SEP: Supervenience in Ethics

[Veritas Aequitas]

Supervenience in this case justify the existence of moral facts i.e. moral facts supervene on natural facts.

Again and again, not in the way you mean.
There are facts about morals. Morality exists. People have ideas about morals. These are connected to their physical make-up and states.

Contradictory moral attitudes are facts.
Antiabortionist ideas and beliefs supervene on their physical bodies.
Abortionist ideas and beliefs supervene on those people physical bodies.

We don't get objective moral facts (relative or absolute) with the aid of supervenience.

Every single moral position out there supervenes on physical entities (for those who are monist physicalists and perhaps some dualists and for some physicalists who accept emergence in different ways).

It does not in any way justify any particular moral position, whether deonotological, attitudinal, consequentialist.

It does not support your moraI position based on empathy because aggression supervenes on bodies aIso.

One clue given the the emergence of moral facts [properties] from biological facts [properties], i.e. in the case of certain aspects of mirror neurons [physical biological properties] supervened by moral properties of 'oughtnotness to kill of humans' from within the brain

You just continue to repeat this. This numinous oughtness, and a cherry-chosen, cherry-focused on, cherry-made up one, which is not in the scientific Iiterature, where we find neurons and neurotransmitters and brain regions.

The changes in the state of the related mirror neurons will effect changes in the moral properties [inhibiting degrees of competencies] of the 'oughtnotness to kill of humans'.

And every human behavior and attitude.

This argument means that today's behavior by humans is moraI. Period. The current situations, since aII actions supervene on physicaI matter and brain states. War, rape, abortion, niceness, compassion, greed, aII these supervene on brain states and neurotransmitters and are thus objective moraI facts.

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAH.

Here is the general principles of supervenience.

In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts. X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supervenience#:

In this case X and Y can be any sets of properties.

There are facts about morals. Morality exists. People have ideas about morals. These are connected to their physical make-up and states.

Not everyone agree to the above.
Moral antirealists [who are epistemological realists] like PH refute there are moral facts, i.e. facts that are absolutely independent of the human conditions.
Because there can NEVER be moral facts, morality cannot be objective.

I am using the principle of supervenience from the moral perspective, i.e. there are moral facts that supervene on natural fact, therefore there are moral facts.
Because there are moral facts [moral FSERC], moral is objective.

Note my principle:
Whatever is fact is conditioned upon a human based FSERC.
Therefore a moral fact must be conditioned upon a human-based FSERC.

Empathy [specific] is a element within the moral FSERC, so it qualify to be a moral fact as argued using supervenience.

Aggression can be justified with supervenience principles but it is not an element within the moral FSERC, so it cannot be a moral fact per se.
Anything else that is justified with supervenience principles cannot be a moral fact unless it is accepted within the moral FSERC.

[Veritas Aequitas]

The changes in the state of the related mirror neurons will effect changes in the moral properties [inhibiting degrees of competencies] of the 'oughtnotness to kill of humans'.

Your writing style kind of hid your answer to my question - you wrote a whole bunch of irrelevant stuff that didn't answer the question, and then ended on one sentence that kind of got close to answering the question.

So when you talk about supervenience in morality and ethics, you're just saying "each persons sense of morality is defined by their brain state". Some people have mirror neurons that make murder feel bad, so for them murder is bad. Some people don't have those, and instead maybe they have a brain state that makes murder feel good, and for those people murder is good.

This is what you mean by supervenience here? That different peoples physical brains give them different senses of morality or ethics?

If this one sentence is finally you spelling out what you think supervenience if ethics means, then OF COURSE it's not controversial you silly goof. "People's sense of mortality changes based on their brain state" ... almost everyone can agree with that, except maybe some subset of religious people. You don't have to be a moral realist to agree with that. Agreeing with that type of "supervenience" doesn't seem to do any work towards supporting your argument for moral realism at all - unless your moral realism just means "it's really true that most people really do have a personal sense of mortality".

There are a lot of nuances to the above.

In philosophy, supervenience refers to a relation between sets of properties or sets of facts.
X is said to supervene on Y if and only if some difference in Y is necessary for any difference in X to be possible.

In line with the above.
moral facts supervene on natural facts.

There are natural facts.
Based on the principles of supervene we can infer there are moral facts.
Of course this need to be justified.
Therefore there are moral facts from the perspective of supervenience.

Moral antirealists, moral relativists, moral skeptic and moral nihilist insist there are no such thing as moral facts. To them the idea of moral facts are nonsense, queer or false.
The thesis of the principles of supervenience of moral facts on natural facts provide the possibility of moral facts are tenable.

Thus the ball on now on the court of Moral antirealists, moral relativists, moral skeptic and moral nihilist to show why my thesis is not tenable.

