Abortion is Not Permissible, Period!

[Immanuel Can]

I'm surprised that you include arithmetic among ontology.

I don't. Mathematics is only a conceptual description. But it does refer to objective realities, such as how many sheep you have in your pasture, or how many metres long a board is to fit your roof. And if you don't know how many sheep you have, or how big your roof is, it doesn't mean you have no number of sheep, nor that just any old board will fit your roof. There are ontological realities to which the calculations are relevant.

In which case we are definitely talking about different subjects, because in my book, ontology is the metaphysical study of being. So while one might ponder the true nature of sheep and boards, the calculations are completely irrelevant. What do you think ontology is about?

I suppose whether we're disagreeing would depend on what you think the scope of "being" is. When I say "ontology" here, I'm using the word very broadly, as in "the consideration of the grounds of all that does or can really exist." Mathematics is merely an abstract, or better, adjectival way of indicating the realities of how many things are present in a given situation. "Twoness" or "fourness" apply to an infinite number of particular objects, just as adjectives like "bigness" or "oldness" or "redness" do. So mathematical quantities do exist, but they exist in an adjectival rather than noun-al relation to reality.

And epistemology won't change the facts.

That goes without saying. You are still labouring under the mistaken belief that underdetermination implies that different hypotheses can be true.

That's actually the mistaken belief I'm critiquing.

All it means is that different hypotheses can account for the same data equally well,

That's an epistemological claim. I think it's also very rarely true. How would we determine what "accounts" for a given "datum" "equally well" to anything else? That would imply the utilization of a tacit and unrecognized criterion being applied in the background, would it not?

'There are phenomena' is ontology.

"Phenomenon" is a word that places the emphasis on epistemology, on how a thing is perceived rather than how it actually is. So even the word "phenomenon" assumes the truth of what I'm saying: that there are two seperate issues here -- what IS, and what is KNOWN about what is.

Well done for at least understanding that ontology and epistemology deal with different issues,...

It's been my claim from the start. Well done for finally realizing that.

but again, ontology deals with the nature of being, the possibility that phenomena are all that exist is an entirely coherent hypothesis.

"Phenomena exist," and "those phenomena refer to ontologically real things" are two very different claims. And the proving of the second is not achieved by appealing to the first.

Yes, "phenomena" in the mind "exist." People do have such things as "delusions" as well as "impressions of reality." But the issue is whether any of those mind-internal-phenomenal-impressions refer at all to things in reality. Once again, we find that appealing to an epistemological claim does nothing to define the ontology.

You say:

It does not follow that if I "interpret" a snake as a cookie that there is more than one right answer to what I'm about to eat.

The point is not that there is more than one right answer, it is that there are always different ways to interpret exactly the same phenomena.

That's just epistemology. It's not ontology.

Maybe we should simplify those terms, so we eliminate misunderstanding. "Epistemology" is only about what people happen to know. "Ontology" is about what's really there, whether anybody knows it or not. The two often are strongly related, inasmuch as some things people know are stimulated by genuine things-out-there: but they experience them only as "phenomena," a word that refers to impressions on the mind that may or may not come from genuine reality...or as Oxford puts it, "the object of a person's perception; what the senses or the mind notice." That's what a phenomenon is. It's never certain, when we use the word "phenomenon" whether it's only a sense-impression, or whether (and how well) it corresponds to reality. But reality is the thing out there that "pushes back" (so to speak) against our phenomenological impressions.

Our epistemology does not define the totality of ontology.

Idealism has many forms and in some cases is based on the meeting point of ontology and epistemology, where all we can know for certain is that 'ideas' (any thought, perception, sensation etc) exist.

That's purely presuppositional, of course, and not at all evidentiary.

Again, you don't understand. Idealism and materialism are both suppositions supported by exactly the same evidence.

They make reference to some of the same evidences. What justifies the claim that they are "equal"? And if they are not equal, then they are not "underdetermined." We can test them differently.

And nobody lives as if it's true.

Tell that to Berkeley.

He was the same. A person literally cannot live one day with a belief that everything is only a product of ideation. A man who gets out of bed in the morning puts his feet on the floor not because he thinks it's the "idea of a floor," but that there's a floor beneath his feet. And a man who fails to recognize the difference between his current sense impressions and reality is soon run over by a car.

Berkeley talked a good game; you can be quite certain he was never able to live it. Nobody can.

...idealism of this sort is irrefutable...

Maybe. But it's also "non-falsifiable," which, in many contexts, can be asynonym for "totally speculative and unfounded." So we need better reasons to take Idealism with any degree of seriousness.

