetical situation, never asked "plato" about "bob's" 'own life'. As can be clearly seen and proved True by your very own words above here.

Hopefully that answers your questions regarding the meaning of life. If it doesn’t, go back and read it a couple more times."

I could read what you wrote here a thousand more times. you have 'certainly not' answered "accelafine's" question/s regarding the meaning of life, at all. In fact you never, really, answered any thing at all here.

[Age]

So he's here to promote his book. How tacky and disingenuous.

Exactly like "will bouwman".

[Age]

He's exceptionally arrogant and unlikeable anyway. IMO.

He answered your meaning of life question well enough didn't he? Why do you need to inflict your perpetual shadow of joylessness on him?

Are you saying he has discovered 'the meaning of life'?

"daniel mckay" has just 'not discovered' 'the meaning of life' but also actually believes that 'that' is the 'wrong question' to even ask.

And yes, I am very good at reading people.

This is 'so relative' that it is actually a redundant thing to say, and claim.

'you' are, supposedly, 'very good' at 'reading people' to 'who', exactly?

And, as some would note and say, is 'exceptionally arrogant' as well.

[Age]

So he's here to promote his book. How tacky and disingenuous.

I am here for answers to a specific question. You were the one who got us onto the meaning of life. I'm not above engaging in a bit of self-promotion if it comes up (great book everyone, available on Amazon). But if that was my goal, I would have brought it up earlier.

Why?

Obviously you could have been waiting for a better, or an opportune, moment.

I just have a few of these posts to reply to, and I didn't particularly feel like writing out a whole thing when I had a pre-written one to hand.

[Age]

He's exceptionally arrogant and unlikeable anyway. IMO.

I mean, even if that is at least half true, it's not really relevant, is it?

Absolutely not at all in a philosophy forum nor in philosophical discussions.

[Age]

You've got a real problem, Daniel. I don't think it's solvable.

Consequentialisms (you will know there are various versions of it) are all dogged by several concerns. One is the ultimately-arbitrary nature of the implied ranking of values, as I'm sure you know. Another is the arbitrary nature of the choosing of any particular "consequence" as the priority: that move needs justification, of course; and you're asking that it be universal and applicable to all agents in all possible worlds. That's no small thing. Another such problem is the difficulty of weighing in things like motives or intentions, or habits, character and virtues, for that matter: things by which all moral practice routinely operates assumptively, and which it seems most moral agents do seem to intuit as not irrelevant to any moral calculation, but which consequentialisms all tend to avoid or obscure on the way to...consequences. There are others, but you'll probably already know them. They've been abundantly rehearsed.

But I think your biggest problem is going to be this: that ontological beliefs are logically prior to moral ones, and either make moral judgments rationally possible or impossible to rationalize fully. "Freedom" is indeed felt by many to be a value; but it's very hard to say why it ought to be, especially if some sort of Materialism, Physicalism, or some simliar kind of belief that logically inevitably implies something like Determinism, Subjectivism or Amoralism is weighed as the foundational ontological belief in play. "Freedom" then becomes an imaginary, emotive, solipsistic or entirely personal kind of preference, and is not assertable as an "ought" or a universal basis of anything, I think. We may all like it: but we can never say why we are owed it.

But if you can beat this problem, the problem of ontology inevitably already imposing limits on what is thinkable as a universal value, I'd be very interested in knowing how you would hope to pull that off. And I think you'll find that the person who can do it deserves more than 10K. They'd have solved what has been called "the major problem in modern moral philosophy." A Rosetta Stone for universal ethical legitimation is (to mix a metaphor) the Holy Grail of current moral theory...and really, that's what you'd need.

Sorry to sound like a "wet blanket," but I think that's where this goes.

So, you've mentioned a lot, so I'll try to focus on what I think your core points are and you can tell me if I'm wrong.

I'm not trying to be difficult, of course; I'm trying to help you at least map the problem a bit, so you are aware of what your thesis examiners might raise against the project you've chosen. If that helps you prepare, I'm good with that.

LOL

The arrogance, self-importance, and superiority belief never ceases from this one.

First, physicalism doesn't imply determinism. Many people would also say that determinism doesn't conflict with moral realism, or indeed with freedom, though I think they're just wrong so you won't hear any such argument from me. Just because a minimal physical duplicate of our world would be a duplicate simpliciter of our world doesn't mean that world would be deterministic (depending on your definition of a world and whether that duplicate needs to be identical into the future). We can discuss that if you like, but it's rather a seperate issue.

But it's not really separate, if you think carefully about it, and if you realize that ontology determines the range of ethical possibilities that can be sustained. In any deterministic universe, we cannot think that moral concern is anything but an epiphenomenon of some kind, an odd kind of happening or "seeming" that people have, for no readily-explicable reason. Our supposition would have to be that it corresponds to a "freedom" that is never genuine, to a situation in which no genuine "choice" ever takes place, and thus no moral judgment can possibly be realisticallly applied. The buck seems to stop with, "Whatever is, just is."

So even though determination might look like a separate concern, it would render illusory any moral philosophy at all. And thus the answer to the problem of Freedom Consequentialism you pose would become moot: since no moral judgments have any referent within reality, other than the purely contingent fact that people just happen to hold such delusions, not only all Consequentialisms but every other moral framework has to go out the window in the service of a realistic and honest Determinism.

But I'm sure you can see the logic of that. No choice, no morality. It's that simple.

There's an additional problem you might wish to consider, as well. Is it not likely that "freedom" is a condition of an outcome, not in itself a targetable consequence or outcome? To put this another way, is not "freedom" always "the freedom TO...X or Y?" "Being free," it seems to me, begs the whole question of what one is supposed to be "free" to do. Freedom bears only an instrumental relationship to other potential 'goods,' does it not? So one man may be freed from jail to live a better life, and another be freed to kill again: but in such cases, the mere having of the "freedom" doesn't seem to tell us anything about the moral outcome, does it?

Second, on the scope of the project. I don't think the issue is determining a universal moral value. I think I've essentially done that (or at least found the best candidate for universal moral value).

I'd be really interested in how that case would be made.

That being said, yes, I agree that I am aiming very high here, that I essentially trying to solve ethics, and that what I am asking for is worth more than $10,000. But that's what I have to offer, so that's what's on the table.

I'm not accusing you of being penny-pinching, Dan. I was merely emphasizing the proper magnitude and scope of the required task. And I'd love as much as anybody else would any amount of free money. But I have to say that I think your money's safe: that is, unless something very revolutionary has suddenly been uncovered in your research or somebody else's. This has proved a very intractible problem for a lot of quite brilliant minds, so far.

That being said, let the inquiry continue.

There's no sense apologizing for sharing your views, especially when I asked for them.

Oh, yes...fair enough...and no point either in resenting the voices of any criticisms that might just fortify your project against future criticisms that might appear at your thesis examination. It all has to be taken as to-the-good, does it not?