From the perspective of the moral FSERC, the "oughtnotness to kill humans" is a moral fact and empathy is part of the set of this moral properties or fact.
This set of moral properties [X] supervened on the mirror neurons which are natural biological facts [Y].covary
As such changes in X with changes in Y.

My significant point is moral facts are tenable from the perspective of supervenience.
I am relying on supervenience as one of the method within a coherent set of beliefs and justifying the existence of moral facts.

You may be familiar with the principles of supervenience in general but you are all over the place with reference to superveniences from the moral perspective.
Suggest you read the SEP article thoroughly.

[Flannel Jesus]

If moral supervenience means what you said it means, then none of what you just said above follows. You are still flailing your slippery hands about, searching for purchase. Looking for it in "supervenience" looks like it has been a failed project. Maybe you can find it somewhere else.

[Flannel Jesus]

Suggest you read the SEP article thoroughly.

The SEP article supports my "situational" interpretation, btw - that's where I got it from.

[Veritas Aequitas]

If moral supervenience means what you said it means, then none of what you just said above follows. You are still flailing your slippery hands about, searching for purchase. Looking for it in "supervenience" looks like it has been a failed project. Maybe you can find it somewhere else.

To me that is just noise.
You have demonstrated how I had failed.
It is likely you have failed.

[Flannel Jesus]

You have demonstrated how I had failed.

Well we can agree on that at least.

[FlashDangerpants]

Watch him silently glide between properties and facts. If you take him at his jumbled up meaningless word, he's a constructivist about facts and a realist about morality, which makes him a realist about moral properties. So which model applies when he's supervening? He's switching between concrete properties and imagineered little factoids with no effort at self control.

VA is a shoplifter, he always wants to get everything without paying the toll.

[Flannel Jesus]

Watch him silently glide between properties and facts.

Well yes, when I asked him to define what he means, he meandered around a bit but settled on a definition of moral supervenience that is entirely about people's subjective ideas of mortality, subjective sense of mortality.

And then when he made the next post saying all sorts of silly shit about how that means moral non realism can't be the case, I pointed out how his definition doesn't support that at all.

It's not that I'm letting him, it's that he just doesn't get it haha. Words mean whatever the wants them to mean whenever he wants - there's no consistency. I can say "your definition doesn't support that", but it's not like I can stop him from being a moron.

[Flannel Jesus]

The word supervenience isn't doing a good job at communicating what you want it to. Even linking to SEP isn't doing a good job, VA, since SEP describes a different meaning of moral supervenience than you're trying to use.

Once again you're having a communication failure in this thread. And quite frankly, you're going to keep on having that failure as long as your idea of philosophical communication revolves around finding fancy words to communicate simple concepts. You can just speak plainly. If you think people's personal sense of mortality changes based on their brains, I'm sure most people agree. And if you think that somehow proves mortality is objective, I'm sure you've misunderstood something.

That's like saying people's brain states decide if they like vanilla or chocolate, and therefore there's an objectively true fact about if vanilla or chocolate tastes better. Do you think that about vanilla and chocolate too?

[Veritas Aequitas]

The word supervenience isn't doing a good job at communicating what you want it to. Even linking to SEP isn't doing a good job, VA, since SEP describes a different meaning of moral supervenience than you're trying to use.

Once again you're having a communication failure in this thread. And quite frankly, you're going to keep on having that failure as long as your idea of philosophical communication revolves around finding fancy words to communicate simple concepts. You can just speak plainly. If you think people's personal sense of mortality changes based on their brains, I'm sure most people agree. And if you think that somehow proves mortality is objective, I'm sure you've misunderstood something.

That's like saying people's brain states decide if they like vanilla or chocolate, and therefore there's an objectively true fact about if vanilla or chocolate tastes better. Do you think that about vanilla and chocolate too?

You are still making noises.

I am very interested.
Demonstrate to me with reference from that article specifically where I have failed?

[Iwannaplato]

That's like saying people's brain states decide if they like vanilla or chocolate, and therefore there's an objectively true fact about if vanilla or chocolate tastes better. Do you think that about vanilla and chocolate too?

ExactIy. So, Iet's extend this.

There is an oughtness to eat chocoIate ice cream because the act of eating ice cream, that preference supervenes on brain states and neurons. It is a moraI fact that we shouId desire chocoIate ice cream.
Those peopIe who nevertheIess order vaniIIa ice cream have inhibited the oughtness to eat chocoIate ice creams.
This oughtness to eat chocoIate ice cream is conditioned on both the neuroscience and neurochemical FSERCs.
It is an objective moraI fact to eat chocoIate ice cream.
And this demonstrates that moraIity is objective, not in the sense that moraIity exists, but that specific gustatory tendencies are objectiveIy moraI because they supervene on actuaI MRI observabIe brain states.