Or "unfalsifiable" as it is usually drafted. Well, so is Christianity.

To say so is merely et tu quoque: even were it true, it would not save Idealism, so it's irrelevant to the present point, and off the topic.

[Will Bouwman]

...but again, ontology deals with the nature of being, the possibility that phenomena are all that exist is an entirely coherent hypothesis.

"Phenomena exist," and "those phenomena refer to ontologically real things" are two very different claims. And the proving of the second is not achieved by appealing to the first.

What you haven't quite grasped is that phenomena cannot prove that anything other than phenomena exist. That's why Descartes had to invoke a good God who would not deceive him about 'clear and distinct ideas'.

Yes, "phenomena" in the mind "exist." People do have such things as "delusions" as well as "impressions of reality." But the issue is whether any of those mind-internal-phenomenal-impressions refer at all to things in reality. Once again, we find that appealing to an epistemological claim does nothing to define the ontology.

Except at the point where epistemology and ontology meet - phenomena exist, we know they exist; it is both epistemologically and ontologically nailed on. It cannot be expressed without being true. But, as critics of Descartes pointed out, it doesn't follow from the experience of you that there is anything more than that experience, which might puff out of existence at any moment.

Idealism and materialism are both suppositions supported by exactly the same evidence.

They make reference to some of the same evidences.

What are the evidences that either makes reference to that the other does not?

[Immanuel Can]

...but again, ontology deals with the nature of being, the possibility that phenomena are all that exist is an entirely coherent hypothesis.

"Phenomena exist," and "those phenomena refer to ontologically real things" are two very different claims. And the proving of the second is not achieved by appealing to the first.

What you haven't quite grasped is that phenomena cannot prove that anything other than phenomena exist.

No, I grasp that. Have you grasped that phenomena could not exist without some real entity that produces the phenomenon, or is it your belief that all that exists are the phenomena (Idealism)? For if everything is only phenomena, then one should really be able to step off a high cliff and not die. One would simply have to adjust one's phenomenal impression or idea of the situation, and there could be no death.

That's why Descartes had to invoke a good God who would not deceive him about 'clear and distinct ideas'.

Descartes is again merely dealing with epistemology. He does no work at all with ontology, around the cogito. After all "cogito" means "I think." But all he could decide out of that was "I am," or better, "that I exist is all I can know."

And you're right: his next move to try to build up from that fails, I think. But what he's proved is that he can't KNOW much for sure, not that the entities outside of him definitively do not exist, far less that he can manipulate them if they exist, by using his ideation. He is not asserting that.

In fact, even to get his skeptical project off the ground, he has to imagine a variety of hypothetical scenarios, like "what if there is a demon who is deceiving me," or "what about my body," all of which presuppose the real existence of some external world, to which only his episteme is deceptive.

It's epistemology. Descartes cogito is not ontology.

Yes, "phenomena" in the mind "exist." People do have such things as "delusions" as well as "impressions of reality." But the issue is whether any of those mind-internal-phenomenal-impressions refer at all to things in reality. Once again, we find that appealing to an epistemological claim does nothing to define the ontology.

Except at the point where epistemology and ontology meet - phenomena exist, we know they exist;

Delusions (synonym for phenomena that do not correspond to any reality) exist, and we know they exist? Yes, they exist as delusions. But that is not to say we are unpacking ontology by saying "delusions about it exist." In fact, if it's a "delusion" it can only be said to be one if there is a real world outside of it that it is failing to correspond to.

So even the critical supposition of Idealism, that "all is phenomena" would have to assume the existence of an objective reality. If there were none, then what information could possibly be supplied by the word "phenomenon"? In such a case, what would "phenomenon" refer, except to the only thing we would also have to call "reality": and then there's no distinction between the two that merits the concept "phenomenon," and it becomes a useless word with no referent. The word "reality" would do very well.

Idealism and materialism are both suppositions supported by exactly the same evidence.

They make reference to some of the same evidences.

What are the evidences that either makes reference to that the other does not?

Well, obviously Materialism is going to have to refuse to take as data anything that is not material. So things like "mind," "identity," "values," "personhood," "the spiritual," "freedom," "choice," and even "logic" and "reason" are going to have to be explained-away in terms of material entities. If you think you have a "mind" or are a "person," the Materialist is going to have to insist that it's only because the molecules in your brain lined up in that particular formation that generates that (false) impression. But he's going to have to say that the real cause of it is not that you DO have a "mind," but that materials cause the impression of a mind. No more can he concede without imperiling his commitment to Materialism.