[Flannel Jesus]

I am very interested.
Demonstrate to me with reference from that article specifically where I have failed?

You haven't failed because of anything in the article. You've failed because of what YOU'VE written, not because of what's written in the article.

You've decided moral supervenience means "the fact that people with different brains can have different senses of morality", and you've decided that somehow supports objective moral facts.

That's like saying "people with different brains can have different preferences in ice cream flavour" and then saying that supports the idea that there's one true objectively best flavour.

It's not a sensible argument to anybody who takes the time to think about it (and that's only 3 people in this thread who disagree with you)

[Veritas Aequitas]

Suggest you read the SEP article thoroughly.

The SEP article supports my "situational" interpretation, btw - that's where I got it from.

Here is AI-wR commenting on your "situational" interpretation:

The comment partially captures an aspect of moral supervenience, but it's not entirely accurate. Here's why:

Moral Supervenience vs. Situational Ethics:

Moral Supervenience: This theory suggests that moral properties (like "good" or "bad") depend on natural properties (like biological or social facts). It's a broader concept about the foundation of morality.
Situational Ethics: This is a specific ethical theory that emphasizes considering the context of a situation when making moral judgments. It falls under the umbrella of moral supervenience.

The Analogy:
Think of moral supervenience as the cake and situational ethics as the frosting on specific slices of cake. The cake (natural properties) provides the foundation, and the frosting (considering the situation) adds nuance to how we judge the morality of an action in a specific context.

Why the Comment Isn't Entirely Accurate:

Supervenience Doesn't Deny Moral Facts: It suggests moral facts exist, but they are grounded in natural properties. Even in a self-defense situation, the moral fact that killing another person is generally wrong still exists. However, the specific context (natural property – threat to your life) allows for a different moral judgment (self-defense being considered morally permissible).
Supervenience Goes Beyond Situations: It's not just about specific situations. It's a broader theory about the underlying basis of all moral judgments.
Here's a breakdown of the self-defense example:

Natural Property: Someone is trying to kill you (threat to your life).
Moral Fact: Killing another person is generally wrong.
Situational Ethics: In self-defense, the threat to your life outweighs the moral fact of not killing, making self-defense a morally permissible action in that specific context.

Moral supervenience acknowledges both the general moral fact and the influence of the specific situation.

[FlashDangerpants]

That cake is a very shit metaphor

[Veritas Aequitas]

I am very interested.
Demonstrate to me with reference from that article specifically where I have failed?

You haven't failed because of anything in the article. You've failed because of what YOU'VE written, not because of what's written in the article.

You've decided moral supervenience means "the fact that people with different brains can have different senses of morality", and you've decided that somehow supports objective moral facts.

That's like saying "people with different brains can have different preferences in ice cream flavour" and then saying that supports the idea that there's one true objectively best flavour.

It's not a sensible argument to anybody who takes the time to think about it (and that's only 3 people in this thread who disagree with you)

Your above ""the fact that people with different brains can have different senses of morality" is a strawman.
That is not my intention.

I have read the article and interpreted based on the theme of the article.
My inference of moral properties [facts] from that article are based on that theme.

Can I state the article is about Ethical Supervenience and present arguments for and against Ethical Supervenience.
Ethical Supervenience in the article refer moral properties [facts] upon natural properties [facts].
Is this a reasonable view of the theme of the SEP article.
If not, what is the most effective way to present the theme of that article.

Here's AI-wR:
Your interpretation the article is merely about situational ethics is a sham and display your shallow knowledge of supervenience in Ethics.

Yes, you can definitely state that the article is about Ethical Supervenience and present arguments for and against it. You've also grasped the core idea of moral properties (facts) supervening on natural properties (facts). This is a reasonable view of the article's theme.

Here's how you can effectively present the theme of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) article on "Supervenience Ethics":

Theme: The article explores the concept of ethical supervenience. This theory suggests that moral properties (like good, bad, right, wrong) depend on or are grounded in underlying natural properties (like biological facts, social structures, or physical laws).

Key Points:
The article discusses various arguments for ethical supervenience.
These arguments try to show why moral properties wouldn't exist without natural properties and how understanding natural properties can help explain moral judgments. (You can mention some arguments like the Argument from Explanation or the Argument from Metaphysical Dependence, as discussed previously).

The article also explores arguments against ethical supervenience. Some philosophers argue that moral facts are independent of the natural world or that the relationship between them is more complex than simply one supervening on the other.
Additional Considerations:

The article goes beyond just arguments. It delves into different types of supervenience (strong, global, weak) and how they might apply to morality.
It also explores various explanations of the relationship between moral and natural properties (reductive, functionalist, grounding, analytic/conceptual, and ethical).
By mentioning these key points, you can effectively capture the main theme of the SEP article while acknowledging the complexity of the debate around ethical supervenience.