"Science," yet another thing Materialism is actually going to have to reject ultimately, is going to turn out not to be the disciplined deliverances of any rational mind, but rather merely the coming together of amino acids and electric impulses inside a cranial cavity. But if science is just the coming together of amino acids etc., then why should we trust it? There is no promise our guarantee in the particular moving-about of material particles that only truths will be generated thereby; so how can we say that science's deliverances are any better than those of pure imagination, which also relies on nothing but chemical and electrical processes and has no deeper cause than the material?

[Will Bouwman]

What you haven't quite grasped is that phenomena cannot prove that anything other than phenomena exist.

No, I grasp that.

Not if you ask the following:

Have you grasped that phenomena could not exist without some real entity that produces the phenomenon, or is it your belief that all that exists are the phenomena (Idealism)?

It's not either/or. I don't happen to believe that only phenomena exist; I can entertain the possibility without committing to idealism.
For anyone who hasn't done a degree in philosophy, which I'm fairly certain includes Immanuel Can, this is basic first year stuff. It's the equivalent of art students spending hour upon hour life drawing or a musician doing their scales - stripping arguments to their logical bones is just practise.

For if everything is only phenomena, then one should really be able to step off a high cliff and not die. One would simply have to adjust one's phenomenal impression or idea of the situation, and there could be no death.

It does not follow from everything being phenomena that you would have total control over your impressions.

That's why Descartes had to invoke a good God who would not deceive him about 'clear and distinct ideas'.

Descartes is again merely dealing with epistemology. He does no work at all with ontology, around the cogito. After all "cogito" means "I think." But all he could decide out of that was "I am," or better, "that I exist is all I can know."

No. The criticism of Descartes is that his radical scepticism isn't radical enough. "I am" is his ontological conclusion from "I think" which, as any philosophy student will tell you, follows from "I anything". When you really squeeze it, the fact that there are thoughts/phenomena doesn't logically necessitate a thinker. If you can't get your head around that, you either haven't formally studied philosophy, or you should get your money back from whatever Mickey Mouse institute failed to teach you.

And you're right: his next move to try to build up from that fails, I think. But what he's proved is that he can't KNOW much for sure, not that the entities outside of him definitively do not exist, far less that he can manipulate them if they exist, by using his ideation. He is not asserting that.

You don't have to tell me what Descartes did or didn't assert; I had people who knew what they were talking about do that.

[FlashDangerpants]

For anyone who hasn't done a degree in philosophy, which I'm fairly certain includes Immanuel Can, this is basic first year stuff.

What have you done? Now he has to do the whole "if only you knew" routine AND he's have to put the Descartes book back on that legendary desk.

[Will Bouwman]

Sorry.

[Immanuel Can]

What you haven't quite grasped is that phenomena cannot prove that anything other than phenomena exist.

No, I grasp that.

Not if you ask the following:

Have you grasped that phenomena could not exist without some real entity that produces the phenomenon, or is it your belief that all that exists are the phenomena (Idealism)?

It's not either/or. I don't happen to believe that only phenomena exist; I can entertain the possibility without committing to idealism.

Well, I would say that we have good reasons to reject Idealism. It's both counterintuitive and self-defeating. As I was saying, it assumes the existence of some external "stimulation" of an undefined nature, but which we can call "reality," that is objective, and of which the phenomena, the "ideas," are merely attempts-to-respond-to and attempts-to-reflect. Maybe you've never thought about that, but it's the case. For an Idealism that is entirely unanchored to the suppostion of an external, real world, has decayed into pure Mysticism, and can no longer even summon arguments there.

For if everything is only phenomena, then one should really be able to step off a high cliff and not die. One would simply have to adjust one's phenomenal impression or idea of the situation, and there could be no death.

It does not follow from everything being phenomena that you would have total control over your impressions.

That is precisely why Descartes, in his thought-experiment, had to adopt the "demon" hypothesis. He needed some way to explain how the impressions could even be provoked, if there was nothing "out there" to provoke them.

The criticism of Descartes is that his radical scepticism isn't radical enough.

That's neither my critique, nor the serious critique. The problem really is that he deprives us of all knowledge except (controversially, still) the awareness of oneself as a "thinking thing," as he puts it. And as it turns out, that leaves us with no epistemology at all.

When you really squeeze it, the fact that there are thoughts/phenomena doesn't logically necessitate a thinker.

Well, that's still debated. But even if we grant it, the problem only gets worse for Descartes. It doesn't make Idealism true, or even render it plausible. For we still have the problem of the sense-impressions existing at all...for absent any external reality, and absent even a thinker to think them, there's no reason they should exist. And we're to utter Nihilism...which, ironically, there's no "thinker" even left to believe.

By the way, Will...you don't need the hostile asides. I'm not angry with you, and am attempting to treat your ideas with seriousness. Please try to read in that tone, and I think this will be a more charitable and useful conversation. You're smart enough to deserve my attention and respect; I would appreciate the return, if possible.

[Dubious]

You're smart enough to deserve my attention and respect;

Sorry, I don't mean to interfere in a meaningless conversation but I can't get over the quoted statement!

I expect Mr. Bouwman to feel thoroughly gratified that he's smart enough to deserve your attention; in that alone, he far exceeds the dubious intelligence and influence of Nietzsche the weasel!

[Immanuel Can]

...he far exceeds the dubious intelligence and influence of Nietzsche the weasel!

I've read quite a bit of Nietzsche, actually...have you?

[Dubious]

...he far exceeds the dubious intelligence and influence of Nietzsche the weasel!

I've read quite a bit of Nietzsche, actually...have you?

Can't say I've read everything, but I read a lot. Also, I can't say I agree with everything he wrote - in not a few instances, I vehemently disagree - but then he wouldn't have wanted his readers to submit to him unconditionally in any event. He made that very clear.

Was it necessary to read him quite a bit, to conclude that he's a weasel and anti-Semitic to boot, even when the more intelligent Jews who have read him conclude the opposite...Hitler himself having said to Leni Riefenstahl he couldn't get anything out of him?

This phrase of yours is somewhat unforgettable in its pure, unrefined, undiluted, unconditional, unhinged prejudice - which happens to be a hallmark of yours whenever one's philosophy or views are at opposite poles to yours; it reminds me of one obnoxious idiot who used to be on this site calling Mozart a chintzy composer! In that respect, you remind me of Trump skyrocketing into ad homs whenever anything crosses him, even though, it goes without saying, your means of expression is vastly superior to his.

There are some things one reads on a philosophy site impossible to forget! In that regard, you've definitely made an impression!

[Immanuel Can]

...he far exceeds the dubious intelligence and influence of Nietzsche the weasel!

I've read quite a bit of Nietzsche, actually...have you?

I can't say I agree with everything he wrote...

Right. I don't either. But I do find him interesting as a demonstration of where his kinds of Atheistic thinking go. And he's good for that. If you like him, have him. He knows he was wrong now.

[Dubious]

I've read quite a bit of Nietzsche, actually...have you?

I can't say I agree with everything he wrote...

Right. I don't either. But I do find him interesting as a demonstration of where his kinds of Atheistic thinking go. And he's good for that. If you like him, have him. He knows he was wrong now.

He does, does he? You're absolutely certain of that!

For N to know that, as you insist, he would have to be in hell since he couldn't possibly be where you hope to end up! But, one can only hope for as long as hope is still possible. After that, it's the perennial silence of the lambs, whether you were Jesus or Attila the Hun makes no difference. The cosmic landfill called death never discriminates. Even the gods are known to croak and eventually disappear in an inevitable Götterdämmerung...which usually means a reset of some kind cycling through human history for as long as it persists.

[Immanuel Can]

He does, does he? You're absolutely certain of that!

We'll see.

[Harbal]

We'll see.

No, we won't.

[Will Bouwman]

...I would say that we have good reasons to reject Idealism. It's both counterintuitive and self-defeating.

You can call it good, but counterintuitive is not a sound reason for rejecting anything. What is counter to your intuition was not counter to that of Leibniz, Berkeley or Hegel, for example, nor that of contemporary thinkers like Bernardo Kastrup and Donald Hoffman.

As I was saying, it assumes the existence of some external "stimulation" of an undefined nature...

What makes you think so?

When you really squeeze it, the fact that there are thoughts/phenomena doesn't logically necessitate a thinker.

Well, that's still debated. But even if we grant it, the problem only gets worse for Descartes.

Well, Descartes famously was a dualist, so I don't see how it makes things any worse for his view.

It doesn't make Idealism true, or even render it plausible. For we still have the problem of the sense-impressions existing at all...for absent any external reality, and absent even a thinker to think them, there's no reason they should exist. And we're to utter Nihilism...which, ironically, there's no "thinker" even left to believe.

Again, I am not arguing that idealism is true, but if you can't accept it as a logical possibility, you wouldn't make it past the first term of a philosophy degree.

By the way, Will...you don't need the hostile asides. I'm not angry with you, and am attempting to treat your ideas with seriousness. Please try to read in that tone, and I think this will be a more charitable and useful conversation. You're smart enough to deserve my attention and respect; I would appreciate the return, if possible.

You have my attention. If this is what you call respect:

Maybe you've never thought about that...

rest assured you already have mine.